

P O L I T I C A L M O S A I C

MESSRS. EDEN AND NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN FAVOUR REVISION ARTICLE

At the meeting of the British House of Commons held on November 5th. Mr. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, pointed out the importance of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to the "Times" of November 6th. his words were: —

"The charge against the League was that it was devoted solely to the maintenance of the status quo. The Covenant itself realized, by Article XIX. the impracticability of the rigid maintenance for all time of the status quo."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Neville Chamberlain on November 19th. addressed a mass meeting in Leeds Town Hall, where, in reference to the

foreign situation he pointed out that Great Britain's strongest interest is the preservation of peace and the strengthening of the League of Nation on which her policy is founded. To achieve this:

"We (Great Britain) ought to try to make it easier for them (the great Nations standing outside the League) to come back by showing them that the League is not just a clamp to hold down everything as it is to the end of time, but that it does contain within itself means by which legitimate grievances arising out of the existing situation can be ventilated, discussed, and if possible removed by peaceful means. If these grievances exist, and cannot be removed by peaceful means, then we must expect that they will be removed by force."

— y —

MR. GARVIN REGARDS REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES OF HUNGARIAN AS MOST URGENT EUROPEAN PROBLEM

Mr. Garvin, the eminent British publicist, whose opinion on political questions is usually followed with the greatest attention by official factors too, in the November 22nd. issue of the "Observer", the leading political organ of which he is Editor, published an article which has become quite a sensation respecting the situation created by the 1919/20 treaties of peace. In this article Mr. Garvin adduces weighty arguments also in favour of a solution of the Hungarian problem. We therefore consider it necessary that we should quote the full text of the article as published in the "Observer":

"Now, as a generation ago, the Anglo-German schism is at the back of the whole world's unrest and dangers. Communism, stimulated by Moscow, has turned Spain into a hell and would do the same in Britain itself or in any other Western country if the chance offered. Yet the whole present policy of Moscow is built upon the presumption of favoured relations with Britain as against Germany. And especially upon our expected connivance in the Soviet Pacts concluded with France and Czecho-Slovakia.

To what would this lead? Germany and Italy have agreed to recognise General Franco and to resist at all costs the spread of Bolshevist revolution. In the same spirit they are entering into collateral arrangements with Japan. With Austria and Hungary they are determined to drive out of Eastern Europe the Russian influence asserted by the Soviet Pacts.

The worst heritage of the "Peace Treaties".

We are suffering chiefly, not from the War, but from "the Peace". The peace which passeth understanding, as some called it; the peace with a vengeance, as others called it; the peace with dragon's teeth, as it was described by this journal. Devastating as was the War, its worst consequences would have been repaired long ago had a saner constructive spirit prevailed after the victory. Instead, the complex of punitive and rapacious treaties bequeathed dire legacies of confusion, bitterness, and revolt.

Bad enough was the Versailles Treaty proper, with its crazy finance and political blunders. *Much worse, and as much harder to remedy by peaceable means, was the Treaty of Trianon.* This instrument dealt chiefly with the redistribution of the peoples and territories formerly belonging to a shattered empire — the old Double Monarchy of the Hapsburgs. The populations to be parcelled out again numbered no fewer than about 50,000,000 souls altogether; the territories, a good deal larger than those of all Germany, covered a total area of about 240,000 square miles.

Austria-Hungary was a medley of jarring races. On the one hand, in its old form, it had become a political impossibility. On the other hand, it was in many ways an invaluable economic combination for the development and progress of all the Danubian lands which a long and a strange history had brought under one sceptre. The system no doubt required complete *reconstruction* on lines which would have made it a magnificent federation with nearly the whole of the great Danube river for its central artery. *To break it to pieces instead — to create in the process some more intolerable grievances and more virulent antagonisms than had existed before — this was the tragedy of Trianon. It was amongst the hugest errors of its kind in human annals.*

Where Austro-Hungary was — an untenable map.

As a result the map of Eastern Europe, and especially its Danube region, *is not only a geographical monstrosity*, as has been so often said; *it is a monstrosity from every other point of view, racial, political, economic.* Unless it can be effectually altered in several features by peaceable means, *it will become the sure cause of war within the next few years — probably within the next two years.* This question is the real crux of our foreign policy, for it is especially vital to the issue of whether there is to be another Anglo-German War or not.

