

can be versatile or even contradictory within the same state as well. Moreover, these kin-state policies compete not only with each other, but also with those stands that reject the basic premise of the kin-state: the ideal of the trans-border cultural nation what follows the responsibility toward ethnnonational relatives living abroad. But even if the latter stand prevails, and the heads of state refute the general axiom of kin-state, there is still a possibility that the representatives of the diaspora communities conceive of the given state as a kin-state and behave accordingly. Let me add here that the relationship of those living in a diaspora is neither uniform with the kin-state, nor can it be generalized. Opinions are divided in this question, and not only between the different diaspora communities, but also within them. However, the emphasis is not on the quality of the relationship between the diaspora and the kin-state (or the ancestral homeland), but about the fact of the relationship itself, which is a crucial criterion for this type of community.

All in all, studying the specific cases of the category of diaspora *from above* (at the level of diaspora policies and kin-state policies) and *from below* (at the level of the everyday manifestations of the diaspora existence) offers an excellent opportunity to explore the novel forms of appearance of nationalisms: the interpretation of the relations of global, national and local formations in the present age.

Gabe Harrach

Does Ethnic Proximity Foster Radical Nationalism?

This study explores the correlation between the presence of certain minorities and the radical nationalism that emerged in Central Europe after the collapse of the Communism. In other words: how and to what extent does the local proportion of a minority population, which became the target of xenophobic sentiments – and which are referred to hereinafter as enemy group or primary enemy group –, influence the local support for xenophobic nationalism?¹ To measure the latter one, the local proportions of votes for radical nationalist parties are examined as an indicator of xenophobic nationalism in this paper, accurately, for those parties (hereinafter: indicator parties) whose opposition to a given enemy group is the focus of their policy or speech, or which are identified by their supporters as a party having the previous criterion. In order to analyse this supposed relation, we select those legislative elections² in which these kinds of parties participated and, in which the results represent properly the sought attitude-group (see more details in the methodological section).

Concretely, the subject of this study is to examine the correlation of both mentioned variables in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. In the case of the first two countries, the Hungarian minorities make up the local enemy group, while in Hungary the Roma population plays a similar role. Instead of citing several earlier surveys on these relations, we quote some remarkable summaries on the issues in question:³

– “In many of their writings they (*Romanian nationalists – G.H.*) invoke the problem of Transylvania, playing upon the collective trauma Romanians experienced when the northern part of that region was briefly returned to Hungary, between 1940 and 1944. Although the majority of the population is Roma-

¹ In this paper the term “xenophobic nationalism” refers to the type of nationalism which manifests itself as a collective sentiment against concrete foreign nationality, ethnic, racial or other groups.

² Legislative elections, contrary to local ones, are marked with generally higher participation, which results in the higher representation of each social group. In addition, the ideological aspects of political choices are more determining in cases of general elections.

³ All quotations in this study, which were written originally in the Hungarian language, are translated by the author of this paper.

nian, many Romanians fear that Hungary wants to repossess the territory; nationalists exploit this fear. (...) Hungarians and Hungary have come to represent the loss of a feeling of wholeness. The 'Hungarian problem' symbolizes the fragmentation, the feeling of flying apart, of chaos and loss of control."⁴

- "Slovakia, which gained its independence in 1993, is unique in the respect that it compared itself to the Hungarians after the Czech-Slovak separation. This is also why today's Slovak nationalism differs strongly from that of the Czechs who become independent at the same time. (...) Perhaps it is mainly similar to Romanian nationalism."⁵
- "Positive trends can also be observed in the change in attitudes towards the Roma during the last eight years. The open and discriminative anti-Roma orientation has been decreasing in Hungary since 1994. (...) Meanwhile, it is observable that attitudes towards the Roma have remained basically negative and the social antipathy to the Roma people is very high compared to the cases of other ethnic groups."⁶

In Romania and Slovakia, where the enemy group status of the Hungarians is not only a social but also a politically generated issue, the appearance of the parties representing anti-Hungarian sentiments was a natural consequence of the transition to a multi-party system. In Hungary, where the problems of the symbiosis between the Roma and the majority did not make the subject of public discourse for a long time (as it does not make it generally even today), the establishment of the indicator party was realized later.

Methodological notes

To measure xenophobic nationalism, the application of the chosen indicator needs additional clarifications, first of all, in connection with representativeness. We have to see that the group of xenophobic nationalist voters are most likely shared between the given radical nationalist party (i.e. chosen here as an indicator party), the "gesture maker" mainstream political forces and, if they exist, the rival

⁴ Verdery, Katherine: Nationalism and national sentiment in post-socialist Romania. *Slavic Review*. 1993, 109-110.

