

ARIZ. SZÉCHÉNYI MŰVEK  
Könyvtár - Budapest  
193. 2. évf. 833. sz.

# DANUBIAN REVIEW

## (DANUBIAN NEWS)

A REVIEW DEVOTED TO RESEARCH INTO PROBLEMS OF THE  
DANUBIAN BASIN

Editorial Board:

**ELEMÉR SZUDY**  
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

**Dr. ANDREW FALL**  
MANAGING EDITOR

**Vol. VI. No. 9.**

**FEBRUARY, 1939.**

**The Fight for Peace**

By **ANDREW FALL**

**Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister Speaks  
Before Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee**

**The Czecho-Slovak Situation**

By **EDMUND TARJÁN**

**Reconstruction in the Danube Valley?**

By **ANDREW BAJCSY-ZSILINSZKY**

**The Minorities and the Rumanian One-Party System**

By **LADISLAS FRITZ**

**Central European Bloc and its Realisation**

By **COUNT VLADIMIR BEM DE COSBAN**

**The Attack on Munkács**

By **ERNEST SCHMIDT-PAPP**

**Political Mosaic**

**How Minorities Live**

**Books**

**Political Economy**

**Price 50 Fill.**

**Subscription one year 6 Pengő.**

# THE FIGHT FOR PEACE

BY

Dr. ANDREW FALL

**A**fter the Four-Power Conference in Munich the peoples longing for peace and the opportunity to work experienced feelings of delight and satisfaction, for that Conference had averted the catastrophe of a horrible world-conflict, and the spirit of peace had triumphed. This feeling of general delight and satisfaction did not however last long; very soon a new tension ensued in the international political situation, and war-clouds loomed large in the European sky. This is in our opinion due to the fact that all that was done at Munich was to solve the question of the moment then threatening Europe with the danger of war, without settling simultaneously all the great questions dividing the peoples. The Powers in council in Munich did not penetrate to the roots of the evils; and for that very reason the antagonisms very soon became active again and produced a fresh crisis.

If we would discover the causes of the antagonisms and the unceasing tension prevailing in Europe, we must look for them in the provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. These Peace Edicts inflicted deep wounds on certain European nations; and there can be no healing of those wounds if they are treated separately and not all at once. Munich too brought about what was merely a partial cure; and the wounds inflicted by the Peace Edicts are most of them still

festering on the bodies of certain European nations. There is no denying that what happened in Munich was a considerable advance towards general peace; it was indeed a triumph of the spirit of peace: but what was done there in theory has not yet been put into practice. This circumstance is due to the Peace Edicts having institutionally divided the peoples of Europe into two camps, each of which puts a different interpretation on the conception of peace. The camp of the victors regards as the sole guarantee of a lasting peace a rigid adherence to the status quo; while the vanquished countries — the camp of the humiliated and stripped — regard the abandonment of the status quo as a sine qua non of their subsistence and of their obtaining the means of livelihood and consequently of the establishment and maintenance of a lasting peace. And this far-reaching difference of outlook between the two camps broke into flame shortly after the Munich Conference. A feeling of unrest ensued in the Danube Valley; the dissension ruling in the Mediterranean question continued: and the claims for colonies revived. But the spirit of peace which had won the day in Munich was not dead; and the great European statesmen — in particular Signor Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy, Herr Adolphus Hitler, Leader and Chancellor of Germany, and Mr. Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Great Britain — deserve the greatest credit for their efforts by means of a feverish diplomatic activity to eliminate the antagonisms and establish peace.

The visits to foreign countries of the various Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers and their discussions with one another followed in rapid succession. The first of the important visits of the kind was that paid to Budapest on December 19th, 1938, by Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, for the purpose of meeting Count Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister. By its enthusiastic, magnificent reception of Count Ciano the Hungarian people offered striking evidence of the unswerving friendship rooted deep in the souls of the Italian and Hungarian peoples. But the meeting in Budapest is likely to prove

an active episode in the development of political events in the Danube Basin. Hungary, whose territory and importance alike has increased, is destined to fulfil more and more intensively her historical mission in the Valley of the Danube. The exceptional importance of Count Ciano's visit consists primarily in the work of preparation leading to a further development of the friendship between Yugoslavia and Hungary which is so essential to the interests of both countries alike. Count Ciano's visit was undertaken in the spirit of Munich and paved the way towards an understanding between the peoples of the Danube Valley.

From the point of view of the development of the political situation in Central Europe great importance attaches to the visit to Berlin, in the middle of January, 1939, of Count Stephen Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister. The latter was received by official Germany with a cordiality and warmth exceeding even the most sanguine expectations; and this reception in itself sufficed to prove that there was no difference of opinion between the German Empire and Hungary. Count Stephen Csáky was received in audience by Herr Adolphus Hitler, Leader and Chancellor, who spent an hour and a half with his guest; and the Hungarian Foreign Minister had long discussions also with Baron von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, and with Marshal Göring. During these discussions the fact was established by both Parties that the two States were in perfect agreement and that all future plans they might have were to be characterised by a sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the cause of peace. Count Csáky's visit to Berlin also helped to further the crystallisation of the political situation in Central Europe. The importance of this visit was explained by Count Csáky in the speech made by him before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Lower House, with which we have dealt in another article published in this issue of our Review. From this speech we learn that on the occasion of the Hungarian Foreign Minister's visit to Berlin — apart from the crystallisation of the relation between the German

Empire and Hungary — the fact was established that in questions of international politics there was no clash of interests as between the two States, but that on the contrary they had many interests in common, the direction of foreign policy in these matters being the same in both countries. The discussions in Berlin considerably strengthened Hungary's situation in Central Europe and render possible a continuation of that peaceful policy of evolution which the Hungarian people has been pursuing for the last twenty years in the cause of a peace based upon justice. The aims of the two peoples — the German and the Hungarian peoples — are identical; both peoples alike are struggling to expand the curtailed possibilities of subsistence and to establish that peace based upon justice.