To examine all the principal aspects of this new Eastern Question would require a volume. Here we

must confine ourselves to *the two factors which are notoriously the most dangerous. One is the crying case of Hungary, now steadily working up to an explosion, which, as we said, is pretty certain to occur within the next two years, unless some large measure of redress by consent can be secured in time. The neighbouring case is that of Czecho-Slovakia, which is not only asked to give up a considerable body of the dismembered Magyar race, but is involved in perilous complications of other kinds; partly through the inherent difficulties of its mixed composition, partly through the almost suicidal faults of its own policy.*

The dismemberment of a race.

Including several races now separated, the old Hungarian Kingdom was a wide and valiant realm which played a famous part for centuries. Destroyed, like the other half of the Dual Monarchy, it never can be restored in its former extent and variety. We speak here of the fate which befell its long-dominant people, the Magyars, whose claims to redress are the most urgent single problem in the whole of Europe. Head for head, they are as proud and gifted a race as any living. *After the War they were treated as mercilessly as Napoleon dealt with Prussia after Jena. The spirit of the partition of Poland was not more ruthless.*

There were then about 10,000,000 Magyars (there are more now). *Nearly a third of these, over 3,000,000 of them, were torn from the living body of their race and allotted, like cattle, to the favoured States created around them. For the sake of these other nationalities, Magyar nationality was denied and outraged to an extent seldom matched in the most barbarous times. For the rapacious benefit of Czechs, Serbs and Rumanians, the Hungarians proper were vivisected and dismembered.*

But the gradual years have made a vast change. Hungary to-day has powerful friends in Germany and Italy, as well as a firm comrade in Austria. The Magyars, following the German and Austrian example, will assert in the near future, and undoubtedly they will obtain, equal freedom to arm. *After that, they will claim some such reasonable revision of their boundaries as shall restore those of their race now dwelling just beyond the punitive frontiers imposed by the Treaty of Trianon.*

How Czecho-Slovakia overdid it.

This brings us straight to the crucial case of Czecho-Slovakia. From that Succession State the Magyars claim — and it is the most pressing of their revisionary points — a historic portion of their territory and about a million of their people. *Never should that territory and its people have been seized. It was an act of indisputable iniquity.*

The Czechs themselves are a tough and able people with whom we must all have as much sympathy as can be given to them within the limits of sense. But when they had their chance after the War they expanded their ambitions beyond all reason. They overdid it right and left. They have continued to overdo it in the desperate attempt to preserve a superiority which it will be impossible to maintain.

Czecho-Slovakia was an entirely new State. *It was a diplomatic creation with no sufficient natural basis either in geography or race. Stretching, sausage-shaped, for nearly six hundred miles from the heart of Europe to the confines of Russia, it is the most artificial both in form and mixture of all the new European structures. Of its population of 15,000,000 the Czechs proper are less than half. To make up the extent of the State they hazardously aspired to dominate other elements. At one end of the sausage-shaped contrivance they*

took in the Slovaks — a related but *distinct race*, who now claim autonomy. At the other end they kept in the Sudetan Germans, now numbering about three millions and a half, who repudiate Czech control and will shake it off, either by autonomy or separation. We cannot glance here at some smaller pieces in *this curious mosaic. We have spoken of that vital portion of Magyar territory and population which was seized in a predatory manner for "strategical reasons" and will have to be restored to Hungary.*

The Plague-carrier of European politics.

Can there be any doubt as to the moral? *Britain will not stand for the ill-starred cause of enforcing the worst and most stupid of the war-treaties. She cannot engage either to maintain the present partition of the Magyar people on the one hand, or to uphold on the other hand the present extent of Czech domination over other races. If with our whole strength we have to fight again for some things, we shall not fight for these things.*

Yet we must now see how these issues have come to be the very crux of the European question. Look back to first principles. When the disastrous nature of the whole system of the post-war Treaties was known, this journal began to point out, week after week, year after year, from 1919, that vast wrongs had been done and that much of it would have to be undone. That the choice would come to lie soon enough between *Revision and War. That timely Revision would have to be the very soul of the League if it were to succeed.*

Dr. Benesh, who conducts the affairs of Czecho-Slovakia, made himself the ceaseless and able antagonist of Revision. Round Austria and Hungary, while they were weak and unsupported, he formed the alliance of the Little Entente to resist and suppress Revision. And when it became clear that the Little Entente might not be enough to uphold Czecho-Slovakia and keep down Hungary, he went further. He concluded the pact between Prague and Moscow which is necessarily directed against Germany and Hungary alike, with whom Italy is now identified on the foremost matters at issue, though not on all the ultimate matters.

