

DANUBIAN REVIEW

(DANUBIAN NEWS)



A REVIEW DEVOTED TO RESEARCH INTO PROBLEMS OF THE
DANUBIAN BASIN

Editorial Board:

ELEMÉR SZUDY
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dr. ANDREW FALL
MANAGING EDITOR

Vol. VI. No. 12.

MAY, 1939.

Hungary in International Politics
By **ELEMÉR SZUDY**

Public Morality in Rumania
By **ZSOMBOR SZASZ**

The Rumanian Question
By **ANDREW FALL**

Peace by Revision
By **ANDREW BAJCSY-ZSILINSZKY**

The Slovak State: Its Domestic and Foreign Policy
By **ANDREW KASSAI**

Count Csáky's Exposé

Political Mosaic

How Minorities Live

Books

Political Economy

Price 50 fill.

Subscription for one year 6 pengő.

HUNGARY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

BY
ELEMÉR SZUDY

To administer a State, to govern a country, is perhaps a much more difficult and complicated task today than ever before in history.

In these extraordinary times Hungary, luckily, has a definite aim in view towards which she must progress: the establishment of peace with justice; and the methods and means that she must employ in the work of European reconstruction are clear and obvious: she must remain loyal to her friends and pursue a policy that leaves her free to make her own decisions.

These, in essence, were the principles to which Count Csáky, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred in his exposé of 13th April, in which he announced the reasons why Hungary had decided to abandon the League of Nations. This decision did not come as a surprise. Ever since 1920, when Count Paul Teleki, during his first Premiership, was called upon to ratify the Peace Treaty of Trianon, the idea had permanently exercised the succeeding Hungarian Governments, and more than once the Government in office was on the point of adopting this decision and turning its back on Geneva. Had Hungary's policy been dominated by sentiment, this would have taken place long ago; but calm deliberation is at least as important as sentiment in the shaping of a nation's course, and till now reason dictated that we must wait in patience and restraint for the psychological moment. And that that moment had now arrived, that the problem of Hungary's farewell to Geneva had grown ripe for solution, was proved by the fact that the Powers who created the League of Nations, and are consequently prejudiced in its favour, accepted Hungary's decision with under-

standing and resignation. They had to recognize that this gesture on Hungary's part was not merely one of offended dignity, a natural manifestation of national pride demanding satisfaction for two decades of humiliation, but also the logical consequence of Hungary's determination to be free of obligations, to shape her own foreign policy in the future. This was expressed by Count Csáky when he said that Hungary wanted to stand on her own feet, could therefore give no promises to anybody to do this or that or abstain from doing it. And if we reserved the right of free decision where our friends were concerned, it was but logical to refuse to be bound in any direction by a rump League of Nations or those whom it represented.

This was a frank statement, the honest word of an honest nation. And surely nothing else was expected from us by those whose ethical standard is similar to our own. So long as we, as a member of the League, demanded the protection of the several millions of Hungarians living as minorities in the Succession States, the powers in Geneva were either unable or unwilling to listen to us. Now that we have thrown off the fettering bonds of League membership, we stand a much better chance of asserting our wishes. There is a prospect of reaching a friendly understanding with Yugoslavia soon, and Rumania will also be compelled to come to terms with Hungary. On the whole a considerable lessening of the tension between Hungary and Rumania is observable, and it was due mainly to Count Csáky's well-known announcement that Rumania ordered the demobilization of several reserve classes. Hungary has no intention of attacking Rumania, although Rumanian propaganda would fain have the world believe otherwise. It is, however, but natural and legitimate that the lives and prosperity of the two million Hungarians in Transylvania are dear to Hungary and that their protection is one of the main tasks of Hungarian foreign policy, in which we refuse to yield an inch. This naturally involves the principle that we cannot regard the unjust territorial provisions of the Peace Treaties as immutable, particularly as international public opinion recognizes the possibility of change by way of peaceful negotiation.

On 19th April important statements were made in the foreign Affairs debate in the British House of Lords. These statements signify a radical change in the policy pursued in connection with the matter of international politics by the Western Powers. In the course of the debate prominent men in British public life, such as Lord Ponsonby and Lord Cecil, voiced an emphatic demand that Great Britain's new policy should not mean the protection and stabilization of the status quo, but that she should seek and find means of redressing as soon as possible the grave injustices of the Peace Treaties and of repairing the obvious mistakes by peaceful agreement. Amongst other things Lord Cecil very correctly pointed out that any British foreign policy would be wrong that had any aim other than preventing aggression; a policy of that kind would justly be in danger of being accused of trying to stabilize present conditions which in many respects were in need of revision. The noble Lord then said that there was as much need of an organization to ensure a peaceful change as of the organization of collective security. Lord Halifax said that as regards the machinery for peaceful change, no one would agree more wholeheartedly than he did with the noble Viscount that there might be a key, could they but find it successfully, to meet most of their difficulties. But it was a great deal easier to state the objective than it was to find the means of achieving it.

Praiseworthy though the statements made by the noble Lords were, the process described by them as desirable does not, unfortunately, proceed forward so rapidly as the peace of the world would require. At present the Powers are divided into two camps: the camp of the countries representing dynamic forces and that of the static Powers who stubbornly adhere to the past and to the "results" achieved by Versailles. The two opposing parties have not yet been able to find a point of approach that would lead to universal justice and general reparation, and President Roosevelt's message has done nothing to further this desirable end. Mr. Roosevelt's message, namely, was chiefly concerned with preventing an approaching catastrophe and neglected to point out in a precise manner the way to a peaceful and just reconciliation. It would have met with

greater success, had Mr. Roosevelt marked out the path to a solution along the lines of an elimination of the injustices of the Peace Treaties; every State would then have welcomed his message with acclamation.

Count Csáky defined Hungary's attitude in the statement he made to the Stefani Bureau while in Rome. The Foreign Minister recalled the terrible mutilation suffered by Hungary under the Trianon Treaty, wounds that were bleeding still, and in particular declared that we should never be able to forget Wilson's famous 14 points, for all that followed was in fact due to them.

Greater weight and importance was lent to Hungary's decision, the ethical justness of which cannot be questioned, by the circumstances amidst which it was taken. It took place at a time when the Hungarian Premier and his Foreign Minister were the guests of Italy in Rome. The European significance of that visit may be gathered from the comments of the British and French Press, and we may safely say that in importance and content the conversations between the Italian and the Hungarian statesmen went far beyond the mere formalities attending a visit of courtesy.

That the tension of the past twenty years in the Danube Valley has in greater part ceased, is primarily due to Italo-Hungarian co-operation, to the friendly support of the Duce who knew no obstacles and whose support was as operative and effective in Munich as it was in connection with the problem of Ruthenia's restoration to Hungary, and which to Hungary's benefit, led in the regions concerned to the re-establishment of the fundamental principles of justice which Italy, so long and so steadfastly, had demanded on behalf of a friendly nation. All this is of permanent value, and has a traditional perspective, from the point of view of the future reconstruction of Central Europe.

Naturally, for this reconstruction the co-operation of the other Axis Power, of Germany, is also indispensably important. The visit of the Hungarian statesmen to Berlin about a week after their return from Rome is a further proof of this. Coupled with the Duce's revisionist policy the dynamic force of the German Reich was the powerful impetus which created a new situation in the Danube Valley

and made it possible for Hungary to obtain redress for certain of her grievances. For this we owed a debt of gratitude, and the visits to Rome and Berlin were made in payment of that debt. We do not believe that the Western Powers can take this amiss. For the past twenty years we have never ceased to present the justice of our case to them, and of late public opinion in those countries has shown much more understanding than formerly for the problems of Hungary's future. We feel convinced that the interest manifested in Hungary will prove a very useful investment when it comes to the point of a general appeasement, and that the time will come, perhaps in the near future, when what today is merely sympathy will assume a more concrete form. This would be to the interests of all the nations that are sincerely desirous of a just peace. And the fact that today the world seems divided into two hostile camps will not prove an obstacle to just peace, which is the most elementary law of life, for those who are determined to pursue a suprematic policy will at length be compelled to realize that the sound instincts of the peoples are seeking with elementary force for a way out of the present chaos, and this is a process that no wiles of diplomacy will be able to check.

— y —

PUBLIC MORALITY IN RUMANIA

BY

ZSOMBOR SZÁSZ

In 1932 a law was passed in Rumania introducing control of the property of public servants while ensuring the protection of their honour. At first sight this may appear meaningless, it is not easy to see the relation between the control of private property and the protection of public honour. In Rumania, however, there is a direct connection between the two: public officials, with salaries large or small, have amassed immense fortunes the sources of which are not always apparent and therefore invite investigation; on the other hand it may happen, though this is rare, that an official is unjustly accused of a misappropriation of public funds, in which case he is entitled to claim protection against his calumniator.

The immediate need for the measures contained in the Act lay in the fact that of all European countries Rumania was the one where corruption, bribery and graft flourished most extensively. We use the past tense advisedly, because the new, one-party system of administration may have worked a salutary change in this respect, although it is as yet too early to form an opinion in the matter.

There can, however, be no doubt as to the corruption of the past, which after the annexation of Transylvania spread also to the former Hungarian territories.

After a few years of Rumanian administration, a Transylvanian Rumanian, Dr. W. Sorban, wrote, that after 1868, following the Ausgleich with Austria, "Hungarian administration became so perfect and ran so smoothly that it could be compared with that of any western country. And where are

we now? Today no honest and well-meaning official who has no intention of selling his soul and convictions to Mammon can remain in the administration. To speak plainly — you cannot charge a thief or a criminal if he is a man of the government; you cannot punish an official, though he be the greatest rascal, if he is useful to his Party; you can steal and your crime will be forgiven; but do not attack a man of the government or you will get into trouble. All that we read in the *Annales* of Tacitus about crimes and vices, falsifications of documents and false witnesses, has been revived in Transylvania. *Virtus rediviva Romana.*"

And it was not minor officials alone who were accused of graft and corruption. Even high officials and Ministers of the Crown were liable to be suspected. Before the Liberals came to power after the fall of General Averescu's administration, their organ, the *Vitorul*, published an article entitled "Régime of Corruption", a passage of which ran as follows: "Of the many sins committed by the Government (of Averescu) the most serious is that their actions have caused a moral dissolution, and given a bad example at a time when the purity and honesty of the Government were more than ever necessary." A year after the advent of the Liberals the Transylvanian Rumanian paper *Patria* wrote: "Corruption everywhere, baksheesh recognised as a legal means of payment, influence needed to attain anything however just and fair, from the authorities. 'Gentlemen, stop stealing!' this is the cheerless echo of every act of the Government."

The causes of all this go deeper than would appear at first sight. Why did none of the Governments, whether Liberal or National Peasant Party, try to alter the situation?

In a delightful article called "A country in which one steals" a well-known journalist, C. Bacalbasa, seeking for an explanation, wrote that in olden times the inhabitants of the present Rumania were Scythians who were notorious thieves and drunkards, and stamped their character on the soil so indelibly, that succeeding people were all smitten with it and

became thieves and rogues in their turn. It is the misfortune of the Rumanians that they came to found their State on Scythian soil. In Rumania, as far back as one can remember, every Government has fallen in consequence of some question connected with theft and bribery. "Since Greater Rumania was founded," — he continued in a later article, — "not a day, nay, not an hour or a minute passes in which an official, civil or military, be he a subordinate or the head of his office, does not steal, or commit a burglary or embezzlement, arson or some other piece of roguery. The whole country is a large den in which you never know whom you can shake hands with, and where it is very rare for anyone to be punished."

The curious thing is that one rarely heard of a corrupt official being punished. Delinquents were arrested, kept in prison for a few days and then released by order of some Minister or other "high personage". The provisions of the Penal Code were seldom applied.

All this might seem fantastic exaggeration inspired by Party animosity, had it not been confirmed later on by the body most competent to deal with public morals, the Parliament itself.

At the beginning of the thirties, during the administration of the National Peasant party, a rumour arose to the effect that at the time of the conclusion of the large armament contracts with the Czech Skoda works, highly placed army officials and even members of the Government and their relatives had been bribed, enormous sums finding their way into their pockets.

The rumours were so consistent and had so damaging an influence on the attitude of the public towards the administration, that the Government decided on a drastic measure to put an end to them and proposed to the legislation to enact the aforesaid measures which were to provide for a supervision of the financial situation of public servants, at the same time making it possible for them to protect themselves against unjust or unfounded insinuations and calumny.

The Bill was ready in the autumn of 1932 and in October the report of a mixed committee was tabled in the Camera.

Immediately after the beginning of the world war — ran the report — the country was plunged into a devastating and oppressive economic crisis, followed by a moral crisis which, barely perceptible at first, gradually assumed alarming proportions and caused great disquiet among the population. "We were confronted", — the report continued, — "by the surprising phenomenon that in the midst of the general impoverishment individuals who were in State or municipal service suddenly abandoned their previous simple and modest mode of life for one of luxury and extravagance markedly at variance with the meagre means ostensibly at their disposal. Sumptuous mansions arose and vast fortunes were made or mysteriously augmented before the dazzled eyes of the embittered masses. Poverty was turned into riches and thrift into prodigality as though at the stroke of a magician's wand. — It was only natural that questions as to how and whence should arise, at first faintly and cautiously, then ever more loudly and peremptorily. Staggered and uneasy, the general public began to level unfounded accusations against all who took part in public life, thereby envenoming the struggle between the political parties.

