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The Primacy of Politics? Arms Imports and Political Relations of the Visegrád Countries 1999–2020¹

Part 1

Gyula SPECK² 

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier–recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties.

Keywords: arms trade, Visegrád Countries, bilateral relations, security policy, the United States, the Russian Federation, Germany

Introduction

Arms imports are determined by numerous factors, from economic development and alliance ties to security perception and defence planning.³ However, if commerce between two states can be affected by the political climate between them, so might arms transfers.⁴ This paper aims to capture the arms supplier–recipient relations between the Visegrád

¹ The research was supported by the ÚNKP-20-3-I-NKE-26 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The author would also like to thank Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes for the interview and Rodrigo Guajardo (former Head of R&D Department, FAMAE) for the additional advice.

² PhD student, University of Public Service, e-mail: speck.gyula@uni-nke.hu

³ Frederic S. Pearson: The Priorities of Arms Importing States Reviewed. *Arms Control*, 9, no. 2 (1988). 171.

⁴ With “arms transfers” we refer not only to arms sales, but also to other forms of weapon supply, like military aid or manufacturing licences. Therefore, we rather use arms transfers instead of arms trade.

countries and the Russian Federation, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate?

In the academic literature on the relations of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) with the United States, Russia or Germany⁵ arms imports are generally mentioned as elements of bilateral cooperation. However, the topic has hardly been systematically examined, despite the fact that arms transfers to this region are becoming highly relevant today, since these countries increasingly focus on military modernisation and replacing their Soviet-era equipment.⁶ In addition, only a few works have examined the defence cooperation of these countries with Germany,⁷ Russia⁸ or the U.S.⁹ (Nonetheless, there is a wide scope of academic literature dealing with the defence cooperation of the Visegrád countries.¹⁰) With this paper, we hope to contribute to the literature on the political relations of the CEE countries by extending the scope to arms transfers. Furthermore, the paper's regional perspective may also serve the broader literature dealing with systematic examination of arms transfers.

Arms transfers and political relations

Theoretical and empirical findings of the academic literature on commerce and international political interactions have proven that political considerations can have a significant impact on decision-making beyond pure economic aspects. Notably, bilateral trade decisions are affected by the parties' general foreign policy orientation towards each other and the actual climate of friendliness or hostility. Consequently, bilateral trade flow is decreased when political relations become more conflictual, whereas it will increase when political relations become more cooperative. This phenomenon is illustrated by the

⁵ Recent works on the topic for example: Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019; András Hettyey (ed.): *Germany and Central Europe: Drifting Apart?* Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2020; Andrei Zagorski (ed.): *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*. Prague, Human Rights Publishers, 2015.

⁶ Jaroslaw Adamowski: Russian Militancy Drives Eastern European Modernization. *Defense News*, 01 November 2015.

⁷ Zdeněk Kříž et al.: Defense Co-Operation Between Germany and the Visegrad Countries. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 31, no. 3 (2018). 354–371.

⁸ Ian Anthony (ed.): *Russia and the Arms Trade*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998; Zagorski (2015): op. cit.

⁹ Gábor Csizmazia: Az Egyesült Államok kül- és biztonságpolitikája Kelet-Közép-Európában 2009–2019 között. PhD Thesis. University of Public Service, 2020; Dániel Bartha – Péter Rada: The Role of the Visegrád Countries in the Transatlantic Future. *Biztopol Affairs*, 2, no. 1 (2014); Péter Rada: Pivot to Asia and the Role of the Visegrád Countries in the Transatlantic Future after 2014. In Marian Majer – Róbert Ondrejcsák (eds.): *Panorama of Global Security Environment 2013*. Bratislava, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2013. 121–136.

¹⁰ See for example: Juraj Krupa: Visegrad Four Defense Cooperation: Years of Missed Opportunities. *The Warsaw Institute Review*, 5 July 2019; Marcin Urbański – Karol Dołęga: The Visegrad Group in the Western Security System. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 9, no. 4 (2015). 5–37; Anna Molnár – Zoltán Szenes: Cooperation or Integration? The New Defence Initiatives in the Visegrád Group. In Christian Schweiger – Anna Visvizi (eds.): *Central and Eastern Europe in the EU. Challenges and Perspectives Under Crisis Conditions*. London, Routledge, 2018.

U.S.–Soviet trade before, during and after the Détente and the West German trade with the Eastern Bloc following the *Ostpolitik*.¹¹

It is highly probable that foreign policy alignment and the current diplomatic climate strongly affect arms transfers because arms are not solely commercial products: they can be harmful to internal and external actors or alter the regional balance of power. Thus, arms transfers may require a certain trust between supplier and recipient, especially in the case of highly advanced weapon systems. First, the supplier must ensure that the weapon is not used against its interests or sensitive information is not leaked to a third party.¹² Second, knowing that the recipient becomes (to some extent) dependent on the supplier in terms of logistic support, spares parts and even military training and offset programs, it may prefer a reliable supplier.¹³ As such, close and trustful bilateral relations may be necessary for arms deals.

However, arms transfers also differ from general commercial trade in the way that they are essential elements of defence diplomacy. Since arms transfers carry many long-term commitments through joint ventures, maintenance, training, supply of spares, modifications and transfer of technology, they necessitate an institutionalised dialogue between defence specialist and military personnel, which ultimately facilitates cooperation and confidence between the parties.¹⁴ Furthermore, military aids which demand only symbolic financial compensation may express goodwill or solidarity toward the recipient. In public diplomacy, arms transfers support the liberal theory of international relations, which contends that interaction, cooperation and dialogue alleviate conflict and promote close relations.¹⁵

Based on these theoretical assumptions, the hypotheses of the paper are summarised as follows:

- cooperative relations facilitate the increase of arms imports of the Visegrád countries
- bilateral tensions and disputes decrease the arms imports of the Visegrád countries
- an increase of arms imports improves relations or at least alleviate the existing conflict between the Visegrád countries and the main three suppliers

¹¹ Brian M. Pollins: Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33, no. 3 (1989). 739–741; Omar M. G. Keshk et al.: Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 66, no. 4 (2004). 1171.

¹² A well-known example is Turkey's failed F-35 deal. See Deutsche Welle: US Removes Turkey from F-35 Program after S-400 Fiasco. *DW*, 07 July 2019.

¹³ Panitan Wattanayagorn: ASEAN's Arms Modernization and Arms Transfers Dependence. *The Pacific Review*, 8, no. 3 (1995). 499.

¹⁴ Frédéric Charillon et al.: Defense Diplomacy. In Thierry Balzacq – Frédéric Charillon – Frédéric Ramel (eds.): *Global Diplomacy. An Introduction to Theory and Practice*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 271–272, 274; B. S. Sachar: Military Diplomacy Through Arms Transfers: A Case Study of China. *Strategic Analysis*, 28, no. 2 (2004). 291.

¹⁵ Charillon et al.: op. cit. 272.

Methodology and structure of the paper

The research concentrates on the major conventional weapon (MCW)¹⁶ imports of the Visegrád Countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) based on data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other academic and media sources.¹⁷ It should be emphasised that our research does not focus on other types of military equipment, like small arms, helmets, bulletproof vests and communications equipment, which may facilitate military cooperation but tell little about political relations. The research period concentrates primarily on the years between 1999 and 2020, as it was in 1999 that the V4 countries (except Slovakia) joined NATO.

The foreign and security policy aspects of the arms imports of the V4 are examined in this paper only as regards those three arms exporters, which are key international actors for the V4 countries, in both political and economic terms, as global or regional powers. These are the Russian Federation, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁸ They have also been for a long time among the top arms exporters of the world. To test our hypotheses, we examine the bilateral relations of the V4 countries in the first part toward Russia and the U.S. and in the second part toward Germany, before and after the arms import decisions.

Nevertheless, a complete discussion of relations of the V4 and their leading exporters lies beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, we concentrate our study strictly on the most important political and security issues of the last 19 years; economic or cultural relations are excluded or only marginally examined. The reader should bear in mind that the study is based on available open sources and interviews. The true intentions of the former and current decision-makers remain unknown to us; thus, we may miss some crucial aspects of arms import decisions.

Arms imports and relations with the Russian Federation

By 1999, the ties that existed in the former Eastern bloc between the Visegrád countries and Russia broke down. While Russia lost its interest in the region, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO, and they were on a solid track to the EU. Under the first Dzurinda Government (1998–2002), Slovakia gave up the former pro-Russian policy, which ultimately led to joining NATO and the EU in 2004.¹⁹ Joining NATO inevitably led

¹⁶ Under the term “major weapons”, we follow SIPRI’s definitions of major weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, which are destined for military use. See SIPRI: *Sources and Methods*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022a.

¹⁷ Although there are other sources for international arms trade data research (for example the UN Register of Conventional Arms), SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is “the most widely cited source of international arms trade data, and the one generally accepted as most authoritative”. About the issues of data on international arms trade see Sam Perlo Freeman: How Big is the International Arms Trade? *World Peace Foundation*, 19 July 2018. 3.

¹⁸ Kříž et al.: op. cit. 356.

¹⁹ Alexander Duleba – Boris Shmelev: Slovak–Russian Relations. In Andrei Zagorski (ed.): *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*. Prague, Human Rights Publishers, 2015. 146–147.

to decreasing Russian exports to the V4, in comparison with earlier decades, as the need for interoperability grew. It may not be a coincidence that between 1990 and 2020, 79% of all Russian arms to the V4 were transferred before the year of the first Eastern NATO enlargement.²⁰ However, Russian arms exports did not vanish completely.

Around 1999–2000, the general distrust of the V4 countries towards Russia dominated the political climate, mainly because of the differences on the Kosovo War and NATO expansion.²¹ This trend is especially apparent in the Hungarian–Russian relations during the first Orbán Government (1998–2002), which openly criticised Russian political leaders and disapproved the modernisation of the MiG-29s.²² However, in the middle of the 2000s, normalisation of relations started to gain momentum through economic and defence industrial cooperation; the latter resulted in a modest increase in Russian arms exports. For example, the Czech–Russian bilateral talks on economic as well as defence industrial cooperation intensified in 2002–2003, which included an import of 17 combat and ten transport helicopters as a debt offset of 184–250 million USD.²³ The second Dzurinda Government of Slovakia in 2002 imported four transport helicopters as debt offset and in 2004 decided to modernise the MiG-29s with Russian components.²⁴

From the late 2000s and in the 2010s, Hungary and Slovakia generally took a softer approach focusing on economic and energy cooperation, with only a moderate critique of Russian aggression during the Georgian War and the Ukraine Crisis.²⁵ On the contrary, the Czech Republic and especially Poland had tense relations.²⁶ This fragmentation could be clearly seen in their reaction to the Ukraine Crisis.²⁷ However, this pattern did not consistently appear in the Russian arms transfers. Whereas in 2008, Slovakia imported 150 man-portable surface-to-surface missiles, and Hungary chose to modernise its Mi-17 transport helicopters by a Russian contractor in 2014, Poland in 2006 and 2010 ordered a few Mi-17 transport helicopters, some of them for use in Afghanistan.²⁸ As Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, who served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces between 2003 and 2005 outlined, good political relations likely played a role for Hungary in the helicopter modernisation, as Polish and Czech

²⁰ SIPRI: *SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Importer/Exporter TIV Tables*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020.

²¹ Juraj Marušiak: Russia and the Visegrad Group – More than a Foreign Policy Issue. *International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 24, no. 1–2 (2015). 32.

²² András Rácz: Towards Increasingly Balanced Relations: Hungary and Russia Since 1989. In Andrei Zagorski (ed.): *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*. Prague, Human Rights Publishers, 2015. 180.

²³ Lukáš Dyčka – Miroslav Mareš: The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisition in Countries of the Visegrad Group. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25, no. 4 (2012). 533–557.

²⁴ Petra Kuchynkova et al.: Czech–Russian Relations 1989–2012. In Andrei Zagorski (ed.): *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*. Prague, Human Rights Publishers, 2015; SIPRI: *SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Trade Registers*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022b.

²⁵ Duleba–Shmelev (2015): op. cit. 164; Rácz (2015): op. cit. 183–184.

²⁶ Kuchynkova et al. (2015): op. cit. 134; Łukasz Adamski – Artem Malgin: Polish–Russian Relations 1991–2011: On the Way to Mutual Understanding. In Andrei Zagorski (ed.): *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*. Prague, Human Rights Publishers, 2015. 90–92.

²⁷ Marušiak (2015): op. cit. 38–43.

²⁸ SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.

companies could also have been contractors.²⁹ Nevertheless, the EU embargo on Russia adopted in late 2014 has prohibited the transfer of arms.³⁰

Regarding our first hypothesis, the modest renewal of defence industrial cooperation with Russia by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 2000s was probably facilitated by the willingness to cooperate pragmatically. President Putin's open-minded foreign policy toward Europe may have played a role, too. Furthermore, Slovakia's and Hungary's cooperative relations with Russia could have facilitated the arms deals in 2008 and 2014. Nevertheless, economic considerations likely had a stronger role. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic had serious defence budgetary cuts in the 2000s and early 2010s. In Hungary, there was simply no political will to rearm the Hungarian Defence Forces with developed western equipment. It was cheaper and easier to maintain the existing Russian made equipment. Besides, in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, having Russian equipment even proved to be an advantage, due to climate conditions.³¹ This also could have been a reason for Poland to buy Russian helicopters in the 2000s. The economic motivation is also strongly apparent on the supplier's side, as "arms account for a large proportion of Russia's manufactured and technology-intensive exports";³² they played an important role in debt offsetting, too.

Our second assumption seems to be justified in the late 1990s, early 2000s when joining NATO resulted in the cooling of relations with Russia by all the V4 countries, which led to a decrease in arms imports from Russia. However, the hypothesis is primarily valid for Poland, which constantly saw Russia as a security threat; as such, it imported the least Russian arms; from the later 2000s, the same is valid for the Czech Republic.

Finally, evidence for our third hypothesis has been found, because major arms deals at least contributed to the re-establishment of pragmatic cooperation in the 2000s. However, they did not have a long-term impact. In conclusion, the results demonstrate that economic and alliance considerations were much more dominant in the flow of Russian MCWs to the V4.

Arms imports and relations with the United States

The relations of the Visegrád states with the U.S. had been already intensely cooperative before the NATO enlargement took place, as the prospects for NATO membership motivated the V4; the contribution to military engagements in the Yugoslav Wars was respected by the U.S., NATO membership created favourable conditions for significant arms deals since it directly impacted the CEE states' security and defence policies, and also their armed forces, in terms of modernisation, organisation and armaments.³³ Imports from the U.S. are examined in three periods.

²⁹ Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, 09 April 2021.

³⁰ SIPRI: *EU Embargo on Russia*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014.

³¹ Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, 09 April 2021.

³² Richard Connolly – Cecilie Sendstad: Russia's Role as an Arms Exporter. *Chatham House*, March 2017. 22.

³³ Yudit Kiss: *Arms Industry Transformation and Integration. The Choices of East Central Europe*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2014. 377–381.

First, the period from 2000 until around 2008 proved to be the ‘golden age’, as the volume of U.S. arms exports increased, and the political relations gained considerable importance. Nevertheless, U.S.–Polish relations by this time had been already on a much higher level than with the other countries. It is illustrative that only Poland signed a deal on the procurement of 48 F-16C fighters and accompanying armaments in late 2002. Although Poland was given for the purchase a favourable loan of 3.8 billion USD and the deal involved offset investments of nearly 8 billion USD, political considerations were the most dominant. By procuring F-16s, Poland sent a clear political message to its allies, clearly expressing its commitment to the U.S.³⁴ Almost simultaneously, Poland, contrary to France and Germany, decided to support the War in Iraq, and soon even took the role of a leading nation with a contingent of 2,300 troops stabilising the south-central zone.³⁵ Although there is no convincing evidence that underpins the explicit connection between the support for Iraq and the purchase of the aircraft,³⁶ the correlation of these actions still reflects Poland’s preference for the U.S. over the European partners.³⁷ It is noteworthy that despite the fighter jets’ numerous technical faults, Poland continued to be a firm Atlanticist, for example, by supporting the deployment of the U.S. National Missile Defence System.³⁸

Even though Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic contributed both politically and militarily to the U.S.-led military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as well, the political relations did not gain such significance as in the case of Poland. The Czech Republic and Hungary opted for Swedish Gripen fighters instead of the American F-16s, mainly due to the significant offset offer.³⁹ Although these decisions did not have a positive impact on bilateral relations, they did not have a long-term effect. Between 2002 and 2006, G. W. Bush met four times with the Hungarian prime ministers, whereas the Czech Republic kept supporting the deployment of the missile defence system.⁴⁰ Both countries procured U.S. produced armament and engines for the Gripens in 2004–2005, later Hungary even imported 100 Maverick missiles, a joint venture was also set up for

³⁴ Dyčka–Mareš (2012): op. cit. 546.

³⁵ Tomasz Smura: Relations between the United States and Poland: From Enemy to the Main Security Guarantor. In Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 105.

³⁶ It is noteworthy that with the invitation to the EU, the European bidders (especially the French) were also pressuring Poland not to buy the American F-16. European companies also tried to convince Poland that by buying European-made fighter jets the European defence industrial potential will be significantly increased. Thus, the European’s pressure could have been counterproductive. See Barre R. Seguin: Why did Poland Choose the F-16? *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*, June 2007.

³⁷ Keith Lambert Carter: *Great Power, Arms and Alliances*. PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2019. 83; Kiss (2014): op. cit. 116–121; Dyčka–Mareš (2012): op. cit. 117.

³⁸ Kiss (2014): op. cit. 119–120; Gábor Csizmazia: Decisive Change or Determined Continuity? The Trump Administration’s Foreign and Security Policy Viewed from Central and Eastern Europe. *AARMS*, 16, no. 3 (2017). 110.

³⁹ Dyčka–Mareš (2020): op. cit. 539; Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, 09 April 2021.

⁴⁰ Gábor Csizmazia: Relations between the United States and Hungary. In Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 82; Judit Hamberger: Atlanticism and Security Policy in Poland and in the Czech Republic. *HIIA Papers*, 2008/14. 12; Ferenc Gazdag (ed.): *A magyar külpolitika 1989–2014*. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszerzői Egyetem, Nemzetközi Intézet, 2014. 185.

maintenance.⁴¹ However, offensive weapon systems were not procured by the Czech Republic and Hungary.⁴² In addition, the purchase of American missiles was the only realistic option, as it could have been very costly and irrational to install a new armament system.

Slovakia was the only country that did not purchase any American MCWs until the mid-2010s. The Slovak–American relations have been clearly affected by the anti-American attitude of the Slovakian society, in which the aversion to U.S. policy of unilateral military interventions played an obvious role, especially during the first Robert Fico Government (2006–2010) despite the early troop support in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴³

In the second phase, between 2009 and 2016, political relations had become more tenuous as the U.S. initially focused more on withdrawing from the Middle East, as well as on its pivot to Asia and its “reset” policy with Russia, with less attention paid to the CEE region overall.⁴⁴ The Czech Republic could not find a specific role in the modified missile defence system (European Phased Adaptive Approach); Poland in 2009 could not agree with the U.S. on a satisfying price of Patriot missiles.⁴⁵ The Obama Administration also criticised the Hungarian and Polish political, economic and judicial reforms in 2014–2016.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the volume of arms exports to the V4 decreased, although armoured vehicles for use in Afghanistan were loaned to Hungary and Poland.⁴⁷ However, it should be remembered that the defence budgets of the V4 countries were severely affected by the economic crisis that coincided with the Obama Administrations. Due to economic constraints, they could not afford it – even if they intended to buy American weapons. The defence budgets have started to grow mainly during the Trump Administration (see Figure 1).

This argument may also be underpinned by the fact that in 2011 the Czech Republic intended to buy F-16s, but due to the high price, it dropped the plans.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Slovakia for the first time, imported from the U.S. nine Blackhawk helicopters for 261 million USD in 2015.⁴⁹ What also stands out is that in 2015, the Polish Government initially decided to purchase 50 European-made Caracal combat helicopters, but the PiS-led government withdrew from the negotiations because it wanted to buy American helicopters. However, as there were no similar U.S. helicopters available on the market, the purchase was eventually cancelled.⁵⁰

⁴¹ Kiss (2014): op. cit. 165.

⁴² SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.

⁴³ Dušan Fischer: Relations between the United States and Slovakia: Friends and Allies between 1989 and 2017. In Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 168–169.

⁴⁴ Csizmazia (2017): op. cit. 113.

⁴⁵ Monika Brusenbauch Meislová: Relations between the United States and the Czech Republic. In Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 62; Smura (2019): op. cit. 112.

⁴⁶ Jan Cienski et al.: Polish–American Romance Sours. *Politico*, 15 March 2016; Csizmazia (2019): op. cit. 89.

⁴⁷ SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.

⁴⁸ Csizmazia (2020): op. cit. 143.

⁴⁹ SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.

⁵⁰ Ryszard Zięba: *Poland's Foreign and Security Policy. Problems of Compatibility with the Changing International Order*. Cham, Springer, 2020. 119.




Figure 1: Defence expenditures of the V4 in percentage of GDP 2012–2019

Source: NATO (2016): *op. cit.* 6; NATO (2019): *op. cit.* 8.

The political relations started to change with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The U.S. became the first NATO member to provide political support to the states in the region by increasing its military presence through the European Reassurance Initiative and the NATO collective defence measures.⁵¹ However, serious change in the relations occurred from 2017, as the new Trump Administration took a different approach towards the CEE region. The boost of the U.S. military presence continued; the mutual sympathy gave a further impetus for the political relations. The mutually shared conservatism and the EU-scepticism of the Hungarian and Polish governments and the Trump Administration helped finding a common ground. In 2019 President Trump met with all the heads of state or government from the V4.⁵² American arms exports to the V4 have also shown a steady increase, and they even included a larger amount of sophisticated weapon systems.

After 2015 Poland considerably strengthened its relations with the U.S. because of its growing fears of Russian aggression. Notably, it requested a permanent American military presence ('Fort Trump'), and in 2019 signed a bilateral defence agreement to strengthen U.S. military infrastructure, whose costs will be funded by Poland. Simultaneously, it signed a series of strategic agreements on arms deals, which significantly contributed to the implementation of the Technical Modernization Program of the Polish military.⁵³ These have included air-to-surface, air-to-air and anti-tank missiles, guided bombs, transport aircraft, Patriot missiles, but also helicopters, UAVs, rocket systems; and

⁵¹ Csizmazia (2017): *op. cit.* 11, 122.

⁵² Csizmazia (2020): *op. cit.* 205, 220.

⁵³ Zięba (2020): *op. cit.* 117–119.

most importantly in 2019, 32 highly advanced F-35A multirole fighters for 4.6 billion USD.⁵⁴ Once again, political considerations had dominated the procurement decisions, as illustrated by the preference of the Polish Government for American companies over European ones and the fact that the government did not consult the opposition before the F-35A deal was negotiated. Furthermore, the deal does not include any offset investment for the modernisation of the Polish defence industry.⁵⁵ Other examples, like the Polish support for the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran and the redundancy in accepting the EU's Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China are strong signs of Atlanticism, too.⁵⁶

The other three countries' relations with the U.S. also intensified during the Trump Presidency, although once again to a lower degree. The Czech Republic, along with Hungary and Romania, blocked an EU statement criticising the transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Moreover, 5G network and cyber threats from China as well as energy cooperation became a subject of Czech–American bilateral talks, but the U.S.–EU trade dispute did not favour the Czech Republic as its economy is export-oriented. The U.S. is still the main guarantor of Czech security, which is shown in the purchase of eight UH-1Y Venom and four AH-1Z Viper combat helicopters for 650 million USD in 2019. The helicopters are so far the highest valued Czech–American arms deal.⁵⁷

After the tense political relations with the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration had much better relations with the Hungarian Government. After more than ten years, in May 2019 Viktor Orbán became the next Hungarian Prime Minister to visit the White House. A year later, the State Department gave a green light to Hungary for the procurement of 60 AMRAAM-ER⁵⁸ missiles and NASAMS⁵⁹ short- and medium-range air-defence system.⁶⁰ Following a two years long negotiation process (because of disagreement over legal issues), the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. was finally renewed in 2019, which enabled the U.S. Department of Defense to invest in the modernisation of the Hungarian military infrastructure.⁶¹ Nevertheless, we do not assume that the arms procurement has tremendously effected the Hungarian–American relations: the Hungarian military sooner or later had to procure additional U.S.-made armament for the Gripens as it is the only realistic option to maintain the capability, moreover, after the announcement of the arms deal, U.S. government politicians still remained divided over

⁵⁴ Congressional Research Service: *Poland: Background and U.S. Relations*. 25 June 2019. 13.

⁵⁵ Zięba (2020): op. cit. 123, 125; Monika Sieradzka: US-Konzerne modernisieren Polens Militär. *mdr.de*, 20 September 2020.

⁵⁶ Paweł Paszak: Poland–China Relations in 2021: Current State and Prospects. *Warsaw Institute*, 29 January 2021; Zięba (2020): op. cit. 123.

⁵⁷ Claudette Roulo: U.S., Czech Republic Agree to Sale of Helicopters. *U.S. Department of Defense*, 12 December 2019; Łukasz Ogrodnik: Intensification of Czech–U.S. Relations. *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, 11 July 2019.