This Czecho-Soviet Pact is the very plague-carrier of European politics. The new Franco-Russian alliance, however lamentably mistaken and miscalculated, could not have worked by itself. The frontiers of the Reich and the Soviet Union would have remained widely divided by intervening countries. The Teutonic Titan and the apparent Slav Colossus (whatever its feet are made of) could not get at each other.

One Serajevo was enough — the Anglo-German Solution.

The suicidal statecraft of Dr. Benesh changed all that. Prague became the door-opener for Moscow. Czecho-Slovakia, whose sausage-shaped extension we have described, became a corridor nearly six hundred miles long, through which Russian air-power in case of war is expected to strike straight into the Reich. Now, before that could occur, if matters came nearer the pinch, there would be no Czecho-Slovakia. Whatever else happened, it would be wiped out by internal as well as external forces. No more infatuated policy could be imagined than this anti-German plan on the part of the Czech State which has three and a half millions of protesting Germans among its own subjects; and has a resurgent Hungary on its flank.

Nothing, then, can now keep unchanged the map of Eastern Europe as it is or preserve the political monstrosity that it represents. Our duty is to keep out of the whole of that business and not to allow it,

so far as in us lies, to become the cause of war in Western Europe. We must not countenance either of the Soviet alliances — not the Paris Pact, much less the Prague Pact designed to carry Russian air-power into Germany's vitals. We will not be responsible in any way for the consequences of these instruments; or for the enforcement of the status quo anywhere in Eastern Europe.

Nothing on earth will induce the British people to mobilise against Germany in that cause. We say with certainty, nothing on earth. This country returning to its old capable sagacity through centuries has to restore its power and limit its risks. Our plain and sane policy in this world about us is one of maximum armaments and minimum commitments. *We should not go beyond our pledges to defend France and Belgium from unprovoked aggression, using the qualifying adjective in a strict sense. We should shun*

every entanglement in Eastern Europe. In that quarter our meddling means muddling. *We are not going to make another Armageddon to hold down the Magyars in the miserable name of Trianon any more than to hold down the Germans in the dead name of Versailles.*

It is no part of our proper affair to block Germany in the East. If we refuse to mix the two problems there will be a lasting peace in Western Europe; but not otherwise. Another Anglo-German war from any cause would be a dark catastrophe. An unnecessary Anglo-German war made by Britain for the sake of the Soviet Pacts and Eastern Europe, would be a blunder and a crime past example. Never again in that way. Engagements and circumstances together were too strong for all the European Powers in 1914. Not so now. To-day we are bound by no such fate and must not incur it. One Serajevo was enough."

PROGRAMME OF THE HUNGARIAN REVISION LEAGUE

In connection with Mussolini's Milan speech Prague and Bucharest are spreading the report that the aim of the Hungarian revision movement is to restore at any price the old 1918 frontiers. In this way they try to prove that the Hungarian revisionist demands are "impossible to fulfil". It seems necessary, in view of this, to cite certain passages from Mr. Francis Herczeg's article in the "Pesti Hirlap" of October 25th which, as we see, was written before Mussolini's speech. In that article the famous Hungarian author, who is president of the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League and as such is competent to speak „ex cathedra" about the programme of the Hungarian revision movement, says:

"The programme of the Hungarian Revisionist League, which represents the unanimous opinion of the Hungarian nation, aims at realizing the Revision of the territorial measures of the Treaty of Trianon through the application of the well-known Wilsonian principles. These principles were accepted at the time by the Allied and Associated Powers as the ultimate aims for which they had been fighting. Later, however, they dropped these principles equally to the detriment of victor and of vanquished.

"The Revisionist Movement takes up its stand on the principle of the Right of Self-determination of the Peoples and on the Nationalities Principle, as laid down by Wilson. From practical conclusions drawn from these principles, it has formulated the

following two claims: firstly, according to the Principle of Nationalities, all those territories which lie immediately over the border of present-day Hungary, the population of which is predominantly Hungarian, shall be unconditionally re-attached to Hungary. Secondly, according to the Principle of the Right of Self-determination of the Peoples, the populations of the other territories of pre-war Hungary shall decide, by means of a Plebiscite, the country to which they wish to belong.

