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LEADERSHIP QUALITIES ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF THE FUTURE

In my opinion the topic of the present symposium is very up to date in terms of the current technical development. Education should be based on the knowledge of the future. But we all live in a very special organisation the military. Our mission is combat, and the international experiences showed us some important aspects of the battlefields. There is more than one side to the coin. On the battlefield of course one is technical quality, level on high technology, but the other is human factor.

In the last century we learnt that we are far from the first line of fight now it became history. The battlefield of the future is predicted to be of enormous destruction. Resulting in great confusion and high level of fear among all those involved. In Yugoslavia we could see conventional weapons becoming far more lethal. It is especially valid to Afghanistan. The threat of NBC warfare can not be ignored even in Central Europe. And we don't have enough time to discuss the new military capacity of the electronic warfare.

Even attempting to communicate may result destruction from weapons systems that lock onto radio signals. Because of night fighting capabilities, soldiers may be called upon to fight continuously with little or no rest. They must to work day to night and night to day. An understanding of these key characteristics is critical for current and future planning.

Do not forget We must fight. Our work is not simply technical stuff. People who fight in the future wars may experience so much strain that they might break up before they come into contact with the enemy. If we analyse our future problems we must do it from the human perspective.

Now we will review in brief the effects of extreme status of arousal on human performance and then suggest ways in which the disruptive effects at arousal can be managed. I'd like to show you some stress factors of the future:

Future battles will be longer with slower replacement and greater potential for the combatants to feel that this could go on and on.

Objective danger will be higher because the extended size of the battlefields and airfields.

It will be impossible to run away from battle because it will not be clear in which direction safety lies nor will the person be able to avoid extended exposure while trying to locate that area.

The quantity of airborne metal will be greater, as will its destructiveness.
Equipment will be more difficult to operate, less reliable, harder to repair, and there will be fewer replacement items because each item will cost more and therefore fewer will be purchased.
Units in future wars will be smaller, dispersed over wider areas, and connected by communication devices that are vulnerable to jamming. This will make it difficult for soldiers to get social support and an accurate view of what is happening.
It is necessary to wear uncomfortable masks, body armour, and clothes to reduce exposure to gas and radiation.
The most of the combatants will be enclosed in mobile vehicles for long periods with minimal visual access to what is going on outside.
Fighting will be continuous, which means that people will be exposed to danger for all duration and therefore must constantly be vigilant.
Since expensive, complex equipment will be continuously used, there will be a higher probability that it will break down, as a result exposing people to enemy fire with reduced protection.
Since ammunition will inflict more severe body damage, injuries will be less survivable even if people are evacuated.
These data incorporate the key processes I would like to highlight. I think it has been proven in human sciences why danger has such a pronounced effect on human efforts to operate weapons (e.g., people could be more distracted, forget some steps, notice fewer potential problems, freeze, revert to old habits that are dysfunctional, become more cautious or more careless, overreact to misleading signals, etc.).
It is important to realise that the threats to performance implicit in states of extreme stress will affect maintenance personnel as well as combatants. Maintenance personnel are likely to operate under pressure because repairs are complex, more difficult to do; therefore, more things can go wrong. (For example, the maintenance manual for the F—14 fighter is over 300 000 pages). Furthermore, since there are fewer high-priced weapons in the inventory, all of them must be kept in constant service to sustain necessary force. To this situation add the reality that maintenance personnel have lower test scores, fewer processing skills, less complete on-the-job training, and fewer analytic skills than previously, and you are given a situation where baffled and agitated maintenance people have to repair the few pieces of hardware that the military could afford to buy.
If we ask the question: “Do formulators of technical guides, teachers and professors understand just how few resources they may have available in the field?” assessment of their writing and delivering is not reassuring. To “fight and win against a new attacker,” forces will need to exhibit greater skill, more

agility, and have a greater ability to co-ordinate different arms. The very things that planners are counting on — greater skill, more agility, greater co-ordination — are the very processes most likely to unravel under conditions of extreme arousal. This suggests that one of the fundamental assumptions that we have made about our future leaders' fighting ability may in fact be anchored more in wishful thinking than in fact.
Remember! In the new armies -unlike in the past- the offices are mangers, leaders, commanders in the same time, not simply technical executives.

THE FUTURE LEADER MUST POSSESS

— *A frame of reference* that produces understanding of the dynamics of the rule system, how to modify or adjust the system to meet situational challenge, and how to operate within the system to produce previously untried solutions to situational challenge. This must be accompanied by a mind-set capable of constantly re-examining the logic of current alternatives and their current formulations according to the real situation.
— *More initiative and foresight*, especially at more junior levels, than at present. Leaders must be more sophisticated and, in all likelihood, less sensitive to the implications of rank differentials. (At present, all military persons are highly sensitive to their own rank and the rank of others around them.) This sensitivity may need to decrease in order to permit effective assumption of command at key times on the chaotic battlefield now visualized. Interestingly most of the subjective impressions show that even now the Army culture is moving toward decreased sensitivity to rank differentials. If that impression is correct, it is probably because of the increased technical competence now required at all levels and the increasing reliance on information to meet technical challenge. This represents a shift from concern about who is right to concern about what is right, which is strongly adaptive when viewed from the perspective of future requirements.
— *Higher technical competence at all levels*. Required technical skills are different from level to level, but technology is impacting to increase the demand for the expansion of such skills at all levels. (An interesting subordinate question is whether the trend toward increasing technical competence will conflict with the development of levels of unit cohesion needed in future combat.)
— *The capacity to generate higher levels of unit cohesion*, both lateral bonding and vertical bonding. Higher levels of cohesion will be needed

because of the higher levels of stress anticipated, but this cohesion will need to be developed in the peacetime Army. There will be no time to build it after hostilities begin.

— *The capacity to operate autonomously*. In addition to having the required thinking skills, leaders must also build respect and inculcate values in their units during peacetime which will serve as a basis for the maintenance of purpose and will by their units in combat, where it is probable that they will be separated from their senior leadership.
— *Greater flexibility and adaptability*. Because the future battlefield will almost certainly bring surprises (as previous ones have), leaders must have the capacity to recognise when a phenomenon is outside the existing taxonomy of phenomena and develop adaptations quickly. Units must also have the capacity to operate in expedient ways to meet the challenge of unanticipated events. Flexibility must be a unit norm, as well as an individual characteristic.
— *The capacity and opportunity to experiment* with unfamiliar situations in training, learn from mistakes, and overlearn the process of "thinking through" so as to ensure that the initial shock of combat stress will not cause "cognitive freezing."
— *The capacity to create* a climate for more junior leaders that permits rational risk taking. This will need to be a climate in which training and development of subordinate leaders is viewed as a top priority, and coaching is viewed as both a method of choice and a required leader skill.
— *An awareness of power and politics*, which has historically been the prerogative of only the highest-level leaders.

It is clear that commanders are facing more complex challenges than ever before. They are forced to make decisions when no alternative seems to bring solution to the situation. Commanders rely on their subordinates at the greatest extent. Though making a hard decision is an outcome of teamwork, it is only the commander who bears the consequences in a very complex situation both by political and military means. Commanders must therefore prepare themselves to perform at a maximum in a very cautious way throughout the conflict and show enormous technical, professional and social skills.

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