The debates on the Bill were short in both houses of Parliament. An impressive speech was delivered by the Suabian deputy, M. Kaspar Muth, a former member of the Hungarian Parliament, who said that the Act would stand in the *Corpus Juris* of Rumania for centuries as "a mirror of public morals". He pointed out that the disintegration of public morals had caused the decadence and the downfall of the Roman Empire and he warned Rumania not to persist in her present course.

The Bill contained the following provisions:

Subject to control under the law is the property of all persons appointed to State or municipal offices or to any public service. The property of Ministers of the Crown cannot be subjected to control as long as they are in office.

Action can be brought against a public servant by any citizen of the State who is in possession of proofs or evidence (*indicii sau dovezi*) entitling him to the supposition that the property of the official in question has been acquired by illegal practices or that it is not proportionate to his income. It is also open for the official himself to demand that an enquiry shall be made into his case.

The procedure starts by information being lodged with the Court of second instance, Curtea de Apel, and it must not be vague or obscure or a simple denunciation without evidence to support it. Anonymous information will, as a rule, be rejected unless the attorney considers the evidence so well-founded that he himself proposes the indictment.

The information is communicated to the official in question, who is then ordered to declare the exact amount of his property, his assets and liabilities.

The procedure is carried out in the same way as any criminal procedure.

Property is regarded as illegal if it has been acquired to the detriment of the State, or if it is not in reasonable proportion to the salary of the official; also if the defendant fails to supply the information demanded or supplies false or misleading information.

In its judgment the Court declares the property to have been legally or illegally acquired. In the latter case 90% of the property is confiscated and the official deprived of his post. In the former case, if the bad faith of the informer is manifest, he can be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year.

From every judgment of first instance appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Justice.

The Bill became law and its application was eagerly awaited. But the general expectation was not fulfilled: neither private persons, nor the officials themselves, nor the attorney, showed any anxiety to put the law into operation. The *Adeverul* published an ironical picture showing an empty Court room in which the judge sitting alone behind his

table was deprecatingly saying: "Pray, don't hustle, gentlemen, you will all have your turn."

The first to apply the new law to himself was Prof. Boila, a relative of the former Prime Minister, M. Maniu; tired of being attacked as one of the persons implicated in the Skoda affair, he challenged his detractors in the press to take action against him; but no one took up the challenge.

After a few cases of minor importance in which one or two officials were convicted in the course of 1934, there followed the notorious case of General Dumitrescu, chief inspector of the gendarmerie, who was sentenced by a military court to a few years' imprisonment. In the same year a crazy Bucharest lawyer, S. Florescu, commenced an action against some of the most prominent statesmen, Messrs. Duca, Iorga, Iunian, Manoilescu, but this was stopped by the Court.

In the following years we find sporadic instances of information being laid with the Courts; we even know of one or two since the advent of the new régime in the spring of 1938. But it is evident that the law which was hailed with so much satisfaction at its enactment has failed as an effective measure for the detection and punishment of crime.

It is to be hoped that the new régime, which has brought to the fore the Party of "national regeneration", will obtain better results in the way of purging public morals than were worked by the fear of punishment.

— y —

THE RUMANIAN QUESTION

BY

Dr. ANDREW FALL

Mankind at large, which longs for peace, was delighted to welcome the Munich Four-Power resolution, which it regarded as the first stage in a process of peaceful evolution. The short period that has elapsed since that resolution was taken has been fraught with bitter disappointment. Today the peoples of Europe are once more divided into two hostile camps; and a single spark may produce a general conflagration. And, we would ask, why all this race in armaments and all this gigantic-scale preparation for war? This question is easily answered. All that the Great Powers assembled at Munich did, was to endeavour to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Czecho-Slovak question which had then arisen; but these Powers did not possess — or at least did not display — the resolution to broach the great problems which had made their appearance since the Great War, the result being that these problems continued to act as precipitous abysses dividing the peoples of Europe against one another. Munich failed to bridge over the gulfs created by the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaties. Apart from other questions left unsettled, the problem primarily responsible for the renewed international tension now in evidence was that of conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. The trouble must be traced to the bad treaties of peace and to the foolhardy operations which cut to pieces the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and dismembered the virile Hungarian Kingdom which was and is the heart of Central Europe. How strange that there should be nations in Europe still dumfounded at the disappearance of Czecho-Slovakia from the map of Europe in compliance with the laws of historical development, and that those nations should

not have been even taken aback when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was wiped off the map of Europe and an operation of dismemberment carried out on that Hungarian kingdom which had for a thousand years defended Europe against all the inroads of Eastern barbarism and had during the whole of that period acted as the mainstay of equilibrium in Central Europe. In the Paris Peace Treaties the peace-dictators defied all geographical and geopolitical laws; and that challenge was bound to and did lead to disaster. The artificial State-formations called into being by that defiance of natural laws have had — and will have — to disappear and make room for States called into being by geographical and geopolitical laws.

Certain of the Great Powers of Europe are still unable to realise the necessity and the importance of a general and just settlement of the Central European question, and are still attempting to stem the natural development of things by establishing blocs of defence and by supporting certain unviable States. Prior to Munich Czecho-Slovakia was the spoiled *homunculus*; while recently the role formerly played by that country has been transferred to Greater Rumania, which is being dignified as the State by the artificial maintenance of which the Powers in question would fain stabilise the situation at present prevailing in Europe. In its present form Greater Rumania is almost as artificial a State-formation as the Czecho-Slovakia of former days. Prior to the Great War Rumania — with an area of 137,903 sq. kilometres and a population of 6,966,000 souls — was a uniform and viable State-formation with a natural „*Lebensraum*“ of its own which both economically and geopolitically was a valuable member of the European community. However, this young State, which in 1878 was liberated from the Turkish yoke and can therefore boast only of a serious historical past of sixty years, — a State which during the Great War played a very dubious role, having concluded with the Central Powers the Treaty of Bucharest during the War and after the War posed as a „victor“ during the Paris Peace Negotiations —, resorted to all kinds of subterfuges to take Bessarabia from Russia, to wrest Transylvania from the Hungarian Kingdom and to sever the Dobrudja from Bul-

garia, and actually came into conflict with Yugoslavia as a result of claiming possession of the section of Southern Hungary known as the Banate. The appetite of Rumania under the Peace Edict added 157.146 sq. kilometres to the pre-War area of that country — an increase of 114%. The increase of population resulting from the augmentation of its territory — according to the data of the 1910 census — was 8,738.000 souls, a number including nearly 5 million persons belonging to national minorities, some 2 millions being Magyars, 3 millions being Russians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Turks and others. We see, therefore, that Rumania dismembered all her neighbours; but not one of those neighbours has renounced its claim to the territory wrested from it. During the past twenty years Rumania has clung desperately to the status-quo policy and has failed to come to an agreement with any of her neighbours on the basis of equity and justice.

Rumania's foreign policy and her domestic policy have alike been dictated by her insistence upon the status-quo. It was for the purpose of maintaining the present status-quo that the foreign policy of Rumania was for years based upon the support of France and the Soviet. And when, after the occupation by Germany of the Rhineland, King Carol realised that as a consequence of the advance in the power of Germany the Franco-Soviet connections were quite unable to ensure the status-quo so desired by Rumania, he immediately dismissed one of the most intransigent advocates of that policy — M. Titulescu — and began to approach the Berlin-Rome Axis. At the end of the year 1937 that Axis appeared to be particularly dangerous; so King Carol — in the person of Octavian Goga — appointed to the office of Prime Minister a politician whose connections with Berlin and Rome were common knowledge. We see, therefore, that the appointment of the Goga-Cusa Government was also made for the purpose of maintaining the status-quo. But even during the term of office of the Goga-Cusa Government the foreign policy of Rumania did not turn its back entirely on the Franco-British Axis: it continued to play its political game with both Axes, watching the rise and fall of the prestige of either in order to im-

mediately withdraw its connection with the other. As soon as negotiations began between Italy and Great Britain — negotiations which led Rumanian politicians to conclude that there had ensued a weakening of the Berlin-Rome Axis — King Carol of Rumania (though his action was dictated by other considerations too) suddenly withdrew his favour from the Goga-Cusa Government and by the appointment of the Cabinet headed by the Patriarch Miron Christea introduced a dictatorship which once more entered the orbit of France. This political opportunism and time-serving change of tactics on the part of Rumania dumfounded the whole world; but it was also due solely and exclusively to a desperate attempt to maintain the status-quo. More recently too Rumania has continued to pursue this double-faced foreign policy, — having on the one hand established close economic connections with Germany and on the other hand carried on negotiations with Great Britain and France for the purpose of participation in the bloc of defence which the Western Powers are anxious to form against Germany. Rumania's foreign policy is today just as unstable and unreliable as was the role played by that country during the Great War.

The political anaemia in evidence in Rumania's domestic policy is also due solely and exclusively to her desperate insistence upon the status-quo. In their anxiety lest they should lose the new provinces obtained after the War the Rumanian Governments endeavoured rapidly and suddenly to convert their polyglot country into a uniform national Greater Rumania. The means employed for the purpose of welding their country into a national unit were not the pacification of the inhabitants of the newly-acquired provinces — not conciliation or appeasement —, but the intimidation of the national minorities subjected to their rule, and attempts to forcibly absorb or expel them from the country. The several Rumanian Governments and Parties vied with one another in persecuting the national minorities, thereby creating a permanent spirit of revolution. The Miron Christea — and later the Calinescu — Government was given the arduous task of overcoming the internal revolutionary crisis and bringing about the national unity

of Rumania. The task is an impossible one, for as a consequence of the double-faced foreign policy pursued by Rumania the Rumanian Government is barely able to control the direction of events. This very double-faced foreign policy is due to the fact that forces directed by the Great Powers are already working in Rumania; and the political factors of Rumania follow a double track in groups conforming to the action of those forces. While on the one hand the Franco-ophile policy is engaged in defending its position, on the other hand — through the medium of the Iron Guard now dissolved — German and Italian policy is endeavouring to ensure its influence. The Constitution brought into being by the dictatorship — combined with the other Draconian measures — has for the moment created a condition of peace and tranquility. But force has never been a means of forming a State or of welding the sections of that State into a unit.

Another question arising in this connection is whether in the situation in which she finds herself today in the field of foreign policy and of domestic policy Rumania represents a serious asset to either of the groups of Powers? The history of Rumania — and in particular her attitude during the Great War — proves that she does not represent a real value. The Rumanian people cannot really be credited with any particular military prowess; and her power is in addition weakened by the divergency of minorities numbering five millions. In her present shape Greater Rumania would be unable to resist any serious attack — from whatever direction that attack might come — except on the line of defence provided by the Eastern and South-Eastern Carpathians, though the experience of the Great War shows us that the Rumanian resistance to the attack of the Central Powers was extremely weak here too, the Rumanian army being unable to hold even this powerful line of defence. History, on the other hand, shows that in the hands of the Hungarians the Carpathian mountain system is an impregnable stronghold. In the Great War, for instance, it was on the ridge of the Carpathians that the mighty Russian army was shattered by the heroic defence of the Hungarian troops.

We may therefore establish the fact that in the treaties of peace concluded after the Great War the young Rumanian State showed an excessive greed when claiming new territories, — that it has failed to solve the problem of its five million minority inhabitants, — that it has failed to come to an agreement with either of its neighbours, — and that, as a consequence of its double-faced policy and of its unfavourable geopolitical situation, it will be unable to keep the territory at present in its possession, unless certain European Powers undertake to act as gendarmes. We should like to know, however, which Power feels it in its interest to undertake such a role? Which of the Powers could undertake the responsibility for continuing to keep Europe in a state of permanent tension simply — to encourage Rumania's political megalomania?

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

PEACE BY REVISION

BY

ANDREW BAJCSY-ZSILINSZKY

Revision! — a peace-idea under all circumstances, both retrospectively and prospectively.

Just think for a moment how different might have been — and most certainly would have been — the development of post-War Europe, had the considerations and arguments, the irrefutable historical, political, economic and geographical truths present in a condensed form in the Hungarian idea of revision, — moments explained exhaustively in 1920 by the Hungarian Delegates to the Peace Conference without any one being able to refute them —, had been enforced already during the peace negotiations! It was the enforcement of the ruthless and rigid principle of "vae victis" put forward by the victors that was ultimately responsible for sowing the seeds of distemper which — particularly in Central Europe — began to ferment and replaced peace with uncertainty, and reciprocal mistrust, stimulating the growth of new passions of hatred and hostility and leading to an enhancement of armaments on an unprecedented scale, to the formation of new, antagonistic blocs, to a division of Europe against herself, to a conflict in the conscience of the world, and to the growth of prepossessions and prejudices in respect of the outlook on life.

Times without number, even among wellmeaning and honest foreigners, we Hungarians are actually suspected of being responsible — as a result of our claims for a revision — for the obstacles impeding reconciliation in the Danube Valley and in Central Europe generally. Not only is this charge groundless and unfounded: just the reverse is true; and the only real basis of peace in Central Europe is revision. For the peace of Central Europe cannot be brought about

except by united action on the part of the nations of Central Europe, while the peace of the Danube sector cannot be secured except by reciprocal goodwill on the part of the peoples and countries of that sector. The real role of the Great Powers in this Central European question is simply to promote the natural adjustment of forces in the territory in question in order to enable the Danube Valley to stand on its own feet and to ensure it against being compelled to enter the service of either group of Powers and thereby to stimulate a further aggravation of existing antagonisms and prepare the way for a fresh conflict leading to a renewed triumph of the barren and destructive principle of "vae victis".