"So much, no more and no less, is what the Hungarian Revisionist Movement claims. The man who denies the moral justification of these claims, denies all ethical justification in the life of the peoples and wishes to perpetuate the rule of the mailed fist. And he who asserts that this programme imperils the peace of Europe, is trying to blackmail Europe by raising the bogey of war."

*

We read with satisfaction that the "Petit Parisien" of November 2nd concludes it will be easier to reach an agreement now that the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League has renounced all claim (or rather, it never put forward any claim) to Croatia. The Hungarian revision movement never did demand anything that, commonsense, or the interests of Europe, or even the well-understood interests of the Little Entente, could have found "impossible to fulfil".

—y—

MUSSOLINI'S MESSAGE TO THE "GREAT DISMEMBERED"

In his great speech delivered at Milan on November 1st. the Prime Minister of Italy said:

"Until Hungary is accorded justice, there can be no definitive settlement of interests in the Danube Valley. Hungary is indeed the Great Dismembered: four million Hungarians are living

beyond her present frontiers. In their endeavour to conform with the demands of an excessively abstract justice those responsible are guilty of what is perhaps an even greater injustice. The feelings of Italy for the Hungarian people and for the military qualities, courage and self-sacrificing spirit of that

people, are inspired by sincere appreciation, which is reciprocal. May be that before long there will be opportunity to solemnly and publicly manifest the warmth and cordiality of those feelings."

Mussolini's speech was received with sympathy in Yugoslavia. But in Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania the part about Hungary gave rise to a general protest, even — especially in the latter country — to an explosion of rage in the nationalist camp.

Czecho-Slovakia

The official arguments were set forth in the "Prager Presse" of November 4th. According to them, there are not four million Hungarians in the Succession States, as Mussolini said, but at most two and a half million, and even so, a considerable proportion of them live in regions not connected ethnically with Hungary. Any revision, however slight, would increase the number of non-Hungarians in Hungary. The situation of the minorities there is not such, either from a political or an ethical point of view, as to make an increase in the number of foreign nationals in Hungary desirable. The moment the frontiers were altered all the nationality questions in Central Europe would come to the surface, and the "Prager Presse" is doubtful whether, in that case, it would be possible to solve the problem of the national minorities in present-day Italy, which, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Italian Government, is still a serious one. This is merely an attempt to divert Mussolini's attention from the incomparably more important problem of the Hungarians in the Little Entente countries by pointing to Italy's insignificant ethnical minorities.

Although the "Prager Presse's" allegation that the number of Hungarians in the Succession States is about two and a half million, is enough in itself to prove beyond dispute how justified the Hungarian endeavours to obtain revision are, — for to force that number of people under alien rule is diametrically opposed to the principles of justice and the dictates of common sense — yet, in order to clear up the facts of the case, we would draw our readers' attention to the following data.

According to the 1910 Census the total number of Hungarians in the territories wrested from Hungary was 3,322,620. If we reckon an average increase of only 8% in a decade, then in the 26 years that have elapsed since 1910 the number of Hungarians in those territories must have risen to 3,987,000, i. e. approximately four millions. We regret not being able to give the exact nationality statistics of the three Little Entente countries; first because Rumania has not yet officially made public the results of the first Rumanian Census, taken in 1930, and secondly, because the nationality statistics of the two other States are utterly unreliable. In support of this statement we refer our readers to "*Der Kampf zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen*" by Professor Emmanuel Radl of the Prague (Charles) University, in which that eminent Czech scholar says that he cannot consider the figures of the Czecho-Slovak Census of 1921 reliable. According to those figures, in 1921 there were 738,517 Czecho-Slovak subjects (not inhabitants!) in the territories taken from Hungary and attached to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czecho-Slovak Census of 1930, on the other hand, puts their number at 681,460, — as though Hungarian women had ceased to bear in the years between the two censuses. How, in these circumstances, can we be expected to place any reliance on the data published by the Czecho-Slovak Statistical Office, or indeed in the figures contained in the "Prager Presse"?

