

DENOMINATIONAL SPACE – NATION-STATE SPACE*
THE GREEK CATHOLICS IN EUROPE-BETWEEN

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Samuel P. Huntington's impressive essay and later his book, that aroused a wide-ranging debate, turned the readers' attention to the great fraction-lines of civilizations of the world that are arranged along the different religions.¹ According to Huntington, "the end of history"² is far from being here and the bipolar division has been replaced by a multi-polar world full of conflicts of civilizations. And these fractions are threatening with regional clashes (fraction-line wars), even with a world war. Two of the nine great civilizations of Huntington covers Europe: the "West" and the "Orthodox" civilizations.³

But where is that borderline? Do the Eastern, orthodox regions belong to Europe's cultural image or the natural, geographical border (the Ural) coincides with the boundary of the European cultural and religious traditions? Can the orthodox world be left out of Europe? Is the cultural fraction-line so sharp between Western and Eastern Christianity that a threat of war can be imminent? After the downfall of the Soviet Union, these questions have been inspiring several essays.

There is a wide-ranging geographical bibliography that aims to determine the geographical content of Europe. Two trends can be identified. An Anglo-Saxon one, that, during the long decades following WWII, sharply divided Europe into a western and an Eastern part according to the political systems (the notion of Central Europe did not exist, for example). On the other hand, the German geographical thinking had a more elaborated image of Europe since the first decades and, considering the cultural and historical characteristics, divided it into smaller regions (eg. Southeastern, Southwestern, Central Europe).

Since the German division, mostly in the countries of the former Habsburg Empire (the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), the most debated issue has been and still is the exact definition of Central Europe. The main question is not the western division line⁴, but rather the borderline of Eastern Europe. The most varied conceptions, of natural geography, history, economy, art history, ideology and those considering the spreading of cultural traits⁵, made their way in the attempt to divide Eastern and Central Europe. Pál Beluszky, however, calls the attention to the real question, the *content* of Central Europe and not the exact location of the borderline. "So, what is the basis of this division?"⁶

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It can be stated that there is not any uniform system of consideration. We have to investigate, Beluszky writes, the reasons why the language is the boundary in one place, the plants in the other and the river in the third, whereas the whole area can more or less be interpreted as Central Europe. The *substantive* traits of this part of Europe should be defined. He believes that the different definitions of Central Europe are close-knit, not flexible enough, although rather multi-faceted⁷.


They are talking about concretely defined (by sharp dividing lines) spaces. However, if historical criteria are kept in view, then the changes of historical structures have to be accepted, in other words, we have to face with the *moving* and not with the sharp line-like nature of the borders of Central Europe, we have to face with its *zonality*. Central Europe has not been present since the beginning. It has had different historical characteristics in time and space. So, Central Europe cannot be defined with one straight line as a great region (or as an Euro-region⁸ according to the present usage), only *between*-regions, border-regions should be mentioned.

In the first half of the century, the attribute *between* appeared in geo-political thinking as the middle term in the trichotomous European spatial model and it replaced the first part of the notion Central Europe⁹ to create *Europe-Between*, the political region ensuring the maintenance of the balance between the territories of the Eastern and Western great powers. Arising from that, *buffer-zones*¹⁰ consisting of little states, serving primarily French interests, were consciously created by the peace-treaty of World War I. After World War II, in the bipolar Europe divided by rigid borders, the attribute *between* was replaced by attributes referring to the region's political *affiliations*, such as East-Central or West-Central¹¹ (East-Central-Europe, Central Eastern Europe: the socialist countries; West-Central Europe: West Germany and Switzerland). From the second half of the 80s and the years of the political change, the geo-political term *Europe-Between* (Europe-Between, Zwischen-Europa¹²) has returned again. It was partly triggered by the recurring geo-political uncertainty that the region disrupted into small nation-states would become a *crisis-centre* of opposing territorial (separatist) national endeavours of small states on the one hand, and, by its insecure, "boundary" position, it would become a *crisis-centre* as a transitional conflict-zone between the collapsing Soviet Union and the united West, on the other hand. The volume "Europe-Between" with hundreds of maps was edited by Lajos Pándi. Here, we can see the classic three-fold spatial model of Europe (east, centre, and west). The maps, among other things, contain the spatial projection of the 200 years history of Europe-Between. According to