⁵ Tálás, Péter: Az aszimmetrikus magyar-szlovák viszonyról. (About the asymmetric Hungarian-Slovak relationship) *Nemzet és Biztonság*. 2008, 11. 74.

⁶ Enyedi, Zsolt, et al.: Nőtt-e az előítéletek Magyarországon? (Has prejudice increased in Hungary?) In Kolosi, Tamás, et al. (eds.): *Társadalmi riport 2004. (Social reports 2004)* TÁRKI. 2004. 384-385.

radical parties. A good example is provided by Slovakia where the initially diverse base of a radical national party, as it will be discussed hereunder again, changed to an increasingly extremist group of supporters, and then most of them were merged into the camp of the most popular party. This case shows clearly that representativeness is a dynamically changing phenomenon and in this paper the voters of the indicator party ideally represents largely those individuals whose personal attitudes against the given enemy group is a high political priority.

The other important methodological principle is that the value of xenophobia against a given minority should be estimated only within the majority. Therefore, instead of the official election results of the indicator party, we use the quotient of the number of its votes and the total votes excluding those of the enemy group. The practical significance of this procedure is revealed in the case of those Transylvanian and Slovakian territories which are inhabited mostly by ethnic-Hungarians, where the radical nationalist parties are competing for their votes in a narrow local market. In these cases the lower number of votes may also reflect the high value of xenophobic nationalism.

Because we do not have any information about the ethnic affiliation of the voters, there are two ways to estimate the value of the mentioned denominator. If virtually all voters of the enemy group support their own ethnic party (and which is not supported by the majority voters at all), the denominator should be computed by the subtraction of the votes for the ethno-party from the total polls. Ethnic-Hungarian parties flourish in Romania and Slovakia, supported by the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian minorities.⁷

We use another method related to Hungary, where there never existed an ethnic-Roma party able to successfully represent the biggest minority of the country. In this case the starting point is a theoretical assumption that there are no differences between the electoral participation of the ethnic groups. Namely, the local per cent value of the indicator for xenophobic nationalism can be figured out in

⁷ Kiss, Tamás: Az RMDSZ és az erdélyi magyar választók. (The RMDSZ and the Hungarian voters in Transylvania) *Pro Minoritate*. 2008, 1. 34-57.; Lampl, Zsuzsanna: A szlovákiai magyarok politikai identitása. (Political identity of the Hungarians living in Slovakia.) *Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle*. 2006, 4. 55-68. In Slovakia, the Híd (Bridge) Party, launched in 2009 as a competitor of the until-then dominant Hungarian Coalition Party, opened up to the ethnic-Slovak voters, so the overall coverage of the ethnic-Hungarians by their ethno-parties extends also to a part of the Slovak majority in this country – see Ravasz, Ábel: Szlovákiai magyarok mint választók, 2009–2013. (Hungarians in Slovakia as voters, 2009–2013) *Magyar Kisebbség*. 2013, 2 (68). 41-68. –, however, these years in Slovakia are not examined in this paper.

Hungary if we divide the per cent election result of the given radical nationalist party and the proportion of the non-Roma adult inhabitants in the total population. The calculations should be performed on the local level, of course. (In this case the adulthood means the age group above 15 years, because of the wide age-intervals in the corresponding public census database.) There are certain distortion effects which derive from the probable deviation of electoral participation of the Roma minority, and from the underrepresentation of their official number.⁸ However, these cannot be corrected because of the lack of relevant statistical information. Theoretically another statistical bias was generated by the fact that the voluntarily registered ethnic-minority constituents, due to the 2013 amendment of the Hungarian election law, are permitted to vote for their corresponding minority list instead of that of the parties. However, considering the low interest, in this case we can ignore the corrections.

Analysis and findings

1. Romania and Slovakia

Anti-Hungarian sentiments and behaviour can be observed in Romania and Slovakia not only in the parties known as radical nationalist,⁹ but also in the mainstream parties with varying intensity. Nevertheless, there are some stylistic and thematic features which enable us to distinguish the moderate and extremist national forces from each other in both countries. The activity of the political organizations being particularly hungarophobic was typical in the nineties and during the millennium. In Romania this kind of extremism was represented mostly by the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), the Greater Romania Party (PRM), and the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) in this period. However, only the voters of the first one will be analysed here, because PUNR almost exclusively focused on the Transylvanian Hungarians and Hungary.¹⁰ As regards Slovakia,

⁸ Kemény, István: A magyarországi cigány népesség demográfiája. (The demography of the Roma population in Hungary) *Demográfia*. 2004, (47) 3-4. 335-346.