By far the greater part of the Hungarians in

Czecho-Slovakia are living along the frontier of post-War Hungary, and only the smaller part of them live in language enclaves. Even according to the 1930 Czecho-Slovak Census returns the number of Hungarian subjects (not inhabitants!) in the frontier districts where the majority live was 448,357, or about two-thirds of the total number. This one item alone shows how unreliable are the data published in the "Prager Presse". Seeing that there are also Slovaks scattered here and there in the Hungarian-inhabited frontier regions, who, like the Czechs to be found there, were brought to those districts after 1918 either by the Land Reform or as civil servants, the restoration of these parts to Hungary would place a small fraction of Slovaks under Hungarian rule. But as these regions are almost purely Hungarian in character, their re-attachment to Hungary would, instead of increasing the numerical proportion of the national minorities in Hungary, lower it. And again, who would venture to assert that it is just and right for the percentage of non-Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia to be 49.6% (even according to the official figures; in reality it is considerably larger) and unjust and wrong if the percentage of national minorities in Hungary (7.9%) is slightly increased.

— y —

Rumania

The first repercussions in the Rumanian press to Mussolini's speech were outcries of disappointment, dismay, alarm and rage. The organ of the National Peasants' Party, the "Patria", simply described the speech as a menace to the Rumanian nation, and did not shrink from calling its tone brutal.

Several leading Rumanian politicians have voiced their opinions of the Milan speech, but strikingly enough M. Tatarsescu, Prime Minister, has preserved silence on the subject; nor did King Carol's speech from the throne contain the slightest reference to it. Among those to express their views M. Maniu, quondam Premier and present leader of the National Peasants' Party, said that Hungary had not been mutilated at all, for the Hungarian nation remained within its old ethnical boundaries, and only certain ethnic enclaves, systematically created by means of artificial infiltration by a political power hostile to and oppressing the non-Hungarian races, had been detached from Hungary. A similar opinion was expressed at the Bucharest congress of the National Christian Party by M. Octavian Goga. Besides this, M. Maniu, in a statement to the "Dimineata", asserted that Mussolini had repeated his manifestations of two years ago in a more categorical form. M. Maniu carefully avoided mentioning that the number of Szeklers living in solid blocks in the "enclaves" — for instance, in the counties of Csík, Háromszék, Udvarhely and Marostorda — exceeded 500,000 in 1910, as the Census returns show. The Hungarians along the western frontier of Rumania — about 600,000 souls — also live almost in one single block. They have been cut off from the purely Hungarian ethnical territory next to them by the frontier drawn in Trianon. Around Kolozsvár the 40,000 Hungarians of Kalotaszeg and Aranyosszék form another Hungarian enclave.

In his broadcast speech M. Jorga, a former Rumanian Premier, superciliously attempted to teach Mussolini that the autochthonous population of Transylvania was Rumanian. In a lecture delivered in Bucharest University he said that Rumania had never been in such danger as now. In the same lecture he held forth on the theory of "Dacian continuity", that is, on the theory that the Rumanians were the autochthonous population of Transylvania, the erroneous nature of which theory is exposed on another page of

this issue by the well-known authority on matters Rumanian, M. Louis Tamás.

At the Bucharest congress of the National Christian League Professor Cuza said straight out that Daco-Rumania had managed to exist for two thousand years without Rome(??) and that the Rumanians would continue to do so in spite of Rome.

M. Vaida-Voivod, another ex-Premier, speaking at a meeting in Kolozsvár of the "Rumanian Front", an organization of the Extreme Right, said that "what Rumania acquired in 1918 was not merely her legitimate right, but was also a glorious heritage won back by the self-sacrifice of the Rumanian army". He forgot to mention the sacrifices made by the victorious Entente Powers to save Rumania when the Rumanian army was driven back into a corner of the old Kingdom by the Central Powers.

At Nagyvárad M. Dinu Bratianu, President of the Liberal Government Party, repudiated the possibility of any revision, or that the Treaty of Trianon was anything but just. According to his statements only 19% of the population of Transylvania was Hungarian in 1918 and only 11% were villagers. This statement is contradicted by the fact that the Rumanian Census of 1930 — according to private Rumanian reports — found a 24.4% Hungarian population in Transylvania.

The 1910 Census showed even 31.7% with a rural Hungarian population of about 1,200,000 (28.6%).