Pándi's phrasing, historiography treats the area he believes Europe-Between (which is different from the traditional notion, Central Europe) as a heterogeneous region between Western Europe and Russia, moreover, as a *natural* buffer zone.¹³ So, this puffer element and aspect as a possible conflict-solving medium has endured in our political thinking up until today.¹⁴ The "puffer medium" can be rather diversified. Between the two World Wars and even today, the ethnic and small state *split up* means that puffer nature in case of Europe-Between. In the buffer-zone, the Székelys and the Saxons settled in the Carpathian Basin with privileges and primarily with defensive function have such a puffer role, as well as the interposed smaller ethnic groups living also in the Carpathian Basin (eg.: as a regional example: the Ruthenians, the Jews and the Swabians).¹⁵ More generally, the types of puffer inside the border-zone can be very diversified, and can fulfil the role of a *cultural* dividing-medium besides the purely defensive and geo-political meanings: for example the *Greek Catholics* living in a, geographically also, in-between position between the western and eastern Christians. After the bipolar world, the fall of the Soviet Union, the revaluation, moreover the *renaissance*, of the European Greek Catholic space can be witnessed in the Huntington-model. According to the moving belt later conceived by Beluszky, Jenő Szucs parts the Eastern and Western side of Europe by the changing boundary of the Latin and Orthodox Christianity. "The concept of the "West" has broadened as the Latin Christianity expanded it."¹⁶ As a result, the "cultural" area of Eastern Europe diminished in the Middle Ages and gradually retired with the increase of the states accepting Rome's religious control. During the Reformation, the areas of the Latin Christianity have lessened. This happened not because the outer frontiers were repelled or because of the secession of the rimlands, but because of the *centrifugal* religious spatial process, from the German speaking areas, the centre, to the rimland. By the spreading of the Reformation, the denominational picture of the western side of Europe has changed. Its stable, homogeneous texture of denominational regions was disrupted and became multi-polar.¹⁷ In the 16th and 17th century, those movements, that emerged in the small states of the Orthodox Europe as an important step of emancipation from, Russia, that has ruled the Orthodox world for centuries as the independent orthodox state, became very important for the Roman Catholic Church because of their expediting of religious union.¹⁸ After the first serious attempt of unification (Firenze 1439), the idea that Moscow, as the "third Rome", is the only protector of the Orthodox believers against the sectarians started to grow further.¹⁹ The Union of Brest was signed after the fashion of the Union of Firenze, in 1596, Poland (in the Polish-Lithuanian State) and resulted in some of the

Orthodox believers' joining the Western Church. A Catholic Polish-Ukrainian area with Orthodox liturgy has emerged in the eastern part of Europe.²⁰ So it is by no accident, that, in 1838-39, the Greek Catholic Church was abolished in the Polish areas annexed by Russia after the dismemberment of Poland.²¹ With the Ruthenians' Union of Ungvár in 1646, the Greek Catholic Church has also appeared in the historical Hungary, among the peoples living under Habsburg rule. The process has continued in Transylvania with the verting of the Romanians living here (1699) and this "church-between" took thousands of square kilometres in area.²² In Hungary, the House of Habsburg, similarly to the Greek Catholic Church of the Polish of Western Galícia, together with the Roman Catholic Church (and often with its serious pressing) attempted to give any help to those who wanted the union to organize a normal church-structure.²³ For example, when the Greek Catholic Bishopric of Várad (1776) was formed, large areas of land were given to them from the estates of the Roman Catholic Bishopric of Nagyvárad (however, not the best lands²⁴) to ensure the perpetuance of the Greek Catholic bishopric. The Greek Catholic Church of Transylvania was growing because of the Romanians verting in great numbers mainly in Máramaros, Szatmár, Szilágy, Fogaras and Hátszeg. Their independent Archsee of Gyulafehérvár-Fogaras was formed in 1853.²⁵ The number of the Ruthenian Greek Catholics has increased further in Transcarpathia as well.²⁶ The number and territorial expanse of the Greek Catholics reached its highest measure by the end of the 19th century in Europe-Between. By the turn of the century a Greek Catholic region with 2 million believers (Map 1) wedged in between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic areas from the Russian Olonyetz government to the borders of Croatia, mainly into the eastern part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.²⁷