⁵⁸ Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles Extended Range.

⁵⁹ National/Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System.

⁶⁰ Sebastian Sprenger: Hungary Plunks Down \$1 Billion for New Air Defenses. *Defense News*, 13 August 2020; Marton Dunai: Orban Says He Discussed Missiles and Natural Gas with Trump. *Reuters*, 17 May 2019.

⁶¹ Béla Gyömbér: Az USA és Magyarország közötti védelmi együttműködés. *Jogalappal*, 05 April 2019.

Hungary, some of them criticised its violation of the rule of law or its closer connections to China and Russia.⁶²

The neglected Slovakian–American relations were renewed during the third phase. Slovakia had been in talks with the Swedish Government about the purchase of Gripens, but the SNS coalition party pushed for other bidders, including Lockheed Martin. After some hesitation, the Pellegrini Government finally agreed with the U.S. company in December 2018 to purchase 14 F-16Vs for 1.8 billion USD.⁶³ According to Slovakian experts, buying Gripens could have been cheaper and more practical to cooperate with the Hungarian and Czech air force, but Slovakia rather chose to strengthen relations with the U.S.⁶⁴ Unsurprisingly, in February 2019, Mike Pompeo visited Bratislava as the first U.S. Secretary of State. Besides, through the funding of the U.S. State Department, Slovakia was granted 50 million USD for its Blackhawk procurement.⁶⁵ The new Slovakian security strategy adopted in 2020, contrary to the earlier governments, better reflected the U.S. security concerns, like Chinese and Russian influence.⁶⁶

To conclude, in the first phase (2000–2008), the general cooperative political relations undoubtedly resulted in increased arms transfers to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Although NATO membership was a strong reason to buy American weapons, it was not an inevitable necessity, as Slovakia’s example shows. Overall, we assess that the first hypothesis is particularly valid for Poland, which is underpinned by the fact that in this period, 92% of U.S. MCWs to the V4 states were imported by Poland, and only Poland procured U.S. aircraft.⁶⁷ In the second phase (2009–2016), because of the economic crisis, convincing evidence for causality between the decrease of arms imports and the diplomatic cooldown cannot be found, as financial considerations determined the procurement options. During the third phase (2017–2020), however, the cooperative nature of relations, due to the security reassurance and later the sympathy toward the Trump Presidency, provided favourable conditions for the increase of arms imports which entailed even highly advanced offensive MCWs. Once again, the Polish share of U.S. arms was the highest with 78%.⁶⁸

Regarding our third hypothesis, arms deals with the U.S. did improve bilateral relations, which is especially valid for advanced offensive weapons systems. The procurement of aircraft and other arms by Poland strengthened the security and foreign policy commitment towards the U.S. The case of Slovakia is especially illustrative, whose relations with the U.S. suddenly changed after buying F-16s. In general, arms imports

⁶² Keno Verseck: Opinion: Donald Trump’s Lonely Dream of Viktor Orban-like Power. *DW*, 14 May 2019.

⁶³ The Defense Post. *Lockheed Awarded \$800 Million Slovakia F-16 Fighter Jet Contract*. 1 August 2019.

⁶⁴ Otakar Berger: Slovakia to Buy Fighting Falcons. *czdjournal*, 12 July 2018.

⁶⁵ SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.; Aaron Mehta: Special US Fund to Replace Russian Equipment in Europe Is Shifting Its Strategy. *Defense News*, 18 March 2020; SIPRI (2022b): op. cit.

⁶⁶ Łukasz Ogrodnik: Slovakia’s New Security and Defence Strategies. *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, 26 February 2021.

⁶⁷ Estimated from the data of SIPRI (2020): op. cit.

⁶⁸ Estimated from the data of SIPRI (2020): op. cit.

proved to be a vital element of broader defence cooperation, which showed resilience to diplomatic tensions and sustained pragmatic cooperation.⁶⁹

Preliminary assessment

Three aspects have been examined above. We assumed that friendly diplomatic relations are more likely to lead to arms deals, and the opposite is true for poor diplomatic relations. Our third hypothesis is that arms deals as important tools of defence diplomacy improve diplomatic relations in general. The results so far give us a mixed picture. Mutually good relations have played a prominent role in arms imports from the United States, but the purchase of Russian arms has been more of a financial and practical necessity. Only for Russia did deteriorating political relations lead to a traceable decline in arms sales. However, the third hypothesis seems to be clearly confirmed, as in both cases arms deals contributed to the maintenance of bilateral relations. As a preliminary conclusion, it can be concluded that arms import decisions can be affected by multiple factors. Arms import choices are not exclusively driven by the current political bilateral relations: financial and defence policy priorities can be equally or even more decisive.

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⁶⁹ Anna Péczeli: Comparing Trends in the Relations of Central European Countries with the United States. In Anna Péczeli (ed.): *The Relations of Central European Countries with the United States*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 229.

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The Primacy of Politics? Arms Imports and Political Relations of the Visegrád Countries 1999–2020¹

Part 2

Gyula SPECK²

International commerce can be determined by the political climate between the exporter and the importer. Arms transfers are a much complex process, where beyond economic factors, alliance ties, security perception and defence planning are also considered. Still, they might not be independent of political relations. This paper aims to capture the arms supplier–recipient relations between the Visegrád countries and Russia, the United States and Germany from 1999 to 2020. More specifically, how do the two factors affect each other: are good political relations necessary for arms deals? Or do arms deals facilitate a friendly political climate? Our conclusion is as follows. On the one hand, a cooperative political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity, as mutual benefits and security perceptions can override the current political climate. On the other hand, however, arms transfers can deepen cooperation or alleviate the existing differences between the parties.

Keywords: arms trade, Visegrád Countries, bilateral relations, security policy, the United States, the Russian Federation, Germany

In the first part of our article, we have analysed the correlation between arms imports of the Visegrád countries and their bilateral political relations with the United States and the Russian Federation between 1999 and 2020. Based on the political economy theory developed mainly by Brian M. Pollins, that trade relations and political relations are interlinked, we assume that cooperative relations facilitate the increase of arms imports (hypothesis 1), whereas bilateral tensions decrease them (hypothesis 2). In addition, since arms trade is also an integral element of defence diplomacy, we also intend to analyse, whether an increased volume of arms imports results in better political relations (hypothesis 3). Previously, we concluded that the overall picture is rather mixed: there is no firm evidence that supports the argument that the current state of political relations

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is the predominant factor in arms import choices. In some cases, financial and defence policy aspects seem more determinant. In the following section, we investigate the three hypotheses in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Arms imports and relations with the Federal Republic of Germany

Germany exported significantly fewer arms to the Visegrád countries compared to Russia and the U.S. In the past 30 years, only Poland and Hungary imported German major conventional weapons (MCWs). Because of the lack of German arms exports to Slovakia, we do not examine its relations with Germany.³

The 1990s were the ‘golden years’ of Polish–German relations. It seemed that troubled historical experiences had been overcome; Germany as a ‘civilian power’ significantly contributed to the improvement of the Polish economy and proved to be an indispensable partner in the accession to the EU.⁴ In addition, military cooperation was also flourishing, which entailed German military aid in 1991 and 1996 (MiG-23 and Su-22 aircraft, Mi-24D combat helicopters).⁵ From 1993 Germany and Poland signed a series of agreements on military cooperation, which included training and partnerships between the land, naval and air forces and the joint establishment of the Multinational Corps North-East (MNC NE).⁶ In 2000 the relations were better than ever before.⁷

The friendly climate of the relations was followed by German arms exports. In 2002–2003, Germany granted Poland a second significant military aid worth at least 300 million USD, including second hand 128 Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks accompanying repair units, bridges, communication systems and several other armoured vehicles.⁸ In addition, 23 former East German but NATO-compatible MiG-29 combat aircraft were sold to Poland

³ Although the Slovakian Ministry of Defence signed a cooperation agreement with the German Diehl Munitionssysteme for the modernisation of the RM-70 rocket launcher system, which was Slovakia’s first cooperative project with a NATO member state, Slovakia did not procure any Western MCW until 2015 (see Yudit Kiss: *Arms Industry Transformation and Integration. The Choices of East Central Europe*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2014. 257). However, in March 2022, Rheinmetall announced that it will build a facility to produce Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, as such, the Slovakian Army will be equipped with 152 Lynx KF41s for 1.7 billion euros (see European Security and Defence: *Slovakian LYNX IFV Facility to be Built*. 11 March 2022).

⁴ Rafał Ulatowski: Polish–German Relations between 1989–2016: Bandwagoning and Its Limits. In András Hettyey (ed.): *Germany and Central Europe: Drifting Apart?* Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2020. 83, 85–86.

⁵ SIPRI: *SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Trade Registers*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022.

⁶ Daniel Kawa: Polish–German Military Cooperation After Joining NATO. *Polish Political Science*, 34 (2005). 72–73.

⁷ Józef M. Fiszer: The 1991 Polish–German Treaty: Origin, Aims, and Implementation. Successes, Failures, and Prospects in the Context of the Migration Crisis in Europe. In Karina Paulina Marczuk (ed.): *Good Neighbourhood Treaties of Poland. Political, Security and Social Relations*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 49.

⁸ SIPRI (2022): op. cit.

for a symbolic price of 1 euro per machine, along with about 500 air-to-air missiles.⁹ The Leopards were received by the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade, which were subordinated to the 7th German Armoured Division as part of NATO rapid reaction forces.¹⁰

However, the optimism of the 1990s faded away, because after the NATO and EU accession Poland had not been particularly dependent on the mediator role of Germany anymore. Besides, disagreements arose in major international issues. First, before the EU accession, Poland supported the U.S. War on Iraq, whereas Germany opposed it along with France. Second, whereas from 2005, Germany has treated the Nord Stream pipeline as a purely commercial project, Poland has regarded the dependence on Russian gas as a security threat. Third, the matter of Second World War reparations and the reform of the EU also caused political debates.¹¹

During the governments of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007–2015), relations got back on track once again.¹² In the euro crisis, the Polish Foreign Minister, Jarosław Sikorski, even expressed the need for a stronger Germany.¹³ At the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis, Poland also cooperated with Germany and France in the Weimar Triangle.¹⁴ The Polish–German military cooperation and the arms transfers continued in 2013, when Poland imported 14 Leopard 2A4s and 105 in 2A5 version with 18 armoured recovery vehicles as part of a 180-million-euro deal, as well as 35 used M-113 APCs¹⁵ and diesel engines.¹⁶ The cooperation among military units in the form of common training and exercises has been broadened to increase the readiness of the NATO Response Force.¹⁷

In 2015, as the PiS-led government came to power, the political relations deteriorated. Poland, along with the other V4 countries, did not support mandatory EU refugee quotas, which were pushed by Germany; moreover, in other EU policies, there have been disagreements, including energy and the rule of law.¹⁸ Perhaps one of the most important friction is the policy toward Russia and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which is seriously opposed by Poland along with the U.S. Poland was also excluded from the Normandy Format, which caused great disappointment.¹⁹ According to the 2020 EU Coalition Explorer, Germany is even more willing to cooperate with its smaller neighbours, like the Netherlands or Austria, than with Poland.²⁰ Despite these developments, the German–Polish defence cooperation has continued. The Polish Leopards are being upgraded by the German Rheinmetall for around 700 million euros; Polish companies are

⁹ Lukáš Dyčka – Miroslav Mareš: The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisition in Countries of the Visegrad Group. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25, no. 4 (2012). 538; SIPRI (2022): op. cit.

¹⁰ Kawa (2005): op. cit. 73.

¹¹ Ulatowski (2020): op. cit. 83–84.

¹² Fiszer (2019): op. cit. 52–53.

¹³ Ulatowski (2020): op. cit. 84.

¹⁴ Jennifer Yoder: Good Neighbourliness in a Tense Neighbourhood: German–Polish Relations, 1990 to the Ukraine Crisis. *German Politics*, 27, no. 4 (2018). 567.

¹⁵ Armoured personal carrier.

¹⁶ SIPRI (2022): op. cit.

¹⁷ Defence24: “Revolution” in the Cooperation Between the Polish Army and the Bundeswehr. 23 January 2015.

¹⁸ Ulatowski (2020): op. cit. 84–85.

¹⁹ Yoder (2018): op. cit. 567.

²⁰ Piotr Buras: The Provincial German–Polish Relationship. *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 06 October 2020.

also participating in the project.²¹ Although, Poland and Germany are willing to cooperate pragmatically in security issues, Poland regards the United States as its main security guarantor. This phenomenon is also underpinned by the EU Coalition Explorer: Poland is not willing to cooperate in foreign policy with Germany, but in defence, Germany is seen as a main European partner along with the Baltic states.²² We assume that whenever possible, Poland is more willing to import American than German arms, as the recent Polish arms procurements show.

The German–Hungarian relations took a similar path. The German–Hungarian relations were generally close between 1990 and 2004, based on strong economic relations: Hungary’s contribution to the German reunification and Germany’s support in the Euro-Atlantic integration. In 1993 and 1995, Germany exported for favourable prices former East German military equipment, including trainer aircraft and combat helicopters.²³ Defence cooperation has been intense since the 1990s in logistics, officer training, stabilisation and peacekeeping missions. Although in the early 2000s, plans arose among the Hungarian defence planners to procure German battle tanks, it was out of the question due to economic constraints and favour for light equipment.²⁴ Except for the Gripen aircraft, accompanying armament and some U.S. armoured vehicles for Afghanistan, Hungary did not procure any new MCW until 2016, when the defence expenditure was increased again, and the new Zrínyi 2026 Defence and Military Development Program was announced. In 2017–2018, Hungary purchased 20 H145M armed light helicopters. In December 2019, another agreement was signed with Germany for the acquisition of 24 PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, 44 highly advanced Leopard 2 A7+ battle tanks, additional 12 Leopard 2A4s, components, simulators, armoured recovery and support vehicles for 1.76 billion euros.²⁵ Hungary became Germany’s main recipient in 2019, even outpacing Germany’s traditional clients, like Egypt and the U.S. Furthermore, in 2020, 280 pieces of the most advanced Lynx KF41 IFV²⁶ were also bought for more than 2 billion euros, of which 172 will be built in Hungary by a joint venture company led by Rheinmetall AG.²⁷ As a consequence of these imports, the German–Hungarian military and defence industrial cooperation was given new momentum in the form of mutual bilateral visits and agreements, establishing joint ventures for maintenance, production of radars and further

²¹ Michał Jarocki: German Industry Cooperating with Central and Eastern Europe. *European Security and Defence*, 19 January 2021.

²² Claire Busse et al.: EU Coalition Explorer. *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 08 July 2020.

²³ András Hettyey: *Hegemónia helyett. Magyar–német kapcsolatok 1990–2002 között*. Budapest, L’Harmattan, 2019. 98–105.

²⁴ Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, 09 April 2021; József Barát: Fegyvervásárlás kontroll nélkül. 168, 09 December 2019.

²⁵ SIPRI (2022): op. cit.; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie: *Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im ersten Halbjahr 2019*. November 2019. 24.

²⁶ Infantry fighting vehicle.

²⁷ Jarocki (2021): op. cit.

armoured vehicles.²⁸ Contrary to the other CEE countries, where military modernisation is rather based on U.S. arms imports, Hungary distinctively favours German equipment.²⁹

Prior to these major arms deals, from 2010, German–Hungarian relations reached the lowest point compared to the earlier decades. Whereas in 2010–2015, differing views on media, sectoral taxes on multinational companies, judiciary reforms were the main issues; after 2015, the clash over migration policy became the main issue. In political statements, under ‘strategic cooperation’, almost exclusively economic relations were emphasised. However, open criticism against Hungary was carefully avoided by the Merkel-led governments, as Germany has rather expressed its concerns through the EU institutions.³⁰ Simultaneous with the arms deals, Germany quickly appeared in the Hungarian political statements as a strategic partner in defence.³¹ In the new Hungarian National Security Strategy published in April 2020, Germany is mentioned in the first place as a bilateral partner in security and defence, outplacing even the U.S.³² However, after the arms transfers, the same trend continued in political relations. Hungary, along with Poland, vetoed the EU’s budget-and-recovery package at the end of 2020; this was criticised by German politicians in the European People’s Party (which Hungary finally left in March 2021). Still, open criticism was averted by the German Government, except when the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has recently outraged as Hungary blocked the EU declaration which condemned China on its policy towards Hong Kong.³³ This suggests that defence cooperation and arms transfers are resilient to the German–Hungarian bilateral political clash of views.

The examination of the Czech Republic is nearly negligible, as the only German MCWs were 15 Dingo APCs in 2008, which was part of the Czech–German military cooperation in Afghanistan.³⁴ However, around 2020, the Czech Republic intended to procure 210 Lynx KF41 IFVs for 2 billion euros, but due to the economic difficulties caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the plans have been postponed. British BAE Systems and American General Dynamics were also among the bidders, but Rheinmetall will likely be the winner.³⁵ This would not be surprising, because defence cooperation with Germany is at a very high level. In 2017, the Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade was integrated into the Bundeswehr. The Czech Defence Strategy adopted in 2017 also emphasises defence

²⁸ Balázs Trautmann: Modern, gumikerekes harcjármű fejlesztése és gyártása kezdődhet meg. *Honvédelem.hu*, 16 December 2020; Péter Snoj: Tovább erősödnek a magyar–német kapcsolatok. *Honvédelem.hu*, 22 March 2019; Portfolio: *Hadiipari üzem jön létre Nyírteleken*. 05 February 2021.

²⁹ Krisztina Budavári: *A magyar védelmi ipar helyzete és fejlődési lehetőségei*. Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság – Hungarian Association of Military Science, 2020. 147.

³⁰ András Hettyey: From a Community of Feelings to Estrangement: Hungary and Germany since 1990. In András Hettyey (ed.): *Germany and Central Europe: Drifting Apart?* Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2020. 134–135.

³¹ Magyar Hírlap: Szijjártó: Németország hazánk stratégiai szövetségese és a legfontosabb gazdasági partnere. 04 November 2019.

³² Government Resolution 1163/2020 (IV.21.) on Hungary’s National Security Strategy, Article 110.

³³ Hans von der Burchard – Jacopo Barigazzi: Germany Slams Hungary for Blocking EU Criticism of China on Hong Kong. *Politico*, 10 May 2010; Lili Bayer: EU Leaders Back Deal to End Budget Blockade by Hungary and Poland. *Politico*, 10 December 2020.

³⁴ SIPRI (2022): op. cit.

³⁵ Jarocki (2021): op. cit.

cooperation with Germany. Still, the willingness to import German arms is rather based on pragmatic cooperation, not on particularly flourishing political relations. Although in 2015 a bilateral strategic dialogue was announced, Germany's migration policy did not find support from the Czech Government.³⁶

To conclude, friendly political relations did seem to give a stable ground for arms transfers in the case of Poland prior to the German arms transfers of 2002 and 2013. This assumption is utterly contradicted by Hungary as tensions were apparent in the relations before the German arms deals were signed in 2017–2020. The second hypothesis is irrelevant to Hungary, as the lack of any MCW import (except aircraft) was caused by the neglect of defence affairs and budgetary cuts. Poland's German arms imports disappeared simultaneously with the deteriorating political relations, but no convincing evidence underpins this simultaneity.

The third hypothesis cannot be firmly confirmed by Poland: certainly, the German military aid in the early 1990s, in 2002 and further exports in 2013 did help to increase mutual trust, but they did not have a long-term impact, as after 2002 and 2013 political tensions quickly came to the foreground. The same is true for the Hungarian procurements. However, defence cooperation and arms transfers did likely help sustain pragmatic cooperation. By Hungary and Poland, the political dialogue was extended with defence affairs and visits of defence ministers were facilitated.³⁷

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to investigate the correlation of political relations and arms imports by the Visegrád countries since 1999. Our research has led us to the following conclusions:

- Cooperative political relations without doubt facilitated the U.S. arms exports to all V4 countries and the German exports to Poland. Here it should be outlined that joining NATO was not a solely factor, as German military aid was already transferred before 1999. By imports from Russia in the 2000s, economic considerations were more determinant, and the German–Hungarian arms deals in 2017–2020 were made entirely in a conflictive climate.
- The assumption that conflictive relations decrease arms imports seems the least convincing. Russian arms exports did decrease around 1999, but in the 2000s, there was still a modest increase. Nevertheless, constant distrust could have been a decisive reason why Poland bought the least Russian arms. As to the decrease of American and German exports, there is no firm evidence, as budgetary cuts seriously limited military modernisations of the Visegrád countries. Buying MCWs, in general, is a very costly business, especially for small countries, like Hungary or Slovakia.

³⁶ Jana Urbanovská – Zdeněk Kříž: Germany and the Czech Republic: An Asymmetric Relationship in Search of a Strategy. In András Hettyey (ed.): *Germany and Central Europe: Drifting Apart?* Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2020. 109–111.

³⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: *AKK wirbt in Mittel- und Osteuropa für eine Post-COVID-Ordnung*. 20 July 2020.

- Finally, arms transfers as part of defence diplomacy undoubtedly contributed to improving relations with the U.S., but they rather helped to sustain pragmatic cooperation with Russia in the 2000s, or they could counter-balance conflictive relations, particularly by the German–Hungarian relations recently.

In general, cooperative diplomatic-political climate increases the probability of arms deals, but they are not a necessity.

First, arms deals, which serve mutual interests, like military cooperation or favourable economic conditions, can override current political relations. This may give a convincing explanation for the German–Hungarian arms deals, from which Hungarian military modernisation and the German defence industry have benefited. It should be underlined that large scale procurements, which include highly sophisticated offensive weapon systems, like fighter jets, battle tanks or IFVs establish closer ties between the supplier and the recipient. Once a new weapon system has been imported, the following imports will likely come from the same supplier, regardless of the current political relations, because it is very costly to change the existing weapon system. Consequently, as part of long-term defence planning, defence cooperation is usually much more resilient to changes in political relations.³⁸ This explains Poland's continuing defence industrial cooperation with Germany despite the conflictive relations. (Obviously, when a country's economic power is strong enough, political considerations can easily prevail on security or economic concerns.) Second, security perception can also be much more decisive than current political relations, especially if the recipient feels threatened. This better explains Poland's, the Czech Republic and Slovakia's choice for U.S. aircraft or helicopters because they perceive the U.S. as a credible security guarantor. Therefore, arms transfers signify a willingness for political alignment based on security or economic interests, not necessarily on political sympathy.

The quality and scale of the imported MCWs also signify a certain degree of relations: it may not be accidental that among the V4, only Poland has a real deep relation with the U.S. and acquired high-tech weapon systems in a larger amount. The other three could not achieve this level of partnership with the U.S., how much they desired.

Nevertheless, the causality of political relations and arms transfers is a two-way phenomenon. Whereas political preferences for a foreign supplier can be decisive, arms transfers can also deepen cooperation between the parties. Political relations themselves do not explain arms transfer decision and vice versa. It is important to note that the relation between two elements is very situation-dependent; the broader strategic context, like alliances and economic conditions, should also be considered. Further studies on the connection between arms transfers and political relations by other geographical regions are suggested to elucidate the above-highlighted results.

³⁸ Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes, 09 April 2021.

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Post-War Tourism in Ukraine: Should We Go Dark or Phoenix?

Anastasiia YEZHOVA¹

The Russian Federation invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Now there are active hostilities, but despite this, the government of Ukraine is already thinking ahead by creating various recovery funds for restoration in the post-war period. This article examines the tourism sector and how it can be adjusted to post-war realities. Moreover, planning in this area is viewed through the prism of city marketing, which is characterised by a clear segmentation of the audience, analysis of the resources available and a study of the target audiences' needs. This work answers the following question: what are the main tasks of post-war tourism in the framework of city marketing after the war in Ukrainian cities considering visiting motives of the potential tourists? In the process of analysing international and domestic tourism experience in post-conflict and post-disaster territories, we can argue that it is necessary to determine the concept of a touristic campaign (the author recommends the Phoenix Tourism concept), attract volunteers, maintain communication through telegram channels, conserve war-damaged buildings as a touristic site, conduct guides training with an emphasis on their mentor functions, etc. At the end of the article, the author raises questions in the field of post-war city marketing that require further attention from researchers.

Keywords: dark tourism, phoenix tourism, city marketing, Ukraine, war

Introduction

Being in a state of war, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced the creation of funds for the restoration of the country after the war: “We already understand how we will be restoring our country. We are already forming special funds for the restoration of Ukraine. There are already four of them: Foundation for the Restoration of Destroyed Property and Infrastructure of Ukraine, Fund for Renewal and Transformation of the Economy, Fund for Servicing and Repayment of Public Debt, Small and Medium Business Support Fund.”² Referring to the leadership of Ukraine and the importance of

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² Forbes Україна: Зеленський: Україна формує чотири спецфонди для відбудови країни. *Forbes.ua*, 03 June 2022.

long-term planning, the author considers it appropriate to discuss the perspectives of the territorial marketing and tourism activity in Ukraine after the end of the war.

After the war, numerous cities in Ukraine will be held hostage by a dark military past and an unstable blurred future. The devastation that reigns around will shift the focus away from areas such as marketing and tourism. But the author considers this an erroneous approach since it is strategic thinking, analysis of resources and timely response to the analysed requests of target audiences that will drive the country's recovery by leaps and bounds.