The German revision has been accomplished; the Hungarian revision only very slightly; and the Bulgarian revision not at all. There have been diplomatic situations and moments when everything seemed to point to the Axis-Powers and the Western Powers being anxious to bring about an adjustment of forces in Central Europe — and in particular in the Danube sector — far more in keeping with the postulates of justice than that prevailing at present. Only recently leading British statesmen declared that British policy does not aim at rigidly interpreting and defending the status-quo, but that — while in the meantime defending the independence of the smaller nations — it desired to leave the way open also for a peaceful re-adjustment. These were certainly magnificent words: but we have every reason to fear that the division of Europe into hostile camps and the possible adhesion of countries outside Europe to either of these camps will once more weaken the spirit of abstract justice and the desire to find and realise that absolute justice which was already on the verge of being put into practice. When hostile camps and fronts are formed in international politics and preparations are being made for a clash of forces, the clatter of arms not only silences the Muses, but also neutralises the spirit of absolute justice — in particular of the justice of the smaller peoples, which is replaced by the accident of adhesion to one or other of the two camps. The decisive moment in such circumstances is not justice or the balance of forces or the idea of organic order, but simply the question as to which of the two Parties wins the day: and the victorious Party

will force even his utterly illegitimate claims on the conquered the result being that the horrible process of decomposition responsible for plunging Europe into the present crisis will begin again.

In my opinion British policy — which is desirous of finding natural, peaceful solutions not inspired by prejudice — is most likely to realise before it is too late that no good may be expected in the future either to result from any Central European order based, not upon the natural balance of forces, but upon the victory of either of the two camps. For every solution of the latter kind — as shown by the consequences of the illstarred Paris peace treaties — must inevitably prepare the way for further fermentation and the reduction of the smaller States to the position of vassals of one or other of the groups of Great Powers. After all, the Great Powers too must realise that within the territory stretching from the Baltic and the northern frontiers of Poland to the southernmost point of the Balkan Peninsula (if we include also the territory of Asiatic Turkey) there are living today more than 120 million souls, — really valuable peoples capable of development living within the ring enclosed by the Russian, German and Italian empires which will never under any circumstances acknowledge, if only because altogether they number 120 million souls, that they are predestined one by one to the condition of slaves, to unceasing trimming and to dependence upon others. But, if this enormous mass of human beings would even superficially join forces and make the defence of its own independent existence the pivot of its endeavours, the several peoples constituting that mass of human beings must with reciprocal goodwill remove and bridge over the differences at present impeding their unity. The only means of a peaceful elimination of these differences and antagonisms is — revision. To prevent the realisation of this peaceful revision by arbitrary force — the splitting up of this territory into sections belonging to various blocs — is to bring about an artificial diffusion that runs counter to the interests of the peoples concerned.

For the real way to peace, understanding and co-operation in the vast territory lying between Russia, Germany and

Italy lies through the absolute independence of these peoples.

Not many of these peoples can boast of historical traditions and independent historical achievements. It is indisputable that the chief places among these peoples are due to the Poles and the Hungarians, the Southern Slavs having far less claim in these respects, while the Rumanians and the other Balkan peoples have very little to show. As a consequence it is the Poles and the Hungarians that are predestined to jointly establish the independent power basis of the new adjustment of Central Europe.

The other peoples living in the territory enclosed by Russia, Germany and Italy were — until quite recently — for ten centuries at all times in the service of foreign Powers, that service being indeed the basis of their subsistence. The Poles and the Hungarians, on the other hand, have always regarded as the decisive moment their special mission in Europe, having at all times lived and acted accordingly. And it would be extremely dangerous and injurious in its effects for British policy to attach either to the grit and perseverance of Poland as a Great Power bent on defending her independence against the superior power of Soviet Russia even in the event of a European conflict or to the grit and perseverance which have always characterised the Hungarians, less value than to the attitude of those peoples which find less difficulty in bearing the yoke of unconditional submission.

The eyes and the conscience of Europe are still unable quite clearly to grasp the sublime and indispensable character of the St. Stephen State-idea. Yet the germ of the crisis from which Europe has been suffering ever since 1914 — i. e. for a quarter of a century — is the circumstance that certain Danubian and Balkan peoples were excessively ready to accept a given patronage as being the easier, cheaper and less risky solution. Whereas it should have been (and should be today) the business of the European Great Powers to espouse the cause of those smaller peoples of Central Europe and of the Danube sector which — like the Hungarians — have the courage to represent themselves, shrink from every form of humiliation and show no sign of the inferiority complex of inferior

nations. For a thousand years and more we Hungarians were accustomed, not only to provide for ourselves, but to look after the interests also of other brother nations of the Danube sector which shared our destiny. That is why we Hungarians will never accept as decisive the ethnographical principle, and why we shall never abandon the historical principle. The historical principle cannot exist or develop except in an atmosphere of independence and self-reliance; nor is it under any circumstances capable of tolerating the idea of, and the humiliating situation resulting from, any given protectorate. It would be merely the beginning of a fresh European catastrophe if the Great Powers were to assemble gatherings of auxiliary peoples in Central Europe, justice to be meted out according to the measure of humility of those auxiliary peoples. We Hungarians have never been an auxiliary people and have never served as such to any other nation: for we still cling to the ancestral tradition that we are Attila's heirs here in the Danube Valley. The Treaty of Trianon distributed justice in keeping with the measure of humility of the auxiliary peoples. It would be a bitter day for Europe if the new order of that Continent were once more to be decided by — the measure of subservience of auxiliary peoples...!

We Hungarians cling unswervingly to our ancient mission, fulfilled during centuries of history, and desire to remain lords and masters of the central section of the Danube Valley and of the Basin of the Carpathians; and we are not prepared to allow the inheritance bequeathed by St. Stephen to be frittered away. The banner of Danubian independence has been in our hands for over a thousand years; and even the Treaty of Trianon failed to definitively wrest it from our grasp.

But what we desire to realise in the Danube Valley is not a one-sided Hungarian domination; we desire only a just division of territory and property in a manner conforming to the distribution of the ethnical forces.

The British Empire was built up, not on the number of Britishers or on the basis of their numerical superiority, but on the foundations of British qualities and of the political and empire-building capacity of the British people. The

people of Great Britain must realise that the Hungarian Kingdom with its ten centuries of existence also owes its origin, not to mere chance, but to the exceptional abilities of the Hungarians. It is therefore not just that the measure applied to auxiliary peoples of diminutive size should be applied also to us, who a few centuries ago possessed dominions rivalling even the power of England . . .

Our desire for and our claim to revision is not merely a postulate of justice, but is justified also by the sublimity of the State-building idea which is our inheritance and by the possession of greater inner forces. We wonder whether our British friends — whose nation and Empire have for centuries been held in the highest esteem by Hungarians everywhere — will realise that fact before it is too late?

OSZK
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

THE SLOVAK STATE : ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

BY
ANDREW KASSAI

On March 14th a new State appeared on the map of Europe, — the Slovak Republic. According to Article 1. of the Independence Act — which takes the place of a Constitution — "Slovakia is an independent and self-governing State", that meaning that Slovakia's State sovereignty ought to be absolute and unrestricted in respect both of its international and of its domestic policy. In actual fact, however, that sovereignty is limited in both respects.

In respect of its foreign policy, on March 16th, two days after the declaration of its independence, Slovakia subjected itself to the protectorate of the German Empire. This protectorate was confirmed in international law too by the Agreement concluded on March 23rd between the Slovak and German Governments Article 4. of which provides that the Slovak Government shall at all times pursue a foreign policy in close agreement with that of the German Government. In order to give practical effect to the obligation of protection undertaken by the German Empire the German army occupied the territory encircled by the Little Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Jablonka range, where it exercised military prerogatives.

So far as the foreign policy of the Slovak State is concerned, in a statement published in the April 5th. issue of the "Curentul" Foreign Minister Durcsánszky admitted that "there cannot be any question of a truly Slovak foreign policy, seeing that a nation comprising only 2.7 million souls cannot carry on an independent international policy". "Our

policy" — continued the Slovak Foreign Minister — "consists solely and exclusively in bringing about good economic and cultural relations with our neighbours".

In a speech broadcast on March 30th Foreign Minister Durcsánszky — dealing with Slovakia's connections with the neighbouring States — observed that the pivot of Slovakia's foreign policy would be the friendship of Germany, that course being pursued in the hope that the neighbouring German State with its 80 million inhabitants could always be relied upon to support Slovakia. He was anxious to strengthen to the greatest possible degree the connections with Poland and to maintain the best relations with that country. In connection with Hungary the Slovak Foreign Minister stressed the point that he was not averse to a friendly rapprochement with that country.

This statement too shows that the Slovak Government is not in control of the situation; for the series of attacks on the Poles and the Hungarians originating from Slovak sources — combined with the constantly recurring bloody frontier incidents provoked by Slovak frontier guards — prove beyond doubt that there are certain Slovak elements anxious to sow the seeds of hatred and dissension as between Slovakia and Hungary and between Slovakia and Poland respectively.

As for the army, the Slovak Republic possesses armed forces of its own; but in terms of the German-Slovak Agreement concluded on March 23rd these forces must be organised in close agreement with the German military authorities. As a consequence — according to a report published in the April 16th 1939, issue of the "Slovak" — the character of the Hlinka Guards has changed completely. This organisation, which so far was of the character of an army, will in the future be employed exclusively in the work of physical training and of popular education. In the statement published in the April 5th issue of the "Curentul" Foreign Minister Durcsánszky explained that the expenditure of the War Ministry would not be large, seeing that the Slovak army would be merely a symbol of the militarism of former days. Its business would be to maintain order in the country and to train the younger generations in a spirit of nationalism. "What we have in mind" — said

Durcsánszky — "is certainly not an army whose business is the defence of our frontiers".

The legislative power has been placed on totalitarian foundations by the transformation of the Hlinka People's Party into a State Party. The parties of the national minorities have been dissolved. This procedure has rendered the inner consolidation of the State practically impossible; for there can be no doubt that the minorities thus deprived of their vested rights will carry on a strenuous and uncompromising struggle against the despotic methods of the Slovaks.

Economically — according to a report published in the April 15th 1939, issue of the "Slovak" — Slovakia is to adjust itself to the Four-Year Economic Programme of Germany. A Slovak-German economic agreement similar to that concluded between Germany and Rumania is to be drafted. The investment of German capital is to be effected systematically on a scale gradually increasing in intensity. Slovakia's natural resources and her industry are to be developed in a manner calculated to satisfy the requirements of Germany.

Under the German-Slovak economic agreement which came into force on April 1st Slovakia is to form a separate customs unit, though in union with the Czech and Moravian territories now under German protectorate and with the Sudeten territories. The customs boundary coincides exactly with the present political frontier of Slovakia. The trade in goods as between Slovakia and Germany is to be carried on on a clearing basis. Slovak debtors are to pay into the Slovak National Bank both the debts due by them in German and those payable in the Czecho-Moravian territories under the protectorate of Germany, the Slovak State then settling the accounts by payment to Germany in marks.

For the purpose of ensuring the equilibrium of Slovakia's public finances an inland loan was issued on February 25th; but — though the period of subscription has been twice prolonged — the amount of the issue has not yet been fully subscribed. This circumstance proves that the inhabitants have no confidence in their Government and are not prepared to offer that Government's policy financial support.

In terms of the Law dated April 4th which deals with

the Slovak currency the Slovak National Bank — an institution of vital importance to the State — was established in Pozsony, a German expert being invited to take over its direction. The new currency issued by the new Bank is the KS. or Slovak crown, the gold value of which corresponds to the gold value of the former Czecho-Slovak crown, (32.21 milligrammes gold).

The organisation of the public administration is proving a most difficult task owing to the general anarchy prevailing in the country. Although the arbitrary action of the Hlinka Guards is no longer in evidence in certain regions, there is nevertheless a general prevalence of lawlessness in Slovakia. Arbitrary arrests are the order of the day in practically all towns alike. The unfortunate victims are usually members of one or other of the national minorities. Nor is there any kind of judicial activity; the courts of law are indeed only just being organised. The Supreme Administrative Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, for instance, were only set up on April 16th. And it will be a long time before they are fully organised.

It is questionable whether Slovakia will be able to cope with the economic and political difficulties incidental to the organisation of her independent State life.

COUNT CSÁKY'S EXPOSÉ

FOREIGN MINISTER EXPLAINS WHY HUNGARY LEFT LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, has submitted exposés similar in tenor to the Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses of Parliament. The text of his exposé to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Deputies ran as follows:

"Everyone knows that I have sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations intimating the decision of the Hungarian Government to suspend immediately all co-operation with the League as a political body, and to resign membership as soon as the period of two years' notice stipulated in the Covenant expires. Although it is scarcely necessary to enter into a lengthy explanation of the Government's decision, I think it may prove useful, if only for the purpose of establishing the facts, to examine in retrospect the links between Hungary and the League on the one hand, and, on the other, to outline the circumstances that have been a source of anxiety to almost every Hungarian Government, and which have now led to the decision that we must leave the League. It cannot be denied that from the very outset the League of Nations failed to fulfil the hopes reposed in its activity. The League, (and in particular the forces patent and latent actuating the various departments and grouped around them), has, during all its activity hitherto, been in the service of political trends diametrically opposed to Hungary's aims in the sphere of international politics.