After the dismemberment of the Monarchy, the return of the Greek Catholicism into the Orthodox Church was expedited between the two World Wars in Romania and in the Slavic successor states (even in Czechoslovakia). Although the number of the Orthodox Catholics increased a little in the Romanian Transylvania because of the high population growth²⁸, the number of Greek Catholics in Transcarpathia fell back from 64.1% to 49.1%.²⁹ The misery of the Greek Catholics in our region culminated only after World War II. Between 1948 and 1950, one by one, the Orthodox Catholic Churches were abolished and incorporated into the national Orthodox Churches by administrative measures in the neighbouring countries of Hungary (in Romania: 1948; in Transcarpathia: 1949; in Czechoslovakia: 1950).³⁰ Although the Greek Catholic Churches continued to work on illegally,³¹ the number of believers has decreased significantly



because of the measures.

*Changes of the Greek Catholic population living in the Carpathian Basin*³²

Country	Year	Total population	Greek Catholics	Greek Catholics %
Slovakia	1930	3 323 347	212 653	6,40
	1991	5 274 335	178 733	3,39
Hungary	1930	8 685 109	201 092	2,32
	1982 ³⁴	--	228 772 ³⁵	--
	1989	10 374 823	230 000	2,22
Transcarpathia	1930	734 249	360 269	49,10
	1989	1 245 618	350 000	28,10
Transylvania	1930	5 548 991	1 385 452	25,00
	1992	7 723 313	206 833	2,68
Vojvodina	1931	1 624 158	18 026	1,11
	1991	2 013 889	24 000	1,19
Pannon Croatia	1931	3 785 000	12 883	0,34
	1991	4 784 265	12 003	0,25
The area of the Carpathian Basin	1930	23 461 521	2 190 114	9,33
	1990	30 605 540	1 000 884	3,27

The Orthodox Catholic Churches were restored after the political changes 1989-1990, but the rebirth of the Greek Catholic religious life came about only the '90s. Although the Greek Catholic population of Transylvania, Eastern Slovakia and the North Transylvanian region has increased to one million, from a territorial aspect, after 1989, the Greek Catholic Church could not wedge in between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church, but in diasporas. The largest Greek Catholic communities live Ungvár, Munkács, Budapest, Kolozsvár, Szatmárnémeti, Kassa, Debrecen and Nyíregyháza.³⁶

The question what political considerations motivated the neighbouring, mainly Slavic, Orthodox states to abolish the Greek Catholic Church would be answered by paralleling the *ethnic* and *denominational* affiliations, by inter-

preting the connections between ethnicity and religion, because I believe that the answer, together with other aspects and processes, should be found in the Eastern and Central European, ethnically-based nation-conception.

There are two ways (Staatsnation, Kulturnation) of forming the modern nation. The first type (Staatsnation) is based on belonging to the same legal – political frame and the same territory, although territory appears only as a given state-frame. In this model, the religious minorities are identified as one cluster of the social minorities with equal rights. So, even if religious minorities are described somehow, similarly to national minorities, they are not interpreted separately from other social groups.³⁷ Denominational affiliation is irrelevant from the aspect of *state existence*.

In case of the second type of nations (Kulturnation), the common language, culture, and the myth of common origins are decisive.³⁸ However, in the Eastern European Orthodox countries, religion should also be mentioned besides language, culture and origins because of its important role in building and holding together the nation. As opposed to the West, an almost sacral “state-religion” exists in this region of Eastern Europe. According to the Russian Slavophil thinking, those Slavic peoples should also be implied in “the myth of common origins” that live outside Russia, but have the same confession as the Russians. Moreover, they also believe that it is Russia’s (not necessarily political) duty to unite and lead the Slavic-Orthodox peoples in a Pan-Slavic liberation movement.³⁹ Contrary to the state-nation, neither territory, nor the state had any decisive role among the criteria of the culture-state. Territoriality gains significance in the Slavophil thinking in this particular Russian form of nation-state, that is the Russian Orthodox nation has a right to unite and rule the Slavic peoples, in fact, it has to be done. The *symbolic religious-cultural control* exercised by the Russian Empire over these states is often complemented by real territorial control. Religion appears as a cloak, moreover as a means, of the aggressive Russian political nationalism⁴⁰. A particular form of the nation-state appears in this endeavour (Pan-Slavic idea). Such a form, that aims to realize the coincidence of the borders of the Slavic states and the borders of the areas confessing the Orthodox faith. It means the abolishment of peripheral, denominationally homogeneous areas of religious minorities (or their integration in the state-church) by rapid, immediate measures. However, in an extreme case it may have an additional meaning, that the state is willing to extend its rule, even by force, over areas outside its borders but interpreted as its own ethnic and/or religious territories (see the dismembered Yugoslavia and the Serb endeavours). Then the state-border gradually becomes a moving rimland or buffer-zone (fron-