This article aims to answer the following question: What are the main tasks of post-war tourism in the framework of city marketing after the war in Ukrainian cities considering visiting motives of the potential tourists?

Up to the moment, there are no published articles on post-war city marketing and tourism in Ukraine. Therefore, this work is to be considered pioneering.

The article contains various case studies of the post-conflict countries and cities that managed to become popular destinations. Their experience will become a ground for strategic marketing planning in post-war Ukrainian cities.

War in Ukraine

The invasion of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation began on 24 February at 5 a.m. Kyiv time. The Russian army began to strike at military infrastructure facilities. In the days that followed, the attacks were not limited to militarised targets. Shelling and bombardments are also being carried out in residential areas of many Ukrainian cities; hundreds of civilians, including children, have been killed.³ The Russian Government refuses to call it a war, following the lead, all the Russian media name it a 'military operation' in Ukraine.⁴ The main goals of this 'operation' are the demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine. The first one has the ground considering the Ukrainian army as 22nd in the Global Firepower ranking of the "available active military manpower by country, from highest to lowest".⁵ The second aim is quite questionable, and considering that it negatively affects the Ukrainian image, the author finds it necessary to provide some counterarguments.

Neo-Nazi organisations, followers of Nazi ideology, operate almost everywhere (Figure 1). The reasons for their occurrence can be different: wars or conflicts on the territory of the state (high level of aggression), poverty, the desire to join the "strong" to feel part of the group, etc.

³ Dan Sabbagh: Researchers Gather Evidence of Possible Russian War Crimes in Ukraine. *The Guardian*, 02 March 2022.

⁴ ТАСС: Военная операция на Украине. Онлайн. ТАСС, 03 July 2022; Interfax.ru: Военная операция на Украине. *Interfax.ru.*, 29 September 2022; Реальное время: Военная операция на Украине: только проверенная информация.

⁵ Global Firepower: *2022 Military Strength Ranking*.




Figure 1: Compilation of the paper titles of various online media on the neo-Nazi

Sources: tass.ru, euronews.com, justice.gov, independent.co.uk, interfax.ru

It is also necessary to understand what the term ‘denazification’ is:

*The process of bringing the leaders of the National Socialist regime in Germany to justice and of purging all elements of Nazism from public life, carried out especially between 1945 and 1948.*⁶

Quantitative data that prove the attitude of people towards this ideology in Ukraine do not exist, but some data will disprove the “popular support” for ultra-right sentiments in the country.

In the elections to the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) of 2019 2.15% of the country voted for the political party All Ukrainian Association “Svoboda” (Euro-sceptic far-right nationalists).⁷ They got one seat in the parliament. At the same time, the pro-Russian political parties “Opposition Platform – For Life” and “Opposition Bloc” received the support of 13.05% and 3.03%, respectively (49 seats out of 423 in total). In the same year, almost all Ukrainian nationalist parties and radical organisations joined forces and nominated one candidate, Ruslan Koshulynsky, for the presidency of Ukraine;

⁶ Lexico Dictionaries: *Denazification*.

⁷ Центральна виборча комісія: *Вибори народних депутатів України 2019*.

he got 1.62% of the votes.⁸ It gives ground to state that Ukraine is being a victim of territory subjugation and intrusion in an attempt to change the political regime and impose a different ideology.

The war has become a catalyst for denoting a single cultural identity for all Ukrainians facing one enemy, which is a very important component of national branding.⁹ Before the war, the country was characterised by a split in society between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, considering different languages as an element of division. But the war gave the exact answer to many who had problems with self-identification and rallied the Ukrainian people; the language they speak does not matter anymore. What matters is your position; the Ukrainian society is being on the rise.

In the context of the war, it is impossible not to mention how much partner countries help Ukraine. Numerous funds and initiatives are being created,¹⁰ cities and states allocate funds from their budgets for humanitarian assistance within Ukraine, as well as for the Ukrainian refugees. For example, in Hungary free train trips for refugees are available, in Budapest urban transport is free for Ukrainian passport holders; tents with free food and water were set up at railway stations, volunteers help with finding accommodation and laying a route to another country where refugees are heading in transit through Hungary. Some countries also supply weapons.¹¹

According to the UN vote, the world is united in its recognition of Russia as an aggressor country. The UN General Assembly voted by an overwhelming majority of 141 against 5 demanding Russia immediately withdraw its forces from Ukraine and abide by international law.¹²

City marketing concept

A high number of studies and publications is devoted to the concept of place marketing, in particular the works of P. Kotler, C. Asplund, I. Rein and D. Haider, G. J. Ashworth and H. Voogd, E. Braun, M. Kavaratzis, A. Pankruhin, D. Vizgalov, S. V. Ward, M. Boisen, I. Piskóti and S. Nagy, G. C. Stanculescu, I. Tózsá, E. Avraham and E. Ketter, T. Moilanen and S. Rainisto, R. Vuignier.

Foremost, several existing terms relatively project the same idea: “place marketing/branding”, “country marketing/branding” and “city marketing/branding”,¹³ the difference is in the scope. If we speak about the first one, it includes not only cities but a variety of

⁸ Центральна виборча комісія: Україна – «Вибори Президента України 2019».

⁹ Božo Skoko – Hrvoje Jakopović – Dejan Gluvačević: Challenges of Branding in Post-Conflict Countries: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Tourism*, 66, no. 4 (2018). 411–427.

¹⁰ Khanyi Mlaba – Tess Lowery: 28 Meaningful Ways You Can Help Ukraine. *Global Citizen*, 24 February 2022.

¹¹ Al Jazeera: Which Countries Are Sending Military Aid to Ukraine? *Al Jazeera*, 28 February 2022.

¹² European External Action Service: *UN General Assembly Demands Russian Federation Withdraw All Military Forces from the Territory of Ukraine*.

¹³ Árpád Papp-Váry: *Country Branding as a Special Type of Place Branding: An Overview of the Related Terminology*. 2019.

territories: from villages to regions.¹⁴ Therefore, it has a broader meaning. The author prefers to work within a narrowed concept which is city marketing. The justification of the choice includes the ability to avoid generalised strategies like country branding strategy considering Ukraine a big country. In the author's opinion, the optimal scheme to apply place marketing in the country is that the government issues the general marketing and branding directives to follow but the local councils are to adapt the general directives for the specific city taking into account its geographical position, the aftermath of war, logistics, resources, etc., and let the world know about them. Otherwise, tourists will keep choosing the country's capital as their final destination.

The reader can become acquainted with the concept of city marketing in previously published articles.¹⁵ Erik Braun points out that city marketing has a customer-oriented philosophy and all its activities should serve not the city but the customer. While Martin Boisen draws attention to the importance of the competitive advantage and position of the city among competitors which can be improved through strategic initiatives. In this paper, it is necessary to focus on the hybrid definition of the above-mentioned ones:

City marketing is a long-term strategic activity aimed at the operation and development of the city according to its (potential) market's demands, stakeholders' wants and needs, and a competitive environment.

To this definition, it is worth adding "when taking into account the city resources available", which can be explained by the limited resources in the post-war territory. Based on the definition, the main initial task of the responsible authority is to create a strategy (up to 3 years in the post-war period) aimed at the development that will have an umbrella effect on all other departments of the city council. By 'umbrella' we mean the creation of a system where everyone is responsible for a certain sector of activity and works for the same goal. Before writing a strategy, it is necessary to analyse the financial and human resources they deal with. The strategy should include the approach for the allocation of the resources from the Foundation for the Restoration of Destroyed Property and Infrastructure of Ukraine, Fund for Renewal and Transformation of the Economy, Fund for Servicing and Repayment of Public Debt, Small and Medium Business Support Fund. The necessary documents should be prepared for the central government to prove and rationalise the allocation of the budget for the settlement.

An integral element of city marketing is a target audience. In the case of a post-war city, we consider target audiences residents, internally displaced people (IDP), refugees abroad, business owners, investors and tourists. Where 'internally displaced people' and 'refugees abroad' are not a part of a usual consumer composition and are therefore highlighted in red colour (Figure 2).

¹⁴ Renaud Vuignier: *Place Marketing and Place Branding: A Systematic (and Tentatively Exhaustive) Literature Review*. 2016.

¹⁵ Anastasiia Yezhova: Theoretical Concept and Definition of City Marketing. *Verejná správa a spoločnosť*, 21, no. 1 (2020); Martin Boisen: *The Strategic Application of City Marketing to Middle-Sized Cities*. 2007; Erik Braun: *City Marketing. Towards an Integrated Approach*.




Figure 2: The target audiences of post-conflict cities

Source: Compiled by the author based on Tózsá (2011): *op. cit.*

Communication with target audiences can effectively continue in the post-war period through social networks such as Telegram. A large number of people use it to monitor news, track air warnings and alarms and communicate with close ones. Government channels during this period received a significant number of followers, compared with the pre-war period (Figure 3). For example, more than 32 thousand accounts are subscribed to the Telegram channel of the Sumy Regional Military Administration and almost 800 thousand to the President's Office channel. People are aware of the spread of fake news, so, according to the rising number of governmental channels followers, users tend to trust official channels of information, such as the Regional Administration, the city council and personal channels of government officials. News channels in English were also created to inform the foreign audience about what is happening in Ukraine. The channel 'Ukraine NOW' was created on the 26th of February and up to the 16th of March, it has more than 100 thousand subscribers. It also has its alternates in German, Polish, Hungarian, Italian, French and Spanish languages. In total, these channels have an audience of 152 thousand who are considered potential tourists.

The main task of these channels is not to lose their relevance after these events and continue to inform citizens about the news and generate useful content. It is also possible to conduct surveys among subscribers on various issues. Naturally, they will not be considered official, since the subscribers of a particular channel are not limited to the boundaries of one city, region, or even country, but an approximate public opinion on a particular issue will be possible to obtain. It will be especially important to work through these channels with refugees and IDPs. Broadcasting the normalisation of the situation and the restoration of the city will be a significant reason for those who have moved to return to the city.

It is impossible not to mention the increase in the recognisability of many cities in Ukraine that are under heavy attack by enemy troops: Sumy, Chernihiv, Mykolayiv, Okhtryka, Bucha, Irpin, etc. The author of this article, having lived in Ukraine for 22 years, can argue that even for many Ukrainians, the geographical position of the city of Sumy before the war was unclear. Some even asked in what part of Ukraine this city is located.

Now, with the active demonstration of military maps and green corridors in the news, the map of Ukraine for internal and external audiences no longer seems to be something unknown, and therefore many settlements have become a household name lately. For example, in Google search as of 16 March, when we enter the query “Sumy Ukraine”, the news tab gives out more than six million mentions including in *Reuters*, *The Guardian*, *Al Jazeera*, *CNN*, etc.



Figure 3: Comparison of Telegram publication views in the Sumy Regional Military Administration channel on February 16 (from the left) and March 11 (from the right)

Source: Telegram

Dark tourism vs. Phoenix tourism

The term ‘dark tourism’ was introduced in 1996 by J. Lennon and M. Foley and it is about “sites and events that are associated with death, disaster, suffering, violence and killing”.¹⁶ Some literature sources also label it as “thanatourism”.

¹⁶ John Lennon: Dark Tourism. In John Lennon (ed.): *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017.

In the work on the post-conflict tourism opportunity spectrum, the authors describe three directions for the development of post-war tourism: phoenix, hybrid and normalisation. The first is characterised by the restoration and the emergence of new tourist magnets, sites, goods and experiences. The stage of hybrid development “adds in ‘regrowth’ of a predominantly past cultural and heritage base”, and normalisation is typical for mature destinations that have not been a territory of conflict for a long time.¹⁷

The adjective ‘dark’ has a negative connotation of evil and harm. If the goal is to attract a tourist who, during and after the visit, will be filled with compassion, empathy and admiration for the country that “is rising from the ashes”, then in this case the concept of phoenix tourism is the most appropriate one. Phoenix is a symbol of immortality, resurrection after death through fire (Figure 4). The name “phoenix” originates from the Greek word, which means red (fiery) colour in connection with the legend of its rebirth in a cleansing flame. The Phoenix gained popularity after being featured in J. K. Rowling’s “Harry Potter” series of novels.




Figure 4: An example of a touristic campaign logo for post-war tourism in Ukraine

Note: The blue and yellow colours symbolise the Ukrainian flag, and the red spots represent blood.

Source: Created by the author on canva.com.

In their work on phoenix tourism, S. Causevic and P. Lynch write about the cathartic experiences that tourists get during their visits to these or other sites accompanied by a guide. The importance of guides cannot be underestimated, as they are like a magnifying glass for the tourist to see the details and read between the lines. Moreover, history knows cases when guides were used as a source of propaganda. For example, starting from 1938, General Franco in Spain had been using tour guides to promote his political ideas when the

¹⁷ Stephen Boyd et al.: Post-Conflict Tourism Opportunity Spectrum (POCTOS): A Framework for Destinations Recovering from Conflict. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism*, (2021). 1–18.

country was in turmoil.¹⁸ E. Cohen's research identifies two types of guides: the pathfinder and the mentor.¹⁹ The first type is more about accompanying and showing the way to unique places, and natural objects (for example, climbing a mountain). But if we talk about mentors, then they provoke a tourist to search for meanings, after their excursions a person leaves with questions and food for thought. This has a longer-lasting effect compared to sightseeing; figuratively, this term can be replaced by "sightfeeling" when it comes to a mentoring tour. The effect of such knowledge of the city will evoke empathy, self-reflection, and discussions in the online and offline environment of the tourist even after they return home. Therefore, one of the tasks of post-war tourism will be the quality training of guides—mentors, who, in addition to foreign language skills and knowledge of history, are eyewitnesses of events. This type of activity can be an excellent part-time job for students of geographical, historical and tourism faculties or for people who lost their jobs due to conflict (professional retraining).

In conclusion, the message for potential visitors could be the following: post-war tourism in Ukraine is about witnessing and helping the revitalisation in every aspect. The desire to live is stronger than death and Ukraine is still alive and welcomes everyone to witness that. Its nation, culture and history are alive and its spirit is unbreakable. Your visit will be a huge gesture of support for the local community that greatly benefits the Ukrainian economy.

Foreign and domestic experiences

There are many examples in the world of how ongoing and post-conflict countries and cities resumed the flow of tourists to their territories (Germany, Egypt, Israel, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda). The domestic example is Ukrainian Chornobyl, where there is still a high radiation background,²⁰ but this does not stop domestic and foreign tourists from visiting this zone to look at the devastation caused by human error.²¹ And this is evidenced by statistical data, which were summed up by the State Enterprise "Center for Organizational, Technical and Information Support of the Exclusion Zone Management".²² According to the Enterprise, in 2021 the exclusion zone was visited by 73,086 people; which is twice as many as in 2020 – 36,450 people. Tourist trips to North Korea, a closed state from the outside world, are also possible (koryogroup.com; uritours.com; koreakonsult.com) even though it ranks 30th in the fragile states index for 2021.²³ The flow of tourists continues to the former German Nazi concentration and extermination

¹⁸ Senija Causevic – Paul Lynch: Phoenix Tourism: Post-Conflict Tourism Role. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 38, no. 3 (2011). 780–800.

¹⁹ Erik Cohen: The Tourist Guide: The Origins, Structure and Dynamics of a Role. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 12, no. 1 (1985). 5–29.

²⁰ SaveEcoBot: *Radiological Maps in Ukraine – Radiation Monitoring*.

²¹ Zsuzsanna Marton et al.: Holidays to the Hells of Earth – Taking Risk as a Dark Tourist? *Deturope – The Central European Journal of Tourism and Regional Development*, 12, no. 1 (2020). 136–153.

²² ДП – Центр організаційно-технічного і інформаційного забезпечення управління зоною відчуження: Чорнобиль – Зона, що притягує.

²³ Country Dashboard: *Fragile States Index: North Korea*. s. a.

camp, such as Auschwitz–Birkenau: in 2019 over two million tourists visited their sites.²⁴ According to Stone, we consider these kinds of places ‘sites of death’, the second type of site is ‘associated with death’.²⁵

If we look at the Hungarian capital, Budapest, there are monuments to the genocide associated with the dreadful events: the shoes on the Danube embankment and the monument to the victims of the Nazi occupation. Also, in Budapest, there are tours of the Jewish quarter, where the ghetto was located from November 1944 to January 1945 (site of death), and there is a cemetery on the territory of the large synagogue where the Jews who died during the Holocaust are buried.²⁶ Now, it is a neighbourhood with many ruin bars, restaurants and nightclubs.

Another European capital that is overflowing with dark tourism sites is Berlin. During any tour of the city centre, you will be taken to the Führerbunker, Checkpoint Charlie and through the Holocaust Memorial. You will also be advised to visit the Topography of Terror, which is an outdoor and indoor history museum located on the site of buildings that were the headquarters of the Gestapo and SS during the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945. The history of the city is woven into the history of wars, and no story about the capital of Germany can now be told without the Berlin Wall, which memorial is included in the top 10 sights of Berlin.²⁷

Bosnia and Herzegovina is at the stage of hybrid tourism since the conflict in the territory of this country took place from 1992 to 1995, which is still a part of the living memory of the population. At this stage, researchers note the importance of separating the image of the country from the conflict and redirecting the attention of a potential tourist from the war to other achievements of the country and its unique characteristics.²⁸ It can be assumed that the hybrid stage begins 15–20 years after the end of the conflict. A striking example of hybrid tourism is the assortment of souvenir stalls in Sarajevo, where on the same shelf you can find postcards with the main sights of the city, the 1984 Olympics, and ones depicting the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a meeting of the Bosnian army during the siege or coffins burying.²⁹ In Sarajevo, you can easily join dark tours, which bring you to thematic places of the war. The main ‘attraction’ on this route is the Tunnel of Hope, now serving as a museum, which was the only connection between the city and the outside world during the siege.³⁰ It is a symbol of resistance, like the Road of Life through Lake Ladoga to Leningrad during the Second World War.

²⁴ Memorial and Museum Auschwitz–Birkenau Former German Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camp: 2 million 320 thousand visitors at the Auschwitz Memorial in 2019. *News*, 07 January 2020.

²⁵ Boyd et al. (2021): op. cit.

²⁶ Еврейский музей и центр толерантности: Шенген не нужен. Онлайн-прогулка по еврейскому кварталу в Будапеште от Эстер Халас. *YouTube*.

²⁷ Visit Berlin: Berlin’s Top 10 Attractions. *Visit Berlin*, 07 February 2013; TripAdvisor: *The 15 Best Things to Do in Berlin – 2022*.

²⁸ Skoko et al. (2018): op. cit.

²⁹ Patrick J. Naef: Travelling through a Powder Keg: War and Tourist Imaginary in Sarajevo. *Via Tourism Review*, no. 1 (2012.)

³⁰ Nicholas Wise – Ivo Mulec: Semblances of ‘War Tourism’ in Sarajevo, Post-2005. *American Journal of Tourism Management*, 3, 1B (2014). 1–9.

Sri Lanka, where the civil war lasted for almost 30 years, reopened to the world in 2009, and the tourism industry has been showing positive results. In the studies about tourism in Sri Lanka, a survey was conducted, where one of the questions was about the acceptance of visiting the military ruins. Most respondents expressed a desire for a post-war experience,³¹ which shows an interest of visitors to post-conflict sites. This raises the question of the tourists' motivation (push factors) to visit such places.

In the bachelor's work *Tourists' Motivation for Engaging in Dark Tourism*,³² in the process of literature review, the author revealed that people are primarily driven by curiosity, fear and acceptance of the fact that death is an integral part of the life cycle. But since it is impossible to go through the death stage and return to the previous one, visitors "touch" death through the prism of other people's destinies. Also, in the process of her research, the author of the latter work states that people visit such places with an educational function to gain more information and knowledge about the events associated with a particular site; it is not only an interest but also a desire to ascertain the veracity of what happened and to recognise it through one's presence and experience. Visiting Ukraine, tourists will also be able to get this information directly from the witnesses of the war, each of whom has their personal story, different from the other. These circumstances add emotional depth to the perception of information.

Adding to push factors for coming to dangerous sites, we should mention cinematography. The number of foreign visitors to Chernobyl in 2021 was 33,914.³³ For most of them, according to the survey, the factor which prompted them to come was the release of the series "Chernobyl" on HBO in 2019 which was filmed in Ukraine and Lithuania.³⁴

Also, it is important to mention the international movement of volunteers to developing countries and its rising popularity. According to researchers in this field, volunteers choose this path as they are driven by the push factors like the desire to help others, make a difference, live in another country, learn something new, gain experience and save humanity.³⁵ It is worth mentioning that referring to the Ukrainian Government "20,000 foreign nationals have applied to join the fight against Russia",³⁶ which also shows interest and concern among the international community. They filled the applications through the specially created website *ukrforeignlegion.com*. A platform similar to the latter can be created for volunteers in the period of post-war rehabilitation.

³¹ J. A. S. C. Jayasinghe – C. T. R. Thalgaswatte: *An Exploratory Study on Post-War Tourism Marketing in Eastern Province of Sri Lanka and its Implications for Market Segmentation*. 2010.

³² Barbara Deutsch: *Tourists' Motivations for Engaging in Dark Tourism. Case Study of Apartheid Memorials in South Africa*. Bachelor Thesis. Vienna, Modul University, 2014.

³³ ДП – Центр організаційно-технічного і інформаційного забезпечення управління зоною відчуження: Чорнобиль – зона, що притягує.

³⁴ Tímea Zsófia Tóth – Árpád F. Papp-Váry: From Nuclear Disaster to Film Tourism: The Impact of the Chernobyl Mini-Series on the Exclusion Zone. In Rita Baleiro – Rosária Pereira (eds.): *Global Perspectives on Literary Tourism and Film-Induced Tourism*. IGI Global, 2021. 280–301.

³⁵ Stephanie M. Topp et al.: Motivations for Entering and Remaining in Volunteer Service: Findings from a Mixed-Method Survey among HIV Caregivers in Zambia. *Human Resources for Health*, 13 (2015); Stephen L. Wearing: Volunteer Tourism. *Tourism Recreation Research*, 28, no. 3 (2003). 3–4; Olagoke Akintola: What Motivates People to Volunteer? The Case of Volunteer AIDS Caregivers in Faith-Based Organizations in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. *Health Policy and Planning*, 26, no. 1 (2011). 53–62.

³⁶ Mariya Petkova: Ukraine's Foreign Legion Joins the Battle against Russia. *Al Jazeera*, 14 March 2022.

Consequently, the restoration of Ukrainian infrastructure can become a magnet (a pull factor) for the flow of volunteers from other countries, investments in the above-mentioned funds and tourism; people aspire to become a part of history, or at least ‘touch’ it.

Conclusions

The Russian Federation attacked Ukraine and is now in a state of war. The country will need to get out of the crisis and at the same time use all possible resources and tools, including city marketing. The whole world is supporting Ukraine currently, and a similar level of support can be expected after the end of the war. Therefore, the world community will need to be told exactly what the country’s needs are and what kind of assistance it requires.

First of all, it must be considered that the consumer composition of urban marketing has changed and now also includes refugees abroad and internally displaced people. Communication is well established with all categories of target audiences through Telegram channels. The main thing is not to abandon them, but after the hostilities shift the focus of attention from the war to restoration.

In touristic strategies and materials, it is worth abandoning the term dark tourism and giving preference to phoenix tourism. Thus, the mental picture of the consumer will not reflect death and suffering, which depress perception, but rebirth and restoration.

The experience of many countries and cities shows that it is possible to return the flow of tourists to the settlements. Tourists are driven by many factors that need to be “warmed up” by appropriate actions on the part of Ukrainian cities so that the trip takes place, and not just stays as a line on the wish list.

Summing up, we can single out the following motives for tourists to visit Ukraine after the end of the war and the appropriate measures so that motivation turns into action (Table 1).

Table 1: The push factors for visiting post-war Ukrainian cities and their corresponding pull factors for attracting the visitors

Push factors to visit	The tasks to create pull factors and attract the visitor
Interest in post-war life and people who survived the hostilities, curiosity to see the destroyed objects. An individual need to feel the risk and danger.	To ensure foreign media coverage with the right messages for potential visitors To maintain the Telegram channels activity To facilitate movies creation based on these events To provide tour guides training To conserve the buildings beyond economic repair as a visiting site (temporary or permanently)
The manifestation of sympathy and admiration for the people opposing the aggressor.	To involve the locals in the communication with visitors To collect the war diaries (text/audio/video) with personalised stories and prompt their dissemination
Desire to participate in the restoration of infrastructure or community support as a volunteer.	To create an online platform with locations where volunteers are needed and the possibility to apply To ensure a safe environment

Source: Compiled by the author.

The author also considers it necessary to list the questions that have been raised in the process of this study and require further attention from scientists of different fields to find answers:

- How to return citizens of Ukraine from foreign countries?
- How to return an investor?
- How to advance domestic tourism?