"These forces, which in the 'twenties so cleverly managed to subordinate the real aim of the League of Nations (viz, the maintenance of international peace) to the post-War psychology of the victorious States, and make

the League serve the cult of the status quo created by the Paris Peace Treaties, were just as clever in recent years in exploiting the League as an instrument of propaganda for the so-called "anti-Fascist and anti-National Socialist ideology". Naturally these phenomena gravely affected the universality of the League. From the beginning the United States of America, disappointed, held aloof from the League, and other greater or smaller Powers did not hesitate to turn their backs on it as soon as it was evident that the Geneva institution was incapable of fulfilling its original purpose. Great Britain was the staunchest supporter of the League, yet her Prime Minister frankly stated in the House of Commons that it would be a delusion for the minor States to suppose that the League of Nations would defend their security.

"Again, the League did not take seriously its rôle as protector of the minorities placed under its charge and failed to supervise the enforcement of the Minority Treaties. This is shown by the fact that of the 881 petitions filed up to the middle of 1938, 392 were immediately rejected by the Secretariat because of technical flaws, and of the remaining 489 only 6 have been laid before the Council. (Three of the six treated of Hungarian matters: one dealt with the question of the settlers in the Banate and the other two with that of the so-called "Csik Private Property.")

"The League of Nations was also guilty of gross neglect in connection with the institution of international arbitration. The idea of compulsory arbitration was sabotaged, and the procedure of asking the legal opinion of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration at the Hague was rendered ineffective by the practice of making an application for a legal opinion conditional on the approval of the States concerned. The motion suggesting a change of this procedure submitted by the so-called Oslo Bloc of States (Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) has gone astray in the labyrinth of Committees. Nor did the League perform its duty in cases where its task as prescribed by international treaty would have been to ensure the undisturbed functioning of an international court of justice. In our case, for instance, influenced by political considerations, the League

neglected to perform its duty of nominating an arbitrator, although, for similar reasons, it hastened to send out a supplementary arbitrator at the request of other States.

"The League of Nations has — to the detriment of Hungary as well as of the rest of the disarmed States — failed to enforce the provisions of the Covenant relating to disarmament. The idea of universal disarmament was sacrificed to the chimera of collective security, and a race in armaments set in which we could not afford to watch with folded arms. Here I may mention that the League of Nations never reached the point of being able to consider impartially the inclusion in the Council, the Secretariat, and various Committees of any of the States regarded with disfavour by the "Geneva ideology". Hungary, for instance, has never been assigned the rôle in these departments to which by virtue of her political and cultural weight she would have been entitled. I have already implied that the most serious obstacle to co-operation between Hungary and the League was of a political nature, and this explains why our contacts were abortive from the very outset."

The Endeavour of the League to Perpetuate the Injustices of the Peace Treaties.

"Owing to its preoccupation with Article 10 of the Covenant, as a safeguard of the territorial status quo, and with the idea of security based on sanctions laid down in that Article, the League neglected other provisions of the Covenant — above all Article 19 — calculated to act as a corrective to Article 10, i. e. to the rigidity of the territorial and political status quo, which would have made possible a peaceful change in conditions threatening international peace. The men responsible for Hungary's foreign policy realized from the beginning that Geneva's attitude towards the Covenant and its cardinally erroneous interpretation thereof were an endeavour to petrify by forcible means the situation created by the Peace Treaties. As a result of this endeavour, when the final text of the Covenant was being drafted, and later on in its application, those of its provisions which would have ensured in every field the possibility of peaceful evolution

among the Member States were thrust into the background in favour of the petrification of the status quo. This was classically expressed in 1929 by Count Albert Apponyi at the tenth General Assembly of the League. With prophetic inspiration he predicted the inevitable consequences if the League of Nations continued to adhere to the policy previously pursued.

"There are situations" — said Count Apponyi — "which with the changing times cease to be just, and there are others which never were just. If the League of Nations desires to maintain these situations permanently, it will find itself at variance with the laws of nature. In that case, not only will it cease to serve the lofty aims of peace and justice for which its standard was raised, but it will also expose itself to the danger of being swept away by the forces of nature which progress irresistibly along the path of development marked out for them."

"When, therefore, after the failure to apply sanctions to Italy, the idea of Covenant reform was first broached at an extraordinary Assembly of the League in 1936, Hungary's delegate was not striking out in a new direction when he pointed out that the chief task of reform should be to reconcile the provisions of the Covenant aiming at a maintenance of the status quo with those the purpose of which was to preserve international peace by the application of preventive measures (appeasement, arbitration, treaty revision, etc.). The principle underlying the speeches of the Hungarian delegates to the General Assemblies of 1936 and 1937 was the same. In their speeches they set forth more particularly the technical means by which the desired end might be achieved, namely, a more effective and practical application of three Articles: Article 11, dealing with appeasement; Article 13, providing for arbitration and, above all, Article 19, which allows of a peaceful revision of the Peace Treaties.

"Great as was the Hungarian Government's satisfaction to see its point of view shared by other well-meaning States, in particular by the Oslo Bloc, the aims of which were similar to its own, it was keenly disappointed to perceive that there was no hope of inducing the Committee of Twenty-eight delegated to draft the proposed revised text of the Covenant

to adopt these useful suggestions. In point of fact the fruitless activity, extending over a period of two years, of that Committee was one of the most lamentable chapters in the history of the League. In this case, too, those latent forces that were always on their guard when it came to a question of the League, in pursuance of its real vocation, ensuring the peaceful development of certain Member States by composing their differences, instead of acting as their advocate, prevented the Committee from doing any successful work.

"Although the Committee delegated rapporteurs to deal with every point at issue, their reports on certain questions — characteristically on Article 19 — were not ready in two years time. And it is probable that even the reports submitted were not gone into by the Committee. In these circumstances it was manifest at the General Assembly in 1938 that the idea of Covenant reform had ended in smoke. It was patent from the speeches delivered in the Assembly that an overwhelming majority of the Member States were unwilling to apply the provisions of the Covenant dealing with sanctions. And now, since in spite of all Hungary's suggestions and warnings, nothing has been done to develop the possibilities of maintaining peace by preventive measures, it would seem that either path is equally closed to the League of Nations.

The Unduly Unilateral Policy of the League.

"Speaking in the League Council last May Mr. Edwards, Chile's Delegate, described the political spirit of the League as follows: Since its establishment 42 matters of a political nature had been submitted to the League by its Members. Of these only 11 had been dealt with on their merits, but as those 11 referred solely to the liquidation of the War, the League had dealt with them merely as the successor of the Entente Council of Four. As for the remaining 31 cases, some of them had been settled by direct negotiation between the Parties concerned, some had been relegated to other international tribunals, some had led to the countries in question abandoning the League; and the rest — a no mean number — had never been settled at all. The time is over when certain peoples, in order to rise above

the level of subordinate nations, were forced to beg admittance to, or remain members of, a society that was furthering the interests of other, more fortunate, States. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly true that, so long as she was a Member of the League, Hungary was formally bound to fulfil certain international obligations the fulfilment of which the Powers directing the League were fully entitled to demand of her. One cannot avoid feeling that, with certain exceptions, the States belonging to the League are very much alike from a political point of view, and that the appeal, based on some of the paragraphs of the Covenant, likely to be addressed to us would serve an easily predictable aim, which aim would not be in conformity with the fundamental principles of Hungary's foreign policy. I assert that many other small and medium-sized States feel uncomfortable today in the League of Nations, and for the same reasons as we ourselves did, namely, because of the unduly unilateral policy pursued by the League. And I ask you, Gentlemen of the Committee, what could Hungary, acting correctly, have done so long as she was formally bound by law to the League, if the latter, through the medium of its Secretariat, its Council or its General Assembly, had appealed to this country on certain matters of major importance? Is it out of the question to suggest that we might have found ourselves ranged against our own interests and those of our friends, when we might, and should, hold aloof from the dispute. While the tie binding us to the League existed, I for my part should never have dared to refuse to fulfil the implied obligations; for I know that one of the greatest assets of a small or medium-sized nation is its absolute reliability, its faithful performance of promises.

"Who would venture to say that, today of all times, we might not be confronted by a serious dilemma? I am fully conscious of the fact that an attempt is about to be made to build up a new system of security in defence of the present status quo outside the framework of the League of Nations, since to do so within it has not proved practicable. Nor do I forget that some States would fain employ certain departments of the League as stepping-stones for the furtherance of new political aims. In my humble opinion, the most

elementary form of prudence makes it imperative for us, in these times when everything is in a state of flux, to spare no effort to preserve our freedom of action on every side.

"We are determined to stand on our own feet; therefore, for the moment, we can make no promises to do this or that or to refrain from doing this or that. And if we have reserved the right to form our own decisions in the case of our friends, then it is but logical to refuse to be bound in any direction by a rump League of Nations, or rather by those who are the moving power behind it. There was a time when every State so to say feverishly sought allies. But even then we endeavoured to preserve our liberty to form our own decisions. Now it seems as if other countries, too, would gladly free themselves from obligations undertaken long ago, perhaps without a due understanding of what they implied. The path and aims of Hungary's foreign policy are determined by her geographical and ethnographical position, by historical tradition and the carefully weighed forces latent in the Hungarian nation. These aims will be realized when and as our desire for peace and our reason dictate. I would stress the point that our resignation of League membership was due solely to our own initiative and made after prolonged deliberation. It did not ensue because we had given, or wished to give, other pledges, but merely in order to more fully ensure the nation's right of self-determination in the days of struggle to come. This step will perhaps give other nations cause to think whether political co-operation with the League today is not identical with taking sides."

— y —

POLITICAL MOSAIC

OFFICIAL JOURNAL, PARTY ORGANISATIONS AND CULTURAL SOCIETIES OF MAGYARS OF SLOVAKIA PLACED UNDER AN EMBARGO

A report dated Pozsony, April 11th, informed us that — referring to instructions received from Premier Tiso — the Pozsony Police Headquarters had notified the editorial offices of the "Uj Hirek", the daily journal of the Hungarian Party of Slovakia published in Pozsony, that the appearance of the paper had been suspended for an indefinite period. The Police Headquarters offered no explanation whatsoever of the action taken to prohibit the appearance of the journal.

The Magyar and German Parties of Slovakia Dissolved.

Another report dated Pozsony, April 11th, informed us that M. Sanyo Mach, Slovak Propaganda Minister, had made a statement — published in the Easter issues of the Hungarian and German papers — to the effect that the Magyar und German Parties of Slovakia could not continue to maintain their independence, but must join the Slovak State Party, within the framework of which they would be able to function as sub-sections. On April 12th the leaders of the German Party of Slovakia declared that they could not consent to the carrying into effect of the scheme put forward by M. Mach, seeing that the absorption of the German Party would be a breach of the promises given by Premier Tiso last November to the German ethnic group. And the Slovak Government has promised to withdraw the measure prohibiting the independent activity of the German Party, the result being that the grave injustice now affects the Magyars only.

Slovak Ministry of Interior Prohibits Activity of Magyar Cultural Society and then also of the Other Magyar Cultural Associations.

A report dated Pozsony, April 20th, informed us that the Slovak Ministry of the Interior had prohibited the activity and struck off the list of societies the most important of the Magyar cultural associations — the Cultural Society of the Magyars of Slovakia.

The explanation of the measure of prohibition was to the effect that the headquarters of the Society were in Komárom — i. e. within the territory of a foreign State. It is common knowledge, however, that after the re-incorporation in Hungary of a part of the Hungarian Highlands the Cultural Society of the Magyars of Slovakia amended its Statutes to the effect that the seat of the Society had been transferred to Pozsony. The Slovak Ministry of the Interior has not yet approved the amended Statutes. The action taken to prohibit the activity of the Society is an exceptionally serious blow to the Magyars of Slovakia. And on April 21st the activity of the other Magyar cultural associations was also prohibited.

*Appeal Addressed to the Magyars of Slovakia by
Count John Esterházy, Leader of the Magyar Party.*

A report dated Pozsony, April 21st, said that Count John Esterházy, leader of the Magyars of Slovakia, had issued the following manifesto:

"Magyar Brethren! The Slovak Government has once more dealt us a blow. Without giving any objective or satisfactory reason for its action, it has placed an embargo on the activity of the Cultural Society of the Magyars of Slovakia and has decreed the dissolution of its organisation. I immediately addressed to the Slovak Government a protest against this fresh act of disablement in which I demanded that the embargo should be removed without delay and the continued undisturbed activity of the Cultural Society ensured.

"The responsibility for this arbitrary measure must rest exclusively with the Slovak Government, which would appear to regard as the chief item of its programme the endeavour to drive the Magyars of this country by an ever-increasing system of oppression into an extremity of despair leading eventually to excesses which it might exploit for the purpose of definitively "subjecting" the Magyars.

"When our patience is exhausted, though we shall not do anything that runs counter to our respect for law and equity, our unbroken national self-consciousness will nevertheless tell us that the cup is full! So far we have not been listened to when we asked for a redress of our grievances and the fulfilment of our demands, nor have we been given a hearing when we offered to collaborate in a brotherly spirit in the work of construction.

"You must continue in the future too to fulfil all your duties as citizens of the country and must avail yourselves of the legitimate rights available in any branch of our public life; but you must protest before all forums alike with every legal means at your disposal against disablement and other grievances. In token of our protest I instruct you to refrain from arranging any cultural events and also from taking part in events initiated by

others. You have been deprived of your press too: for a time we shall be doomed to silence in the field of Hungarian culture, but our silence will proclaim louder than words the justice of our cause and will call the attention of the world to the lot of Magyars in this country."

Open Letter Addressed by Count Esterházy to Premier Tiso.