tier).

The primary aim in the abolishment of the Greek Catholic Church in Romania and Czechoslovakia (although Slavic people live in the latter country and there was a strong Pan-Slavic movement, too, the Czechs and the Slovaks are not Orthodox peoples) after World War II was to weaken the minorities, the minority churches and the language use in the minority churches.⁴¹ In Romania, the abolishment of the Orthodox Catholic Church was intensely supported by the fear that the national unity based on the Romanian language would not be enough to be the counterpoint of the mainly Hungarian Roman Catholic and Calvinistic minority living in Transylvania. The unitary national church should also be an important basis of the ethnic identity – equally to language.⁴² The aim is to detach the Greek Catholic Romanians with a “specific Transylvanian identity”⁴³ from the Catholic Church that embraces Hungarians as well. This way religion is a technical means serving a possible national homogenization. This endeavour impliedly serves the preservation of the country’s *territorial integrity*, as well. In the *construction of the nation-state*⁴⁴, the majority nation pursues to diminish the spreading of the homogeneous minority or mixed zones and diasporas, to disrupt and abolish the inner, almost sacralized ethnic boundaries (religious fault-line in this case) on its territory, in other words it aims to fill the whole available space (between the state-borders). They believe that the *equilibrium* of nationalities can only be found only in this (ethnic and religious) state.⁴⁵ Although the churches have been sorely tried for 40 years in the orthodox states of Eastern Europe (70 years in the states of the former Soviet Union) and religiosity was attempted to be repelled, it can be stated that the *national churches* did receive some kind of protection. However, the minority churches, including the Greek Catholic, did not possess any guarantee of perpetuance.⁴⁶ As we see, the ethnic dimension of the concept “culture-nation” (nation as a language- and blood-community) is gradually transforming in the countries with the orthodox state-religion. The Greek Catholic Church does not belong only to the minorities and the linguistically unitary state-nation in the given countries (Romania, Ukraine, and Belo-Russia) is also divided by a sharp religious (unionist P Ü orthodox) fault-line. Nowadays, when the Greek Catholic Churches regained their independence in the post-socialist countries with the orthodox state-religion, safety-politicians always call attention to these regions in their *macro-level* analyses. In these analyses, the places of discourse are the state or national framework, the larger religious communities and the global international stage besides the smaller communities.⁴⁷ These analyses show that in this last decade the religious fault-lines do change (*may change*) the concept of

the East European culture-nation (one language – one nation) and that tendencies similar to the processes prevailing in the Islamic and Far Eastern countries (one nation – one religion) can be observed in the countries with the orthodox state-religion, that sometimes denominational affiliation predominates over religious attachments. From this tendency the question is raised: how is the concept of the religious nation delineated in Europe?

The religious nation does not depend on the territory and the state border, similarly to the ethnically dimensioned culture-nation. Even states can fall apart by religious fault-lines and independent countries can emerge in Europe.⁴⁸ The geopolitical, or “state-breaker”, situation of the Greek Catholics has been analyzed in two countries. Huntington believes that among the eight great cultures the sharp and inevitable fault-line between the Eastern and Western civilizations, that may unleash a war, is drawing through Ukraine. As he writes, the difference between East and West Ukraine is best revealed in the people’s attitude.⁴⁹ Among other things Huntington analyzes the results of the presidential elections in 1994. A sharp line can separate the Greek Catholic regions with their western-oriented election results (Leonyd Kravtchuk and the parties behind him) from the Ukraine that elected an Eastern Orthodox “national” president (Leonyd Kutchma).⁵⁰ The author believes that the result of the election is only a surface indication of the cultural-mental processes that (may) lead to the parting of the country on a long view.