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Public Diplomacy and Its Related Concept to Soft Power: Ecuadorian Commitment

Stefany CEVALLOS¹

This article addresses the Ecuadorian public diplomacy to the European audience. Public diplomacy is focused on soft power. Socialism of the 21st century background is mentioned in this paper with the aim of the construction of a country image to accelerate the local socio-economic development in the international arena. The conceptual framework of this research was designed to address this correlation between governance, and socio-economic development to contribute to our current understanding of the role of locality in public management and to describe the theory and practice of urban marketing as a greater engagement with Ecuadorian public diplomacy. Urban marketing is a fundamental support for these. Citizens, businesses, governments and employees are a policy priority due to the fact that cities are a key factor for the new industrial scenario to converge all segments of society. In addition, the paper briefly presents the highlight of the former president Rafael Correa Delgado as best national representative of soft power use in an Ecuadorian single country case study from a sociological spectrum. The methodology applied is both primary and secondary sources including various books in Spanish language, the Constitution of Ecuador, journal articles, Ecuadorian government reports and implementation plans.

Keywords: *public diplomacy, soft power, urban marketing, governance, public management*

Introduction

This article expects to share the Ecuadorian panorama of public diplomacy to enable the Hungarian and European reader to develop a perspective of the context of Socialism of the 21st century in Ecuador and the South American region.

First, the concept of Nye, must be emphasised, which is often referenced by scholars. Soft power in public diplomacy is the ability in which the state can communicate and the understanding that public policies can change with the administration or leader; but culture and values tend to be longer in duration. Hence, it is clear that smart power strategy combines hard and soft power in separate ways, according to Joseph Nye.²

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² Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: The Decline of America's Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, 83, no. 3 (2004). 16–19.

This work deals with diplomatic success referring to the management and projection of the image or country branding of Ecuador, specifically, what is recognised as public diplomacy. In this sense, it will include the dimension of urban marketing as an instrument of international projection that has had, paradoxically, difficulty in being used by most of the actors in the governmental system. Explanations about the slow spread and adoption of public diplomacy are not easy to propose or generalise, nor are they the main object of this paper; but it is important to record how its study has been developed and how it is possible to include urban marketing in the fundamental aspect of Ecuador's foreign policy.

Public diplomacy

Diplomacy bestowing to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2008) in *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* is understood as the art of negotiating amongst States using practices and methods that seek to directly communicate and/or exert influence, between one and the other. The term 'public diplomacy' was first used in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston.³ Indeed, public diplomacy as an international term dates from the mid-1960s at a specific moment in the evolution of foreign policy in the United States around the Cold War.⁴

The contemporary practice of public diplomacy is frequently justified by referring to the concept of soft power developed by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. at the end of the Cold War, which emphasises the usefulness it gives to an international actor being admired for their values or culture.

In fact, in its purest beginnings, the term propaganda was coined during the Counter Reformation by Ignacio de Loyola as part of his conceptualisation of the scope of the Catholic church.

In practice, most of the academic literature in this field has positioned Latin America only as a target for public diplomacy, and for propaganda for others. A good example is the American Dream.⁵

Public diplomacy is defined as the conduct of international relations by governments, private individuals, and groups through public media communications, trying to positively influence the perception of a country's image abroad. The technological progress and globalisation have heralded the improvement of communication strategies among states and its more representative example is e-government.

Public diplomacy seeks to exceed exclusively governmental communications. Therefore, it is possible to understand the propagandistic nature of public diplomacy, since, using various means, the State or private persons (stakeholders) seek to influence

³ Alfonso Nieto – María Peña: La diplomacia pública: los medios informativos como instrumento de política exterior. *Estudios Políticos*, 9, nos. 13, 14, 15 (2008). 149–163.

⁴ Nicholas J. Cull: *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 258–260.

⁵ The American Dream has been conveyed to Central America, the Caribbean and South American countries through Hollywood films for decades, and this is still the case today.

attitudes and the decision-making process directly or indirectly in politics locally and internationally.⁶

In this way, States have introduced specific means to promote a favourable international presence and image, using the media and broadcasting, as well as carrying out the promotion of cultural and sports events, in addition to encouraging the organisation of academic exchanges with the central objective of promoting the construction of a relationship between States and citizens of other countries, beyond government relations.⁷ This set of actions is what some authors call “public diplomacy”.

The soft power function of public diplomacy is reflected in its ability to promote national interest and influence foreign audiences through interaction based on understanding and mutual understanding. Specifically, public diplomacy is generally underpinned by values, ideals, and policies that shape a country’s image, making public diplomacy and soft power complementary to each other. As the leading exponent of soft power and renowned internationalist, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. points out, this type of power attenuates the military and economic and focuses on a less coercive aspect of power, such as influence in the international system. Besides, agreeing with Nicholas J. Cull’s definition, it is “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign audience”.⁸ Unlike traditional diplomacy, which has as its main objective governments and organisations (that is, conventional subjects of international law), public diplomacy is directed at civil society.

Marca país or nation branding

Returning to the line of conceptual analysis of the Socialism of the 21st century: there is no image without identity. Building the image is to communicate the identity by all possible means and resources. In the context of the period 2007–2017, its greatest exponent was former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa Delgado, considered the greatest communication asset of the Government of Socialism of the 21st century; a leader who made it clear that overexposure did not bother him and concentrated all the channels for sending out messages to his constituents by using social media: Facebook and Twitter. He was a scholar, cyclist, revolutionary, charismatic leader with great aptitude. He was the cornerstone of any strategy, a character who exploited the media rhythms to control the agenda or to attract it when the coverage no longer referred to his government. He began to experience this way of occupying the communicative dimension of the public and political aspects of Ecuador when he was a candidate and ended up consolidating it in power. With the incorporation of the publicist Vinicio Alvarado, owner of the Creacional agency, and

⁶ Eytan Gilboa: Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12, no. 2 (2001). 1–28.

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, no. 1 (2008). 94–109.

⁸ Cull (2008): op. cit. 251.

the Mexican firm Cuarto de Guerra S.C., owned by José Adolfo Ibinarriaga, an executed proposal with significant creative potential was developed.⁹

As Ávila maintains, an electoral communication strategy was established that combined tradition with modernity, in a sort of hybrid format that is very typical of Latin American political culture. They were atypical and challenging television spots, which appealed to the values of popular culture, which managed to insert a discourse of change and passion for the country through the so-called “revolución ciudadana”.¹⁰ As president elect, his target was his constant and careful communication strategy, which has not presented problems in adapting over the course of recent years to the new platforms of court interaction digital technology, hand in hand with the accelerated entry into the Ecuadorian market of mobile devices and smartphones. At times he was accused of extremely polarising opinions, directly confronting the media or exacerbating national myths, appropriating transversal signifiers of the population, and what was evident was that since the Government had come into power, political communication had a permanent stamp on the official apparatus. In fact, the communication structure was not established spontaneously, but as a media amplifying engine of government actions.

Television had been of great importance for the former president Rafael Correa, especially in the first period of his presidency, when the digitalisation of communications was not yet consolidated on a massive level or did not translate into the intensive use of cell phones or social media. Since 2006, there had been permanent and expeditious interaction at the time of establishing popular contact like his former partner, President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, through his program “Alo President”. An interesting aspect of his audiovisual and radio proposal called “Enlace Ciudadano” or “Citizen Outreach” TV program he hosted was the activation of popular networks of his government, which had prepared the issues, solutions and messages with the communities themselves very well arranged in advance.¹¹

The power of his speech was displayed in a language that went through different states of mind from the great narratives of salvation, thus sacralising his politics and the government project: “They are secularized theological concepts put to work to create a profound mystical-salvific bond between the ruler and the ruled.”¹²

After a decade and with economic indicators that appealed to the growth of the country and greater access to connectivity, the Government had more points of contact available with citizens, so it was political strategic communication that had to evolve and become more professional, assuming the political contexts and the promulgation, in 2013, of the Organic Law of Communication, which was resisted in the private media industry.

⁹ Caroline Ávila: *La patria, Eloy Alfaro y la revolución ciudadana*. In Mario Riorda – Omar Rincón (eds.): *Comunicación gubernamental en acción. Narrativas presidenciales y mitos de Gobierno*. Buenos Aires, Biblios, 2016. 187–206.

¹⁰ Ávila (2016): op. cit. 189.

¹¹ Claudio Elórtegui: *Populismo y comunicación. La política del malestar en el contexto latinoamericano*. Barcelona, UOC Press, 2013.

¹² Pilar Pérez: *El presidente Rafael Correa y su política de redención*. *Ecuador Debate*, no. 80 (2010). 77–94.

Frame setting

Political agendas and the establishment of frames are part of a symbolic and power dispute in which the local news and its coverage transcend national borders and try to impact foreign media. For this reason, Entman¹³ refers to the concept of mediated public diplomacy, as “the organized attempts by a president and his foreign policy team to exercise as much control as possible over the framework of the politics of a country in foreign media”. One of its relevant functions of mediated public diplomacy is the dissemination of frames, defined as the act of selecting and highlighting some aspect of a certain situation or topic, with the purpose of promoting a particular interpretation. Entman¹⁴ points out that the interpretation is given, generally, by a discourse that includes a definition of the problem that generates a defined policy, the analysis of its causes, a moral evaluation of the actors involved and a possible solution.

Method

To better develop this topic, the methodology considered the review of 116 items, corresponding to the tweets published by the Twitter account of Rafael Correa (@Mashi Rafael)¹⁵ – Twitter, in 2016. The data obtained in the sample were systematised and coded through an analysis sheet that considered four variables, two quantitative and two qualitative, divided into categories such as: repercussion impact on Twitter, topic of the item, strategic objectives, geographical focus, personalisation, communication resources and interpretations.

Subsequently, the results were analysed with the statistical computer program SPSS,¹⁶ which facilitates the understanding and interpretation of the results. The methodology used in the analysis of Correa’s tweets was the analysis of contingency tables, “a technique aimed at studying the relationship between two or more qualitative or categorical variables measured at the nominal and ordinal level”.¹⁷

Research findings

The main aspects shown were the following: Rafael Correa Delgado’s account was actively used and ranges from receiving congratulations for his mandate: *the most clever and handsome president of the history of Ecuador*, to hatred and accusations or

¹³ Robert Entman: Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13, no. 2 (2008). 87–102.

¹⁴ Robert Entman: *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago–London, The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

¹⁵ «Mashi» in kichwa o Quichua language means Amigo (Spanish) – Friend.

¹⁶ Bienvenido Visauta Vinacua: *Análisis estadístico con SPSS para Windows*. Madrid, McGraw Hill, 1997.

¹⁷ Pedro López-Roldán – Sandra Fachelli: Análisis de tablas de contingencia. In Pedro López-Roldán – Sandra Fachelli (eds.): *Metodología de la investigación social cuantitativa*. Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Dipòsit Digital de Documents, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2015. 61.

complaints by citizens. Their messages (replying 116 tweets) were written logically but with a revolutionary spectrum. Undeniably, their messages connect easily with the civil society of Ecuador, with interests of the South American region and with foreign groups that feel closer to the Latin American socialist project.

Indeed, having consolidated Citizen Power model linked to the former president and the sense of national purpose in the Ecuadorian population. In the same context of the Socialism of the 21st century, several public diplomacy projects were carried out, among the most relevant:

The national return plan in Ecuador “Bienvenido a casa” “Welcome home”

The Ecuadorian Government through its diplomatic missions worldwide executed the Return Plan, through the Embassies abroad and the National Migrant Secretariat providing the necessary assistance to Ecuadorian professionals who would benefit from the Return Plan to work as teachers in their home country. The initiative offered them the opportunity to return to Ecuador with a temporary work contract until they passed the merit-based competition that, once approved, would lead to obtaining a permanent position within the teaching profession or the highest authority of the Ministry of Education.

The National Return Plan had been presented in the cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia, where the largest number of Ecuadorian migrants resided. This was intended to provide a solution to the difficulties of professional and non-professional Ecuadorians in Spain, as well as to strengthen the educational system of Ecuador with skilled professionals.

Project Yasuni-ITT (CGY)

The failed Ecuadorian Project Yasuni initiative wanted to avoid the emission of 407 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO₂) by forgoing extraction and burning of fossil fuels in the extensions of the Amazonian region of Ecuador.

Initial approaches of soft power went around the world. Countries targeted included France, where, through the General Council of Meurthe et Moselle of France, Yasuni-ITT Guarantee Certificate (CGY) received the contribution of 53,763 US dollars to the Trust Fund of the Yasuni-ITT initiative. The Council also promoted the creation of the French association “Viva Yasuni”, from November 2010 until its constitution in September 2012.

The environmental project proposed by the former government of President Rafael Correa, had as its purpose to protect life in the Yasuni National Park, the most biodiverse place on the planet, and to respect a minimum living space for people in voluntary isolation. In this context, Ecuador in 2008 became the first country in the world to recognise nature as a legal entity and enshrined the right of people to live in a healthy environment in its constitution as quoted below:

Chapter Seven: Rights of Nature

Article 71. Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples, and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and interpret these rights, the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as appropriate. The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an ecosystem.

Article 72. Nature has the right to be restored. This restoration shall be apart from the obligation of the State and natural persons or legal entities to compensate individuals and communities that depend on affected natural systems. In those cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, the State shall establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and shall adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental consequences.

Article 73. The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures on activities that might lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the permanent alteration of natural cycles. The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that might definitively alter the nation's genetic assets is forbidden.

Article 74. Persons, communities, peoples, and nations shall have the right to benefit from the environment and the natural wealth enabling them to enjoy the good way of living. Environmental services shall not be subject to appropriation; their production, delivery, use and development shall be regulated by the State.

Consequently, invariably, public diplomacy is related to the power over time and, particularly, to the “soft power” of a State, according to Nye.¹⁸ However, it is not exclusively the concern of the State that can conduct actions in terms of public diplomacy. The participation of civil society and private organisations plays an important role in seeking support from foreign audiences.

The presence of Ecuador

The term in office of the current president of Ecuador, Guillermo Lasso 2021–2025, is characterised by a non-binding and ill-thought-out policy. In practice, there is no real monitoring or supervision of Ecuador's image abroad and reporting on the results, which would help shape Ecuador's strategy for communication abroad.

After Socialism of the 21st century an overview of how Ecuador was perceived abroad in the recent years is time off. However, there is a report focusing on perceptions of Ecuador among the public abroad based on the results of the 2021 Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index (NBI), and it reveals where Ecuador's strengths and weaknesses lie in terms of its image abroad and how it fares in international comparison. Besides, the report examines the correlation between Ecuador's good overall image and the appraisal of the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Ecuador made the position 53 of the dimension concerned with export products and innovation, governance, people, and immigration and investment, as well as tourism.

¹⁸ Nye (2008): op. cit. 95.

Urban marketing

Urban marketing gives the very first impression and delivers a Message about their value. Since nations or states today need to re-engage popular support, they should use the power of branding.¹⁹ Indeed, soft power in practice is the ability of a government to promise a better world and it strives to deliver one and its constituents eagerly look forward to embarking on the road to development, peace, welfare and social stability. In addition, it is considered that the application of urban marketing depends to a great extent on the construction, communication and management of the image of the city. Besides, it frames the available resources and achievements of a country or other political entity in order to seem favourable and attractive in the eyes of possible allies and supporters.

There are two processes: image building and nation branding,²⁰ which are experiencing greater growth in place marketing for development of cities and countries. Consequently, in the case of local projects an evaluation is taking place in intangible assets when new processes of political and social participation are unfolding.²¹ In fact, place marketing is an asset for image construction to ensure the development of its entire concept, from the strengthening of the city image to that mainstream integrated quality in the country leading to good governance practices.

Brand is a product or service, and branding is the process of planning and designing to build or manage reputation. Nations, regions and cities do have brand images: they are usually branded.²² In that sense, identity logo, image reputation, purpose, shared values and external promises are shared, in addition to a persuasion of equity or good will. Indeed, for branding it is important to emphasise that trademark is not owned only by one brand because the image may reside in the mind of the consumer in a remote location.

The main target groups in place marketing are tourists, citizens, students and employees. The tourist board promotes the country to holidaymakers and business travellers.²³ Agencies, Fairs and international scenarios promote the country to foreign companies and investors. In cultural perspective the cultural institute builds cultural relations with other countries and promotes the country's cultural and educational products and services.²⁴ Furthermore, the Ministries present their policies to overseas publics in the best possible light, and sometimes attempt to manage the national reputation. There are other bodies and special interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and companies all promoting their version of the country, too. The most important thing to emphasise is

¹⁹ Gregory Ashworth – Stephen J. Page: Urban Tourism Research: Recent Progress and Current Paradoxes. *Tourism Management*, 32, no. 1 (2011). 1–15.

²⁰ Gregory Ashworth – Henk Voogd: *Selling the City: Marketing Approaches in Public Sector Urban Planning*. Belhaven Press, 1990.

²¹ Gregory Ashworth – Mihalis Kavaratzis: Beyond the Logo: Brand Management for Cities. *Journal of Brand Management*, 16, no. 8 (2007). 520–531.

²² Tamás Kaiser – Gábor Bozsó: The Chief Aspects of the Concept and Measurability of State-Centric Governance. In Tamás Kaiser (ed.): *Measurability of Good State and Governance II*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2016. 11–37.

²³ Giliberto Capano et al.: Bringing Governments Back in: Governance and Governing in Comparative Policy Analysis. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 17, no. 4 (2015). 311–321.

²⁴ Margaret Levi: The Study of the Study of the State. In Ira Katznelson – Helen V. Milner (eds.): *Political Science. State of the Discipline*. New York, Norton, 2003. 33–55.

that they are working in isolation. However, working collectively would be desirable for knowledge acquisition and development skills.²⁵

Besides, it is considered that the application of urban marketing depends to a great extent on the construction, communication and management of the image.²⁶ With this, in turn, as mentioned by Vásquez, it should be possible to “identify and recognize the different needs of the locality and its translations in a city-brand, the result of a collective agreement and commitment, which must not only seek to position the city abroad through its image, but also guarantee the strengthening of local identity”.²⁷ In this sense, the participation of local governments is at the level of the “city brand”, which in turn can also have impacts at a higher level in relation to the country brand.²⁸ For local governments of developing countries, a positive association with the governments of other countries, new markets and international organisations may be seen as a milestone of projection and reputation. In this sense, by ensuring its economic position, Ecuador, as other South American countries, seeks to increase the influence of Foreign Direct Investment in its development. This search occurs not only by attracting large amounts of money, but also benefiting from it in areas such as technology, employment, skilled migrants, exports, qualification and, in general, competitiveness.²⁹

From the legal framework perspective, Ecuador has the Executive Decree of Law No. 793, which includes regulatory amendments related to tax matters for the application of the Organic Law of Incentives for Public-Private Associations and Foreign Investment (2015). The purpose of this is to establish incentives for the execution of projects, and, in general terms, to promote productive financing, national investment and foreign investment in Ecuador. In addition to this, Ecuador also has a specific law: Organic Act for the promotion of production, attraction of investments, generation of employment, and fiscal stability and balance (2018). According to Keeble,³⁰ this law is presented as a great attraction, an incentive for foreign investment in the country. The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador and the corresponding legal framework establish that the management of international cooperation is the responsibility of subnational governments. In this context, the latter have already had experience working with international cooperation agencies, through which contributions have been made to local development processes. For example, work carried out with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and its investment promotion agencies.

²⁵ Laurance E. Lynn, Jr: The Many Faces of Governance. Adaptation? Transformation? Both? Neither? In David Levi-Faur (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 49–64.

²⁶ Mihalis Kavaratzis et al. (eds.): *Rethinking Place Branding. Comprehensive Brand Development for Cities and Regions*. Cham, Springer, 2014.

²⁷ Sandra Ornés Vásquez: La gestión urbana sostenible: conceptos, rol del gobierno local y vinculación con el marketing urbano. *Provincia*, no. 31 (2014). 161.

²⁸ Simon Anholt: *Competitive Identity. The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

²⁹ Simon Anholt: *Brand New Justice. How Branding Places and Products Can Help the Developing World*. Oxford, Butterworth–Heinemann, 2005.

³⁰ James Eduard Keeble – Diego Ramírez Mesec: Promoting Investment and Developing Production in Ecuador. *Revista Internacional Jurídica y Empresarial*, no. 2 (2019). 151–156.

Investment promotion agencies are the institutions responsible for promoting foreign investment in a specific area. These types of institutions can be government non-profit organisations, or even private entities run by boards of directors that can include government officials and business managers. Therefore, one of the main activities of an investment promotion agency is the positioning of the country in the international market, a task that implies the construction of a favourable image, and with this, the creation of a “Country Branding”. It is important to note that the United Nations offers support for the promotion of investment for the sustainable development of cities, and that local governments are essential entities to ensure the 2030 SDGs.

In real terms, in most developing countries, such as Ecuador, the government is the one who directs these dynamics, which is why governance and good governance depend to a great extent on it. In a broader sense, who provides governance is the key concern. This is so if we consider the case of developing countries, especially in Latin America, where the States provides public service, the latter being where governance should materialise.

In this way, governance in local instances connotes a sense of direction in the capacity and integrated quality of government action. However, it is difficult to assign a single definition to governance, as this term changed from being descriptive to being analytical. “Governance is itself the object of a theoretical debate in which the diversity of traditions and currents in the social sciences is reflected.”³¹

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador of 2008, namely, its article on the Organic Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization (COOTAD), the model of administration, decentralization and development of the Decentralized Autonomous Governments is determined in the field of planning, in addition to other State regulations at the national level:

Article 1. Scope. This Code establishes the political-administrative organization of the Ecuadorian State in the territory: the regime of the different levels of decentralized autonomous governments and the special regimes, in order to guarantee their political, administrative and financial autonomy. In addition, it develops a model of compulsory and progressive decentralization through the national system of competences, including the institutions responsible for its administration, the sources of financing and the definition of policies and mechanisms to compensate for imbalances in territorial development.

Decentralized Autonomous Governments are legal entities of public law with political, administrative and financial autonomy. Local governments then have the capacity to formulate and execute public decisions and, above all, they can generate strategic links with other public or private actors. In March 2019, 5,675 authorities were elected for the levels of provincial government (23 provinces), cantonal (221 cantons), parochial (823 parishes) and the special regime of Galapagos (CNE 2019). These local government authorities are the ones that carry out public policies in the territory. Central government administers management strategies, but the local government, in its scope of action, adjusts political decisions in a more operational and technical way to realise them with the citizens. This is

³¹ Guillaume Fontaine: *Petropolítica: Una teoría de la gobernanza energética*. Flacso-Sede Ecuador, 2010. 106.

a governance process where dialogue and negotiation occur with private actors, in addition to the different groups that have a direct relationship with local governments due to their interest in investing.

Preliminary balance

The Ecuadorian commitment has understood that every country wants to sell its unique identity and secure its place on a map. Indeed, the leading actor in this process is undoubtedly the government. Through its public diplomacy, as well as its global persuasion efforts, it will be able to build an image that is consequently reflected in opinions, ideas and ultimately investment decisions. Country branding thus offers business opportunities to promote business activities with a positive balance for Ecuador and should be assumed by the central government and local governments. The political sphere is fully aware that the government at all levels is the only entity that can sell this nation branding.

A brief challenging socio-economic context such as the one present in a developing country like Ecuador, in relation to public diplomacy and urban marketing, allows us to point out, in the first instance, that the national government and local governments, whether provincial or municipal, face multiple and independent changes at the time to manage their services and resources.

Conclusion

A country's legal and regulatory framework is promoted internationally, so it generates proposals for international agreements and once the investment is received, it provides services to ensure the investors stay in the country. Governments seek to execute public projects with private participation as consideration for their investment. Governments are considered key actors for international expansion, since they may or may not incorporate the experience of a private entity to create, acquire and operate a public infrastructure and offer a service. Undeniably, a determining factor is competitiveness as well as the ability to significantly improve its branding to anchor itself in the international arena.

The countries³² have sought to align themselves with the world trend and this is how it consolidates a process of creation and dissemination of its brand with the sole purpose of strengthening the imaginary that it communicates.

In this sense, the objective of this work was to make visible the importance of public diplomacy and the reputation of countries in the framework of place branding and governance, applied to the Ecuadorian internationalisation, as a proposal to set clear goals for the country's economy and the strategy of inclusion in world trade. For urban marketing, the construction of a paradigm of "equitable socioeconomic reputation" has allowed the birth of new paradigms that can be placed inside a normative frame of a constitutional State

³² According to the annual report on the most valuable and strongest nation brand with a Brand Strength Index (BSI).

governed. This way, regarded as “meta-governance”, it emphasises the important position of government in governance. This positioning among equals should be established for a developed market, mature civil society and perfect political structure of countries. The lack of these necessary conditions is bound to affect the effective implementation of place marketing in governmental institutions.

In this context, the importance of public diplomacy and a country’s reputation was presented to better understand confidence in the stability and standing of a country that has a huge impact on the way it is perceived and impacts worldwide on decisions such as investing or not in a place. In fact, the present study will be helpful for introducing urban marketing in the national agenda with the prospect of public diplomacy in favour of both tourism and exports.

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Addressing Multilateralism in Interregional Forums: Evidence from the Dialogue between the European Union and Latin America¹

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The emergence of economic, political, social, and health crises brings to light the fact that, in a globalised world, isolated state responses are insufficient to face upcoming international challenges. Cooperative action, not only between states but also between regions, has become crucial. A salient case is the relationship between the European Union and Latin America. This biregional partnership is characterised by its foundation on common values inherited from a shared historical background. These values are closely related to a liberal standpoint that promotes multilateral cooperation as a way to find solutions to global issues. By studying this case, this paper aims to understand how interregional dialogue can become a driver of multilateralism and how it might reflect a political will to foster multilateral agreements. The expected result is a complex assessment of the EU – Latin American interregional dialogue examining how the official speech on multilateralism has evolved over the years and identifying whether multilateralism is a priority in the biregional agenda.