Count John Esterházy at the same time addressed to Premier Tiso an Open Letter in which he protested against the embargo placed upon the activity of the Magyar Cultural Society and against the other injurious measures. He pointed out that the motive put forward in justification of the embargo was groundless and arbitrary, seeing that the Society in question had two months previously amended its Statutes and designated Pozsony as its seat, that amendment having been submitted for the approval of Government. And, in the event of Government finding some other pretext for the civil disablement involved, he (Count Esterházy) declared that the Magyars had vested rights entitling them both to maintain their organisations and their cultural associations and to defend and develop their ethnic individuality in all fields alike. These rights had been accorded the Magyars during the previous régime too; the Magyars were therefore not asking for anything new, merely the enforcement of those rights which they had enjoyed under Czecho-Slovak rule. The Magyars had not given Government any cause for such measures; and in proof of that statement Esterházy referred to the manifesto addressed by him to the Magyars after the Vienna Award in which he had stressed the desire of the Magyars to contribute actively towards the re-construction of Slovakia, having done so in the hope that this gesture would be received by the Slovak people in a spirit of understanding.

Esterházy pointed out also that those responsible for the Vienna Award had taken measures to ensure the protection of the rights of the Magyars of Slovakia and to ensure the complete equality of the Pozsony Magyar ethnic group. The Open Letter then proceeds as follows:

"We Magyars came forward unselfishly to take part in the work of construction, — even though we were made to feel that official circles were continuously sowing the seeds of hatred of us — doing so more and more intensively — until today they have converted this procedure into a veritable system. I must confess frankly that the task before me was exceptionally arduous; I was being ground between two millstones: but I undertook the responsibility because I believed unswervingly that the Magyarphobe attitude of the Slovak Government would very soon change.

"That no such change has ensued, is not my fault or our

fault — not the fault of the Magyars of Slovakia. The responsibility for this state of things lies exclusively with the Slovak Government and with those leaders of the Slovak people who churlishly refused to accept the proffered hand of friendship and in addition went so far as to treat with brutal savagery everything that was dear to our souls and to our Magyar hearts — as if they would have us believe that we Magyars of Slovakia were some inferior kind of mongrel people only fit to serve as tests upon which to try out the worst instruments of their policy of oppression."

Esterházy establishes the fact that the measure suspending the activity of the Magyar Cultural Society is a fitting link in a long chain of similar measures of oppression. He therefore protests against these measures, not only as leader of the Magyars of Slovakia, but also as the only Deputy in the Slovak Diet representing the Magyar people. And the responsibility was devolved upon him by the Slovak Government itself when it placed his name on their official list of candidates.

THE ROME POURPARLERS.

Count Paul Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary, and Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, were received in Rome on April 17th. — amid the enthusiastic cheers of the people and with a splendour in externals displaying a brilliant and pompous pageantry — by the chief dignitaries of Italy, with Signor Mussolini at their head. This visit was not a mere act of courtesy; besides documenting an alliance of two peoples deepened by the complete harmony of their feelings, it was an event of prime importance in international politics too the significance of which was acknowledged also by the international press. It afforded an opportunity for the discussion of questions raised by recent international developments which were of interest to both Parties alike — a discussion far exceeding the limits of a mere friendly visit. Hungary took part in the discussion as a factor whose importance had been considerably enhanced by the acquisition of a strip of Upper Hungary and of Ruthenia and by the possession of a splendid new army — the object of that discussion being to contribute towards the consolidation of a peace founded on a spirit of justice, an issue in the induction of which Hungary plays a decisive role, there being indeed no possibility of a settlement of the problem without her agreement or against her will.

This circumstance was stressed most emphatically in the speech made by Signor Mussolini after the dinner given in honour of the Hungarian Ministers on April 18th., — a speech in which the Italian Premier, dwelling on the close and firm friendship uniting the two nations, emphasised that Italy had

been delighted to see that fundamental principles of justice which Italy had so long and so consistently demanded had been restored for Hungary's benefit and that Hungary had recovered territories and populations which ought never to have been wrested from her. Echoing the leading motif of Signor Mussolini's speech — that part stressing the importance of the fundamental principles of justice — Count Teleki declared that the events of recent months had opened the gate of justice to the Hungarians and that for the historical assistance and help granted in this connection even the humblest Hungarian cottage echoed with gratitude to Italy. "We know" — he continued — that Italy is determinedly anxious to see Hungary strong; and on the other hand it is our interest that the power of the Italian Empire should increase rapidly and rise to the greatest possible height."

Diplomatic circles were deeply impressed by the fact that the negotiations became daily longer and longer. In contrast to the usual practice the first day's *pourparler* — which lasted for an exceptionally long time — was followed in the evening by a second discussion, there being a third discussion too on the following day. Not only the Italian, but the whole international, press stressed that negotiations of considerable importance had been started for the purpose of settling in a spirit of justice the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary and between Hungary and Rumania respectively; indeed, a section of the press was actually of the opinion that very shortly the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between Hungary and Yugoslavia was to be expected, the international press having unanimously established the fact that the Rome *pourparlers* relating to a settlement of the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary were to be the starting-point of the negotiations to be held in Venice between the Italian and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. Diplomatic circles thought it opportune to recall the fact that on the occasion of the visit of Count Ciano to Budapest last December the Hungarian Foreign Minister — in his speech at the dinner in honour of the Italian Foreign Minister — had declared that "our friends' friends are our friends", a remark generally regarded as an allusion to Yugoslavia. And Hungary has recently in any case repeatedly expressed her readiness to adjust the relations with Yugoslavia in the spirit of justice and in a manner satisfactory to both Parties, the Hungarian Premier having indeed, in the speech made by him on April 18th., referred to the fact that the connections between Hungary and Yugoslavia were becoming more and more satisfactory.

In diplomatic circles the fact was also established that Rumania was impelled to break with the one-sided policy previously pursued by her, having become a point at which the interests of the two Axes meet; and that both groups of Great Powers would welcome Rumania adjusting her relations with

that Hungary which the Trianon Peace Edict had compelled to forfeit to Rumania a greater area of territory and a larger quota of population than to any other of the so-called "Succession States". And it should not be forgotten that it was during the visit to Rome of the Hungarian Ministers that Signor Mussolini answered President Roosevelt in terms decidedly emphasising the objects of justice and peace.

During the visit to Rome — a visit marked by an unusual cordiality and an exceptionally brilliant pageantry — the Hungarian statesmen were received by the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, who gave a lunch in their honour; Signor Mussolini arranged a dinner in their honour; and the Fascist Youth passed in review before the distinguished guests of the country. An event of outstanding importance was the reception by the Pope on April 20th, the audience being a particularly lengthy one marked by exceptional cordiality, His Holiness's guests — the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister — being personally known to Him. His Holiness sent Hungary and the Hungarian people His blessing.

The following official communiqué was issued in connection with the visit to Rome:

"Rome, April 20th. Tonight, at midnight, the following official statement was issued respecting the Italian-Hungarian discussions:

"During their visit to Rome Count Paul Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary, and Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, had several discussions with the Duce and Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister. These discussions were carried on in that atmosphere of cordiality and mutual confidence which characterises the close friendly connections existing between the two countries. An exhaustive investigation was made of the most important questions, in particular of the problems of Central Europe and the Danube Basin, due consideration being had also for recent events and for the situation at present prevailing. Satisfaction was expressed at the results achieved by the two Governments in both the political and the economic field for the purpose of obtaining the greatest possible degree of consolidation; and expression was given to the joint intention of both Parties to place their activities at the service of those objects of peace and justice which have been adopted by the Berlin-Rome Axis. To that end the Parties have agreed in particular to further develop the policy of co-operation with friendly States."

VISIT TO BERLIN OF HUNGARIAN PREMIER AND
HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

The visit to Berlin of the Hungarian Premier and Hungarian Foreign Minister was an event of considerable importance in respect of the development of international relations in Central Europe. The importance of the event was due, not only to the fact that it followed immediately after the visit of the Hungarian statesmen to Rome (a visit with which it was in organic connection, being its natural complement and consequence), but also because this friendly act of courtesy on the part of the Hungarian Ministers — an act documenting the profound feelings of friendship for Germany of Hungary and her concurrence with the trend of the policy pursued by the Axis Powers — followed immediately after the historical date on which the German Leader and Chancellor so emphatically and vigorously expressed the desire for peace of the German Empire.

The spirit permeating this declaration made by the German Leader and Chancellor was in complete conformity with the declaration made previously by Signor Mussolini; and the insistent and consistent endeavours of Hungary to bring about a peaceful evolution are in perfect harmony with the unwaveringly firm tendency followed by the Axis Powers. Moreover, the absolute agreement in principle between the German Chancellor and the Italian Premier manifested in their desire to achieve peace on the basis of justice and equity was endorsed by the visit to Berlin immediately after their visit to Rome, that visit serving as a demonstration of Hungary's determination to support the same principle of peace by justice and equity.

This agreement was manifested also in the brilliant magnificence of the cordial and friendly reception accorded to the Hungarian statesmen on their arrival in Berlin on April 29th, and during their stay in the German Capital, — a reception in which the leading role was played by Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister —, and in the round of festivities which included dinners arranged in their honour by Herr Hitler, Leader and Chancellor of the German Empire, and Herr von Ribbentrop, as also during the important discussions carried on between the Hungarian statesmen and Chancellor Hitler himself, the German Foreign Minister and Herr Frick, German Minister of the Interior. At the dinner given by the German Foreign Minister the Hungarian Premier — referring to the friendship between the two peoples dating centuries back which had struck such deep roots in both countries — stressed the importance of the words spoken by Minister von Ribbentrop when he outlined the significance of the re-incorporation in Hungary of those Hungarian territories which had been wrested from Hungary in defiance of right and justice.

From what has been said above we see, therefore, that the visit to Berlin was an international event far exceeding in importance the character of a simple act of courtesy or a mere demonstration of friendly loyalty.

On May 2nd. the following official communiqué was issued in connection with the Berlin visit:

"The official visit of the Hungarian statesmen today came to an end. During the discussions carried on between Count Paul Teleki, Hungarian Premier, and Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, of the one part, and the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Ribbentrop, Imperial Foreign Minister, Marshal Göring and Herr Rudolph Hess, Imperial Minister and Deputy Leader, of the other part, the Parties frankly and openly discussed all questions of the moment at present of interest alike to Germany and Hungary. In addition, during an investigation of the general European situation, it was ascertained that there was perfect agreement between the views held by the two Parties. The festivities arranged during the official visit also contributed in a valuable measure to further strengthen the German-Hungarian friendship."

From the above communiqué the fact may therefore be established that during the pourparlers not only the questions of immediate interest to the two States, but also the general political situation in Europe and in particular the Central European problems of common interest to Hungary and the Axis Powers, were treated of, the complete agreement of views being thereby ascertained.

HERR HITLER AND REVISION

The speech made by Herr Hitler, Leader and Chancellor of the German Empire, on April 28th made a deep impression on Hungarian public opinion. The whole of Hungary was stirred to the depths by the words of Herr Hitler, inspired by a sense of historical realities, in which the German Chancellor emphatically reminded the world of the silly injustice with which the Paris treaties of peace had cut up coherent national units and annihilated economic, commercial and industrial units of production which had stood the test of centuries, subjecting, masses of people against their will and without their consent to foreign rule, instituting inhuman differences between victorious and defeated peoples and widening the gap already separating those peoples by saturating the former group with all worldly goods and condemning the latter group to misery and destitution. The public opinion of Hungary felt the thrill of its own sense of injustice suffered when it heard the German Leader and Chancellor summon to appear before the tribunal of history in the character of accused that narrow-minded

policy, inspired by a spirit of vindictiveness which, defying economic and geographical laws, created an untenable situation, plunged the world into economic crises of measureless extent and into utter misery and distress haunted by the infernal shadows of the unceasing unrest resulting — the world affected including, not only the conquered peoples which had been thrust into a state of destitution, but also the so-called "victors" and satisfied peoples.

Hungarian public opinion also shares the opinion of Chancellor Hitler to the effect that all States need "spheres of life", which are just as essential to their existence as is water to fish and air to the individual man. M. Réclus himself spoke of Hungary as a country which "God Himself had created as an indivisible unit." Consequently, when this geopolitically and geographically coherent country — this State welded into a firm unit by ten centuries of history — was dismembered and mutilated to a far greater extent than any other of the States defeated in the Great War, it was deprived of its "Lebensraum" and robbed of its vital conditions of existence. Before Hungary was dismembered at Trianon she formed a perfect geographical unit in combination with Slovakia and Transylvania, — a unit encircled by the ring of the Carpathians serving as a natural frontier, with a coherent water-system and network of roads, the interdependent economic circulation of which (based upon a reciprocal exchange of products between the mountainous regions and the plain) cannot be interrupted with impunity. Dismembered Hungary is just as little able to dispense with the minerals, salt and wood of Slovakia and Transylvania as those provinces are able to dispense with the agrarian products of Dismembered Hungary. Consequently, the brutal elimination of the interdependence of market and product at one blow deprived both post-Trianon Hungary and the territories wrested from her by force of their respective "spheres of life" and their vital conditions of existence.

The geographical and economic laws are in this connection supported also by the historical right to which Chancellor Hitler so aptly referred; for historical development is never the result of the working of chance, but is always based upon unalterable laws. And we would ask whether there is any nation in the world better entitled to appeal to historical continuity as basis of its legal claim than the Hungarian, whose country for more than ten centuries — from the days of the conquest of Hungary by the Magyars to the enforcement of the Trianon Peace Edict — formed an undisputed unit into which the several parts fitted as naturally as the limbs fit into the human trunk, constituting elements as interdependent as the lungs and the heart or as the nerves and the muscles.