Gusztáv Molnár analyzed the Romanian elections. In the elections of 1996, Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention behind him won with a sweeping triumph throughout the whole Transylvania and this result was enough for the final victory of the presidential candidate, because he could counterpoise the defeat he had suffered in the Regát. According to Iliescu’s Transylvanian campaign, the results of the first (and later the second) round show that Transylvania is wanted to be torn out of Romania, and the elections will be followed by the autonomy and federalizing of Transylvania.⁵¹ The national minorities and even the Romanian-speaking inhabitants (!) of Transylvania bordered by the Carpathians all voted along the civilization fault-line. The European liberal parties won in the western, in this case Greek Catholic, regions (Transylvania), while the nationalist parties with orthodox background won in the eastern part of the country (the Regát). Iliescu’s fear confirms Huntington’s thesis: *cultural fault-lines are not merely boundary-lines, but also factors provoking political tension*.⁵² Naturally, the “specific Transylvanian (containing Romanians, Hungarians, Saxons) identity” has emerged out of many constituents. One cannot overestimate the role of religion, although the Greek

Catholic dimension of the Transylvanian identity has a significant role besides the also important economic and legal (eg.: the Saxon rights) identity factors.

Based on the cases of the countries described above, the western geo-political thinking draws up the developmental trend of the European spatial structure, according to which the integrated area of the unitary Europe will only stretch until the eastern borders of Hungary and Poland, but the outer sphere of influence of the EU, with the help of a very sharp cultural ("West" – "Orthodox") border-line, will cover the area of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and "the more western-like" regions in it, "with Greek Catholic mentality". So it is traceable, that on macro-level a territorially isolable religious zone does exist in Europe-Between, although that only functions in connection with *certain situations*, primarily with *symbolic* functions (e.g.: political elections).

In this territorial-political thinking the question is raised whether or not the Greek Catholic belt is the artificial eastern guard-band of the West. The united Europe conceives this region not merely as a cultural puffer medium, but also provides it with the "dumping-ground" function of phenomena undesired on the western side of the united continent. This Europe surrounds itself with such states that were made "friendly", and, by contracts, economic shares and subsidies, were made willing to handle, for example, the admission (deportee contracts) and the temporary settlement of refugees aimed for the EU, while the united Europe attempts to close its borders before these phenomena (see the contract made in Schengen). This intention prevails especially in the German foreign policy that often departs from the European Union's policy. Germany's primary interest is to end its "peripheral" position it takes in the EU, to surround its eastern boundaries by states that are (already) part of the union, and this way to ensure its position in the centre and its permanent safety. This endeavour, while positions Europe-Between and the Greek Catholic zone in it *inside* the integrated Europe or positions it as a contracted area, still treats it as a *peripheral, transit* region.

As a cultural borderline, the Greek Catholics in their horizontal spatial partition may function as a means of spatial partition in Europe. The concept of border has four basic functions: dividing, connecting, colliding and filtering.⁵³ The Greek Catholic "space-between" as a culture-region has no sharp borderlines. This region itself functions not as barrier, a division line, but as a *dynamic border-zone* described earlier.

Notes

1 Huntington, S. P., *The Clash of Civilization*. In: *Foreign Affairs*. 1993. 3. 22–49.; Huntington, S. P., *A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása*. Budapest 1998.; Mezo F., *A posztmodern geopolitika és kultúrföldrészek*. In: *Valóság*. 1999. 9. 1–10. – It should be noted though, that the science of geo-politics is associated with negative notions in our region, because of its role in World War II. German researchers would hardly use the term even today. The term political geography is more likely to be used instead of geo-politics for the research of the correlation of geographical space and politics.: Pap N. – Tóth J. (szerk.), *Európa politikai földrajza*. Pécs 1997. 1. – About the historical load of the science (geo-politics) and about the use of the concept: I. A. Gergely A., *Kisebbség, etnikum, vallás*. Budapest 1997.; Galló B.; *A mediterrán térség és az európai integráció*. In: Kulcsár K (szerk.), *Az integráció: történelmi kihívások és válaszkísérletek*. Budapest 1998. 96–124. The term geo-politics has no negative associations in the French and English-speaking areas. The word designates the science of the correlation of geography and politics: Foucher, M., *Európa-köztársaság*. Budapest 1999. 17.