Keywords: *multilateralism, European Union, Latin America, interregional dialogue*

Introduction

International cooperation within the framework of multilateralism has become crucial given the emergence of increasingly complex global challenges. Yet, multiple phenomena jeopardise the progress of multilateral collective action. The rise of populist leaders has been closely associated with an anti-multilateral view as they tend to reject what they

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perceive as external interference beyond their personal control.³ Nationalism is also seen as an obstacle to engagement with multilateralism as some nationalist governments view multilateral commitments as impositions that threaten sovereignty.⁴ Despite this, multilateral forums are key decision-making instances for dealing with arising economic, political, social and health crises at the international level.

Multilateralism has been analysed from multiple perspectives. Particularly, the study of interregional relations contributes to understanding how regional blocs associate and agree on common behaviour in the context of multilateral forums. In this setting, one of the most studied cases is the relationship between the European Union and Latin America. This relationship relies on deep historical roots dating back to colonial times. Despite some difficulties, a common understanding between these regions has prevailed over time. In this context, this paper aims to examine whether multilateralism has been part of the agenda at the EU – Latin American summits and how it is portrayed in the official declarations. To this end, qualitative content analysis is conducted by examining all the summit declarations to identify patterns related to support for multilateralism and recognise specific proposals aimed at promoting multilateral actions. The documents were analysed individually by identifying mentions of multilateralism to compile and organise them, which helped to understand how this topic has been addressed by the biregional dialogue over the years.

The article is organised according to the following structure. First, the contextual framework is presented to describe the background of the relationship between the EU and Latin America. Secondly, an analysis of each summit declaration is provided to explain the main ideas and proposals on multilateralism identified in the texts. Thirdly, key patterns and changes are examined to provide an overview of the evolution of multilateralism as a key topic in the biregional agenda over the years. Later, a brief assessment of the main challenges of the EU – Latin American dialogue in promoting agendas in multilateral forums is presented. Finally, the article concludes by summarising the main findings and outlining possibilities for further research.

Contextual framework

The relationship between Europe and Latin America is based on deep historical roots dating back to colonial times. Several milestones in the history of Latin America are closely related to phenomena originated in Europe.⁵ Although the relationship has had periods of ups and downs, economic, social, cultural and political ties have remained strong over time. Particularly, the biregional relation acquired special relevance during

³ Daniel W. Drezner: The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 41, no. 2 (2017), 23–44.

⁴ Thomas Meyer et al.: *Cultures, Nationalism and Populism. Challenges to Multilateralism*. London, Routledge, 2019.

⁵ Anna Ayuso – Gian Luca Gardini: EU – Latin American Relations as a Template for Interregionalism. In Frank Mattheis – Andrés Litsegard (eds.): *Interregionalism across the Atlantic Space*. London, Springer International Publishing, 2018. 115–130.

the decade of 1990 due to major changes in both regions. On the one hand, after the period known as “the lost decade” in Latin America, a set of neoliberal reforms were implemented in the region to bring the economies to order. These reforms provided possibilities for investment in state-owned companies, which attracted European investors to the region.⁶ On the other hand, the creation of the EU and the development of its foreign policy played an important role in the rapprochement with other regions, especially those with which there were shared values and common understandings.

In this context, the EU sought to establish a more institutionalised relationship with Latin America.⁷ In 1999, the First Summit between the Heads of State and Government of the EU and Latin America was held in Rio de Janeiro. During this event, the EU – Latin American strategic partnership was created aiming to establish a permanent communication channel between these regions and promote a set of joint action programs to strengthen their relationship. The strategic partnership was based on three main pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and trade.⁸ Since 1999, biregional summits were held every two years, as it is shown in the table below. Major decisions regarding the joint programs were taken at these biennial events. Summit diplomacy became a key element of the interregional relationship.

Table 1: The European Union – Latin America biennial summits (EU–LA summits)

Summit	Place	Dates
I EU–LA Summit	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	28–29 June 1999
II EU–LA Summit	Madrid, Spain	17–20 May 2002
III EU–LA Summit	Guadalajara, Mexico	28–29 May 2004
IV EU–LA Summit	Vienna, Austria	12–13 May 2006
V EU–LA Summit	Lima, Peru	16–17 May 2008
VI EU–LA Summit	Madrid, Spain	17–20 May 2010
VII EU–LA Summit (named I EU–CELAC Summit)	Santiago, Chile	26–27 January 2013
VIII EU–LA Summit (named II EU–CELAC Summit)	Brussels, Belgium	10–11 June 2015

Source: Compiled by the author based on Quevedo Flores (2017): op. cit.

The lack of a regional organisation representing Latin America was an obstacle to the relationship from the beginning. The divergence of interests among countries made it difficult to reach consensus before attending biregional summits.⁹ In 2012, with the

⁶ Wolf Grabendorff: La estrategia birregional y sus limitaciones en un mundo unipolar. *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 189 (2004). 97–109.

⁷ Christian Freres – José Antonio Sanahuja: *Study on Relations between the European Union and Latin America. New Strategies and Perspectives*. Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, 2005.

⁸ Rafael Cervantes: Una nueva asociación estratégica birregional: la Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe-Unión Europea. *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, no. 61 (2000). 128–142.

⁹ Wolf Grabendorff: La asociación estratégica Unión Europea-América Latina: ¿unas relaciones birregionales con geometría variable? *Comentario Internacional*, no. 13 (2013). 155–171.

creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the first bloc that brings together all Latin American and Caribbean countries, a new stage in the biregional relationship began. CELAC was recognised as the official interlocutor of Latin America and the Caribbean, which would facilitate relations with other actors such as the EU.

CELAC was expected to help consolidate the biregional dialogue by becoming the single voice of Latin America.¹⁰ However, the proliferation of subregional initiatives has shaped the relationship since it became a dialogue between the EU, as a single actor, and a plethora of organisations and schemes on behalf of Latin American countries (such as Mercosur, CAN, Caricom and SICA).¹¹ While the creation of CELAC was the attempt to gather all Latin American countries together in a single entity, a common position and understanding in the region remain an unachieved goal.

Nowadays, the EU – Latin American relationship is going through one of its most difficult moments. Phenomena such as the Euro crisis in 2008 and the migration crisis in 2015 had a negative impact on the EU's interregional relations.¹² In addition, the Brexit process and the health emergency triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic are demanding a lot of attention in the region. Some consequences of this situation are the decrease in cooperation funds to Latin America, the lack of new initiatives and, in general, a greater skepticism of Europe towards the biregional relation. In this context, Latin America has been set aside in European foreign policy as other actors and areas have become more relevant.

On Latin America's side, CELAC's low level of institutionalisation, the ideological divisions around the Venezuelan crisis, the economic instability caused by low commodities prices and the Covid-19 pandemic and, in general, the lack of regional consensus have been detrimental to the EU–LA relationship. As a result of these intraregional crises, no biregional summits have been held since 2015, which is unprecedented. While a couple of ministerial meetings have taken place, they do not have the same relevance and impact on decision-making that the biennial summits between Heads of State and Government have.

Despite this hostile scenario, the strategic partnership remains in place and some of the biregional initiatives are active to date. In this regard, it is important to note that the EU–LA relationship is composed of a set of mechanisms and programs involving both governmental and non-state actors, making this relation an example of complex and polymorphic interregionalism.¹³ Although the most important forum of the biregional partnership is the biennial summits, there is a multiplicity of mechanisms that create a complex network of agreements and cooperation projects around which the relationship evolves and remains.

¹⁰ Lourdes García Rodríguez – Fernando Jiménez Valderrama: Balance de la asociación entre América Latina y el Caribe y la Unión Europea. *Revista IUS*, no. 33 (2014). 7–33.

¹¹ Mercosur stands for Mercado Común del Sur, CAN refers to the Andean Community, Caricom stands for the Caribbean Community and SICA refers to the Central American Integration System.

¹² Anna Ayuso: 20 años después ¿Hacia dónde va la asociación estratégica? *Pensamiento Propio*, no. 49 (2019). 53–84.

¹³ Ayuso–Gardini (2018): op. cit.

The EU–LA summits: An analysis of the declarations

Considering the role of the summits as the main decision-making instance for the EU–LA relationship, the most relevant topics on the biregional agenda are reflected in the official declarations resulting from these meetings. In order to understand how multilateralism has been addressed in the EU–LA dialogue, a comprehensive review of these documents is necessary. Therefore, in this section each summit declaration is examined to identify how multilateralism is portrayed in these documents, how often it is mentioned, and whether there are specific proposals aimed at fostering multilateral actions. Content analysis has been used to categorise and quantify the data obtained from the summits declarations observing key trends, patterns and changes regarding multilateralism in the biregional agenda. In total, eight documents were analysed; they correspond to the eight biregional summits held during the study period (from 1999 to 2021).

I EU–LA Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1999)

The first summit between the EU and Latin America laid the foundations of the biregional relationship and introduced the main objectives of the strategic partnership. The Declaration of Rio de Janeiro provides details of these first commitments highlighting the importance of the shared values inherited from the common history between the two regions. Regarding multilateralism, at the beginning of the document it is mentioned that the strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America is established in full compliance with the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁴ This first mention of the UN is the prelude to a set of references to this organisation, as one of the main messages of this declaration is that both regions have the political will to find solutions to global problems through collective action and multilateral institutions, mainly in the framework of the UN.

Throughout this declaration, the EU and Latin America stated their support for multilateral initiatives and treaties such as the Panama Comprehensive Action Plan on Drug Policies, the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Constitutive Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Fourth World Conference of Women, the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, the Rio Convention on climate change, biodiversity and desertification, the Kyoto Protocol, the Uruguay Round, the World Summit for Social Development, among others. They also recognised the importance of international cooperation in areas such as the protection of human rights, the defence of democracy, gender equality, sustainable development, trade liberalisation, environmental protection, nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against transnational crime, among others.

In this document, the leaders of both regions pledged to “strengthen multilateral institutions as fora for international dispute resolution and the promotion of development”.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Article 3.

¹⁵ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Article 31.

Furthermore, they affirmed that they would “jointly support intensifying multilateral relations, including advancing the process of reforming the United Nations system, in the search for a new balance between its principal organs, so as to improve their effectiveness”.¹⁶ Particularly, the last part of the declaration reveals how the EU – Latin American strategic partnership is at the service of multilateralism since, for example, both regions resolved to participate actively in the design of a new international financial architecture within the framework of the UN consultations¹⁷ and to use multilateral fora to promote cultural diversity and pluralism in the world.¹⁸ Finally, they committed to:

Promote closer cooperation and exchange of points of view in international fora on matters of common interest. Work jointly for the improvement of the capability of the United Nations Organization to respond in an ever more effective manner to its tasks in the new millennium, with full respect for the objectives and principles of the Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations 50 years ago.¹⁹

II EU–LA Summit (Madrid, 2002)

In this summit declaration, the continuity of the previous summit patterns is observed as some of the main statements are repeated. The representatives of the EU and Latin America pledged to “strengthen the multilateral system on the basis of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”.²⁰ In this sense, one of the commitments in the declaration was “to reinforce biregional political dialogue in international fora and consultations in the UN system and in major UN Conferences on the main questions of the international agenda”.²¹

One of the main topics of this summit was the fight against terrorism in view of the 9/11 attacks in the United States the year before the summit was held. In this regard, both regions committed to “promote the conclusion of, and adherence to, all international conventions relating to terrorism and the implementation of UN resolutions on the matter”.²² However, the summit was not limited only to that topic. As at the Rio de Janeiro summit, the leaders addressed various issues such as the protection of democratic institutions and the rule of law, poverty alleviation, gender equality and women’s empowerment, preservation of cultural heritage, the fight against racism, and nuclear non-proliferation, among others.

The declaration reflects the support of European and Latin American leaders for multilateral institutions and agreements such as the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the Doha Work Programme, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,

¹⁶ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Article 31.

¹⁷ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Article 53.

¹⁸ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Article 60.

¹⁹ *Declaration of Rio de Janeiro* (1999), Annex, Article 1.

²⁰ *Declaration of Madrid* (2002), Article 1.

²¹ *Declaration of Madrid* (2002), Article 9.

²² *Declaration of Madrid* (2002), Article 4.

the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the International Conference on e-Government for Development, the World Food Summit, the Declaration on Cultural Diversity, among others.

A particularity of this summit was the understanding of multilateralism from an international trade perspective. In this regard, the leaders claimed:

We support an open and transparent non-discriminatory multilateral trade system, in which the progressive opening of markets and the removal of trade barriers, based on stronger more transparent multilateral rules, allows everyone to benefit from the comparative advantages of their respective economies and fosters competitive integration in world trade and reduces the scope for protectionism.²³

Furthermore, they stated their firm rejection to all kinds of unilateral practices, especially those occurring in international trade. Lastly, it should be noted that, in this declaration, the leaders of both regions emphasised how the relationship is strengthened by their dialogue in international forums. In this sense, they stated: “Our biregional strategic partnership is being reinforced by deepening and widening our dialogue in international fora, particularly through political consultations in the United Nations fora and in major UN Conferences”.²⁴ Thus, not only is multilateralism strengthened by the biregional dialogue, but joint participation in multilateral fora strengthens the biregional relationship itself.

III EU–LA Summit (Guadalajara, 2004)

The structure of this summit declaration is different from the two previous ones. This declaration is divided into three main sections: multilateralism, social cohesion and biregional relationship. Devoting one section to multilateralism in the document reflects the central role of the topic in this summit’s agenda. In this regard, multiple mentions were made of the UN system and the importance of its agencies and treaties in addressing multilateral issues at the international level. For example, Article 8 of the Declaration states: “We reiterate that an effective multilateral system, based on international law, supported by strong international institutions and with the United Nations at its centre, is essential for achieving peace and international security, sustainable development and social progress.”²⁵

Particularly, the importance of the UN system is emphasised when addressing issues such as the eradication of poverty and hunger, crisis management and peaceful resolution of disputes, illicit weapons trafficking, the prohibition of torture and other degrading

²³ *Declaration of Madrid* (2002), Annex 1, Article 45.

²⁴ *Declaration of Madrid* (2002), Annex 1, Article 4.

²⁵ *Declaration of Guadalajara* (2004), Article 8.

treatment, the fight against transnational organised crime, the fight against corruption and the prevention of climate change. However, it should be noted that the EU and Latin American leaders recognise the need to reform and revitalise the UN system, including the roles and structure of the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to “make the multilateral system more responsive and effective in meeting global threats and challenges”.²⁶

The role of the UN as the focal point for multilateral initiatives is not only stated in the section on multilateralism but is also mentioned several times in the sections on social cohesion and biregional relationship. This fact reflects the firm belief of the EU and Latin America that the UN is the cornerstone of multilateral efforts in all areas and must be strengthened despite its flaws. Yet, both regions recognise that multilateralism also takes place in other instances and meeting spaces. Some of the multilateral conventions and treaties outside the UN system mentioned in the declaration are the Panama Action Plan on maritime cooperation, the Doha Round, the Cotonou Agreement, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, the World Water Forum, the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition and the World Summit on Information Society.

IV EU–LA Summit (Vienna, 2006)

This declaration has fourteen sections corresponding to the areas of action prioritised by the EU–LA leaders at this summit. One of them is entitled *Strengthening the Multilateral Approach to Fostering Peace, Stability and the Respect for International Law* and, as its name indicates, contains information on multilateral actions promoted by both regions. In this regard, at the beginning of the declaration, the leaders stated: “We further reiterate our shared commitment to a strong and effective multilateral system, to which end we are committed to advancing the multilateral agenda as a crosscutting issue and as a priority for our biregional relations.”²⁷

As in previous summits, it was claimed that the UN system should be at the center of multilateral efforts. Yet, the EU–LA leaders insisted on the need for changes in this system and reiterated their commitment to “a comprehensive reform and revitalization of the UN reinforcing its democratic nature, representativeness, transparency, accountability and efficiency”.²⁸ Some of the multilateral cooperation areas mentioned in previous summit declarations also appear in this document, for example the fight against terrorism, the protection of human rights, the defence of democracy, gender equality, nuclear non-proliferation, the prevention of climate change, the eradication of poverty, among others. However, the detailed thematic division of this declaration provided a more organised structure to the text compared to the previous ones, allowing for more details on the initiatives corresponding to each topic.

²⁶ *Declaration of Guadalajara* (2004), Article 12.

²⁷ *Declaration of Vienna* (2006), Article 3.

²⁸ *Declaration of Vienna* (2006), Article 11.

A particularity of this document is the greater prominence given to biregional initiatives to address the common challenges faced by both regions. In this sense, the leaders expressed their support for biregional cooperation spaces such as the EU–LAC Inter-Parliamentary Conference, the Eurosocial program, the European – Latin American – Caribbean Civil Society Forum, the EU–LAC Mechanism for Coordination and Cooperation on Drugs Policies, the EU–LAC Ministerial Information Society Forum, among others. Furthermore, the agreements between the EU and subregional blocs such as the Andean Community, Mercosur and Cariforum received special mention in the declaration. However, multilateral bodies, and multilateralism in general, continued to be a priority on the agenda.

V EU–LA Summit (Lima, 2008)

In this summit, unlike the previous ones, multilateralism played a secondary role in the biregional agenda but was still mentioned and recognised as relevant for the strategic partnership. For example, Article 3 of the declaration mentions that, in order to harness the potential of the relationship, both regions will:

Strengthen the multilateral system making it more effective and reinforcing its democratic nature, with the UN at its centre, through greater LAC-EU coordination and cooperation, particularly in matters on which we have undertaken specific initiatives, as well as on global issues of common interest.²⁹

Moreover, the leaders of both regions argued that unilateral coercive measures pose a serious threat to multilateralism, especially in terms of trade.³⁰ They claimed that, in the medium and longer term, a lasting response to global problems requires coordinated action from the international community.³¹ In this sense, they reaffirmed their commitment to initiatives such as the Doha Round and reiterated their willingness to reach an agreement in order to promote social development in the world.

One of the central topics of this summit was sustainable development and environmental protection. In this regard, the leaders recognised that the achievement of sustainable development is based on strengthening international cooperation, for which both regions reaffirmed their commitment to support environmental governance in the UN System and multilateral initiatives such as Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on Desertification. In addition, biregional mechanisms such as Euroclima and the EU–LA dialogue on environmental policy were created to provide a biregional response to the challenges arising from climate change.

²⁹ *Declaration of Lima* (2008), Article 3.

³⁰ *Declaration of Lima* (2008), Article 4.

³¹ *Declaration of Lima* (2008), Article 8.

The other main theme of this declaration was the eradication of poverty, inequality and exclusion. This section stressed the importance of the implementation of effective social policies, the need for economic growth with a distributive impact, and the promotion of social participation and a sense of belonging. Although the social agenda gained more importance, little mention was made of the need to foster multilateral cooperation to solve these issues compared to previous summits. In this area, biregional action was also prioritised by highlighting the role of initiatives such as the Eurosocial program. The special emphasis on the social agenda at this summit could be attributed to the greater role played at that time by left-wing governments in Latin America and their influence on the regional dialogue and establishment of priorities.

VI EU–LA Summit (Madrid, 2010)

This declaration is divided into three main sections: partners in jointly addressing global challenges, strengthening our biregional partnership, and promoting innovation and technology on a biregional scale for sustainable development and social inclusion. References to multilateralism were made mainly in the first section. In this part, both regions reiterated their commitment to multilateralism, mainly within the framework of the UN system, with the aim of promoting peace, security, freedom, democracy, human rights and prosperity.³² In this sense, they stated:

We shall intensify our efforts at both subregional and biregional levels to identify common interests and, whenever possible, coordinate positions and actions in the multilateral organizations and fora of which our countries are Parties. In order to continue promoting an effective multilateral system, we remain willing to cooperate in the reform of the United Nations, with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the UN to face the many challenges posed by the new millennium.³³

Moreover, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to support a set of multilateral initiatives such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis, the Convention to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), the Monterrey Consensus, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity, among others.

A particular characteristic of this declaration is its mention of the need for international cooperation to address the global consequences of the economic and financial crisis of 2008. In this regard, the EU–LA leaders declared:

³² *Declaration of Madrid* (2010), Article 2.

³³ *Declaration of Madrid* (2010), Article 2.

We reaffirm our commitment to work together towards a new international financial architecture, including the reform of the international financial institutions, giving increased voice and voting power to underrepresented developing and transition countries while also delivering on non-quota governance reforms.³⁴

Furthermore, in terms of trade both regions “remain determined to favour an open and non-discriminatory, rules-based multilateral trade system and fully respect its disciplines, and recognize its contribution in promoting the recovery from the economic crisis, and in promoting growth and development”.³⁵ They also pledged to avoid protectionism in all its forms and intensify their efforts towards achieving a rapid conclusion of the Doha Development Round.

The second and third sections of the document focused on biregional initiatives that were being implemented to advance in priority areas of action for both regions such as social development, migration, drug trafficking, prevention of natural disasters, infrastructure, innovation and technology transfer, among others. It was preferred to address these areas of action at the biregional level, but without ignoring the importance of the broader multilateral environment. In this sense, both global multilateral initiatives and biregional mechanisms were of equal importance in this summit declaration.

VII EU–LA Summit (named I EU–CELAC Summit) (Santiago, 2013)

This biregional summit was the first in which CELAC participated as the official representative mechanism of Latin America, providing an opportunity for the region to speak under one single voice. However, this novelty did not seem to imply big changes in the form of the biregional dialogue since the summit declaration follows the same agenda patterns as previous ones. The document is divided into four main sections: new CELAC–EU Dialogue, shared values and positions in the international and multilateral arena, progress in the biregional strategic partnership process, and alliance for sustainable development: promoting investments of social and environmental quality. The second section contains most of the references to multilateralism.

In this section, the leaders stated: “We ratify the consensus reached in our previous summits which have reinforced our positions in the international and multilateral arena, and in this regard, we reaffirm our commitment to multilateralism.”³⁶ They reiterated their support for the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Likewise, they committed to continue their efforts in the fight against terrorism, transnational crime, climate change, corruption, poverty and inequality. They

³⁴ *Declaration of Madrid* (2010), Article 8.

³⁵ *Declaration of Madrid* (2010), Article 12.

³⁶ *Declaration of Santiago* (2013), Article 4.

insisted on the importance of the UN in addressing these global problems as well as the relevance of biregional initiatives to tackle some of them. The last part of the document highlighted sustainable development as the main theme of this EU–LA meeting and mentioned both global and biregional agreements that should be strengthened to address this issue.

VIII EU–LA Summit (named II EU–CELAC Summit) (Brussels, 2015)

This was the last summit held between the EU and Latin America before the current non-summit period began. The main theme of the summit was: “Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens.” This declaration includes most of the topics addressed at previous summits. The text is composed of four sections: global challenges, biregional association, an updated biregional Action Plan and future of the partnership. References to multilateral actions were made mostly in the first section. In this part, the EU–LA leaders asserted:

We underscore the need to strengthen the multilateral system and to promote more effective and inclusive global governance, respectful of international law. To that end, we renew our commitment to its reform with the view to its democratization, inclusiveness and transparency in order to strengthen our collective capacity to face the many challenges posed by the new millennium.³⁷

They also reiterated their interest in strengthening their cooperation on the global agenda and agreeing on common positions in international forums.³⁸ In addition to mentioning the traditional areas of multilateral cooperation from previous summits, this declaration highlights multilateral initiatives to address issues such as trans-border intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation, citizen security, digital gap, the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, among others. The implementation of biregional mechanisms is presented in the other sections of the declaration as well as the results of cooperation dialogues between the EU and some subregions of Latin America. In sum, the EU–LA relationship makes use of both global multilateral forums and biregional initiatives to address their common challenges, thus becoming advocates of joint solutions to shared problems at all levels of cooperation.

³⁷ *Declaration of Brussels* (2015), Article 6.

³⁸ *Declaration of Brussels* (2015), Article 7.

Key patterns and changes over the years

The analysis of the summit declarations made it possible to identify two main patterns: strong support for multilateralism and the importance of the UN system as the focal point for developing multilateral initiatives. Firstly, support for multilateralism is a constant feature of all the analysed declarations, which is reflected in the mention of a multiplicity of multilateral initiatives on various issues and the insistence on the importance of taking part in them. Furthermore, many of the commitments made in the summit declarations are inspired by proposals from multilateral bodies in which European and Latin American countries have participated. The mention of multilateral agreements such as the Doha Round, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol, among others, is very frequent.

Secondly, the role of the UN system as the centrepiece of multilateralism is the other recurring theme in the declarations. Many of the paragraphs refer to the participation of the EU and Latin American countries in UN conventions and bodies on diverse topics. Similarly, encouragement to other countries to join UN conventions is very often in these documents, highlighting the level of importance that both regions attach to the UN system. However, most of the declarations mention the need to reform the UN system to make it more inclusive in line with current international trends.




Figure 1: References to “multilateralism” and “multilateral” in the EU–LA Summit Declarations

Source: Compiled by the author based on the calculations resulting from the content analysis.