The sentence of death passed on the Treaty of Versailles

must be followed logically and necessarily by a similar sentence on the Treaty of Trianon. — y —

THE BULGARIAN PREMIER'S EXPOSÉ

On 20th April, in the forenoon, the Bulgarian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Kiosseivanov, spoke before the Foreign Affairs Committee on the international situation. He established the fact that Bulgaria had made no pact with any other country and was determined to adhere strictly to a policy of neutrality. Speaking of the economic connections between Bulgaria and Germany, he stressed the point that the close co-operation between the two countries was due to the fact that none of the Western Powers had shown any interest in the Bulgarian markets. As regards their relations with their neighbours, the Premier declared that the Government was striving to re-establish the Bulgarian frontiers of 1919 by means of peaceful compromise. This was the only condition on which Bulgaria would be willing to join the Balkan Alliance. The members of the Foreign Affairs Committee declared that the Premier's exposé had completely satisfied them. — y —

HOW MINORITIES LIVE

RUMANIA

FURTHER MILITARY COURT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HUNGARIANS

The Military Court of *Kolozsvár* (Cluj) has tried M. István Csengery, Notary Public in Szatmár. He was accused of irredentist propaganda, a charge which the defendant — pleading not guilty — described as pure fiction. The Court did not accept his explanation and sentenced him to two months' imprisonment; as, however, M. Csengery had already spent two months in detention, the Court ordered his immediate release. ("Keleti Ujság", March 25, 1939).

The Rev. József Márton had to appear before the Court to answer a charge of wilfully carrying on irredentist propaganda with a view to "Magyarising" the Swabian (German) population of his parish; he was also accused of spreading false rumours concerning the Rumanian status-quo. The Military Court sentenced the minister to three months imprisonment, while his two associates were sentenced to the payment of a fine of 2000 lei. ("Magyar Lapok", March 29).

M. József György and M. István Biró, two leaders of the Hungarians in the County of Maros-Torda, had to answer for a speech they made in the village of Vadad one year ago, when addressing the audience of a religious performance given by the local Women's Society. A few weeks after their appearance at this performance the local gendarmes reported them for wilful propaganda against the State elementary school. It appeared at the trial, however, that the two speakers had dealt with strictly religious and ecclesiastic problems and did not even mention the State elementary school. Both were acquitted. ("Magyar Lapok", March 29).

A petition was submitted to the Court of Law by the Rumanian population of Románrákos that 81 yokes of common pasture land and forest land should be taken away from the neighbouring Hungarian village of Tordaszentlászló and given to the Rumanian village. Although each of the surrounding villages had received an adequate share of common land in course of the Land Reform, the Court accepted the Rumanian petition.

When the inhabitants of the Rumanian village came over to the Hungarian village to take possession of the 81 yokes, the inhabitants of the two villages started a fight, which was only stopped by the gendarmes. The gendarmes then reported 16 Hungarian farmers of the village of Tordaszentlászló for mutiny and slandering of the Rumanian nation. All of them were found guilty by the Military Court of Kolozsvár (Cluj). Three Hungarian farmers were fined 2000 lei each, while the others had to pay fines of 1000 lei each. ("Magyar Ujság", April 2).

Sister Ilona *Mátyás*, a nurse, came to Rumania on March 10th to visit her relatives in the village of Tordaszentlászló. In her bag the customs officials discovered a book of poems which they regarded as propaganda hostile to the State. The book was thereupon confiscated, and the nurse was arrested. Sister *Mátyás* pointed out at her trial that she had bought the book to read on the journey, but its contents had been unknown to her. The Military Court did not accept her explanation and sentenced her to one month's imprisonment. ("Keleti Ujság" April 5).

The Rev. *Dávid Potowschi*, the Roman Catholic parish priest of Csikdánfalva, appeared before the Military Court of Kolozsvár (Cluj) to answer the charge of hostile propaganda against the State. He was alleged to have forbidden his parishioners to go to the local Greek Catholic church. He was also alleged to have spoken in his sermons against those parents who sent their children to other than their own churches on the Rumanian national holidays. — The defendant explained to the Military Court that there is no law by which the children could be compelled to go to any other church than their own. In any case, he said, he had only done his duty in encouraging his parishioners to visit their own church. The Military Court acquitted the priest of the charge. ("Népujság", April 2).

The Rev. *László Szabó*, Protestant minister of the village of Szilágyszentkirály, M. *József Süle* and *Antal Pap*, his two churchwardens, were also summoned before the Military Court of Kolozsvár (Cluj) on the charge of irredentism. The charge against them was that they had ordered their church to be painted with the colours of the Hungarian tricolor: the roof red, the windows green and the walls white (the Hungarian tricolor being: red-white-and-green). — The defendants pleaded not guilty and pointed out that the roof was not red but purple, the windows — it is true — were green, but that the walls were gray rather than white. Judgment was reserved. ("Keleti Ujság", April 2).

Father Leonard *Trefán*, former Prior of the Order of St. Francis, had to appear before the Military Court because during a dominiciary visit a book of poems entitled "The Broken Harp", had been found in his library, though it was under embargo in

Rumania. The Military Court dismissed the case, as it fell under the amnesty edict. ("Néplap", March 23). — y —

PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING RUMANIAN CITIZENSHIP. FLAGRANTLY UNJUST TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN RUMANIA.

The Minority Minister, Dr. Dragomir Silviu, promised the Magyar members of the National Renaissance Front that the question of the Magyars whose names had been omitted from the lists of Rumanian citizens would be settled by a special Order. On 24th March, a decree dealing with the question of citizenship was actually issued by the Minister of the Interior, but it discriminated in favour of the majority and against the minorities by instituting flagrantly unequal methods of procedure. For, whereas all that members of the majority require is a simple form of recognition, a lengthy and expensive procedure is imposed on minority subjects who wish to become Rumanian citizens.

That the decree discriminates between Rumanian and non-Rumanian subjects is shown by what is required of them.

An applicant of Rumanian ethnic origin has only to file an application bearing a four lei "courts of justice" stamp accompanied by the following documents: 1. birth certificate; 2. certificate of his parents' marriage; 3. a statement that he renounces citizenship of any other country; 4. a certificate from the courts of law that he is not under tutelage; 5. a certificate from the Attorney General's Office that he has no criminal record; 6. a certificate of integrity from the local authorities of the place where he is domiciled; 7. a certificate from the mayor or parish council of his place of domicile proving that he is a Rumanian and that his parents were also Rumanians, and 9. a certificate to the same effect from the parish priest.

An applicant of non-Rumanian origin must file his application on a special form bearing a 600 lei stamp and must affix thereto an extra 100 lei so-called "Ministry of Justice" stamp and another 2 lei one. This application must be addressed to the President of the Naturalization Committee (Presidente al Comisiune de naturalizare) in the Ministry of Justice and with it must be enclosed:

1. birth certificate;
2. a certificate from a court of justice that the applicant is not under tutelage and that he has not been deprived of his civil rights;
3. a certificate from the Ministry of Justice stating that no State has applied for his extradition on a criminal charge;
4. a certificate from the Public Prosecutor's Office that he has no criminal record;

5. a certificate of integrity from the local police or government authorities;

6. a certificate from a court of law or the local municipality that he is not suffering from an incurable disease;

7. a statement of the taxes he pays, or should he pay none, of the sum he receives at present as a pension;

8. a certificate that he is able to meet the requirements necessary to obtain the rights of citizenship;

9. a school certificate that he can read and write Rumanian;

10. a certificate that no bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted against him;

11. besides submitting these certificates, if required by the Committee of Naturalization, he must make a statement that he renounces citizenship of all other countries;

12. a certificate that he has lived uninterruptedly in Rumania for the past ten years. ("Néplap", March 30.)

That minority subjects are obliged by the decree to pay 702 lei per head in stamps while a person of Rumanian origin must only submit a petition bearing a 4 lei stamp, and that non-Rumanian applicants are required to produce a school certificate that they can read and write Rumanian, are proof that, despite the treaty obligations internationally undertaken, the same system of unequal treatment that for the past two decades has weighed so heavily on all non-Rumanian inhabitants, still continues to be applied to the minorities in Rumania. — y —

THE FARMERS OF NAGYSZALONTA NOT ALLOWED TO COME TO HUNGARY TO LOOK AFTER THEIR FARMS

The town of *Nagyszalonta* (County of Bihar), like so many other places, also had its area cut in two by the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, so that many farmers have one part of their farms in Hungary, and the other in Rumania. In all those places where the same situation prevails, the farmers are generally given a permanent permit to cross the frontier in order to be able to look after their farms in Hungary. These permits are printed in Bucharest, from where they are sent to the frontier authorities, who issue them to the claimants. — This year, however, the permits have not yet arrived from Bucharest, so that the frontier authorities have refused permission now to cross the frontier. The farmers concerned have submitted a petition to the Director of the Customs Office at Nagyvárad, asking for permission to cross the frontier. The spring work in the fields, they pointed out, was already in full swing, and it would therefore cause them heavy losses if

they were not allowed to till their land. The Director's reply was a flat refusal. ("Magyar Lapok", April 2, 1939). — y —

HUNGARIAN COUNTIES AND TOWNS NOT ALLOWED TO LISTEN IN TO BROADCASTS

The police authorities of *Szatmárnémeti* have officially informed the population that several wireless sets in the town and in the county are to be sealed. The edict says that within a zone of twenty kilometres from the frontiers no private persons are allowed to operate wireless sets. The edict also specifies, according to the letters of the alphabet, in what order the inhabitants have to present their sets for sealing. After they have been provided with an official seal by the police, the sets are to be returned to their owners. All those who do not promptly obey these orders will be sentenced to imprisonment for periods of from one month to two years. Repeated domiciliary visits will secure police control. ("Keleti Ujság", April 5.)

Similar orders have been given in the town of Arad. The police appeared in the wireless shops and sealed all news sets on stock. The police in the town of Marosvásárhely have sealed the wireless set of the Hungarian school there. After *Szatmár*, *Arad* and *Marosvásárhely*, several wireless sets have been sealed by the police in the whole of Szeklerland. The police had received instructions to visit several owners of wireless sets and to seal the sets on the spot. The population has been warned against hiding their sets, under pain of two years' imprisonment. ("Népujság", April 15). — y —

SLOVAKIA

EXCESSES OF HLINKA GUARDS: NUMEROUS MAGYARS ARRESTED

The "Slovak" of 1st April, 1939, publishes a report received from Eperjes on 30th March stating that 70 important Magyars had been arrested in the town and environs. The newspaper, the official organ of the Slovak Government, adds the following comments: "On Tuesday and Wednesday (March 28 and 29) 70 persons were arrested in Eperjes and environs, 20 of them in the town itself. All these stirrers up of strife had been deliberately trying to disturb the peace of the citizens in Eastern Slovakia and create unrest and confusion.

"They did not succeed, and now they can sit in their cells and meditate on their Judas-like behaviour and its consequences ... It should be noted that these men are Magyar gentry landowners and some of the wealthier people of the town and

its surroundings. They were supported by the Magyar pensioners and the Jews.

"Rigorous proceedings will be instituted against them. The authorities in Eastern Slovakia are determined to apply the severest measures, should they prove necessary. A list has been made of persons under suspicion of circulating false reports and rumours incompatible with the interests of the Slovak State."

The truth, however, as reported from Pozsony on 13th April, is that the Hlinka Guards are not particular about the methods they adopt to procure money, seeing that they have to provide their own food and clothing. In Nagymihály they resorted to open brigandage. They made a system of arresting the well-to-do citizens of the town on the pretext that they were dangerous to the independence of Slovakia. A large number of well-to-do citizens were carried away from Eperjes to an unknown destination. A few days later their families received a visit from members of the Hlinka Guard, who told them that there was a possibility of the arrested citizens regaining their liberty, but that it would cost them from 50 to 100 thousand crowns each, as the case might be. These sums were demanded as bail, but everybody knew that it was really a question of ransom money to provide the Hlinka Guard with means. If the relations of the arrested persons pay this so-called bail, they will never see their money again, and if they are not in a position to pay, their relatives will be carried off to a concentration camp.

It was reported from Pozsony on 11th April that the persecution and arrest of the Magyars were the order of the day in Slovakia. A few days before Easter the following persons were arrested in Nyitra: Bernard Rolfesz, vice-burgomaster; the parish priest, Kálmán Smida, a man aged 75, who was the chairman of the local branch of the United Hungarian Party; the honorary president of the local branch of the Party, Dr. Akos Györgyi; the wife of the district president; a tradesman named Charles Szelcsik, who was a member of the municipal organization of the Party, Julius Gerlai, a confectioner, and three other Magyars of Nyitra. In *Nagymihály* a doctor, Ernest Szécsényi, a member of the Hungarian Party, was arrested. These arrests came as a bolt from the blue and the arrested persons were not informed what the charge against them was. When the Bishop of Nyitra intervened, Premier Tiso ordered the parish priest, Kálmán Smida, to be released.

The Hlinka Guards have been guilty of a series of acts of violence in Eperjes and in other places along the Hungarian frontier.

In Eperjes they arrested a lawyer named Dr. Joseph Kisóczy and plundered his house. Kisóczy, who had lost an arm in the

great war, was one of the most prominent of the Magyars of the town. Several other Magyars were arrested in Eperjes, and the houses of all of them were plundered. Many important members of the Slovak intelligentsia were also arrested, several of whom were men well-known in Kassa. Among others were arrested Dr. Joseph Ruzsiák, a lawyer, Dr. Paul Novák, another lawyer, and his wife, and Dr. Ladislav Petrikovitch, a former notary public. Besides these several physicians have been arrested. Paul Novák was for a time burgomaster of Kassa during the Czecho-Slovak régime. It is rumoured that they were arrested because they had openly expressed their conviction that the future of the Slovak nation could best be assured by establishing contacts with Hungary. All these people have been sent to the convict prison in Illava.