2 Fukuyama, F., *A történelem vége*. Budapest 1994.

3 In his volume Huntington shows the two different conceptions of the relationship between civilization and culture. The German sharply distinguishes between the two, while the English tradition considers the two to be each other's synonyms. Huntington, 1998. 48–62.

4 The western border is the line of the Rhine, as the margin of the spread of the German language and culture, and that is the dividing line between Western and Central Europe indicative of compromise. Although it should be noted that this border cannot undisputedly be accepted in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in France (because of its "German" nature – why should it be the German linguistic border?), this dividing line is less controversial than the Eastern one.

5 Natural geographic: the river Bug. Rétvári L., *Közép-Európa: a kohéziós földrajzi erovonalak*. In: Dövényi Z. (szerk.), *Tér-Gazdaság-Társadalom*. Budapest 1996. 293–313.; Historical-economical: The time of the abolition of serfdom. Gunszt P., *Kelet-Európa gazdasági-társadalmi fejlődésének néhány kérdése*. In: *Valóság*. 1974. 3. 18–29.; Art historical: Europe ends where the last Gothic cathedral stands, or Europe ends where the Renaissance influence ends.; Ideologies: The propagation area of the Baroque and the Enlightenment. L. Chaunu, P., *Felvilágosodás*. Budapest 1998. 289. (the map); The spread of cultural traits: eg. the borderline between the spread of the Latin and the Cyrillic

alphabet.

6 Beluszky P., Közép-Európa – merre vagy? In: Földrajzi Közlemények. CXIX. (XLIII.). 1995. 3–4. 223–232.

7 See Beluszky P., op. cit. 223–232. for the different Central Europe conceptions and maps.

8 The region's content and its size is uncertain. The concept of region should be defined by setting it to the framework of the given research. In case of Central Europe with uncertain borders and content, see the approaches of different aspects (historical, geographical, ethnographic and geo-political) on the basis of a large bibliographical reference: Ring É. (szerk.), Helyünk Európában. I–II. Budapest 1986.; Rétvári L., Közép-Európa földrajzi igazsága. In: Földrajztanítás. XXXIII. 1993. 3–4. 17–22.; Bayer, K., Közép-Európa: útkereszteződés és éle paradoxon – Csehország, mint magterület példáján. In: Földrajzi Közlemények. CXIX. (XLIII.). 1995. 3–4. 251–262.; Beluszky P., Változó helyünk Európában. In: Frisnyák S. (szerk.), A Kárpát-medence történeti földrajza. Nyíregyháza 1997. 77–96.; Lendvai L. F., Közép-Európa koncepciók. Budapest 1997.; Carter, F.W., Közép-Európa: valóság vagy földrajzi fikció? In: Földrajzi Közlemények. CXIX. (XLIII.) 1995. 3–4. 232–250.; Ruppert, K., Közép-Európa. Egy fogalom megközelítése. In: Dövényi Z. (szerk.), Tér-Gazdaság-Társadalom. Budapest 1996 293–313. – The term Euro-region, that emphasizes the presently widely used political considerations, also occurs as a definition of Central Europe. Through this term I would like to suggest that the region contains several countries and has a separate geo-political significance. For a geo-politically similar regional division of Europe that also considers the hardships of demarcation, see Pap N. –Tóth J. , (szerk.), op.cit.

9 Mackinder, H., Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. New York 1919. The term (Europe-Between) is primarily politically motivated. It describes the small state region that wedged in between the great powers. Pándi L., Köztes-Európa. 1997. 21.

10 Hajdú Z., Az európai politikai földrajz fejlődésének jellegzetes szakaszai. In: Pap N. – Tóth J. (szerk.), op.cit. 3–28.; Pozdnyakov, E., Oroszország esélyei a geopolitikai összeomlás után. In: Kiss I. – Sakelina, T. – Kortunov, A. (szerk.), Doktrínák és alternatívák. Budapest 1998. 86–117.; Miletics P., Egy európai határrégió: Kelet-Közép-Európa geopolitika térben. In: Pál Á. – Szónokyné Ancsin G. (szerk.), Határon innen – határon túl. Szeged 1996. 240–250.