The table above presents the number of references to the terms “multilateralism” and “multilateral” found in the summit declarations. Aggregating the results of all the declarations, the words multilateralism and multilateral appear 73 times in total. However, a downward trend is observed since 2002. A preliminary hypothesis from this result is that the decrease in the inclusion of references to multilateralism in the summit declarations

may be related to the rise of populist leaders in Latin America. As mentioned above, populist leaders tend to reject what they perceive as external interferences beyond their control, in this case, multilateral initiatives. Yet, further research is needed to determine whether the correlation between the rise of populist leaders and reduced attention to multilateralism at summits implies causality between them.

The EU–LA summits and multilateralism: Main challenges

With its sixty countries, the Euro – Latin American space accounts for nearly one-third of the UN members, which raises the question of the international prominence of these regions in tackling current global problems through multilateralism. In this sense, joint action between the EU and Latin America could play a greater role in the international arena by establishing priorities and pushing ahead specific topics on global forums. Yet, despite the importance that multilateralism has for these regions according to statements made at the summit declarations, the relationship falls short of its potential when it comes to shaping agendas in multilateral forums.³⁹

The possibilities for multilateral action promoted by the EU and Latin America are threatened by several issues. Firstly, Latin American countries have not been able to coordinate their foreign policies due to the persistent regional fragmentation in terms of ideologies and interests. Therefore, the possibilities of harmonising positions with the EU seem even more uncertain. Secondly, the EU has faced its own intraregional disagreements, which makes it difficult to reach common positions among its members on certain issues. Moreover, the EU does not act as a single actor in some multilateral spaces, thus some countries may behave in a way that disregards the regional interest. As a result, it has been challenging to achieve, for example, a joint vote of the EU and Latin American countries in the UN plenary.⁴⁰ In this sense, coordinating common positions in multilateral forums is a yearned but unachieved goal. Furthermore, the lack of summits since 2015 has aggravated the situation.

However, it should be mentioned that there was a virtual meeting in December 2021 that gathered the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU and the Heads of State and Government of seven Latin American countries holding the presidencies of regional and subregional organisations in 2021. This virtual meeting addressed the issue of the post-Covid recovery aiming to build a more resilient connection between the EU and Latin America in the context of the lack of summits.

In this meeting, the leaders held discussions on topics such as pandemic prevention, fight against climate change, digital innovation, sustainable economic recovery, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and cooperation on citizen security,

³⁹ Susanne Gratius et al.: *Alcances, límites y retos de la diplomacia de cumbres europeo-latinoamericanas*. Alcalá, Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Alcalá, 2011.

⁴⁰ Gratius et al. (2011): op. cit. 33.

among others.⁴¹ Furthermore, the importance of multilateral action was highlighted in the discussions as the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stated that the EU and Latin America have a decisive role in shaping the multilateral agenda and in addressing key global challenges considering the weight of their membership at international forums.⁴² In general, the expectations of resuming biregional summits and advancing the multilateral agenda remain despite adverse conditions at the intraregional and international level.

Conclusions

The biregional relationship between the EU and Latin America has given multilateralism a privileged place on the summits agenda over the years. From the biregional perspective, the practice of multilateralism is closely related to the United Nations system and depends strongly on it. However, it is important to note that the leaders of both regions are aware of the need to reform some structures of the UN system to improve its management and broaden the scope of their actions. An examination of the EU–LA summit declarations reveals that, for both regions, the most relevant issues to be addressed in the multilateral framework are the protection of democracy and human rights, sustainable development and climate change, gender equality, eradication of poverty, trade liberalisation as well as the fight against terrorism, illegal arms trafficking and nuclear proliferation.

Some summit declarations, specifically the last ones, mention the coordination of common positions between the EU and Latin America in multilateral forums, but there is no specific reference on how they plan to implement it. Moreover, this aspiration faces big challenges as joint positions at the intraregional level are difficult to reach, thus interregional consensus seems even more uncertain. Nevertheless, the dialogue between these regions has become a driver of multilateralism as it has been a space to encourage the participation of the EU and Latin American countries in multilateral bodies and to foster the search for solutions to global problems in these meeting spaces. Although in some summit declarations biregional mechanisms appeared to have more relevance to address common challenges, global multilateral bodies and multilateralism in general continued to be a priority on the agenda.

Finally, this analysis provided an overview of the observable trends in the texts as a mapping exercise and a preliminary assessment of the phenomenon. However, considering the limitations of the selected methodology, further research on this topic is recommended to discover the reasons behind the trends that appeared in the summit declarations. As Soriano points out, content analysis only examines the information that can be observed in the surface structure of the texts and it is not concerned with the latent or “hidden” content.⁴³ Therefore, discourse analysis and other methodologies can

⁴¹ European Council: EU-Latin America & Caribbean Leaders’ Meeting: Joining Forces for a Sustainable Post-Covid Recovery – Press Release by Presidents Michel and von der Leyen. *Press Releases*, 02 December 2021.

⁴² European Council (2021): *op. cit.*

⁴³ Juan Pablo Soriano: High Expectations. Interregional Agendas on Global Security Challenges: East Asia, Europe and Latin America. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 62, no. 1 (2019). 1–24.

be applied to this case to provide explanations of the revealed patterns by considering the political and economic context of the biregional summits between the EU and Latin America.

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Cybersecurity Policy-Related Developments in Latin America¹

Anna URBANOVICS² 

Latin American countries begin to develop their national-level cyber policy including their cybersecurity strategy. The paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of the strategy development processes in six Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The methodology is based on a mixed approach. For the quantitative analysis, the National Cyber Security Index and UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal were used, while for the qualitative analysis a document analysis was carried out on the national strategies. Analysing national data based on the NCSI, Chile stands out overall, however, the country is still in the initial phase in terms of digital and essential service protection, personal data protection and cyber crisis management. Brazil's position is interesting, standing at 3rd place overall, being the most targeted country by cyberattacks in the region. Brazil stands out in terms of cyber threat analysis and military cyber operations. Based on the document analysis, Chile and Argentina have a more holistic cybersecurity strategy, including factors such as cybersecurity education, cybercrime detection, regulatory framework, and the aim to cooperate with international and industrial partners.

Keywords: Latin America, cybersecurity, strategy analysis, cyber policy development

Introduction

Cybersecurity is identified as “the technologies, processes, and policies that help to prevent and/or reduce the negative impact of events in cyberspace that can happen as the result of deliberate actions against information technology by a hostile or malevolent actor”.³ Cyberattacks have been on the rise for years before the Covid-19 pandemic as well, but the quarantine, the changing living conditions of citizens, and traveling restrictions increased

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³ David Clark et al. (eds.): *At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy. Some Basic Concepts and Issues*. Washington, D.C., The National Academies Press, 2014.

the cyberattacks against nations as the citizens relied on the online services more. In the study by Buzzio-Garcia and co-authors,⁴ it is stated that, although Latin America suffered more than 41 billion cyberattacks in 2020, cyber preparedness is still in the initial phase for companies. The negative tendencies have been perceived by citizens within a survey:⁵ 31% of respondents claimed that there was an increase in the number of cyberattacks. Social engineering (phishing) and malware attacks have been detected by companies most times within the same survey. Buzzio-Garcia and co-authors⁶ summarised specific cases, including phishing, web attacks and data leaks.

Based on these numbers, it is important to examine the interpretations of how central governments of states tend to fight against cybercrime. In parallel, this paper aims to compare the national cybersecurity strategies both from quantitative and qualitative aspects of six Latin American countries. These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The main objectives of the study are to investigate the latest trends in the cybersecurity sector of the selected region and to carry out a comparative analysis based on empirical data from the selected countries. The relevance of the topic is reflected in the growing number of cyberattacks, while the Latin American region is still in the initial phase of handling cyber policy. These emerging countries, however, have a high potential for future development in this domain.

The paper is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the second section maps the current literature on the significance of building a national strategy in cyber policy. The methodology is described in the third section, followed by a general overview of the region's cyber preparedness in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the comparative analysis, while the conclusions are drawn in the final section.

The role and core functions of cybersecurity strategies

For the emerging markets, the social and cultural shaping of cybersecurity capacity building and cyber awareness building can be an effective but cost-effective way to strengthen the immunity of the nation in cyberspace.⁷ However, this is not a sufficient enough solution in terms of national cyber capacity building, which requires a harmonised strategic view.⁸ Here appears the notion of “cybersecurity governance” referring to “a holistic and integrated vision of the security of networks, systems, services, and infrastructures in society. It includes the institutions, initiatives, policies, programs, and other mechanisms (formal and informal) that are part of an ecosystem of distributed

⁴ Jorge Buzzio-Garcia et al.: *Review of Cybersecurity in Latin America during the Covid-19 Pandemic. A Brief Overview*. 2021 IEEE Fifth Ecuador Technical Chapters Meeting (ETCM). 1–5.

⁵ Marsh and McLennan Companies: *Estado del Riesgo Cibernético en Latinoamérica en tiempos de Covid-19*. 2020.

⁶ Buzzio-Garcia et al. (2021): op. cit.

⁷ Sadie Creese et al.: The Social and Cultural Shaping of Cybersecurity Capacity Building: A Comparative Study of Nations and Regions. *Personal Ubiquitous Computing*, 25, no. 5 (2021). 941–955.

⁸ Carlos Solar: Cybersecurity and Cyber Defence in the Emerging Democracies. *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 5, no. 3 (2020). 392–412.

capacities and responsibilities regarding cybersecurity”.⁹ The national cybersecurity strategy is essential for a country to unify its cyber capabilities. As a strategy element, the cybersecurity governance appeared first time in the Brazilian E-Cyber Strategy in 2020. “Cybersecurity strategy can be considered political manifestations of the country subscriber to the extent that your content tends to divide responsibilities among national stakeholders, stipulate the strategic objectives pursued, define the goals, concrete steps to be achieved within defined deadlines, and identify the potential threats perceived by the country.”¹⁰

Table 1: Framework of core functions

Function	Category
Identify	Asset management Business environment Governance Risk assessment Risk management strategy Supply chain risk management
Protect	Identity management and access control Awareness and training Data security Information protection processes and procedures Maintenance Protective technology
Detect	Anomalies and events Security continuous monitoring Detection processes
Respond	Response planning Communications Analysis Mitigation Improvements
Recover	Recovery planning Improvements Communications

Source: Barrett (2018): *op. cit.*

Table 1 summarises the complexity of aspects comprised in cybersecurity strategies. In addition to the national level, the region is active in international cybersecurity initiatives, showing maturity in terms of cultural and social aspects. Countries participate in the CSIRT Americas platform,¹¹ a collaborative framework, and also in cybersecurity programs of the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS supported these countries to issue their first cybersecurity strategies: Colombia (2011 and 2016), Chile (2017), Mexico

⁹ Louise Marie Hurel: Cybersecurity in Brazil: An Analysis of the National Strategy. *Igarapé Institute*, 15 April 2021.

¹⁰ Eric Luiijf et al.: Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies. *International Journal of Critical Infrastructures*, 9, no. 1–2 (2013). 3–31.

¹¹ CSIRT Americas Platform. s. a.

(2017) and Brazil (2018 and 2020).¹² It is important to note that the militarisation of cyberspace leads to the danger of countries using their capabilities in cyberspace, leading to the “characterization of the digital environment as a martial ‘cyber’ domain”.¹³ In 2016, NATO recognised cyberspace as a domain of military operations.¹⁴ Tikk and Kerttunen¹⁵ stated three possible narratives of international cybersecurity: “The sum of all global cybersecurity fears, a combination of national cybersecurity concerns, or strictly a matter of peace or war.”

In alignment with these, a comparative analysis of cybersecurity strategies was carried out,¹⁶ pointing out the objectives of these documents including the protection of critical infrastructures, education and training, data protection, and regulatory framework among others. Besides, country profiles have been drawn based on cybersecurity strategies.¹⁷

Methodology

The methodology used in the paper carries a mixed approach as quantitative and qualitative analyses have been conducted. The quantitative analysis can be divided into two parts. Bolgov¹⁸ suggests that one way to evaluate policy effectiveness is to compare the position of countries in global rankings. First, basic indicators introduced a general picture of the selected countries, including individual-specific and country-level indicators. These can be found in the general overview section of the study. Then, a more detailed quantitative analysis was conducted using the National Cyber Security Index. The National Cyber Security Index is a global index, which measures the preparedness of countries to prevent cyber threats and manage cyber incidents. The NCSI is also a database with publicly available evidence materials and a tool for national cybersecurity capacity building. The NCSI development process can be determined in five steps:

1. Identification of national-level cyber threats
2. Identification of cybersecurity measures and capacities
3. Selection of important and measurable aspects
4. Development of cybersecurity indicators
5. Grouping of cybersecurity indicators

¹² Belisario Contreras – Kerry-Ann Barrett: Challenges in Building Regional Capacities in Cybersecurity. A Regional Organizational Reflection. In Eneken Tikk – Mika Kerttunen (eds.): *Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity*. London, Routledge, 2020. 214–217.

¹³ Jonathan Zittrain: ‘Netwar’: The Unwelcome Militarization of the Internet Has Arrived. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73, no. 5 (2017). 301.

¹⁴ Laura Brent: NATO’s Role in Cyberspace. *NATO Review*, 12 February 2019.

¹⁵ Eneken Tikk – Mika Kerttunen: Introduction. In Eneken Tikk – Mika Kerttunen (eds.): *Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity*. London, Routledge, 2020. 1–8.

¹⁶ Eduardo Izycki: National Cyber Security Strategies in Latin America: Opportunities for Convergence of Interests and Consensus Building. *RISTI – Revista Ibérica de Sistemas e Tecnologías de Informacao*, E15 (2018). 39–52.

¹⁷ Ekaterina Kosévich: Estrategias de seguridad cibernética en los países de América Latina [Cybersecurity Strategies in Latin American Countries]. *Iberoamerica*, no. 1 (2020). 137–159.

¹⁸ Radomir Bolgov: The UN and Cybersecurity Policy of Latin American Countries. *2020 Seventh International Conference on eDemocracy and eGovernment (ICEDEG)*. 259–263.

The database focuses on the measurable aspects of cybersecurity implemented by the national central governments including the legislations in force, the established units, the cooperation formats and the outcomes. It collects evidence within three categories, 12 capacities, and 46 indicators. Countries collect points based on the evidence as follows:

- 1 point – a legal act that regulates a specific area
- 2–3 points – a specialised unit
- 2 points – an official cooperation format
- 1–3 points – an outcome/product

The database contains country-specific data about Argentina (25 June 2019), Brazil (24 September 2019), Chile (3 December 2020), Colombia (13 February 2019), Mexico (25 January 2021) and Peru (28 August 2019). The value of the database can be found in the ease of comparing worldwide data and the evidence collected for each indicator. It is to be noted that the cited legislation can be found in the NCSI database with links pointing to the original documents, that is why here they are not listed in the reference list.

For the qualitative analysis, a qualitative content analysis was carried out on the national cybersecurity strategies. These strategies were collected from the National Cybersecurity Strategies Repository collected by the International Telecommunications Union. The following strategies were involved in the analysis:

- Argentina: Estrategia Nacional de Ciberseguridad de la República Argentina (2019)
- Brazil: Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Cibernética (E-Ciber) (2020)
- Chile: National Cybersecurity Policy (NCSP) 2017–2022 (2017)
- Colombia: Política Nacional de Seguridad Digital (2016)
- Mexico: National Cybersecurity Strategy (2017)
- Peru: in progress

Here it is important to note that Peru has not yet issued its national cybersecurity strategy, but the cyber policy is competitive with other countries.

Context of the Latin American cyber policy

To have better insight into the national cybersecurity strategies, and what causes and legal, political, economic, or social processes are behind them, it is important to note the general conditions of these countries based on several indicators.

The IMD World Digital Competitiveness Index measures the preparedness of the countries based on three pillars including knowledge, technology and future readiness. The 2021 report shows that the better performing countries are the ones that rank higher in the future readiness pillar, pointing out the importance of a state's ability to adapt to the fast-changing environment. Regarding this, Chile dominates being in the 39th place, followed by Brazil (51st place), Mexico (56th place), Peru (57th place), Colombia (59th place) and Argentina (61st place). Studying the constituent pillars, we can see that most of the studied countries rank the highest in the technology pillar, while Chile and Peru stand out in the knowledge pillar.

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) ranking dealing with the general internet use and the share of internet penetration in the society is worth studying as well. The share of the individuals using the internet compared to the total society shows interesting data. Regarding this, Argentina stands out with 85%, followed by Chile (82%), Brazil (74%), Mexico (72%), and Colombia and Peru both at 65–65%. When breaking down the share of internet users by age groups, we can see significant differences. The most active age group is between 15–24 years, being at 92% in Brazil and Mexico, 90% in Argentina, 84% in Colombia, and 83% in Peru. It is interesting to see a relatively high share of internet users among the age group above 75 years in Brazil (83%), Mexico (68%) and Colombia (60%). Regarding digital skills (where data are available), only 20–31% of the society have basic skills, while a much lower percentage, between 2–12% of the total have advanced skills. These data highlight that although the technological infrastructure develops in the studied countries, the citizens cannot keep pace with these improvements. This is a pressure on the society making people without sufficient digital skills exposed to cyberattacks, and vulnerable within their “digital life”.

After drawing the picture of the individual digital capacities of the studied countries’ populations, it is worth having an insight into the Latin American digital and internet market. The value of the cybermarket in Latin America shows a dynamically increasing tendency between 2019 and 2025 forecast.¹⁹ In 2019 it was worth 12.88 billion USD, in 2022 17.78 billion USD and a total of 26.2 billion USD is forecast for 2025.²⁰ This growing tendency however is very much exposed to cyberattacks, which cause damage that can be measured in the average cost of data breaches.²¹ Having a look at the data from 2020, Latin America (1.68 million USD) is lagging behind other world regions and countries such as the world-leading United States (8.64 million USD), the Middle East (6.52 million USD) or Canada (4.5 million USD). On the other hand, Brazil is the 13th country on the list with 1.12 million USD.

The share of cyberattacks among Latin American countries (based on 2020 data)²² and the change in information technology (IT) spending (based on 2021 data)²³ are summarised in Figure 1. Here we should expect that the most exposed country in terms of the number of cyberattacks focuses the most on its IT, but as we can study in the figure this is not the case. Most cyberattacks targeted Brazil in 2020 (55.97%), followed by Mexico (27.86%) and Colombia (7.33%). While the change in IT spending in 2021 occurred in Argentina (10.4%), followed by Mexico (10%) and Peru (9%).²⁴ This can be a warning sign for Brazil though. The public sector is even more exposed as the majority of the country’s critical infrastructures are run by the public sector. Data from 2019 show the web application

¹⁹ Statista: *Value of the Cybersecurity Market in Latin America in 2019 and 2025*. 2022e.

²⁰ Statista (2022e): op. cit.

²¹ Statista: *Average Cost of Data Breaches Worldwide as of 2020, by Country or Region (in million U.S. dollars)*. 2022a.

²² Statista: *Countries in Latin America most targeted by cyber attacks in 2020*. 2022c.

²³ Statista: *Change in Information Technology (IT) Spending in Selected Countries in Latin America in 2021*. 2022b.

²⁴ Statista (2022b): op. cit.

attacks in the public sector,²⁵ again dominated by Brazil with 27,900 attacks, followed by Colombia (10,006 attacks), Argentina (3,606 attacks), Mexico (1,716 attacks), Peru (256 attacks), and Chile (54 attacks).²⁶




Figure 1: Share of cyberattacks (in %) and change in IT spending (in %)

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data of Statista (2022c): *op. cit.*

Comparative analysis of cybersecurity developments

The study’s framework does not provide enough space to elaborate in detail on the different aspects included in the National Cyber Security Index and Digital Development Index. However, the summarised points can be observed in Figure 2.

²⁵ Statista: *Latin American Countries with the Largest Number of Web Application Attacks Observed in the Public Sector in June 2019*. 2022d.

²⁶ Statista (2022d): *op. cit.*




Figure 2: Scores achieved on the National Cyber Security Index and Digital Development Index

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data of the NCSI.

Based on the total points reached by the countries in the NCSI, Chile dominates with 59.74 points, followed by Argentina (48.05) and Brazil (46.75). The Digital Development Index shows a somewhat similar ranking among the countries, with the leading position still owned by Chile (59.88), followed by Argentina (59.13) and Brazil (55.89). However, we can see that based on the NCSI Colombia is in 4th place among the studied countries, while, based on the Digital Development, Mexico comes in 4th place. In the world ranking, the following ranks can be found: Chile is at 47th, Argentina is at the 71st, Colombia is at the 74th, Brazil is at the 75th, Peru is at the 81st and Mexico is at the 84th place. It is interesting that even though Peru has not yet issued its national strategy, it is better ranked based on its policy measures than Mexico. If we dig deeper into the different aspects of the index, we can determine the maturity level of each country.

The first set of indicators is related rather to political and defence dimensions of cybersecurity, and cybersecurity policy in general (Figure 3). Among these, the cyber incidents response and cyber crisis management are those in which none of the countries reached total preparedness level. All of the studied countries set up cyber incident response units. Concerning the fight against cybercrime, Chile dominates, as cybercrimes are criminalised, having a cybercrime unit and digital forensics unit and a 24/7 contact point for international cybercrime. It is important to note that all the countries criminalised cybercrime in their national legislation. The first state to have a legal act was Argentina within its Act No. 26,388 of 24 June 2008, amending the Criminal Code, which defines different types of cybercrimes including intercepting communications, gaining illicit

access to computer systems, causing harm to IT systems, fraud, falsifying electronic or IT-based documents, interrupting communications and deleting or altering digital evidence. As for the threat analysis, Brazil stands out having a threat analysis unit and providing a cybersecurity website run by public authority. Brazil has two websites related, one is the “Internet Security Guidebook” run by the CERT unit and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, while the other is a website addressing children and teenagers about cybersecurity-related content. Brazil and Chile lead in the military cyber operations, having cyber operations units and successfully carrying out cyber operation exercises. It is worth noting that all of the studied countries have already participated in international cyber operation exercises: Argentina and Chile were already in the Panamax 2016 operation, while the other countries joined later in the Panamax 2018 operation.




Figure 3: Scores achieved in political and defence-related indicators of the National Cyber Security Index

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data of the NCSI.

Further details are summarised in Table 2 on the legislative framework and structure of these countries in their cyber policy.

Table 3: Core elements of the national cybersecurity policy

Country	Strategy documents	Dedicated agency	Summary of responsibilities	National CERT/CSIRT	FIRST membership
Argentina	National Cybersecurity Strategy Referential Model of Information Security Policy	General Directorate of Cyber Defence Cybersecurity Committee	Planning, formulation, direction, supervision and evaluation of cyber defence policies for the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence Control over the Cyber Defence Joint Command of the Armed Forces	CERT	2004
Brazil	National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) (2020–2023) Defence White Paper National Defence Strategy	Cyber Defence Command	Responsible for planning, coordinating, directing, integrating and supervising cyber operations in the defence area	CTIR	2022
Chile	National Cybersecurity Policy (2017–2022) Defence White Paper	Interministerial Committee on Cybersecurity	Responsible for planning and executing joint military operations in cyber defence	CSIRT	2020
Colombia	National Digital Security Policy Guidelines on Cybersecurity and Cyber Defence	Joint Cyber Command Colombian Police Cybercenter	Strengthening the technical and operational capabilities of the country to enable it to confront computer threats and cyber attacks through the implementation of protection measures, as well as the introduction of cyber defence protocols Protect critical infrastructure, reducing computer risks to the country's strategic information	CERT	No data
Mexico	National Cybersecurity Strategy National Digital Strategy (2021–2024)	Inter-secretarial Commission for the Development of Electronic Government	Aims to promote and consolidate the use and exploitation of ICTs in the Federal Public Administration	CERT	1996
Peru	National Cybersecurity Strategy (in progress)	National Office of Electronic Government and Information Technology	Responsible for formulating and proposing national and sectoral policies, national plans, norms, guidelines and strategies in the field of IT and e-Government	CERT	2020

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data of the UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal and Solar (2020): *op. cit.*

Concerning the policy indicator of the NCSI, Chile is the most developed followed by Argentina. The first cybersecurity policy unit was established in Chile by the Supreme Decree N° 533/2015, which creates a Cybersecurity Inter-Ministerial Committee (CICS). Later, Supreme Decree N° 579/2019 modified this, creating a new technical commission with advisory rights in cybersecurity affairs. The two other countries where cybersecurity policy units operate are Argentina (National Direction of Cybersecurity created by the Chief of Cabinet, DA 103/2019) and Brazil (Information Security Department created by Decree 9668 of 2019).

In Table 2 we can study some of the main features of these countries. Strategy documents differ, cybersecurity strategy is found in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and is in progress in Peru. In Chile and Colombia, the cybersecurity strategy is a policy-type document. A Defence White Paper is found in Brazil and Chile. If we scan through the list of the agencies dedicated to cybersecurity, we can see that Mexico and Peru are not restricted only to cybersecurity but are involved in the electronic government and information technology in general. In most cases, we find military-related cyber units, such as the Cyber Defence Command in Brazil, while in Colombia, besides this, we find a unit related to the police investigating cybercrime issues. Some of the core tasks and functions of these units include:

- planning, formulating, directing and supervising the national cyber defence policies
- executing and coordinating cyber military operations
- protecting critical infrastructure

Somewhat differently, in Mexico and Peru, the emphasis is more on the development of information technology, and government and public administration use of technology.

