

## Summaries

### **Anna Aklan: Contradictions Around the Stoic Sage. Chapter Twenty of Plutarch's *On Stoic Self-Contradictions***

In Chapter nineteen of his *De Stoicorum repugnantiiis*, Plutarch criticizes Chrysippus that the idea of the sage he presents is contradictory in parts of the Stoic philosopher's writings. Plutarch exposes the contradictions which center mainly around the mutually exclusive precepts of the private versus public life of the sage and secondly, around his money-earning occupations that both entail further contradictory corollaries. The first part of the article examines the Plutarchan passages, and in the second part an attempt is made at reconciling the contradictions using a wider range of Stoic literature. I suggest that the concepts of acting together with the cosmic law on the sage's part and his selection in accordance with nature to help whatever belongs to him can be the key elements to make a consistent interpretation of the selected Chrysippian passages. While it may be possible to make a consistent picture of the Stoic ideas regarding their concept of the wise person, we must remember that Stoicism did and does offer paradoxes both to ancient and modern inquirers.

### **László Bernáth: Stoicism and Frankfurtian Compatibilism**

Although the free will debate of contemporary analytic philosophy lacks almost any kind of historical perspective, some scholars (for instance Zimmerman 2000; Salles 2001, 2005) have pointed out a striking similarity between Stoic approaches to free will and Frankfurt's well-known hierarchical theory (Frankfurt 1969, 1971, 1988). However, the scholarly agreement is only apparent because they disagree about the way of similarity between the Stoic and the Frankfurtian theories. The main thesis of my paper is that commentators have so far missed the crucial difference between the Stoics' approach to free will and Frankfurt's, a difference that renders the former as the superior theory. I make three main claims. In the first section, I argue that it is misleading and ultimately false to say that Frankfurt's and the Stoics' conception of free will are the same or notably similar to each other (*pace* Zimmerman 2000). Nevertheless, in the second section I show that there is indeed a relevant similarity between the two approaches. Both of them provide a semi-compatibilist reason- and reflectivity-based theory of moral responsibility. Finally, in the third section, I describe the difference that I take to be the most relevant between these theories regarding the problem of moral responsibility. I consider this difference as a crucial one because a serious disadvantage of the Frankfurtian view follows therefrom.

### **Ágoston Guba: Desire in *Ennead* IV. 3–4**

In my paper I examine Plotinus' theory of desire in his middle period, which can be found in the most elaborated way in *Ennead* IV. 3–4 . Plotinus describes the desire by the terms of sense-perception: while physical affection (*pathos*) belongs only to the body, the propositional activity (*krisis*), which is based on the former, belongs to the soul. In the first part of my paper I will analyse IV. 3. 28, which deals with the connection between the memory and desire. Keeping in mind Plotinus' convictions about the impassibility of the soul, I will argue that here, instead of the disposition of the soul Plotinus speaks about that of the body which can be regarded as the part of affection in the process of desire. In the second chapter, I am going to examine IV. 4. 20-21 and demonstrate that Plotinus uses a triadic structure in the process of desire, parts of which are the so-qualified body, nature (*physis*) and the superior soul. In addition, I would also like to demonstrate that the Plotinian concept of nature goes beyond its original Aristotelian or Stoic framework.

### **Viktor Ilievski: Stoic Influences on Plotinus' Theodicy?**

The aim of this paper is twofold: a) to identify the Stoic-attempted solutions to the problem of evil, allegedly appropriated by Plotinus and made use of in his main work on theodicy, which was divided by Porphyry into two treatises and published under the titles *On Providence* I. and II. (*Ennead* III. 2 and 3); and b) to demonstrate that the most significant theodicean strategies applied by the Stoics and later utilized by Plotinus are either of direct Platonic origin, or else might have been inspired by certain passages from Plato's dialogues. As a side issue, it will be shown that the Stoic answers to the problem of evil that do not concur with the Platonic approach – with a single exception – are not taken into consideration by Plotinus. This is not to say that the Stoics' contributions to the field of theodicy exerted no influence on Plotinus, but that in the counterfactual scenario where they never wrote on providence and theodicy, Plotinus would have nevertheless been able to compose a theodicy that is very similar to the present one, relying chiefly, if not exclusively, on Platonic sources and his own ideas.