11 Kissinger, H., Diplomácia. Budapest 1996. 377–406.

12 Pándi L., op.cit. 21.

13 It is not only Europe-Between that history can describe as a „natural”

buffer zone. In Europe, such a region is the Partium in the historical Hungary, where the mountains and the plains meet, or the Polish-Ukrainian areas between the Pripyaty-marshes and the Bug (the zone of the Curzon-line) or the region of Alsace-Lorraine.

14 Yugoslavia was a good example. The acquiescent national endeavour, that did not attempt to solve the situation, to make the impossible, to organize the new, ethnically clear states by very sharp ethnic borders, had a decisive role in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.: Kocsis K., Jugoszlávia. Egy felrobbant etnikai mozaik esete. Budapest 1993. – One sign of the failure: the „IFOR, then SFOR puffer”. By their presence in uncertain ethnic areas with intermediate positions, the troops only treat (delay?), but does not solve the crisis.

15 Csorba Cs., A tiszántúli régió néptörténeti vázlata. In: Kunt E. – Szabadfalvi J. – Viga Gy. (szerk.), Interetnikus kapcsolatok Északkelet–Magyarországon. Miskolc 1984. 17–26. However, it is very difficult to interpret the wide forest-belts between the completely separate Walloon and Flemish areas as a geopolitical or even as a cultural dividing zone. Today the Walloon-Flemish conflict mobilizes separatist forces as well.: Karsai L., Vallonok és Flamandok. Budapest 1986; Pap N., Nyugat–Európa politikai földrajza. In: Pap N. – Tóth J. (szerk.), op.cit. 85–105.

16 Szűcs J., Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról. In: Történeti Szemle. 1981. 3. 313–359.

17 About the religious distribution of Central Europe, see the statistics and the map. Rónai A., Közép–Európa Atlasz. 1993. 152–155.

18 Font M., Oroszország, Ukrajna, Rusz. Budapest – Pécs 1998. 164.; Kis I. (szerk.), A megváltó Oroszország. Budapest 1992. 245–304.

19 Szvák Gy., Moszkóvia és a Nyugat. Budapest 1988. 146.

20 For details, see Halecki, O., A nyugati civilizáció peremén. Budapest 1995. 126–128.; Molnár D. I., Vallási kisebbség és kisebbségi vallás. Budapest 1995. 7.

21 Pándi L., op.cit. 30.

22 About the “between” position of the Greek Catholic Church (liturgy, institutional structure): Gesztelyi T., Egyházak a mai Magyarországon. Budapest 1991. 55–72.; Ivancsó I., Görög katolikus szertartástan. Nyíregyháza 1997. Továbbá: Petrassevics, N., Ortodox görögkatolikus vallásos néphagyományok kölcsönhatásai a Kárpát–medencében. In: Fejos Z. – Küllos I. (szerk.), Vallásosság és népi kultúra a határainkon túl. 1990. 74–94.

23 About the formation of the Greek Catholic Churches of the historical Hungary: Pirigy I., A magyarországi görögkatolikusok története. I–II. Nyíregyháza 1990.; About Poland: D. Molnár I., Vallási kisebbség vagy kisebbségi

vallás? In: *Dimenziók*. 1993. 1–2. 22–39.

24 Data concerning the poverty of these estates can still be collected in the formerly Greek Catholic, but since 1948 orthodox villages of the Partium.

25 Bulk K., A görög-katolikus egyház szervezete és köziazgatása. In: Borovszky S. (ed.), *Magyarország vármegyéi. Bihar vármegye*. Budapest é. n. 420.; Adatok I. Kocsis K., A Kárpát-medence változó vallási térszerkezete. In: *Földrajzi Közlemények CXXIII. (XLVII.)* 1999. 1–2. 11–18.