⁹ Because it is impossible to list the cases of political hungarophobia in one study, we would just refer to the steps from the former years, such as the constant official punishment for the use of Hungarian street signs and symbols in Transylvania, the delaying of property restitution confiscated by the Romanian Communist regime, as well as, the targeted severity of the state language protection act and the citizenship law in Slovakia.

¹⁰ PRM, for instance, used also anti-Semitic language, and had other political priorities such as the hoped-for unity of Romania and Moldova, or the political protection of the former Securitate members.

three parties should be mentioned too, which formed a government coalition between 2006 and 2010: the Direction – Social Democracy (Smer), the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), and the Slovak National Party (SNS). Among them the last one can be characterized as the most hostile towards the Hungarian minority.¹¹

Apart from Smer, which rose to the position of a great and moderate leftist-nationalist force in the course of time, all of the mentioned parties dropped out of the parliament. One of the reasons for this was that the great parties in governing positions realized some relevant anti-minority ideas of the radical parties. Consequently, today the radical nationalism, just like the radical camp, has been spread among the mainstream parties in both countries.¹² This process is illustrated by the following figures.¹³

Out of the above parties, only PRM was able to successfully address bigger groups and absorbing almost entirely the voters of their rival radical parties. However, we can suppose that PUNR had only xenophobic nationalist supporters during the short time of its activity. Although the party was the most successful in 1992, the public database of this election, that we use, is deficient (no results found for five of the 16 Transylvanian counties), so in the case of Romania we deal also with the data for the year of 1996.¹⁴


¹¹ Mesežnikov, Grigorij – Gyárfášová, Olga: National populism in Slovakia. *Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)*. 2008.

¹² Some authors draw attention to the fact that although “the withdrawal of nationalist rhetoric is an important development, but it includes the risk, because of its invisibility, that outside analysts or politicians will be deceived”. See Kántor, Zoltán – Pászán, Zsolt: Elenyészett a nacionalizmus Romániában? (Has nationalism vanished in Romania?) *Pro Minoritate*. 2009, 1. 68. In Slovakia, according to the newest surveys, SNS has a serious chance to return into the parliament in the 2016 election. However, shortly after the dismissal of its extremely anti-Hungarian leader Ján Slotá, the party gave up the hungarophobic rhetoric, and began to focus on the migration issue. Special thanks for the last information to Krisztián Rákóczi, political scientist, Slovakia expert.

¹³ Smer and HZDS, although they used xenophobic nationalist language in opposition and made anti-Hungarian decisions in power, both of them try to “domesticate” their hot-tempered and extremist coalition partner in the government. Thus the validity of the attribute “radical nationalist” is ambiguous in this situation, and because of this fact both parties are left out from the graphs. In connection with Romania, the same can be said related to the Romanian leftist-nationalist mainstream political force, the Social Democrat Party (PSD), formerly connected to the name of Ion Iliescu.

¹⁴ Romania has a bicameral parliament; data used here are based on the votes for the Senate, the number of which exceeded that of the votes for the lower house by fifty-thousand in 1996.

Figure 1-2. *Parliament election results of the radical nationalist parties in Romania and Slovakia between 1992 and 2012 (%)*




Sources: *Transindex Database* (www.adatbank.transindex.ro); *Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic* (www.statistics.sk)

As regards the Slovak SNS, initially it was supported also by nationalist intellectuals and urban social groups. It had been radicalized continuously throughout the 90s, whereupon its geographical base shifted to the North and the East, to that region where the former far-right Slovak People's Party had great electoral successes

between the two World Wars.¹⁵ This is why we reckon that 2006 was the year when the results of SNS represent adequately the extension of xenophobic nationalism in Slovakia.

The values of the independent variable, i.e. the regional proportion of the Hungarian minorities, are calculated by those censuses, the dates of which are closer to the correspondent election, so that is the 1992 census in Romania and the 2001 one in Slovakia.

Figure 3. *The proportion of ethnic-Hungarians in 1992 and of the PUNR voters among non-Hungarians in 1996 in the Transylvanian counties (%)*



Source: *Transindex Database* (www.adatbank.transindex.ro)
 Note: Counties are indicated by their Romanian and Hungarian names.