— y —

At an anti-revision meeting in Nagyvárad M. Inculet, Deputy Premier, said that not Hungary was the "Great Mutilated", but Rumania, from whose body Transylvania had been lopped off in bygone days. This statement of the Deputy Premier's, which was made in the irresponsible atmosphere of a mass meeting, is a distortion of the most elementary facts of history; for Transylvania always belonged to Hungary, whereas Rumania had no existence as a State until the 19th century.

At the same meeting M. Lapedatu, Minister without Portfolio, made a disclosure revealing that Rumania had had visions of a larger conquest; for he said that the Rumanian Government had asked the Peace Conference for all the territory up to the banks of the Tisza and that M. Bratianu left the Conference because that demand was not granted. M. Lapedatu had the temerity to assert that the town of Debrecen was Rumanian in type — Debrecen with a Hungarian Population of 116,426 souls and only 30 Rumanian inhabitants!

— y —

COUNT AND COUNTESS CIANO IN BUDAPEST

Nothing could have shown better the gratitude felt by the Hungarians for Mussolini's Milan speech than the enthusiastic and hearty welcome extended, not only by Government, but also by the Hungarian nation as a whole, to Mussolini's son-in-law and his wife, the Count and Countess Ciano, when they arrived in Budapest on their way home from Vienna, where the signatories of the Rome Pact had been in conference.

Detailed descriptions of the Budapest programme of festivities were published by the international press, so we shall confine ourselves to a brief summary of the more important events.

A crowd of two thousand people gathered at Hegveshalom, the Hungarian frontier station, to greet the Count and Countess Ciano. M. Ladislas Radocsay, Lord Lieutenant of the County, welcomed them on behalf of Government. In reply to his address the Italian Foreign Minister delivered Mussolini's message of friendship to Hungary. At Győr the Mayor welcomed the distinguished visitors at the railway station.

Meanwhile Budapest was waiting — every house gay with flags. A multitude of people thronged the railway station and lined the streets. In the state waiting-room of the Eastern terminus a large group of Hungarian notabilities, headed by M. Darányi, Prime Minister and M. Kánya, Foreign Minister, had gathered.

The train rolled in. The guests alighted. Greetings over, Count Ciano, with M. Darányi by his side, made his way towards the exit through the ranks of a regiment of honour of regular soldiers and ex-servicemen and the members of the Italian Fascio in Budapest. The band played, first the Giovinezza, and then the Hungarian national anthem. From thousands of throats came the cry of "Evviva Italia", "Evviva Mussolini!", "Evviva Ciano" and the Hungarian "Éljen!". From the station to the Dunapalota Hotel, where a suite of rooms had been engaged for them, the car of the Count and Countess Ciano passed through streets lined on either side with masses of eager spectators, while the surroundings of the hotel itself were literally black with people.

The programme of festivities opened with a lunch in honour of the distinguished visitors. It was given in the National Casino by M. Kánya, Hungary's Foreign Minister. A visit to Parliament, which was in session, followed. When Count and Countess Ciano arrived, the Speaker, M. Sztranyavszky, interrupted proceedings to welcome them with assurances of the great esteem, respect and gratitude felt by the Hungarian nation towards its powerful friend, the Kingdom of Imperial Italy, whose leader, Mussolini, had but lately evidenced his sympathy with Hungary and the Hungarian cause. M. Sztranyavszky laid stress on the two main characteristics of the Hungarian people, honesty and loyalty, — no mean assets in a friend. "We have — he said — survived a thousand years of vicissitudes, and we bear all the injustice and wretchedness of the present with the consciousness that justice is on our side and that, when the mists of falsehood have been cleared away by common sense, justice will shine forth victoriously."

Irrespective of party, all members of the Hungarian Parliament loudly cheered Count and Countess Ciano. They were then shown over the Parliament buildings by M. Darányi, Prime Minister, and M. Kánya, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and shown all the objects of interest in it.

In the evening M. and Mme Darányi gave a dinner party in their honour, to which the Austrian Minister in Budapest was also invited. A toast in Italian was proposed by Premier Darányi, who raised his glass to Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy and Emperor of Abyssinia, to Mussolini, and to Count and Countess Ciano.

On the second day of his sojourn here the Italian Foreign Minister laid a wreath on the tomb of the Italian soldiers buried in Budapest and then did homage before the Hungarian Cenotaph. After this he had a private audience with the Regent, Admiral Horthy, which was followed by a lunch given by the Regent in honour of the Count and Countess Ciano.