For the purpose of discussing the questions connected with a general European re-construction, on January 11th, 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, and Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, visited Rome. The discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax on the one part and Signor Mussolini and members of the Italian Cabinet on the other part were not intended exclusively as a means of finalising the Italian-British Agreement concluded on April 16th., 1938, but had other political objects of much wider import. The British statesmen had realised that the Italian factor in Mediterranean matters had also been completely transformed, and formulated fresh claims. Mr. Chamberlain acted in the spirit of Munich in his desire to ascertain what Italy claimed and to divert the endeavour to realise those claims into a peaceful channel. And the desire for peace manifested by Mr. Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini had its result; the discussions in Rome were followed by a clarification of the atmosphere: the tension between Italy and France was lessened, so that in the less sultry atmosphere resulting it will be possible to begin negotiations between these two countries as desired by Mr. Chamberlain,

and indeed by France herself and even more ardently by Signor Mussolini.

The investigation of the general European situation and therewith also of the situation in the Danube Basin was the object served by the visit to Belgrade, on January 18th., 1939, of Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister. The discussions between Count Ciano and the Yugoslav Premier, M. Stoyadinovitch, were not confined to the question of strengthening the political and economic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, but laid great stress also upon the necessity for an improvement of the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary, and for the elimination of any obstacles that might be in the way of a friendship between the two countries. That this endeavour was eminently successful, may be seen from the words used by Count Csáky, Hungarian Foreign Minister, in the speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The clarification of the Central European situation and the consolidation of peace were the objects served also by the visit to Herr Hitler (on January 5th., 1939) of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, and then of the visit to Warsaw (on January 25th.) of the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Ribbentrop. This latter visit had been awaited with peculiar interest by the public opinion of the world, seeing that after the re-formation of Czecho-Slovakia numerous questions had arisen as between Warsaw and Berlin the settlement of which had been postulated by the non-aggression treaty concluded in 1934 between Germany and Poland. It was not a mere accident that von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw had been timed for January 26th., that being the fifth anniversary of the signature of the German-Polish treaty of friendship. The five years which had passed had shown that the political genius of Marshal Pilsudski had judged aright when deciding the direction of the foreign policy to be pursued by Poland for a long period to come; in these five years so pregnant with critical events the relations between Germany and Poland had stood the test unscathed. Von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw resulted in documenting

that for the five years which the German-Polish treaty has still to run the German-Polish alliance is a guarantee that the two countries will always be able to create the harmony essential to a co-operation in all questions of common interest to these two Powers. The strengthening of the German-Polish alliance has also reinforced Poland's position in Central Europe; and that is a noteworthy result also in respect of the common aims of Poland and Hungary. The question of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier has advanced a step nearer solution; and the realisation of that common frontier will be bound to lead to a consolidation of peace in Central Europe.

It was while all these remarkable events were still the focus of interest in the international situation that, early in February, 1939, M. Gafencu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, visited Belgrade. The principal endeavour of M. Gafencu at the present moment is to obtain the mediation of Yugoslavia in order to conclude agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria. For Rumania's rigid adherence to the status quo is driving that country more and more into the impasse of complete isolation. M. Gafencu is anxious to save Rumania from the consequences of that complete isolation. The success of M. Gafencu's efforts must naturally depend upon whether Rumania is prepared to reckon with realities and to make peaceful concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria. If Rumania does so and the policy of Rumania is permeated with the spirit of Munich, that country will be doing the cause of European peace an inestimable service. Should she fail to do so, Rumania is bound to remain in isolation and would have to make very considerable sacrifices in order to be given her due place in the Central European community of nations.

The final word respecting the objects of all these visits of foreign ministers and prime ministers was said by Herr Hitler in his great speech delivered before the German Reichs-Assembly on January 30th. In this mighty oration Herr Hitler stated unequivocally that Germany desired peace and did not wish to deprive any other people of its means or opportunity of subsistence, adding however that the German people demanded the opportunity of establishing its own subsistence. The German Leader and Chancellor believes

that the problems of the nations can be solved peacefully and believes in the possibility of peace. But that peace has its price. With undisguised frankness the Leader of the German people laid bare the problems facing the German Empire and determined the means of solution. And, barely twenty-four hours later, Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, replied to Herr Hitler's speech and declared on his part too that there was no question that could not be settled by peaceful discussion. We have heard the speeches: and now the millions — the peoples — are anxious to see actions. Action must be taken at once on all points and by universal agreement. The Hungarian people has taken to heart the words spoken by Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain and expects these speeches to be followed in Central Europe by deeds too and by Hungary being given the means and the opportunity of subsistence in the spirit of Munich.

If the just and legitimate demands do not fall on deaf ears, — if the spirit of Versailles and Trianon is liquidated —, the visits of the foreign ministers and prime ministers will prove fruitful in the cause of international peace.