The distribution of the diagram elements demonstrates the shortage of the correlation between the Hungarians' proportion of the population and the level of xenophobic nationalism in Transylvania. PUNR was supported by the ethnic-Romanians (or more precisely: by the non-Hungarians) at similar levels in the Székelyland and in the counties with slight proportions of the Hungarians. It is interesting to see the outstanding proportion (28-33%) of votes in the counties of Cluj (in Hungarian: Kolozs) and Mureş (Maros). An important, but not exclusive statistical reason of this phenomenon

¹⁵ Spáč, Peter, et al.: Patriots or Nationalists? The Ideology and Support of the Slovak National Party. In *Unpublished manuscript prepared for the ECPR General Conference*, Bordeaux. 2013.

is the concentration of the PUNR voters in the county towns, Cluj/Kolozsvár and Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely. In the previous city the party was supported by 30% of the majority,¹⁶ while, according to the 1992 Romanian census the proportion of the Hungarians was only 23% there, which together demonstrates the lack of coherence between the examined variables. Furthermore, in the local government election, held five months earlier, the candidate for mayor of PUNR was supported by two-thirds of the ethno-Romanians in Cluj/Kolozsvár and by 60% of them in the half-Hungarian Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely.¹⁷

A question arises about the reasons of this deep-rooted Romanian radical nationalism in the “capital” of Transylvania and of the Székelyland. One of the possible answers is the notion of the so-called “frontline city”. Cluj/Kolozsvár and Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely are equally famous for being among the most important centres of Hungarian history and culture; their population had a strong Hungarian majority (82-89%) before World War I. The Romanian state, which paid great attention to both cities following the annexation of Transylvania, has made serious efforts through decades – especially during the Communism – to change their ethnic composition, among other cities, by the mass settling of the Romanians. (However it took place in the name of industrialization, the ethnic-colonization endeavours are confirmed by the classification of five Transylvanian cities as “closed settlements”, in order to prevent the ethnic-Hungarians living in the surrounding villages from moving in.)¹⁸ The success of this aim was registered for the first time in the 1966 and 2002 censuses. Béla Pomogáts has explained the psychological reasons of xenophobic nationalism in both cities as follows: “The masses who were settled in the former capital of Transylvania by Bucureşti, had nothing to do with the historical traditions of Cluj/Kolozsvár and likewise to the traditional tolerance of Transylvania. Moreover, they will be really and permanently feel at home only if they destroy these traditions and eliminate the Hungarian cultural character of the city.”¹⁹

¹⁶ Az országos választások kolozsvári részeredményei. (Partial results of the national elections in Cluj/Kolozsvár) *Szabadság*. 05. November 1996.

¹⁷ Választási körkép. (Election panorama) *Szabadság*. 04. June 1998.

¹⁸ Csetri, Elek: Kolozsvár népessége a középkortól a jelenkorig. (The population of Cluj/Kolozsvár from the medieval ages to the contemporary ages) In Dáné, Tibor Kálmán, et al.: *Kolozsvár 1000 éve (1000 years of Cluj/Kolozsvár)* Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület – Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület. 2005, 5-22.

¹⁹ Pomogáts, Béla: *Kárpát-medencei körséta. (A tour in the Carpathian Basin)* Pesti Szalon. 1995, 138-139.

In contrast with these sentences, according to Brubaker and his co-authors, “yet Clujeni responded on the whole with equanimity and detachment, indeed with considerable indifference, to the nationalist rhetoric that has saturated public discourse. (...) Equally striking was the weakness of popular nationalist mobilization and the absence of serious ethnic tension in everyday life.”²⁰ Although the question arises automatically whether or not we should interpret the three elections of Gheorghe Funar, the most anti-Hungarian candidate for mayor, as clear evidence for the local social embeddedness of radical nationalism, the authors consider the mayor’s triumphs as consequences of the political constellation at that time and the voters’ attitude towards him as being a good manager (*bun gospodar*). However, according to other observers, Funar received this designation only later, due to the frequent street cleaning of the city (while the investors shunned Cluj/Kolozsvár at this time), but he won his position mainly because of his strong hungarophobic campaign messages, especially during his first candidacy.²¹ All things considered, although the acceptance of xenophobic nationalism cannot be connected to the proportion of the ethnic-Hungarians in Transylvania, it seems to depend, first and foremost, on historical, symbolical and politically inspired roles of some important cities.


In the case of Slovakia, we could find election data from each of the districts, thus we can obtain a picture of the relationship between both variables on a lower territorial level.