Later on in the day, Count Ciano was received with ovations at the headquarters of the Italian Fascio in Budapest and in the Italian Cultural Institute. On

behalf of the Hungarian Government, Dr. Valentine Hóman, Minister of Education, presented the Institute with a bust of Mussolini. In his reply to Dr. Hóman's speech Count Ciano emphasised the indestructible nature of the friendship between the two nations.

In the evening Prince Colonna, Italian Minister, and the Princess gave a dinner in honour of Count and Countess Ciano, at which Herr Mackensen, Germany's Minister to Hungary, was present.

Count and Countess Ciano spent the third day at a shoot in Gödöllő as the guests of the Regent. In the evening there was a gala performance in the Operahouse. When Count and Countess Ciano made their appearance in the beflagged box of the Premier, a roar of applause went up from all sides of the crowded house. The programme consisted of selections from Verdi's "Fancy Dress Ball" and two pictures from the ballet, "Hungarian Fantasies", composed by Márkus from Liszt's Hungarian Rhapsodies. After the gala performance M. Kánya gave a reception in honour of

the Italian guests in the state room of the Ministry of the Interior.

The fourth day was occupied in visiting the Italian school and the Hungarian National Defence Army's school of riding and driving at the camp in Örkény. In the evening they left for Rome. Premier Darányi, with M. Kánya and many other Hungarian notabilities, was at the station to see them off. After taking the salute of a regiment of honour Count and Countess Ciano were cheered, long and enthusiastically, by the huge crowds collected in front of the station.

According to the official reports issued in the course of the conversations between Count Ciano on the one hand and the Hungarian Premier and M. Kánya, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the other, all matters touching the common interests of the two countries were discussed. The tenor of the conversations was extremely cordial throughout and the views of both parties on those questions were found to agree.

— y —

RUMANIAN ATTACKS ON YUGOSLAV MINORITY POLITICS

The "Curentul" of Bucharest (November 7, 1936) gives a prominent place to a letter written by a Rumanian teacher living in the Yugoslav Banate. In it we are told that the Rumanians living under Yugoslav rule feel benumbed, and the writer asks whether their benumbed condition is not a prelude to death — to rapid denationalization. *For Yugoslav policy is more oppressive than any other weighing on the Rumanian minority.* Neither in Greece nor in Bulgaria is the Rumanian minority oppressed in the same measure as in the country of the Serbs. The reason why no complaints are heard is that the political power forces the Rumanians to stifle them. In other countries the Rumanians have schools, at least on

paper, but Yugoslavia refuses all offers of negotiation on a reciprocal basis.

✱

The educational agreement concluded between Rumania and Yugoslavia on March 10th 1933 grants various advantages and privileges to the Rumanian minority in Yugoslavia, as compared with the rest of the minorities. The "Curentul" of November 8th attacks Yugoslavia, because the educational authorities there do not carry out the provisions of the agreement in the way the Rumanians are entitled to expect. The "Curentul" says that the situation of the Rumanians in Yugoslavia is in anything but satisfactory.

— y —

BULGARIAN PRESS COMMENTS ON M. STOYADINOVITCH'S TRIP TO ANGORA AND S. MUSSOLINI'S MILAN SPEECH

The elaborate welcome accorded to M. Stoyadinovitch in Angora was a further proof of Yugoslav-Turkish *rapprochement*. Toasts and official reports gave voice to the desire of both countries to safeguard the peace of the Balkans within the limits of the Balkan Bloc, to cherish and develop friendly relations with their neighbours, and extend the Balkan Bloc by getting Bulgaria to join it. Although M. Stoyadinovitch's visit was followed with keen interest in Bulgaria, no special importance was attached to it. The "Mir" alone commented favourably on it. The peace of the Balkans — said this paper — was not endangered by Bulgaria. If the wish that Bulgaria should join the Balkan Bloc was sincere, justice must first be done

to Bulgaria. If the Balkan problems were discussed in Angora with a real desire for peace, then M. Stoyadinovitch's visit would prove profitable not only for the countries of the Balkan Bloc, but also for Bulgaria. — M. Mussolini's Milan speech was very warmly received in Bulgaria as a sign that the resistance to a change of the *status quo* was growing much less stubborn. According to the Bulgarian press, the present dangerous situation has been caused by the efforts of antirevisionists. All true friends of peace must realize the necessity of revision and must endeavour to bring it about.

— y —