Government-related Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are found in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. While in Chile there is a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and in Brazil, the Brazilian Centre for Prevention, Treatment and Response to Government Cyber Incidents (CTIR) operates.




Figure 4: Score achieved in services and data protection related indicators of the National Cyber Security Index

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data of the NCSI.

The second set of indicators is mainly related to services and data protection issues (Figure 4). We can see a general lower tendency in each country in these aspects of the cybersecurity policy, except the personal data protection, which reaches a total preparedness level in

Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Concerning the protection of digital services and the protection of essential services, some countries have not yet implemented any policy (while the former is absent in Brazil, Colombia and Peru, the latter is absent in Argentina, Mexico and Peru). In terms of digital service protection, Argentina, Chile and Mexico stand out as all issued cybersecurity standards for the public sector. In Argentina, an Information Security Policy Model has been established for public authorities, in Chile, Presidential Order N° 8, 2018 on Cybersecurity implements these specific measures, while in Mexico the Cybersecurity Guide for Public Facilities was issued in 2018. Related to cybersecurity education, most countries offer cybersecurity degrees at Bachelor’s and Master’s levels, but none of them have PhD level degrees. Concerning the contribution to global cybersecurity, we can see a general low tendency in each country, being in the initial phase of the international cooperation as newly emerging cyber powers. Although in the initial phase, the first step has been taken by each country, as they are all members of the CSIRT Americas Network, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Personal data protection is well elaborated having national-level legislation and a personal data protection authority as well.

In addition to the quantitative, index-based analysis, it is crucial to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the national cybersecurity strategies of the chosen countries. As it has already been mentioned, Peru has not yet issued a national cybersecurity strategy, however, as was reflected in the index-based analysis, the country has already implemented many of the essential measures into its cybersecurity policy. Within the qualitative analysis, the strategies are compared based on five dimensions. These dimensions are related to the objectives determined by national governments. They are cybersecurity education, then measures related to cyber incident detection, cybersecurity regulation, international cooperation with other states, and cooperation with industrial actors.

Table 3: Results of the qualitative strategy analysis among five dimensions

Country	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Mexico
Education	X		X		X
Detection	X	X	X	X	X
Regulation	X		X	X	
International cooperation	X	X	X	X	X
Industrial cooperation	X		X		

Source: Compiled by the author based on the national strategy of the country.

Table 3 summarises whether the above-mentioned dimensions are included in the national cybersecurity strategies, shedding light on their complexity. Among the studied countries, Argentina and Chile included all of the factors, while Colombia and Mexico only three of them, followed by Brazil including two of them. If we observe the factors, it is important to note that detection and international cooperation are present in each strategy, while education in three, regulation and industrial cooperation are only incorporated in two strategies.

The complexity of the national strategies, based on these factors is in parallel with the results of the NCSI, as Chile and Argentina precede the other studied countries in the world ranking. Concerning the actions articulated in the strategy, country profiles can be identified.

Argentina defined cybersecurity education by creating a national security awareness plan in cyberspace and promoting the training of professionals, technicians, and researchers in the field of cybersecurity. Besides education, the promotion of the cyber industry plays a key role.

Brazil in its national cybersecurity strategy approaches cybersecurity with a public sector focus. Actions are primarily related to the public sector also including holding governance forums and establishing minimum cybersecurity requirements in contracts by public bodies. The defence aspect is also emphasised in the strategy by promoting the joint analysis against cybercrimes and encouraging the information share about cyber incidents and vulnerabilities.

Chile expresses a strong willingness for international cooperation in its strategy including the cyber policy within the Chilean foreign policy and promotes international regulations encouraging trust and security in cyberspace.

Colombia identifies the cyber infrastructure as critical infrastructure and promotes a defence strategy for it. Furthermore, the strategy approaches cybersecurity from the aspect of incident management and digital forensics, mentioning cybercrimes.

Mexico emphasises cybercrime prevention as well, however, its approach is very broad, mentioning wider objectives and actions such as developing a cybersecurity culture, developing cyber capacities, and developing the legal framework and self-regulation.

Conclusions and perspectives

With the growing number of cyberattacks and the growing significance of cyberspace in international and national capacity building, it is more important than ever to elaborate national strategies and establish units dealing with cybersecurity issues. The emerging markets are lagging behind the more developed states, but the willingness to develop cyber policy is reflected in the recent years' tendencies. They are committed to strengthening social and cultural awareness in the cyber domain and cooperating regionally to enhance their capacities and share information and best practices. These tendencies point out the relevance of studying cybersecurity strategies from a comparative approach.

This study aimed at measuring the maturity level of six Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru based on basic indicators shedding light on their digital preparedness and internet user behaviours, and also, more specifically, based on their strategies. The comparative analysis was conducted both from a quantitative aspect relying on the data of the National Cyber Security Index, a global database and ranking system, and from a qualitative aspect by content analysis. Certain conclusions can be drawn after the analysis. First, these countries are very much exposed to cyberattacks by a dynamically growing number of internet and social media users, and an insufficiently prepared institutional, infrastructural and regulatory framework. It is important to note

that most cyberattacks are targeted against Brazil, which is not reflected in the country's spending on IT.

National data based on the NCSI and Digital Development Index highlight that Chile stands out overall, however, the country is still in the initial phase in terms of digital and essential service protection, personal data protection and cyber crisis management. Brazil's position is interesting, standing at 3rd place overall, being the most targeted country by cyberattacks in the region. Brazil stands out in terms of cyber threat analysis and military cyber operations. Based on the content analysis, we could see that Chile and Argentina – leading in the NCSI ranking as well – have a more holistic cybersecurity strategy, including factors such as cybersecurity education, cybercrime detection, regulatory framework, and the aim to cooperate with international and industrial partners.

To conclude, these countries are in the initial phase in terms of the efficiency level of their national cybersecurity strategies; in many cases even the implementation plan is absent. On the other hand, they carry a huge potential for further development. The intention is claimed by central governments and recent events such as the Covid-19 pandemic shed light on the necessity of these coordinated strategies.

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“Blood Antiquities” of Africa: A Link between Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property and Terrorism–Financing?¹

Anna PUSKÁS² 

In the light of recent years’ armed conflicts and the growing level of terrorist activity globally, the link between illicit trafficking of cultural property and terrorism constitutes a growing concern for war-torn regions as well as for the international community as a whole. Identified as a possible form of terrorism-financing in recent years, the illegal trade of artefacts contributes to the fuelling of the spiral of violence and by this, to the undermining of the identity of the targeted populations. Due to the effects of the Arab Spring swiping through several African countries resulting in a still-existing destabilisation, power vacuum and the spread of different terrorist groups, these countries are serving an especially timeous example from this point of view. By presenting some examples from North Africa and the Sahel region, the paper aims to give an initial insight into the issue as an increasingly important international security challenge.

Keywords: *illicit trafficking, cultural property, terrorism, Libya, Mali, Sahel*

Introduction

The plunder and destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflicts and during occupation is not a new phenomenon, it has occurred all the way along history. It is especially true for Africa, where colonialism and the spread of Christianity had violently affected the continent’s heritage,³ some being destroyed, others transported to the colonial states. This latter has resulted in still ongoing restitution affairs between Western European and

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³ It is important to note here that although Christianity in Africa is often viewed in an oversimplified way as an import of the colonialist powers, it has a much longer presence in certain parts of the continent. The oldest example is the Aksumite Empire, where the ruins of probably the first Christian church in sub-Saharan Africa from the 4th century AD has been revealed by archaeologists in 2019. But we shall also refer to the Coptic Orthodox Church centred in Alexandria, but gaining influence also beyond Egypt, as well as the Christian kingdoms in the territory of Nubia, today Sudan (Jeff Oganga: Christianity in Africa Is Not a Colonizer Religion. *Religion Unplugged*, 14 April 2021; János Besenyő: Christianity and Africa. In János Besenyő – Viktor Marsai [eds.]: *The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2018. 23–36).

African countries (for example the case of the so-called Benin Bronzes which Nigeria claims back since the 1960s, with limited results so far).⁴ But – due to the rising level of terrorist activity globally – what is happening today is unprecedented: terrorist groups often turn to the use of cultural heritage for conveying their message, underpinning their propaganda (mostly by its damage or destruction) on the one hand, and in the background, the looting of cultural property provides a form of funding of their operations on the other hand.⁵ The wave of the Arab Spring from 2011 swept across several countries of North Africa and brought about the enlarging influence of jihadist terrorist groups building on the existing inter-communal and political tensions and profiting from the power vacuum and chaos. For example AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) gained ground in Algeria and Tunisia in 2011, Ansar Dine and AQIM (and their successor organisations) in Mali from 2012⁶ or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) cells in Libya from 2014.

ISIL is considered the first terrorist organisation to make a viable and significant source of revenue from the systematic and large-scale organised looting, smuggling and illegal sale of cultural goods.⁷ Its field of operation has been primarily Syria and Iraq, but we can see a similar pattern in the Sahel and North Africa as instability and influence of Al-Qaeda or IS-affiliates were spreading, and security deteriorating all over the region.⁸

“Blood antiquities”, as illicitly traded cultural property funding armed conflicts has been often called – as a reference to blood diamonds providing financial sources for rebellion groups to fund military actions against the internationally recognised governments, a problem receiving worldwide attention in the 1990s (especially in Angola, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone)⁹ – are representing a growing concern for the international community because of their potential financial contribution to the operations of terrorist organisations.

⁴ One of the most notorious and often cited examples is the appropriation of approximately 3,000 artefacts – what is today called the ‘Benin Bronzes’ – during the 1897 punitive expedition of the British Empire in the capital of the kingdom of Benin (today its former territory is to be found in the southern part of Nigeria) together with the destruction of the city, including the Palace of the Oba (the traditional ruler of the Edo people). This high-scale plunder is the basis of several still ongoing restitution affairs between Western European countries and Nigeria, as the country, since having gained independence in 1960, has repeatedly called for the repatriation of the artefacts. One important element of the process was the creation of the ‘Benin Dialogue Group’ in 2007 made up of representatives of major cultural institutions in order to arrange for the permanent display of the artefacts in Nigeria. In recent years, some countries and institutions – like France, Berlin’s Humboldt Forum, Scotland’s University of Aberdeen and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York – have pledged to repatriate objects in their possession, but the results remain limited so far (Alex Greenberger: The Benin Bronzes Explained: Why a Group of Plundered Artworks Continue to Generate Controversy. *Artnews*, 02 April 2021).

⁵ Tom Westcott: Destruction or Theft? Islamic State, Iraqi Antiquities and Organized Crime. *Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime*, Research Report, March 2020.

⁶ Zoltán Prantner: The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after the Arab Spring. In János Besenyő – Viktor Marsai (eds.): *The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2018. 151–167.

⁷ Hans-Jacob Schindler – Frederique Gautier: Looting and Smuggling of Artifacts as a Strategy to Finance Terrorism. Global Sanctions as a Disruptive and Preventive Tool. *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 26, no. 3 (2019). 331–342.

⁸ Will Brown: Echoes of Isil as Armed Groups Loot Priceless Artefacts across Sahel. *The Telegraph*, 07 March 2020a.

⁹ Robert Curley – Emily Rodriguez: Blood Diamond. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s. a.

This paper focuses on the illicit trade in cultural property to give an initial look at the issue as a potential means of terrorism financing thus a more and more considerable international security challenge based on two case studies from North Africa and the Sahel region by also pointing out some of the measures taken by the international community to counter this threat.

Black market of cultural goods and terrorism-financing

The illicit trafficking of cultural property – after illicit drug and arms trade – is considered by some experts to be the third most serious international illegal trading activity as for its volume.¹⁰ These three types of crimes are at the same time closely intertwined in terms of their trading routes.¹¹ However, illegal trade in cultural property differs from the other two in the sense that the article needs to be entered into the legal market, i.e. to be laundered by obscuring the transit routes, generating false documentation and false provenience in order to represent a higher value.¹² It is virtually impossible to estimate the exact amounts of transactions via the black market due to a number of causes including lack of awareness, knowledge and expertise within law enforcement organisations, lack of awareness of the art market, and the low political priority of the issue.¹³ However, according to the OECD’s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) figures, illicit trade in art and cultural property represents a 6.3 billion USD annual revenue globally.¹⁴

The extraordinary size of the black market is also reflected by the impact assessment of the European Commission, according to which 80–90% of antique sales globally are of objects of illicit origin.¹⁵

The potential contribution of illicit trade in cultural goods to the financing of terrorist organisations has been highlighted by the activities of ISIL in Syria and Iraq, which have reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from institutionalised looting beyond all

¹⁰ See, for example, Agnès Bardon: Art Traffickers: Pillaging Peoples’ Identities. *The UNESCO Courier*, October–December 2020. 5–8. However, the later presented WCO reports on illicit trade do not confirm this claim: according to them, of all reported investigations and seizures, only a small fragment was related to cultural property crimes in the examined years. This low number is partly due to the specific and complex character of the cultural property black market, which will be elaborated later (Ivan Macquisten: A New Report on Transnational Crime Shows That the Business of Smuggling Cultural Property Is Not as Big as People Think. *Artnet News*, 28 September 2020).

¹¹ George Abungu: Illicit Trafficking and Destruction of Cultural Property in Africa: A Continent at a Crossroads. In Noah Charney (ed.): *Art Crime. Terrorists, Tomb Raiders, Forgers and Thieves*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 240–254.

¹² Marta Suárez-Mansilla: Blood Antiquities: A Net Acting in Spain Helped to Finance DAESH through Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods. *Art World Law Bulletin. Chronicles of Themis and Athenea*, no. 4 (2018). 1–32.

¹³ Neil Brodie – Donna Yates: *Illicit Trade in Cultural Goods in Europe. Characteristics, Criminal Justice Responses and an Analysis of the Applicability of Technologies in the Combat against the Trade: Final Report*. Luxembourg, European Commission Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, 2019. 130–166.

¹⁴ OECD: *Illicit Trade. Converging Criminal Networks*. OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016. 24.

¹⁵ P8_TA(2019)0037. European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2019 on cross-border restitution claims of works of art and cultural goods looted in armed conflicts and wars.

previous levels. According to some estimates, it made up for the second largest revenue of the organisation.¹⁶ The terrorist organisation made archaeological excavations on the area under its control subject to a permit issued by its natural resources department (*Diwan al-Rikaz*) and imposed a tax (*khums*) of 20–50% on smuggling activities.¹⁷ When the organisation began to retreat, it changed tactics: until then, it earned income primarily from the issuance of excavation permits, but later it probably bought the items to manage the trade itself – in exchange for weapons for example.¹⁸ But a similar phenomenon shows up in North Africa too as we will see in the next section.

Due to the events of the Arab Spring (and its culmination in a civil war in Libya for example), the reinforcement of Islamist jihadist groups¹⁹ has accelerated from the 2010s in the African continent too, as they were easily gaining a foothold in North Africa and the Sahel region building on social fault-lines in the often ethnically/religiously diverse countries and among populations with poor living standards. The issue of weak governance paired with structural violence – partly originating from extreme poverty – and horizontal inequalities²⁰ have been all contributing to the spread of influence of different extremist groups.²¹

The dramatic boost in terrorist activity in the African continent in the 2010s both in qualitative and quantitative terms is well reflected by the number of casualties and affected countries.²² According to the 2020 Global Terrorism Index, – although the number of deaths globally fell significantly since 2014 – the number of countries affected by terrorism is still high (being 63 in 2019). Most (96%) of the deaths caused by terrorism were occurring in conflict-torn countries. Terrorism remains a widespread problem on the African continent. Although by 2019, the activity of ISIL had been decreasing in the Middle East and North Africa – the region accounting for the vast majority of ISIL-related

¹⁶ Joe Parkinson et al.: Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ Race to Protect Antiquities as Looting Bankrolls Terror. *Wall Street Journal*, 10 February 2015.

¹⁷ Mark V. Vlastic – Helga Turku: ‘Blood Antiquities’: Protecting Cultural Heritage beyond Criminalization. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 14, no. 5 (2016). 1175–1197.

¹⁸ Suárez-Mansilla (2018): op. cit. 1–32.

¹⁹ Nevertheless, radical Islamist activity had been present on the continent well before the Arab Spring – like al-Shabaab in Somalia, the AQIM rooting in the radical armed groups of the Algerian civil war, but gaining ground in neighbouring countries as well, or Boko Haram in Nigeria – which have reached a new quality in terms of activities in the last decades, making Africa the centre of global jihad (Viktor Marsai – Ákos Treszkai: Radikális iszlamista csoportok az afrikai kontinensen. In Viktor Marsai [ed.]: *Afrika a globalizált világban. Lehetőségek és kihívások*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 245–266).

²⁰ Horizontal Inequalities are factors defined by the degree of disproportionality between the size of culturally defined groups and their share of resources, serving as a concept to understand causes of violent conflicts within multi-ethnic and multireligious countries. We can identify Horizontal Inequalities in four dimensions: 1. political participation (the share of political positions at a top level); 2. economic aspects (access to and ownership of assets, employment opportunities, incomes); 3. social aspects (access to services, human outcome indicators); 4. cultural status (the recognition/exclusion of certain cultural traditions by the state) (Frances Stewart: *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and Some Hypotheses*. In Frances Stewart [ed.]: *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 3–24).

²¹ Dëlidji Eric Degila: The Hybridisation of Security Challenges in Contemporary Africa. In *Global Terrorism Index 2020. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020. 80–82.

²² Viktor Marsai – Omar Sayfo: Húsz év után – a dzsihádisták terrorizmus helyzete 2021-ben. *Horizont*, no. 14 (2021). 1–12.

terrorism deaths between 2013 and 2017 – the group remained active across the world (27 countries recorded attacks by ISIL or its affiliates). Sub-Saharan Africa had been affected the hardest – 41% of deaths related to the activity of the terrorist organisation in 2019 occurred in the region. Much of the terrorist activity was concentrated in the Sahel: from the five countries accounting for the highest numbers of deaths from terrorist attacks, four (Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria) are located in the region.²³ One of the six big jihadist centres in Africa by nowadays is the surroundings of the common boundary of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.²⁴

Modern info-communication technologies, in particular the Internet (and especially various social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, etc.), are playing an increasingly important role in the management of illegal trade, both by providing anonymity and by facilitating access to global markets. These factors have been resulting in an increase in the number of cultural goods sold.²⁵ Facebook’s share in the digital black market is on the rise since the beginning of the Arab Spring – rare artefacts showing the biggest growth.²⁶ An excellent example to describe this phenomenon is the report of the ATHAR project published in June 2019, which examined the role of Facebook in the global illicit trafficking in artefacts and its relationship with terrorism, organised crime, and cross-border smuggling. 36% of the posts in the Arabic-language Facebook groups offering art for sale surveyed in the study came from conflict zones, with Libya in the second place just after Syria. Another 44% of the posts examined were uploaded from neighbouring countries of war-torn states; the role of North African ones (Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria) is also significant here. The Facebook groups involved in the study had a global outreach, and the members showed a mixed picture; besides average citizens, they demonstrably included people associated with extremist organisations.²⁷

A major result of the project is the June 2020 announcement of Facebook to prohibit all sales of antiquities on its social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram), directly after ATHAR reported an uptick in the activity of the groups examined presumably profiting from the lockdowns due to the Covid-19 pandemic.²⁸

²³ IEP: *Global Terrorism Index 2020. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020.

²⁴ Marsai–Sayfo (2021): op. cit.

²⁵ Brodie–Yates (2019): op. cit. 16.

²⁶ Amr Al-Azm – Katie A. Paul: Facebook’s Flawed Plan to End Antiquities Trafficking. Evidence of War Crimes Must Be Preserved, Not Destroyed. *Foreign Affairs*, 01 July 2020.

²⁷ Amr Al-Azm – Katie A. Paul: Facebook’s Black Market in Antiquities. Trafficking, Terrorism, and War Crimes. *ATHAR Project Report*, June 2019.

²⁸ Carlie Porterfield: Facebook Bans Artifacts Trade after Uptick in Posts of Looted Objects. *Forbes*, 23 June 2020.

A new security threat for African cultural property? Case studies from Libya and Mali

Over the past decade, both Mali and Libya are constantly among the top 5 countries experiencing the most serious worsening in terms of fragility.²⁹ Political violence constantly being present since 2010 in North and West African countries,³⁰ these countries can serve as hotbeds of different forms of organised crimes, including illicit trafficking of cultural property interweaving with terrorism in some proven cases.

The problem of fragile statehood, lack of state and institutional control and of law enforcement capacity, corruption, porous borders, weak economies and the proximity of the North African region to important European markets are all contributing to the profitability of illegal trade – including in cultural property – by transnational organised crime groups in the region. According to Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization), Egypt and Libya are the most exposed to the latter issue. This can be a major concern from a security policy perspective, as it further undermines economic growth, public security and efforts to build political stability and sustainable peace in the long run. Moreover, it can further fuel corruption and violence. In addition to organised criminal groups, due to the high degree of poverty, individuals and groups (often equipped with rudimentary tools) – for whom this is a kind of source of income – also appear in connection with illegal excavations, thefts and looting. Although presumably to a lesser extent than ISIL in Syria and Iraq, there is good evidence that the illicit trafficking of cultural property is a source of revenue for terrorist organisations operating in the region, in cooperation with various organised criminal groups.³¹ This analysis is focusing on examples from Libya and Mali, but in the case of Tunisia, for example, evidence has been also found about the intertwining of organised crime and terrorism in connection with illegal trade in art treasures.³²

The particular exposure of conflict-torn and neighbouring countries to the issue is also underpinned by the results of the ENACT (Enhancing Africa’s response to transnational organised crime) project. Launched in the framework of the European Union’s Pan-African Programme, the project includes vast research on the illegal trade in cultural property across North and West Africa.³³ The analyses – examining more closely four countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Mali) from the region – have found that due to the lack of state presence and because of economic pressure, the rate of illicit trade in artefacts means a major threat for the region’s cultural heritage. The upheavals of the beginning of the 2010s have severed the problem in Tunisia and Mali, as well. The complexity of the issue is well reflected by a wide array of motives and actors from subsistence looting of impoverished

²⁹ FFP: *Fragile States Index. Annual Report 2021*. Washington, D.C., The Fund For Peace.

³⁰ ACLED Dashboard: *The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project*.

³¹ Interpol: *Overview of Serious and Organized Crime in North Africa. Analytical Report*. ENACT Project, Lyon, France, 2018.

³² Garde Nationale: Démantèlement de 11 cellules terroristes en décembre. *Mosaiquefm*, 06 January 2017.

³³ Julia Stanyard – Rim Dhaouadi: *Organised Crime in Africa. Culture in Ruins: The Illegal Trade in Cultural Property across North and West Africa. ENACT*, 12 November 2020d.

communities to organised and specialised criminal networks. The illegal trade of artefacts shows a strong intertwining with other forms of illicit trading activities.³⁴

As for North African cultural property, the main markets are in Europe, in the United States, and increasingly in the Gulf States, where there is a particular interest in Islamic artefacts. In terms of routes, according to the data of the Interpol, the objects are transiting through either Gaza, Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey or other North African countries before reaching their destination.³⁵ This fact is also underpinned by the WCO’s (World Customs Organization) 2018 and 2019 Illicit Trade Reports, which found that in all reported cases, the illicitly exported cultural goods from North Africa were heading to the Middle East.³⁶ (It shall be noted that WCO has been assessing cultural heritage as an independent category within its reports only since 2015.) The 2017 report revealed minor trading activity toward Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern and Central Europe.³⁷ But it is important to emphasise here, that North African countries can serve as transit countries as well for the illegal trade in works of art originating from the Western part of the continent (for example from Mali), using the same routes as for human trafficking and smuggling.³⁸

Since the breaking out of the civil war in 2011, there is evidence of an increase in trafficking of art from Libya,³⁹ which trend has accelerated with the gaining of foothold of the Islamic State in the country from 2014.⁴⁰ The terrorist group – building on the already existing Al-Qaeda network – managed to get control over some coastal territories in 2014 for a short period, losing them apart from some isolated far-south regions by 2016.⁴¹ The economic instability following the 2011 civil war and the lack of control and capacity of law enforcement as well as the rise of the online market parallel with the increasing Internet connectivity and use of social media among the population have all been contributing to a thriving illicit trade in artefacts. Recent reports suggest that the hot spot for the illicit trade in antiquities is primarily Cyrenaica, family and tribal affiliations determining the market.⁴²

Although to a lesser extent than in the case of their Syrian and Iraqi counterparts, there is evidence for local ISIL member involvement in the international smuggling of artefacts. For instance, during the battle of Benghazi, prehistoric objects originating presumably

³⁴ Julia Stanyard – Rim Dhaouadi: Culture in Ruins. The Illegal Trade in Cultural Property across North and West Africa. *ENACT Research Paper*, no. 18 (2020c).

³⁵ Interpol (2018): op. cit.

³⁶ WCO: *Illicit Trade Report 2018*. Brussels, World Customs Organization, 2019. 21; WCO: *Illicit Trade Report 2019*. Brussels, World Customs Organization, 2020. 26.

³⁷ WCO: *Illicit Trade Report 2017*. Brussels, World Customs Organization, 2018. 21.

³⁸ Interpol (2018): op. cit.