As can be seen from the following graph, the example of Slovakia proves even more clearly, that the existence of a xenophobic nationalism is not at all a condition of a physical symbiosis with the members of the enemy group. In those twenty Slovakian districts which can be characterized by the highest support for SNS, the proportion of the Hungarians are between 0-0,9%, including seven subunits where their presence is undetectable, and seven other ones where they have only 0,1%. Meanwhile, in the Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely) district, having the highest proportion of Hungarians in Slovakia (75%), SNS suffered its second worst result among the Slovak (i.e. non-Hungarian) population.

²⁰ Brubaker, Rogers et al.: *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. Princeton University Press. 2006. 5.

²¹ Mária, Gál: Kolozsvár süllyesztőbe küldte a város fura urát. (Cluj/Kolozsvár dumped its weird leader) *Népszava*. 15 August 2015.

Figure 4. The proportion of ethnic-Hungarians in 2001 and of the SNS voters among non-Hungarians in 2006 in the districts of Slovakia (%)



Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (www.statistics.sk)

Note: Districts are indicated by their Slovak and Hungarian names.

2. Hungary

The Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIÉP), as the first contemporary radical national party in Hungary, was founded three years after the change of regime, later than in the cases of Romania and Slovakia. The reason for the “delay” was due to the existing Hungarian party structure, as well as, the ethno-demographic and social conditions of the country. There was no such numerous and native ethnic minority in Hungary, which in addition had formerly its own state, so that it would be suitable to play the role of an enemy group. Accordingly, MIÉP focused on a typical Hungarian phenomenon, the “folk–urban” historical rupture, leaning on the leftist-folk intellectual heritage of the 20s–30s. It was an anti-liberal and unsuccessful party, which could get into the parliament only once (1998), therefore it cannot be compared with the Romanian and Slovak radical national parties of the era, either from the aspect of acceptance, or in their main characteristics and focus.

In 2009 the Jobbik party reached 15% in the European Parliamentary elections among Hungarians. During the modern history of Hungarian radical nationalism, it meant a breakthrough. It was a

total transformation of the political platform, changing the image, the political emphases, and, of course, the camp of supporters. There is a conviction in the domestic and international literature that the unexpected popularization and electoral successes of Jobbik is due primarily to the unique approach to the Roma issue, including the foundation of the Hungarian Guard (banned by the court in 2009). However, it is demonstrable that this was not the most frequent topic among the manifestations of the party,²² while they proudly announce their role in its verbalization.²³ However, beyond the appearance of Jobbik, outrageous scandals were also necessary to generate a mass political demand for change such as the ‘Olaszliszka case’, when a teacher was lynched in front of his children’s eyes in 2006, or the 2009 gang murder of Marian Cozma, the famous handball player of the Veszprém team. These triggered, even if only temporarily, previously unknown and open public debates on the questions of interethnic coexistence.


With the appearance of Jobbik, the radical national camp replaced: a strongly anti-liberal political subculture with several intellectual voters from the capital and its surroundings turned into a fundamentally order-centric mass, located primarily on an Eastern-Hungarian geographical base, which only partially represents the traditional Hungarian right-wing values.²⁴ It is typical that MIÉP suffered its worst results usually in Szabolcs, a county inhabited in high proportion by the Roma, but could defeat Jobbik only in the richest districts of Budapest. The following two figures show the causal relations between the proportion of the Roma in the counties according to the 2011 Hungarian census, as well as, the results of Jobbik in the two last legislative elections in the same territorial divisions; the electoral values are corrected by the above described methodology.

²² Varga, Mihai: Hungary’s “anti-capitalist” far-right: Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard. *Nationalities Papers*. 2014, 42(5). 791-807.

²³ “The revitalization of the notion of Gypsy crime, used before the political transition also by the police, is connected to the name of Jobbik. The Hungarian Guard, established in August 2007, has marched in some of the settlements already, drawing the attention to the problem of Gypsy crime.” In *Erősödés és siker az EP választásokon*. (Strengthening and success in the EP election) <https://jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/erosodes-es-siker-az-ep-valasztasokon> [accessed: 21 January 2016]

²⁴ One of the most important cornerstones of this value system is (traditional) religiosity. According to the 2009 and 2010 surveys of the TÁRKI, 33% of the Jobbik voters are non-religious, while it is 26% among the others. Persons, who are religious according to the church’s teaching, make up only 7% of the Jobbik voters but 13% of the rest. See Rudas, Tamás: A Jobbik törzsszavazóiról. (About the core voters of Jobbik) In Kolosi, Tamás – Tóth, István György (eds.): *Társadalmi Riport 2010*. (Social Reports 2010) TÁRKI. 2010. 512-526.