### **Gábor Kendeffy: The Use of the Stoic Concept of *Phronēsis* by Irenaeus and Lactantius**

The Stoic concept of practical wisdom and the stoic Idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil implicitly combined by Stoics themselves can be found in the works of

early Christian thinkers like Irenaeus, the bishop of Lyons and Lactantius, the African apologist. Both authors tried to reconcile the Stoic and the biblical concepts of wisdom, and both located this hybrid concept in the history of salvation. Irenaeus did this in a somewhat isolated section of his anti-heretic work, *Against Heresies*. As for Lactantius, he combined them in the *Divine Institutes* and in the *Epitome*, with the doctrine expounded by Seneca on the providential training of virtue by the adversaries. These conceptions were incorporated by the African theologian into his dualistic theological system in a very substantial way, serving to give account for why Satan was produced and allowed to operate by God. These are integrated into Lactantius' idea of divine deception, which is inherent to his doctrine of the two ways.

### **İlker Kısa: *Katharsis* and *Phantasia* in Plotinus' Thought**

The Plotinian virtue of *katharsis* is heavily integrated with his teaching on the concept of *phantasia*, which is the image-making faculty in his system. The processes of image-making and formation of mental representations are very intricate in the philosopher's thought, finding its start at the level of the organic, living body, which is alive thanks to the presence of the soul within. The last step into the other end of the spectrum is reason (*dianoia*), which has the role of judgement about the contents found in *phantasia*. In this article, I argue that the Plotinian cathartic virtue aims at the transformation of the relation of this faculty and reason. In this way, reason firstly stops busying itself with the lower content which takes place in *phantasia* and secondly, thanks to the first step, identifies more and more with the higher content, which also belongs to *phantasia* as a faculty of the soul which unfolds the content of the divine intellect, *Nous*. *Katharsis'* extended work upwards is also key for the transformation of the lower components of the human soul and reduction of the demands of bodily life to its natural minimum. Thus, intellectual philosophical work is what provides the necessary step thanks to which the desiderative and affective states change and upgrade.

### **Zülfükar Emir Özer: *Chaosmos* Against the Metaphysics of One, or a Defence Against Badiou's Criticism on Deleuze**

Alain Badiou asserts that Deleuze's philosophy is a reintroduction of the metaphysics of One, although Deleuze tries to overcome it. He thinks that the univocity of Being in Deleuze's philosophy is a sign of the contingent and coherent cosmos that is the unity of all beings. For Badiou, the reason why Deleuze's understanding falls back to a metaphysical point is its strong affiliation with Stoic philosophy throughout all his

works. Indeed, for Deleuze, Stoicism promises a new understanding that overcomes the opposition between the Presocratics and Platonism. The Stoic concept of *lekta* – i.e. events-effects – is very prominent according to Deleuze as well. However, Deleuze's understanding diverges from Stoicism regarding their understanding of cosmos. Deleuze reintroduces the concepts of *chaosmos* and Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, by which he overcomes the alleged problems Badiou depicts.

### **Ádám Smrcz: When the Stoic Chameleon Came Across the Cylinder. Stoicism and the Matter of Confessions**

This paper analyses the relationship between Justus Lipsius' earlier and later thought on causation, and it claims that a major shift did take place between the author's earlier stance (outlined in his *De Constantia and Politica sive Civilis Doctrina*) and his theories elaborated in later works (mainly in his *Physiologia Stoicorum*). While in his early works Lipsius endorsed a semi-compatibilist view (claiming that humans were not endowed with free will, but still, they could be held responsible for their actions), later in his life, he adopted a more libertarian stance. The paper does not only aim to challenge such theses of contemporary scholarship which claim that Lipsius held a mostly homogenous stance throughout his life, but it also intends to highlight the confessional importance of the shift between his earlier and later views: while his earlier works were written in a Calvinist milieu, his latter writings were authored after his recatholisation, and the two facts – according to this paper – are interrelated. Lipsian Neostoicism, hence, was not only intended to harmonize Stoicism with Christianity in general – as mainstream scholarship holds –, but with particular confessions as well.