The inhabitants of Nagyszalánc are being kept in a state of permanent terror by the Hlinka guards. Things came to a head on the Thursday of Easter Week, when the people of the place, who were tilling their fields, were driven into the village by armed men. The Hlinka Guards marched up and down the streets, shooting. A young man, Stephen Chikó, jr. was wounded in the shoulder. Numerous houses were searched.

According to a report received from *Pozsony* on 13th April, John Böszörményi, Reformed Church pastor of Kolbász (County Zemplén) has been carried off by Hlinka Guards. Nothing further is known of his fate.

— y —

TREACHEROUS ATTACK OF HLINKA GUARDS AT KASSA

As reported from Ungvár on April 24th, on April 22nd, about 6.30 p. m., a Hungarian patrol of two men set out on their round from the frontier village of Hernádtihany (near Kassa). They had hardly left the village when two men dressed in mufti who had come from Slovakia, fired at the Hungarian patrol from the direction of the railway tunnel. Both Hungarian frontier guards were severely wounded, one in the stomach and the other in the chest. The one who was less severely wounded had just enough strength, before falling unconscious, to fire at the two assailants, who however managed to escape to Slovakia. It is not known whether his shots hit them. — The two severely wounded Hungarian soldiers were conveyed to the hospital in Kassa, where one of them died. The other soldier was at once operated; the bullet was removed from his body, but his condition is still very grave. The gendarmes and the military authorities at once proceeded to inquire into the matter. It is believed that the assailants were members of the Hlinka guard dressed in civilian clothes.

— y —

NEW SLOVAK FRONTIER INCIDENT AT SAROSREMETE

As reported from Ungvár on April 21st, on Thursday (April 20), at 9.15 p. m. Slovaks opened fire on the Hungarian frontier guards, and the following day, at 6 a. m., began to bombard the village of Sárosremete. The village was hit five times. The Hungarian frontier guard offered resistance. No losses have been reported on the Hungarian side. — y —

YUGOSLAVIA

NEW MINORITY COMPLAINTS AND DESIRES

The leaders of the Magyar minority in Yugoslavia leave no stone unturned in their effort to ensure and hasten the fulfilment of the legitimate demands of the minorities so often stated and to obtain redress of the complaint just as often voiced. In this direction the following steps have been taken by the Magyar minority.

On 25th March Senator Várady saw in Belgrade M. Beshlitch, Minister of Agriculture and M. Tomitch, Minister of Commerce, with whom he discussed questions affecting the Magyars in Yugoslavia. True to form, both of the Ministers promised to fulfil the wishes stated and to redress the complaints submitted. So far, however, no measures have followed.

The Magyars of Magyararkanizsa (Pavlovgrad) — a town 95% Hungarian — have launched a movement with the object of dividing the office of head inspector of elementary schools, in view of the fact that the present inspector of all the elementary schools does not speak a word of Hungarian. The parents of the Magyar pupils demand a Magyar inspector for the so-called Hungarian parallel departments of elementary education, and insist that the inspector of the State elementary schools shall be a man with a working knowledge of the Hungarian language. In the first week of April a delegation of Magyar parents and representatives of the Magyar associations in Magyararkanizsa went to M. Beshlitch, Minister of Agriculture, who at the time was on a visit to Zenta, demanding from him greater freedom of movement for the Magyar associations, the appointment of Magyar teachers in the Hungarian departments of the elementary schools and the employment, in proportion to the numerical strength of the Magyar minority, of Magyar officials in the Government offices. They also insisted on a settlement of the question of a Hungarian teachers' training college in accordance with the wishes of the Magyar minority. This delegation, too, was sent away with fair promises.

On 15th April the appointed Town Council of Szabadka (Subotica) held a gala meeting to honour Dr. Ivan Radivoyevitch, the recently appointed Ban of the Danube Banate. On behalf

of the Magyars of Szabadka, Dr. Denis Strelitzky, former member of the Skupshtina, addressed the Ban. In his speech he begged the new Ban to show a greater sympathy for the legitimate demands of the Magyar minority than his predecessors had done. M. Radivoyevitch replied in the usual terms, saying that "the same treatment was meted out by the Government to all loyal citizens irrespective of nationality and religion."

At the last meeting of the Town Council of Szabadka a resolution moved by the Magyar councillors was adopted which abolished the extra tax levied from the local Magyar societies on all "foreign", that is to say Magyar, amateur theatricals and cultural lectures. The argument urged by the Magyar members of the Town Council was that in Szabadka the Hungarian language could not be described as "foreign", since a considerable section of the inhabitants (53%) belonged to the Magyar Minority. Against this resolution, which was adopted by a majority of the Council, an appeal was submitted to the Ban's Office. In this appeal it was urged that all languages except Serb, Croatian and Slovene should be considered foreign.

On behalf of the German minority Herr Francis Hamm and Dr. Trischler, members of the Skupshtina, on March 24 presented to M. Tziritch, Minister of Education, a memorandum stating the demands of that minority. The most important of these demands are: permission for the private German-Swabian teachers' college in Ujverbász (Novi Vrbas) to accept a larger number of pupils; teachers of German nationality for the German departments of the State schools; education in German all along the line, and the establishment of German secondary schools. — y —

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL AND JUST TREATMENT IN PRACTICE.

At its meeting on March 28th the Municipal Council of the city of Ujvidék (Novisad; centre of the Danube Banate) decided this year to accord a grant of 134.800 dinars to the various local associations. Out of this grant the various Hungarian associations of the city will receive only 10.700 dinars, instead of 40.200 dinars, which would be nearer to the fair share which the 30% Hungarian population of the town may lawfully claim. The German associations will receive a grant amounting to 7000 dinars, while the rest of the amount will be divided among various Slav and other associations.

Six scholarships have recently become vacant at Zombor, where the Gyalókey Fund supplies fifteen Roman Catholic secondary school boys with scholarships of 4000 dinars a year each. At its meeting on March 20th the Municipal Council of Zombor decided to divide the six Hungarian scholarships among five boys of Slav nationality and only one Hungarian boy. — y —

B O O K S

Mr. Lloyd George's Disclosures in re the Peace Treaties.

In Vol. II of his work "The Truth about the Peace Treaties" Mr. Lloyd George sets forth in detail the history of the arrangements made in Paris in 1919—1920. He emphasises the point that the future peace of Europe depended on whether the peace terms were just and fair to all parties, and now asks, if they were not, what has been done to obtain a speedy remedy of the injustices. In his speech of 2nd February, 1919, the British delegate, Sir Eyre Crowe, warned the Peace Conference that they ought not to go to extremes with the principle that the new frontiers must always be drawn so as to favour the Allies of the Entente at Hungary's expense, for the ultimate task of the Peace Conference was to create conditions conducive to permanent peace.

The Czech delegation — says Mr. Lloyd George — at first demanded a Danube frontier from Pozsony to Vác and from thence a frontier running south of Miskolc and Sátoraljaujhely to the Rumanian border. Economic, political and military reasons were urged, and the Czechs declared that this frontier would leave as many Slovaks in Hungary as it would give Magyars to Czecho-Slovakia. Besides this Beneš demanded a corridor 200 kilometres long through Hungary to connect Czecho-Slovakia with Yugoslavia and give the Czechs access to the Adriatic.

The greatest of all misfortunes — according to Mr. Lloyd George — was that Czecho-Slovakia was not represented at the Peace Conference by Masaryk, but by an excitable, crafty, far less balanced and very shortsighted man, Beneš, who did not realize that the more he grasped the less he would be able to keep. But the Entente was always on the side of the Czechs. The result of this was the recognition of a polyglot and incoherent Czech State in which hundreds of thousands of protesting Magyars

and millions of indignant Germans were incorporated. The greater the indignation displayed by the nationalities, the less the attention paid to them by the Czech Government.

Drawing up the balance-sheet of the past twenty years, Mr. Lloyd George establishes the fact that the authors of the Peace Treaties, the victorious Powers, have neglected to fulfil the obligations undertaken by them when they signed those documents: first, because they did not keep their solemn promise to disarm after their enemies had done so; secondly, because they did nothing to assist the weaker members of the League of Nations when they were exposed to aggression; thirdly, because they scandalously broke their promise, which was an integral part of the Peace Treaties, to respect the rights of the minorities; fourthly, because they ignored the clauses providing for a revision of the Treaties. But no treaty can ensure mankind against a universal breach of faith, is Mr. Lloyd George's bitter conclusion.

— y —

OSZK
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

POLITICAL ECONOMY

HUNGARY

REVISION OF THE LAND REFORM IN THE RECENTLY RE-INCORPORATED REGIONS OF UPPER HUNGARY

Speaking to the people of Tornaalja on April 16th Andor Jaross, Hungarian Minister for the recently re-incorporated areas of Upper Hungary, announced that Government would undertake a revision of the Land Reform carried out by the Czechs after the Great War. This Land Reform, he explained, had been aimed against the Hungarian population and therefore contained many elements of social injustice. The main principle of land division had not been to provide with land those who really needed it, but to reward the services of political and other favourites by giving so called "surplus" estates of many hundred acres. Out of the total amount of land divided, (577.277 cadastral yokes), the Hungarian population ought to have received 174.970 yokes; in reality, however, it received only 42.320 yokes, — i. e. 75% less than it should have lawfully received according to its percentage. — Out of the total amount of land expropriated, 80.7% had been sequestered from Hungarian proprietors, while the share of the Hungarians in the division of the expropriated estates was not more than 7.4%. A revision of the Land Reform must, therefore, provide for a readjustment of this twofold social and national injustice.

This problem was already raised in the Czechoslovak Parliament at Prague when, many years ago, the Hungarian deputy M. Gyula Koczor — speaking on behalf of the Hungarian Party — demanded that in the Hungarian areas the land should be divided among the Hungarian claimants.

The above official declaration of a Cabinet Minister is a striking argument against the unfounded rumour spread by Rumanian propaganda, — viz. that the real motive of this intended revision of the Land Reform is to return the expropriated estates to their former owners.

Public opinion in Hungary is by no means averse to the idea of a Land Reform; on the contrary, such a reform — the Bill for which has just been completed — will be carried out in the whole country. As regards the Land Reform of the

Czechs, the Hungarian Government is resolved to carry it out to a hundred per cent, with this slight modification, however, that the land should really be given to those who want it most. — y —

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO HUNGARY OF RUTHENIA

Ruthenia as a geographical and political conception is one of the new nations that owe their existence to the Treaty of Trianon. During the whole thousand years of Hungary's history we find no indication thereof, for the simple reason that the inhabitants of Ruthenia never had any ambition to separate from Hungary. When in 1919 the Czecho-Slovak Republic was created, the easternmost part was given the name of Ruthenia (Carpatho-Russia), and this despite the fact that it was not inhabited solely by Ruthenians, having a wide belt in the south where the population was purely Magyar. For the sake of clearness we have thought it necessary to present these facts before entering into an enumeration of the economic data pertaining to Ruthenia.

The area of this province is 12.687 square kilometres, the population of which, according to the Czech census of 1930, numbered 725.357 souls, that being 57 inhabitants to the square kilometre. In 1930 their distribution according to the various branches of occupation was as follows:

Agriculture and forestry	480.856	66.3%
Industry	86.590	11.9%
Commerce	41.550	5.7%
Crafts	23.095	3.2%
Civil service	30.072	4.1%
Military service	7.703	1.1%
Other branches of occupation	55.493	7.7%

Agriculture.

In 1938 the area of Ruthenia was distributed as follows:

Arable land	242.458	hectares
Meadow land	155.445	hectares
Gardens	6.949	hectares
Vineyards	4.701	hectares
Pastures	168.359	hectares
Cane-brakes	1.592	hectares
Forests	587.116	hectares
Fish ponds	40	hectares
Other areas under water	10.845	hectares
Parks	576	hectares
Built over areas	11.530	hectares
Waste land	48.243	hectares
Uncharted	40.800	hectares

From the above table we see that in 1938 the arable land in Ruthenia was a bare 19.1% of the entire area; so little that it is totally insufficient to provide food for man and beast. It makes little difference that the consumption of cereals is very low (about 100 or 110 kilogrammes per head, per annum), for even thus Ruthenia cannot produce enough to satisfy the wants of the population. The shortage in cereals amounts on an average to about three or four thousand quintals yearly. This quantity can easily be obtained by the Ruthenians in the Great Plain of Hungary.

The stock of animals is also very small. On 1st January, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak statistical office recorded 232.324 horned cattle, 73.782 pigs, 109.845 sheep and 26.610 goats. This number is inadequate to supply the inhabitants with meat and fat, and it will be the task of the Hungarian Government to supply Ruthenia's deficiency of live stock.

Fruit production is not on a very high level. In 1937 the survey showed 2.400.000 fruit-trees and 200.000 gooseberry and currant bushes. On an average the annual production is 300.000 quintals of fruit, 208.630 quintals of grapes and 113.474 hectolitres of wine. Tobacco production is fairly good: 20.755 quintals of tobacco leaves on an area of 2.055 hectares.

Forestry.

Extensive forests cover practically the whole of Ruthenia. The entire wooded area is 587.116 hectares, the greater part of which — 72.5% — consists of deciduous trees, while the remaining 27.5% are conifers. The bulk of the broad-leaved trees are beeches, about 58% of all the forest lands are beech forests. The annual production of timber may be estimated at between 360.000 and 400.000 cubic metres. This enormous quantity of timber will enable the saw-mills along the river Tisza to work again at their full capacity and will greatly reduce the quantity of Hungary's timber imports. The same applies to firewood. With the restoration of Ruthenia Hungary's imports of that commodity will be reduced by about 30.000 wagonloads.