Figure 5-6. The proportion of the Roma in 2011 and of the Jobbik voters among the non-Roma population in 2006 in the Hungarian capital and counties (%)



Sources: KSH census database (<http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas>); Database of the Hungarian National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu)

In contrast to the Romanian and Slovak examples, the causal relation between the local presence of the enemy group and the popularity of the radical national force is evident in both cases, although, as a consequence of the slight regional equalization of the propor-

tion of votes for Jobbik, the strength of the correlation decreased by 2014. Since Eastern Hungary can be described as an economic backward macro-region, it would be easy to explain the radicalization of individuals by personal frustrations (see e.g. the Dollard–Miller theory), however, according to the TÁRKI surveys referred to above “the Jobbik electors live in much better circumstances than the overall voters, thus they cannot be regarded as losers of the change of regime”.²⁵ This fact supports the presumption of the relevance of existing interethnic conditions in this case, as it is confirmed by the figures.

We examined the same connection not only within the group of the Hungarian counties, but also among the settlements and smaller districts of Borsod county, where the Roma population and the Jobbik voters have a high proportion alike. Their correlation was, surprisingly, much weaker at district level and among the settlements at all. We found three explanations for this phenomenon:

1. A kind of saturation effect: in fact, the *real* market potential of Jobbik is finite among the non-Roma voters, independently of the ethnic character of a given settlement or its involvement in interethnic conflicts. Thus, in those places where the proportion of the Roma exceeds a certain level, Jobbik is not able to obtain the “statistically expectable” support of the voters.
2. Several villages, which are registered in the census database as mixed-ethnic, are inhabited, in fact, entirely (or almost entirely) by Roma people, thus here Jobbik received only a few votes, despite the mentioned expectations.
3. We ought to consider that the voters’ political preferences generally are influenced by subjective or micro-level facts such as personal connections and sympathies or well-organizing and embedded local party-cells, especially in small villages. In several cases, these factors can be more relevant for the voters than the interethnic considerations.

Conclusion

The cases demonstrated in this paper verify the diversity of radical nationalisms in Eastern and Central Europe. In Romania and Slovakia, hungarophobia can be observed even without Hungarians in several cases. In Hungary, however, the modern radical nationalism can be considered, first of all, an outcome of the direct and indirect experiences in/about ethnic conflict zones. While in the first two

²⁵ Rudas, Tamás: *Ibid.* 522.

cases the xenophobic nationalism was generated by “old-fashioned” ethno-nationalist mechanisms based on historical and contemporary rivalries, in the latter case it takes place basically along socio-cultural dividing lines.²⁶ The strength/weakness of the correlations between the variables examined here can be considered also as indicators in order to distinguish types of radical nationalism.

Focusing on a possible direction of a continuation of this study, we would also emphasize the importance of international comparability on this topic. The historical antagonism between Romanians/Slovaks and Hungarians can be connected to the English and Irish, Spanish and Catalan, Italian and Austrian majority–minority conflicts, independently of their historical background, current intensity and earlier or later outcomes. However, the interethnic challenges in Hungary, referred to in this study, can be compared with those Western European internal cultural diversification problems which can be derived from the migratory processes of the second half of the 20th century.

Authors

ISTVÁN CSERNICKÓ, Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, Ukraine – University of Pannonia, Hungary

CSILLA FEDINEC, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies

VIKTÓRIA FERENC, Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad

DÁNIEL GAZSÓ, Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad

GABE HARRACH, Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad

ESZTER HERNER-KOVÁCS, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies

JULIEN DANERO IGLESIAS, University of Glasgow

VALERIA ILAREVA, Foundation for Access to Rights, Bulgaria

GERGELY ILLYÉS, Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad

TAMÁS KISS, Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities

ANDRÁS MORAUZSKI, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies

ATTILA Z. PAPP, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies

KRISZTIÁN RÁKÓCZI, Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad

RÓBERT SATA, Central European University – Political Science Department, Hungary

GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN, political scientist, MEP, Hungary

ÁGNES VASS, Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada

²⁶ Significant differences in qualification can be regarded as one of the indicators of cultural or civilizational differences. New data from the level of education completed of the ethnic groups in Hungary can be found only in the database of the 2011 census. Accordingly, the proportion of persons over 15 years of age with primary or lower education is 30.5% within the non-Roma, and 80.6% within the Roma population.