26 Bonkáló S., *A rutének*. Budapest 1996. 109–111.

27 Source of the map: Kocsis K. op.cit. 13.

28 Rónai A., op. cit. 158.

29 Kocsis K., op.cit. 15.

30 From 1968, as the result of the “spring of Prague”, the Greek Catholic Church became independent again in Czechoslovakia. András K., *Tények és problémák a magyar kisebbségi egyházi életben*. In: *Regio*. 1991. 2. 3. 15.; Gesztelyi T., op.cit. 69. For the detailed history of the Greek Catholic Church of Transcarpathia, see Botlik J., *Hármas kereszt alatt*. Budapest 1997.

31 In 1991, in the Romanian Várafenes, the Orthodox curator told in the interview that he was a Greek Catholic (!), but “that’s the situation”.

32 The statistical conspectus was made on the basis of the table from Kocsis K., op.cit. and the *A Hajdúdorogi Egyházmegye és a Miskolci Apostoli Kormányzóság Schematizmusa* (1982).

33 For the spatial structure of the Hungarian Greek Catholics in 1920, see Bartha E., *Görög katolikus ünnepeink szokásvilága*. Debrecen 1999. 10–11.

34 On the basis of the Greek Catholic Schematism.

35 The unnumbered 45–50,000 people living in diaspores outside the dioceses and the apostolic government complete this number given by the Schematism.

36 Kocsis K., op.cit. 17. For data concerning the whole of the Carpathian-Balkan region, see: *A Kárpát-Balkán régió etnikai-vallási arculata*. In: *Földrajzi Közlemények CXV. (XXXIX.)* 1991. 3–4. 165–189. For the changes in the institutional structure of the Greek Catholic Church, see Sebok L., *A katolikus egyházszerkezet változásai Trianon óta*. In: *Regio* 1991. 2. 3. 65–88.

37 Meinecke, F., *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates*. München–Berlin. 1922. 1–22.; Heckmann, F., *Minderheiten. Begriffsanalyse und Entwicklung einer historisch-systematischen Typologie*. In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*. 30. 761–779.

38 For the detailed description of the two types of nation, see: Romsics I., *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam*. Budapest 1998. 9–16.; Keményfi R., *Etnikai tér és a nemzetállamiság eszméje*. In: *Tabula*. 1999. 2. 2. 3–26.

39 Dosztojevszkij, F. M., Kell-e nekünk Európa. Budapest 1999. 84–91., Kis I. (szerk.), op.cit. 245–304.

40 I use the term “nationalism” according to Gellner’s definition, that this concept is ‘primarily such a principle that considers the congruency of the political and national unity necessary’. – Hobsbawm, E. A nacionalizmus kétszáz éve. Budapest 1997. 17.

41 András K., op.cit. 15.

42 Gergely J., Az erdélyi görög katolikus román egyház. In: Regio 1991. 2. 3. 106–117.

43 For the investigation of the Transylvanian Greek Catholic identity, see: Ilyés Z., „Magyarul beszélünk” In: Borbély É. – Czégényi D., Változó társadalom. Kolozsvár 1999. 6–21.

44 There are several approaches for the interpretation of the nation-state. According to the general definition, the nation-state is such a state that has a population nationally (linguistically) more or less homogeneous, or aims to unite the people on its territory by its means (common culture, symbols, values traditions). Guibernau, M., Nationalisms. The Nation–State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge 1996. 47–48. idézi: Romsics I., op.cit. 11.

45 See Keményfi R., op.cit. 13.

46 András K., op.cit. 21.

47 Barth, F., Régi és új problémák az etnicitás elemzésében. In: Regio. 1996. 7. 1. 3–25.

48 I’d like to refer to the Yugoslavian wars. Religious conflicts proved to be more important than the ethnic ones. Mezo F., Etnicitás, idostruktúrák a volt Jugoszlávia geopolitikai rendszerében. In: Tér és Társadalom. 1999. 1–2. 142–159.; Romsics I., op.cit. 328–336.; Kapronczay P., A koszovói konfliktus történelmi, politikai és kulturális háttere. In: Krausz T. (szerk.), A Balkán-háborúk és a nagyhatalmak. Budapest 1999. 23–36.

49 Huntington, S. P., op.cit. 270.

50 See the election map: Huntington, S. P., op.cit. 272. The parliamentary elections of 1991 produced a similar result. See the map: Pándi L., op.cit. 608.

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