Ruthenia's role in the production of charcoal is also an important one. The annual output of the charcoal works is about 3000 wagonloads, 500 of which are needed by the works themselves, while the remaining 2500 wagonloads will cover part of Hungary's home consumption. Present-day, or enlarged, Hungary requires from 4000 to 4500 wagonloads of charcoal per annum, so that with the restoration of Ruthenia 60—70% of her needs will be covered at home.

Mining.

Ruthenia is not rich in minerals, but there are large salt mines near the source of the Tisza. In 1937, the mines in the

vicinity of Akna-Szlatina produced 1.605.790 quintals of rock-salt. The number of people employed in these mines is 900. For Hungary these mines are very important, for there is no other salt-mine in the country, and hitherto Hungary has had to import all her salt.

Industry.

Industry in Ruthenia is rather primitive. Far from doing anything to develop Ruthenian industry, the Prague Government closed down the majority of the factories found there. The object was to free the Czech industries from domestic competition. In consequence of this policy of desindustrialization, the number of factories decreased and to this may be attributed the fact that according to the statistics for the year 1935—1936, Ruthenian industry was not able to provide work for more than 7.267 persons.

Finances.

From a financial point of view Ruthenia is in a bad way. There being no opportunity of amassing capital, the bank deposits at the end of 1935 did not amount to more than 306.800.000 Czech crowns. This sum was distributed as follows: 16.200.000 in the branches of the Czech Banks, 164.800.000 in Slovak banks, 58.600.000 in the branches of the Czech savings-banks and 67.200.000 in various co-operative societies.

In 1935 Ruthenia had only ten banks with head offices in the province. The total capital of these institutions was 6.400.000 Czech crowns and if we add reserve funds of 2.000.000, it will be 8.400.000 Czech crowns. It is interesting to note that the total assets of the largest Ruthenian bank were 3.000.000 Czech crowns capital and 500.000 reserve fund, that is to say 3.500.000 Czech crowns in all. The rest of the Ruthenian banks had even less. The total amount of their clients' money handled by the Ruthenian banks did not exceed 60.000.000 Czech crowns. None of them paid dividends.

There were 171 co-operative societies in Ruthenia with 123.760 members. Amongst them were 5 agricultural credit institutes and a few industrial and Jewish credit institutes the statistics of which are unknown.

— y —

FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE FOR FIRST QUARTER OF YEAR SHOWS EXCESS OF EXPORTS OF 20.5 MILLION PENGŐ

Official records for March 1939 show that the total value of Hungary's imports amounted to 43.3 million pengő, while that of her exports totalled 42.8 million; there being therefore an excess of imports in March amounting to 0.5 million pengő. In

March 1938 the value of our imports amounted to 36.1 millions, that of one exports to 48 millions the excess of exports last year being therefore 10.9 million pengő.

In the first quarter of 1939 the value of Hungary's imports totalled 122 (95.8) million pengő, while that of her exports amounted to 142.5 (133.6) millions. Hungary's foreign trade balance for the first quarter of 1939 shows an excess of exports of 20.5 millions, as against 37.8 millions in 1938.

In the first quarter of this year there was a considerable increase — composed with the previous year — in the imports of such articles as pig-iron and scrapiron, copper, coke, sawn-wood and dressed furs. On the other hand, the imports of timber, raw tobacco and iron ore decreased. As regards our exports, the following articles show an increase: wheat to Germany (522.507 quintals), to Italy (958.049 q.); pigs to Germany (89.491), clover and lucerne seeds to Germany (26.788 q.) there was a certain decrease in exports of maize, rye, cattle, butter, railway carriages and rail-cars.

— y —

RUMANIA

RUMANIAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE MAGYAR AREAS

Rumanian chauvinist circles imbued with a hatred of the Magyar minority have more than once suggested that the unity of the Magyar nationality zone on the western frontier should be broken up. One plan was that the State should appropriate all the land within a forty kilometre zone and settle Rumanians on it. This plan was not adopted in its entirety by the State; but several larger or smaller settlements have been created in the districts in question. Extensive settlements in those areas were impossible, for the simple reason that every rood of soil had been taken possession of and was being cultivated by Hungarians. The State did not dare to settle Rumanians there en masse: that would have been too Asiatic a procedure. But wherever it was possible, small settlements of Rumanians have been created. The idea of Rumanian settlements in the Hungarian districts has again been broached by the anti-minority, chauvinist "Astra" organization. This organization has sent a notice to the Rumanians of Măramaros stating that those of them who are willing to settle in Counties Szatmár and Bihar and in the Banate would receive 10 hectares of land.

The "Astra" refuses to recognize that these areas are purely Magyar in character and that it would be impossible to replace them with settlements of Rumanians, for the latter would be the first to run away, since the economic level of the Rumanian peasantry is so low that they could not hope to compete with

the more advanced Magyar farmers, and besides this there is no room for settlements.

That this is so was proved by the case of the Campul-Popii settlement near the town of Szatmár. In 1934, 30 Rumanian families from County Kolozs were settled there. It has been declared by the State, i. e. Rumanian, agricultural authorities that in spite of repeated warnings and assistance these settlers did not cultivate the land as they should have done and that therefore it would be taken away from them. This fact was established by the "Curentul", one of the most important Rumanian newspapers, on April. 5th 1939. It would be worth while examining the rest of the Rumanian settlements. It is sure that even the official Rumanian authorities would be forced to the same conclusion as was reached by the above-mentioned unbiassed agricultural supervisory board. Rumania would do better to raise the agricultural level of the Rumanian areas instead of thinking of depriving the Magyars of the frontier zone, who have little enough land as it is, of their farms and settling persons without a knowledge of agriculture on them. — y —

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES IN RUMANIA

Britain is now preparing an economic agreement with Rumania. The speedy decline of Anglo-Rumanian trade relations has made it necessary for Britain to act as quickly as possible. Exports to Britain in 1936 represented 14.2% of Rumania's total exports, in 1939 this figure sank to 11.2%. In 1936 Rumania sold to Britain goods of the value of 3.100 million lei, but in 1938 the total value of goods sold there declined to 2.400 millions. In 1937 Britain contributed 9.4% of Rumania's imports; in 1938 her quota amounted only to 8%.

The Rumanians have spent hundreds of millions in increasing their export trade with Britain; yet all they have achieved is to prevent their trade not shrinking to a minimum.

What is going to happen now that Germany's territorial aggrandisement has enormously increased her demand for raw materials, and that the economic policy inaugurated by Britain and France is compelling her to rely primarily on Rumania?

Rumania will develop her economic relations with Germany still more; and these relations will become even more intense in view of the fact that apart from purchasing all her raw materials from Rumania, Germany is prepared to undertake enormous investments to increase the output of Rumania's raw materials.

Under such circumstances Britain's economic prospects in Rumania are very poor indeed, and they are bound to become less and less as time goes on.

Moreover, Rumania's political reliability is very unlikely to

fulfil Britain's expectations. It will be impossible for Rumania to serve the political interests of Britain once she becomes economically dependent on Germany. This is one of the causes of Rumania's political unreliability and continual hesitation at present. Rumania can by no means be considered as a fixed point suitable to be included in Britain's recent security plan.

Britain's endeavours to offer political assistance can, and do, merely give Rumania a good opportunity for economic blackmailing. In an article published in the Rumanian daily, "Universul", on April 17th we find a frank statement to the effect that Rumania's desire regarding the forthcoming Anglo-Rumanian trade discussions is not to make an advantageous trade agreement with Britain, but to persuade Britain to undertake the responsibility of financing Rumania's exports: "Those sums which Britain spends on rearmament in a few days would cover the total economic deficit of Rumania. Germany has understood this argument... "In the same issue the "Universul" points out that an advantageous agreement now enables Rumania to find a market for her total output, and that she could only export goods to Britain if Britain, like Germany, would also undertake to contribute towards the increasing of Rumania's productive capacity.

In a word, Rumania's plan is to persuade Britain into financing Rumania's exports and increasing her productive capacity; in other words: to persuade Britain to serve Rumania's interests in every way.

— y —

SLOVAKIA

SLOVAKIA'S LEATHER INDUSTRY

Since 1918, the Slovak leather industry has been steadily on the decline. At the beginning of 1919 there were 16 leather undertakings in Slovakia, but by degrees, and in consequence of the competition of the Bata shoe factory, the number sank to 9. Slovakia's shoe consumption is valued at 77 million Czech crowns per annum. There is enough raw material in Slovakia to supply this demand, so that imports are not required, At present the Slovak shoemaking industry is able to use 1.600.000 kilogrammes of leather per annum, but 1.500.000 kilogrammes are supplied at home. In other branches of the leather trade things are different. Slovakia has not enough cowhide of her own, and is forced to import hides to the value of 4.872.000 crowns, i. e. 812.000 kilogrammes. Slovakia must also import 130 wagonloads of tan (of a value of 2.860.000 crowns) per annum. She requires 85 wagonloads of salt annually for the leather industry. The Slovak leather industries do not manufacture kid leather, so that goatskins to the value of 450.000 crowns are available

for export. Slovakia could also export sheepskins to the value of 1.800.000 crowns. ("Slovak", April 16.) — y —

TRANSPORT SCHEMES IN SLOVAKIA

In No. 6, Vol. 7 of the "Deutscher Lebensraum", a German periodical, we find a report of the work planned, and to a certain measure begun, in Slovakia preparatory to that country's being drawn into Germany's economic system. In order to make Slovakia's natural resources available, the river Vág is to be transformed into a navigable stream. To make it navigable as far as Liptóujvár at the foot of the Lower Carpathians five locks are to be built. One of them is ready now and the estimates of the second have been approved, so that work on it will soon begin. With this waterway the question of the supply of energy is expected to be solved. New railway lines are to be constructed in the southern part of the country, in order to provide direct communication between Pozsony and the rest of Slovakia. In Eastern Slovakia railway lines between Divék and Besztercebánya and Straske and Eperjes respectively are already under construction. Plans have also been made for the construction of a great road from west to east. This would cost 1.500 million crowns, 400 million of which have been already set apart for the purpose. A sum of 178 million crowns has been estimated for road improvement. — y —

SLOVAKIA'S WATER-WORKS INVESTMENTS

Slovakia requires 78 million crowns to keep its present water-works in repair and complete those it has begun to build. Besides this sum the Department of Water-works in the Ministry of Agriculture has recommended an estimate of 118 million crowns for investments. Of that sum 48 millions would devolve upon the State. This would bring the sum required for these State investments up to 126 million crowns. But the State cannot devote more than 20 millions per annum to this programme; in other words it would take 7 or 8 years to complete the most urgent and necessary investments, which would extend to the regulation of rivers, irrigation, water power, pisciculture and hygienic arrangements. ("Slovak", April 23.) — y —

SLOVAK DAIRY FARMING

In spite of favourable natural conditions, dairy farming in Slovakia is very primitive in character. In 1936 the quantity of milk delivered to the dairy co-operative societies was 344.562.500 litres in Bohemia, 252.556.200 in Moravia, but only 49.908.600 in Slovakia. With a proper system of dairy farming and a ra-

tional use of Slovakia's present milk production, the country should be able to export 100 wagon-loads of butter per annum. ("Slovak", April 22.)

— y —

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAVIA PLACES EMBARGO ON IMPORTATION OF DINAR BANKNOTES

In order to prevent an illegal flight of money from the country, the Yugoslav Minister of Finance has issued a decree placing an embargo on the importation of banknotes of 1000, 500, and 100 dinars. Yet visitors to Yugoslavia often happen to bring dinar banknotes with them, while relatives living abroad attempt to send dinar banknotes by letter to their people at home. These banknotes will be confiscated by the authorities and blocked. Since the importation of dinar banknotes is carefully watched and made impossible by the authorities, the Yugoslav National Bank has issued a notice to all concerned that they should inform their foreign clients and correspondents (relatives) abroad that the sums to be remitted should henceforth be sent in foreign currencies (dollars, French and Swiss francs, pounds sterling, Dutch florins, etc.), but on no account in dinar banknotes, for these will be confiscated by the authorities and blocked, with no immediate possibility of their being available for use.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

— y —

YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN TRADE IN FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR

This year Yugoslavia's foreign trade shows an unfavourable balance of 175.100.000 dinars for the first quarter of the year, as compared with 137.700.000 for the same period last year. It is reported from Belgrade that according to official statistics the value of exports in the first three months of the current year was 1.081.500.000 dinars, as compared with last year's 1.173.800.000, that is to say, the decline was 92.200.000 dinars or 7.86%. Imports totalled 1.256.50.000, against last year's 1.311.500.000, a decrease of 54.800.000, or 4.18%. A comparison of Yugoslavia's foreign trade shows an unfavourable balance of 175.100.000 dinars, as compared with last year's deficit of 137.700.000.

— y —

The Danubian Review is published monthly. — Editorial Offices and Management: Zrinyi-utca 1, Budapest V. — All articles, — with the exception of those signed „y” — have been translated by Dr. ARTHUR B. YOLLAND, Professor of English literature in the University of Budapest. — Responsible for the publication: Dr. ANDREW FALL. — Editor for Economics: NICHOLAS UDVARDY. Issued and printed by Sárkány Ltd. — Responsible for the printing: Dr. A. and J. Wessely. 14468