³⁹ Aidan Lewis: Libya’s Ancient Sites Not Exposed to Same Risk as in Syria, Iraq – Experts. *Reuters*, 11 May 2016.

⁴⁰ Pilar Velasco: Jaume Bagot, el anticuario del expolio libio descubierto por un estudiante belga. *SER*, 28 March 2018.

⁴¹ Azeem Ibrahim: *Rise and Fall? The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Libya*. Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College Press, 2020.

⁴² ASOR: The State of Illicit Trade and Looting of Libyan Antiquities 2011–2020. *ASOR*, 31 December 2020.

from Fezzan, but also Roman and Byzantine items were captured in the house of an Islamic State commander in May 2016.⁴³

A fact-finding article published in 2016 by war reporter Domenico Quirico of the Italian daily *La Stampa* revealed the relationship of the Islamic State operating in Libya and mafia networks of Southern Italy (especially *Camorra* and *Ndrangheta*) in the trade of artefacts. The terrorist group sold antiquities pillaged from Libyan territories once under its control and from the Middle East – Libya serving both as a source and a transit country – in exchange for weapons coming from Moldova and Ukraine. The transport was carried out by Chinese criminal networks’ ships and containers to the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, Calabrian region. As a result of the tightening regulations in the United States, there is evidence that Russia, Japan, China and the United Arab Emirates had become the main business partners.⁴⁴ Following the report, an investigation has been launched in the case by the prosecutor of Salerno.⁴⁵

The first time the link between illegal trade in cultural goods and the financing of Islamic terrorism and its way to the Western markets have been explored through investigative police operations was in a Spanish criminal case. Objects from North Africa, mostly from Egypt and northern Libyan sites of Balagrae, Apollonia and Cyrene – latter ones being at the time under the jurisdiction of Islamic State affiliates *Ansar Al Sharia Benghazi* and *Ansar Al Sharia Derna* – had been smuggled to Spain between 2014 and 2015.⁴⁶ On 27 March 2018, two Spanish antique dealers, Jaume Bagot Peix and Oriol Carreras Palomar were arrested – later released on bail – for terrorism financing, membership in criminal organisation, contraband and documentation forgery by the *Brigada de Patrimonio*, the department responsible for crimes relating to cultural property within the Spanish police.⁴⁷ The two accused were allegedly involved in a smuggling network dealing with antiquities trafficking linked to looting and thefts of the Daesh. The three-year investigation in collaboration with the Italian and the Libyan police also shed light on the trade routes of the Libyan pieces (Figure 1). The results are mostly in line with the above-mentioned findings of Interpol and WCO reports: the objects were sent across other North African or Middle Eastern countries like Egypt to Jordan from where they were either sent directly to Spain or by a loop through Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, then back to Jordan. A second route established by the investigative work led through Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Thailand from where the objects were transported through a number of European countries such as Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom to arrive at their final destination in Spain. The invoices incorrectly

⁴³ Lewis (2016): op. cit.

⁴⁴ Domenico Quirico: How to Buy Antiquities Looted by ISIS from an Italian Mobster. *La Stampa*, 18 October 2016.

⁴⁵ *La Stampa*: Arte trafugata da Isis e mafie Inchiesta al via. *La Stampa*, 26 October 2016.

⁴⁶ Brodie-Yates (2019): op. cit. 123–124.

⁴⁷ La Moncloa: La Policía desmantela una red que comerciaba con obras de arte expropiadas en Libia que servían para financiar el terrorismo yihadista. *Government of Spain*, 28 March 2018.

indicated Turkey or Egypt as the place of buying.⁴⁸ However, the trial case is still not closed since and there is no information available on its actual status.⁴⁹

As Deborah Lehr, the chairperson of the Washington-based non-governmental organisation working against antiquities-looting and trafficking, Antiquities Coalition observed about the case: “If confirmed, [this] will be a smoking gun that “blood antiquities” are reaching the international art market, and will hopefully serve as a wake-up call.”⁵⁰




Figure 1: Visualisation of routes mentioned in the *Jaume Bagot* case

Source: Brodie–Yates (2019): *op. cit.* 125.

Mali shall be mentioned as another important case study from recent years, also from the point of view of the role of international intervention possibilities. A multi-ethnic country with its northern part stretching to the Sahara Desert, Mali gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960. The northern part of the country has been affected by cyclical conflicts ever since unleashed by the Tuareg population of the region. But the latest – erupted in 2012 led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – proved to be more serious than the earlier ones as jihadist groups had soon took control over the conflict. It led to an intervention from the part of the international community (first France through Operation Serval, followed by Operation Barkhane, then the Africa Union-led AFISMA [African-led International Support Mission to Mali] mission, replaced

⁴⁸ Brodie–Yates (2019): *op. cit.* 123–124.

⁴⁹ IADAA Newsletter: Poor Research Demanding Dramatic Outcomes Is not a Victimless Activity. *IADAA Newsletter*, June 2022.

⁵⁰ Georgi Kantchev: Suspected Traders of Ancient Art Linked to Islamic State Are Detained. *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2018.

by MINUSMA [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali] under the aegis of the UN).⁵¹ The uprising eventually resulted in the expansion of different Salafi-Jihadist organisations in the northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal). The primarily Tuareg-based Ansar Dine militant Islamist group had a major role in the Mali conflict in 2012–2013, especially in Timbuktu. Together with the Saharan branch of AQIM, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF or Katiba Macina) and Al-Mourabitoun, the four organisations formed JNIM (*Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin*) in 2017 pleading allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The group is active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, as well. The branch of the Islamic State in the Sahel, ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) is also active since 2018 splitting from Al-Mourabitoun in 2015.⁵² It shall be noted that the number and affiliation of the different groups is showing a constantly changing pattern. The terrorist activity has also spiralled into neighbouring countries, posing a regional threat.⁵³

From 2015, the terrorist violence in Mali has benefited from the tensions in the central Mopti region (inhabited primarily by Fulanis and Dogons) of the country with the appearance of MLF (consisting mostly of Fulanis). The violence of the group was focused mostly against officials and authorities. Their activity has been building on the existing inter-ethnic tension from time to time reaching up to violence rooting in socio-economic, as well as cultural differences (which has been often used in the rhetoric of the MLF too referring to the 19th century Macina Empire) and longstanding grievances between primarily Fulanis and Dogons.⁵⁴

The country has been struggling with instability, extreme poverty and the deterioration of the social order, disposing of porous borders especially in the north which are making it a thriving transit point for illegal trade (in drugs, arms, etc.). Profiting from the chaos, the pillage of archaeological sites and illicit trafficking of cultural property has been posing an increasing problem due to the destabilisation and growing armed violence in the region.⁵⁵ As the head of UNOWAS (United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel) highlighted at a United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting, reflecting on the root causes of the lingering turmoil in the region: “The growing linkages between terrorism, organized crime and intercommunal violence cannot be overemphasized. [. . .] Terrorists continue to exploit latent ethnic animosities and the absence of the State in peripheral areas to advance their agenda.”⁵⁶ A map presented at a regional meeting hosted by Dakar, Senegal with the support of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific

⁵¹ János Besenyő: Thoughts on the Crisis in Mali. In Marian Majer – Róbert Ondrejcsák (eds.): *Panorama of the Global Security Environment*. Bratislava, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), 2013. 415–430.

⁵² Will Brown: The Key Actors Battling for Control of the Sahel. *The Telegraph*, 01 March 2020b.

⁵³ Adrian Blomfield: Jihadists Win Hearts and Minds in the Sahel by Providing Basic Services. *The Telegraph*, 06 March 2020.

⁵⁴ Aurélien Tobie: Central Mali: Violence, Local Perspectives and Diverging Narratives. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, Research Report, 01 December 2017.

⁵⁵ UNESCO: Groupe de travail vers une action conjointe de lutte contre le trafic illicite des biens culturels dans la région du Sahel. *Note conceptuelle*, 2017.

⁵⁶ UN Security Council: Situation in West Africa, Sahel ‘Extremely Volatile’ as Terrorists Exploit Ethnic Animosity, Special Representative Warns Security Council. *Press Release*, 9 July 2020.

and Cultural Organization) – as part of a line of capacity-building training in Africa⁵⁷ – in July 2017, shows well the dynamics of illicit trafficking of cultural property in the Sahel and Mali’s central role in it (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Dynamics of illicit trafficking of cultural property in the Sahel region

Source: UNESCO Office in Dakar (2017): *op. cit.*

Due to the growing level of cultural property trafficking coming from West Africa, ICOM (International Council of Museums) has drawn up a so-called ‘Red List’ for the region. It is serving to illustrate the categories of cultural goods most vulnerable to illicit trade, thus to help individuals as well as police or customs authorities in identifying objects at risk and in preventing their illicit sale and export.⁵⁸ By the way, a similar ‘Emergency Red List’ was launched in the case of Libya too in 2015 as a result of the instability and violence in the country putting cultural heritage in peril.⁵⁹ The relevance of this latter list is well reflected by another publication of the ATHAR project drawing up a list of selected objects put on sale in different Facebook groups corresponding to categories listed by ICOM for Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen.⁶⁰

The city of Timbuktu – located in the northern part of Mali – fell prey to the violent occupation by extremists in 2012. Apart from the razing of several mausoleums and

⁵⁷ UNESCO: *Africa: Training Activities*. 05 October 2020.

⁵⁸ ICOM: *Liste Rouge des biens culturels ouest-africains en péril*. 2016.

⁵⁹ ICOM: *Liste Rouge d'urgence des biens culturels libyens en péril*. 2015.

⁶⁰ Amr Al-Azm – Katie A. Paul: Facebook’s Black Market in Antiquities. ICOM Red List Artifacts Offered on Facebook. *ATHAR Project Report*, June 2019.

mosques – the majority of them part of the World Heritage site of the town⁶¹ – the town’s priceless manuscripts collection⁶² was affected by Ansar Dine’s violence, which seized control over the town in the spring of 2012. The Ahmed Baba Institute housing around 46,000 pieces in its collection – the oldest ones dating back to the 13th century – was burned down in January 2013, leading to the destruction (or steal) of 4,203 manuscripts.⁶³ Fortunately, about 90% of the collection could be saved by previously evacuating them and other private, family-owned collections from the town to Bamako. But a number of valuable manuscripts were pillaged and probably entered on the black market.⁶⁴

Due to the instability and ongoing violence since 2012, it is estimated that 90% of sites in Mali have been looted, however, still scarce information is available on this. The investigation is encumbered by several factors, including the differences in the routes and markets by types of artefacts, the lack of control over sites and of financing for awareness-raising. To this, adds the shortcomings of the related legal framework, the weakness of the judicial system, the lack of access to comprehensive information and of data sets on artefacts.⁶⁵

The northern and central part of the country is the most heavily hit by archaeological lootings (around the towns of Djenné, Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao). The trafficking of artefacts is accomplished together with other forms of (either licit or illicit) trading activities. Due to the economic breakdown and profiting from the lack of control and proper governance structures, items are increasingly being smuggled through the porous borders with neighbouring countries including Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger – besides Bamako still being a major hub for illegal trade in cultural objects⁶⁶ – in growing cooperation with violent extremist groups, often together with other items, such as drugs and arms.⁶⁷ As for their destinations, according to the results of the ENACT project, Western European and – at a raising but still small rate – Asian countries (China and to a lesser extent Japan) can be traced as for terracotta, bronzes and other archaeological

⁶¹ As part of their extremist propaganda, Ansar Dine being in cooperation with AQIM introduced severe measures after occupying the town and destroyed or damaged mausoleums and mosques related to the Sufi population of Timbuktu. The International Criminal Court convicted Amad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, member of the Ansar Dine and the leader of the local ‘morality police’ *Hisbah* for 9 years of imprisonment for war crime of attacking protected objects in 2016, namely 10 buildings of historical and religious importance, 9 of them World Heritage Sites between 30 June and 11 July 2012.

⁶² Mali disposes of the most significant collection of Arab language manuscripts in Western Africa. Timbuktu’s collections are even more outstanding, the north Malian town serving as a thriving regional educational-scientific-cultural hub in the Middle Ages under the Mali and from the 15th century Songhai Empire. The depositaries of this intense scientific exchange with the rest of the Arab world are well preserved by the today known manuscripts of 377,000 pieces. Until 2012, the manuscripts were held in over 45 private collections and in the archives of the Ahmed Baba Institute established in 1973 by UNESCO, funded by Kuwaiti and Saud Arabian ruling families (Joshua Hammer: *The Bad-Ass Librarians of Timbuktu. And Their Race to Save the World’s Most Precious Manuscripts*. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2017).

⁶³ AP News: UN Assesses Damage to Timbuktu Manuscripts. *AP NEWS*, 02 July 2013.

⁶⁴ Guillaume Thibault: F. Baba Keita: “Les manuscrits anciens, objet du nouveau trafic illicite”. *RFI*, 22 July 2017.

⁶⁵ Allan Ngari: Instability Is Decimating Mali’s Cultural Heritage. *Institute for Security Studies*, 23 June 2021.

⁶⁶ Julia Stanyard – Rim Dhaouadi: Culture in Ruins. The Illegal Trade in Cultural Property. Case Study: Mali. *ENACT Case Study*, November 2020a.

⁶⁷ Ngari (2021): op. cit.

items, European as well as Gulf states and Turkey in the case of medieval manuscripts, and other Sahel countries in the case of ancient beads. The case of manuscripts is also interesting as due to the eruption of the conflict, a large number of these objects was taken to neighbouring countries by refugees as part of their family wealth, often acquired and then internationally trafficked by collectors and dealers.⁶⁸

The most important international responses

Table 1: List of examined responses of different international organisations

Organisation	Action	Relevant elements
United Nations	Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013)	deployment of MINUSMA
	Security Council Resolution 2199 (2015)	looting and smuggling of cultural heritage as a possible means of generating income for ISIL, ANF and other Al-Qaeda groups
	Security Council Resolution 2347 (2017)	first one addressed exclusively to cultural heritage protection; concern about links between the activities of terrorists and organised criminal groups (in ex. trafficking in cultural property); includes the possibility of involving protection of cultural heritage in the mandate of UN peacekeeping missions
	Security Council Resolution 2482 (2019)	jointly addresses organised crime and terrorism in preventing and countering illicit trafficking of cultural property
European Union	EU Security Union Strategy (2020)	links trafficking in cultural goods as both a way of terrorism financing and a form of organised crime, promotes steps and cooperation in this regard
	EU strategy to tackle organised crime (2021)	envisages the development of an Action Plan on tackling illicit trade of cultural goods by 2022
	Conclusions on the EU strategic approach to cultural heritage in conflicts and crises (2021)	stresses the importance of urgently enhancing the fight against illicit trade in cultural property and the fight against terrorism also on the basis of existing international legal frameworks
	EU–Africa Security Cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (2020)	calls for protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones
African Union	Model Law on the Protection of Cultural Property and Heritage (2013)	promotes the filling of the gaps in adequate legislation in Member States to tackle illicit trafficking, and ratification of key international instruments of this domain
	2021 Theme Year ‘The Arts, Culture and Heritage: Levers for Building the Africa We Want’	recognises the potential in cultural heritage to contribute to the integration and socio-economic development in the continent

Source: Compiled by the author.

⁶⁸ Stanyard–Dhaouadi (2020a): op. cit.

The first-ever UN peacekeeping mission mandated amongst others with the protection of cultural property – the MINUSMA – has been deployed in Mali since 2013 by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) and has been taking part in collaboration with UNESCO and the Malian authorities in the fight against illicit trafficking in cultural objects. Besides, it provided for instance logistical support in the rehabilitation of shrines, mosques and libraries in the city of Timbuktu (damaged or destroyed during the summer of 2012 by the terrorist groups occupying the city).⁶⁹

The example of the mission can be an important precedent for future UN peacekeeping operations. By creating the mandate of MINUSMA, ‘the Security Council had established the link between illicit trafficking in cultural objects and the financing of terrorism’ – said Ban Ki-Moon, former UN Secretary-General on the event of adoption of Security Council Resolution 2347 (2017). This latter resolution was the first of its kind dealing exclusively with cultural heritage protection, and including amongst others the possibility of involving protection of cultural heritage in the context of armed conflicts from destruction, illicit excavation, looting and smuggling in the mandate of UN peacekeeping missions,⁷⁰ thus fully integrating it in the international peace and security agenda, which builds on the positive experience of MINUSMA in this field.⁷¹

Important to note here that in recent years, the UN Security Council through its several other decisions has also built a link between terrorism and organised crime in terms of financing or logistical support including in relation to illicit trade in cultural property and international responses to these security issues. Resolution 2199 (2015) – in case of Iraq and Syria – recognised the fact that ISIL, ANF (Al-Nusra Front) and other Al-Qaeda affiliates are profiting from looting and smuggling of cultural heritage items in order to support recruitment efforts and to strengthen their operational capability. In the above-mentioned Resolution 2347 (2017), the Council used the same wording, also recognising the links ‘between the activities of terrorists and organized criminal groups that, in some cases, facilitate criminal activities, including trafficking in cultural property, illegal revenues and financial flows as well as money-laundering, bribery and corruption’.⁷²

In order to jointly address these ‘twin threats’, following an open Security Council debate⁷³ and initiated by Peru, the Council adopted its Resolution 2482 (2019) urging Member States amongst others to ratify and implement global instruments and participate in initiatives to build capacity in preventing and countering illicit trafficking of cultural property.⁷⁴ UNESCO, UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Interpol, WCO and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) have all taken an active role in supporting Member States in the implementation of Resolution 2347 (2017) by providing awareness-raising activities, supporting international cooperation and

⁶⁹ Brown (2020a): op. cit.

⁷⁰ S/RES/2347 (2017) adopted by the Security Council at its 7907th meeting on 24 March 2017. 19.

⁷¹ UN Security Council: Security Council Condemns Destruction, Smuggling of Cultural Heritage by Terrorist Groups, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2347 (2017). *Meetings Coverage*, 24 March 2017.

⁷² S/RES/2347 (2017). 2.

⁷³ UN Security Council: Security Council Expresses Concern over Links between International Terrorism, Organized Crime, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2482 (2019). *Meetings Coverage*, 19 July 2019.

⁷⁴ S/RES/2482 (2019) adopted by the Security Council at its 8582nd meeting on 19 July 2019.

offering capacity-building trainings for cultural heritage professionals, the judiciary, the police, customs officers, actors of the art market and financial services.⁷⁵ In the case of Mali, capacity-building and training programmes for law enforcement agencies provided by UNESCO and WCO amongst others yielded positive results,⁷⁶ and the support provided by Interpol and MINUSMA together with the military forces for the national heritage protection agency in the training of the security personnel has also been effective.⁷⁷

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has also been actively engaging in the safeguarding of cultural property in the fight against illicit trafficking, especially as regards its possible links with terrorism financing. In several documents and decisions relating to combating terrorism and terrorism financing, the organisation stressed its concerns in this regard. The *Conclusions on the EU Strategic Approach to Cultural Heritage in Conflicts and Crises* adopted by its Foreign Affairs Council in June 2021 recalls the development of an Action Plan on tackling illicit trade of cultural goods by 2022. This action plan was already scheduled by the *EU Strategy to Tackle Organised Crime* adopted in April 2021 by the Commission, in line with the *EU Security Union Strategy* adopted in July 2020, which also stated that:

[...] trafficking in cultural goods has also become one of the most lucrative criminal activities, a source of funding for terrorists as well as organised crime and it is on the rise. Steps should be explored to improve the online and offline traceability of cultural goods in the internal market and cooperation with third countries where cultural goods are looted as well as providing active support to law enforcement and academic communities.⁷⁸

The document laying down the framework of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Africa also included the increasing of efforts to fight against the illicit trade in cultural goods within their cultural cooperation.⁷⁹ In the European Parliament (EP)’s resolution on the establishment of an *EU–Africa Security Cooperation in the Sahel Region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa*, the EP highlights “the emergence of new forms of mafia economy, including human, migrant and drug trafficking, cultural and wildlife smuggling”, as a major challenge, and “calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones”.⁸⁰

The African Union (AU) has put arts, culture and heritage as its theme for the year of 2021 (“The Arts, Culture and Heritage: Levers for Building the Africa We Want”) highlighting its potential to contribute to the integration and socio-economic development

⁷⁵ S/2020/754. Action taken by Member States and United Nations entities to address the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime. 14–15.

⁷⁶ Ngari (2021): op. cit.

⁷⁷ Stanyard–Dhaouadi (2020a): op. cit.

⁷⁸ COM(2020) 605 final. Communication from the Commission on the EU Security Union Strategy.

⁷⁹ Council of the European Union: *The Africa – European Union Strategic Partnership. Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace*. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. 30.

⁸⁰ P9_TA(2020)0213. European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU–African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (2020/2002(INI)).

in the continent.⁸¹ Within the AU’s efforts in protecting and preserving cultural heritage, we shall mention the 2018 elaboration of a *Model Law on the Protection of Cultural Property and Heritage* aiming to fill the gaps revealed by a 2013 report by the organisation and to assist member states to improve their current legislation. The identified gaps included the lack of adequate legislation in Member States to tackle illicit trafficking, the low number of ratification of key international instruments of this domain (for example the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property or the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects) or the lack of follow-up on cases of illicit procurement of cultural goods.⁸²

But as we regard efforts of African regional organisations such as the AU or ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) concerning returning illicitly trafficked or stolen cultural property, they are primarily in relation with the restitution of objects removed during the colonial period (see for example ECOWAS 2019/2023 action plan for the return of African cultural property to their countries of origin⁸³ or the concept note of the AU’s thematic year⁸⁴), the link with terrorism is not explicitly appearing in their decisions.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning some intergovernmental initiatives in this regard. Having recognised the scale of the issue, the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Oman released in May 2015 the so-called Cairo Declaration to set up measures against the looting, trafficking and destruction of cultural property by criminal networks and extremist groups motivated by intimidation of populations on the one hand and by profit-making on the black market on the other hand. The actions drawn up in the document included amongst others the launching of a Cultural Racketeering Task Force to coordinate activities to prevent smuggling and repatriate stolen artefacts, supported by an International Advisory Committee.⁸⁵ In July 2021, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Libyan and Egyptian attorney general’s offices – the two African countries most heavily hit by the issue – in order to improve cooperation in investigations concerning terrorism, misappropriation of public funds, petroleum smuggling and the recovery of cultural property.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Institute for Security Studies: *Peace and Security Council Report*. Issue 132, February 2021. 9–10.

⁸² African Union: *The African Union Model Law*. s. a.

⁸³ ECOWAS: Validation of ECOWAS 2019/2023 Action Plan for the Return of African Cultural Property to Their Countries of Origin. 12 April 2019.

⁸⁴ African Union Executive Council: *EX.CL/123(XXXVII) Rev. 1, Concept Note on 2021 as the Year of Arts, Culture, and Heritage in Africa*. 2020.

⁸⁵ The Cairo Declaration, 14 May 2015.

⁸⁶ Mohammed Abu Zaid: Egypt, Libya Pledge Closer Ties in Terror, Trafficking Probes. *Arab News*, 31 July 2021.

Conclusion

The uprisings of the Arab Spring leading to political instability, violent conflicts and economic pressure in several countries of the Middle East and North African region has sharply increased the scale and the systematic way of illicit trafficking of cultural goods in which online platforms have a major role.⁸⁷ These conflicts also led to the deliberate destruction of built heritage in numerous cases, however, this falls out of the scope of the present article. Given the complexity and elusiveness of the issue, limited factual information is publicly available about the exact scale of illicit trade in cultural property so far, especially as for those originating from conflict zones of recent years. Also, due to the special nature of the antiquities black market, stolen objects may wait for years, even decades before entering the market. According to some experts, antiquities spoiled by ISIL may appear on the market around 2030 – based on the time span elapsed in the case of the looting of the Baghdadi Iraq Museum of 2003⁸⁸ – which reflects the long-term character of the issue and the need for sustained international cooperation in this field. And the response shall be complex as well, ranging from awareness-raising, tightening legislation, capacity-building, strengthening border control, and police and judiciary cooperation in order to disrupt the ability of terrorist organisations to generate income from illicit trafficking of cultural property,⁸⁹ necessitating taking measures both in source and market countries.

The correlation between illicit trafficking of cultural property and the financing of terrorists and other violent non-state actors is a hardly measurable but a certainly existing security issue. The earlier cited report of the European Commission, however, reminds us of the fact that this link has been detected only in a small number of cases so far and illegal trade of cultural goods shall be regarded primarily as an organised crime-related issue. The low number of revealed cases suggests that cultural goods originating from conflict zones either may be warehoused, or not recognised as such, or does not mean a significant portion of the market. Finally, the report’s observation shall be highlighted according to which overemphasising a link between terrorism and illicit trafficking is useful for raising public and political awareness of the problem but eventually may result in the ignorance of other significant aspects of the issue in criminal justice and other responses.⁹⁰

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⁸⁷ Julia Stanyard – Rim Dhaouadi: Culture in Ruins. The Illegal Trade in Cultural Property. Case Study: Algeria and Tunisia. *ENACT*, 2020b.

⁸⁸ Vincent Michel: Illegal Trafficking of Cultural Goods in Countries of Conflict. *NETcher*, 07 October 2020.

⁸⁹ Schindler–Gautier (2019): op. cit.

⁹⁰ Brodie–Yates (2019): op. cit. 112–115.

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