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THE PARADIGMS THAT INFLUENCED THE ABSENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN IDEAS IN THE POLITICAL PARTIES' PROGRAMS AND PROCESSES IN THE COUNTRIES THAT EMERGED FROM THE DISSOLUTION OF FORMER SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

The paper focuses on describing some of the specific paradigms and factors that influence the absence of the republican idea in the political programs and processes in the former Yugoslav socialist republics over the last two decades following the fall of communism in Europe. These paradigms and factors have played an important role both in shaping the attitude of the international community towards the South- East Europe and in the process of setting the agenda of the local political elites.

The absence of the republican influence within not- well defined political scene of the Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia is analyzed and documented through studying theoretically the specific ways of policy formation used in these countries. The political systems of theses countries function contrary to those in the countries in the West with functional republican or democratic standards.

Each of the former Yugoslav republics is characterized with a lack of republican proliferation of the parties in their political activity and structuring. In no any former Yugoslav republics there is fluent any major political party with a republican concept. There has not been invested on developing the republicanism.

INTRODUCTION

Today the conceptual relationship between republic and democracy is wooly, though the former often suggests civic responsibility in contrast to the latter's emphasis on individual autonomy and rights. In this view the both the republican and democratic premises in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia seems to be merged as both of above-mentioned suggestions can be find as a common point that fits with the political practice of the ethnic politics.

Being the driving force of the policy formation in the former Yugoslav republics, the ethnic politics has not been allowed a distinction of the two suggestions that characterize the republic and democracy. Namely, in general within the South East European states with the diverse ethnic and cultural structures there is going on a traditional battle between:

- from one side the *State* (identified with the majority ethnic group that used to have an exclusiveness on the state primary and privileged status) which emphasis on civic responsibility, and
- from another side the non-majority ethnic groups (traditionally underrepresented in the system and marginalized by the state and the majority ethnic groups) which ask and fight politically for individual autonomy of rights.

The founding of the *Republic* anywhere in the world has been symbolized the rejection of rulers who treated the political community as their private property. But, in case of the South East European region it happened only formally, and it was not an outcome of the post-communism era. Despite the republic has been founded in the region following the fall of the communism and socialism, the rejection of the rulers who treated the political community as their private property didn't happened. Two decades after the democracy and multiparty system has been introduced the presence of the oligarchic political leaderships continues to be evident in each of the countries of the region. The oligarchic habits from the communist system survived and they only get transformed their name from oligarchies of the communism into oligarchies of democracy.

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The oligarchy as an extreme form of the rule that treat the political organizations as private properties of a circle of few people proceeded to prevail in the political leaderships structures even in the new democratic systems in the in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia: *Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia*. Therefore, instead of rejecting the obstacles of the *Republic* (i.e. rejecting rulers who treat the political community as their private property) and give a chance to the *Republic*, in most of these countries (excluding Slovenia and from time to time and to some extent excluding Croatia) rather happened a rejection of the Republic itself with developing the oligarchic form of the rule in the political organization.

Polybius, in the second century BC, described (although not entirely accurately) the Roman Republic as a 'mixed regime' where monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy balanced one another, providing stability and protection from the constant cycling of regimes from one form to another. In case of the post-socialist former Yugoslav republics today, that balance of that 'mixed regime' is not achieved due to the presence and high influence of the oligarchic form of rule that was not stopped with the emergence of the democracy, even rather was developed more in the post-communist era.

Each of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of the former socialist Yugoslavia is republics having a parliamentary democracy and a political system with a strict division into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Each of their parliamentary democracy is characterized with a popularly elected president and some of them with higher and some with lower level of the multiethnic party representation.

Each of them two decades after the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation like the overwhelming systems in the Eastern and Central Europe are open systems. The start of process of democratization has replaced the isolated system established in the monism-era, with the new political system², which communicates more intensively with the citizens, the neighbors and the rest of the world. In this framework should be perceived every dialogue within the societies and in regional level as well.

The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. According to the Constitutions of the former Yugoslav republics the Parliaments' representatives are directly elected by the people for four-year term. The unicameral Parliament governs each of the countries, except of the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina having the bicameral legislative body.

THE POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE COMMUNISM IN EUROPE

In the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia like in the Eastern European countries differing organizational forms appear to result from the prevalence of successor communist parties³, the emergence of new state-organized parties, and a mass of tiny parties working in an electoral landscape where democracy is weakly rooted.⁴ The failed communist parties of the former socialistic block in Europe including those from the South East Europe were organized around the principle of democratic centralism and there was not room to be developed after the republican idea.

The countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia countries are newcomers to the camp of new democracies. After the fall of the Berlin wall, these countries faced tremendous difficulties in establishing the institutions of democracy, rule of law, and the free market. In the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia like all around the rest of the South East Europe the political scene is not well defined. New political parties, particularly those established over the last two decades, are going through a stage of their development that is characterised by huge problems and without any shaped ideology profile.

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The political parties, which emerged in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia, are of four main types:

- The former ruling communist parties;
- Anti-communist electoral alliances;
- Resurrected parties and
- New parties.⁵

The former communist parties changed their names and liberalized their structures. The strongest amongst them in the South East Europe were those of Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, all of which remained united and most of which continued the close association with nationalism established before 1989.

Cohesion and continuity amongst the anti-communist electoral alliances were rare, though not unknown. Generally, these were loose associations, which fell apart once their one unifying demand, the removal of the communists from office, had been achieved.

The third group of parties, those resurrected from the past, has played very little part in the evolution of the area since 1989. Most had little in the way of infrastructure or funds and their leadership, though venerated, was old and had been too long in exile to be in touch with contemporary affairs.

In general, newly formed parties were much more important than resurrected ones. But they too faced considerable difficulties. Communist rule had meant the elimination of former distinctions of class, status, and wealth upon which old party divisions were frequently based, and there had not been time for market forces to create or recreate the social bases for bourgeois parties.

Some new parties were founded on issues such as the environment and most countries soon had their Green party or its equivalent. Parties representing ethnic majorities and minorities appeared in all states.

Communist successor parties all around the Balkan countries at first sight appear to be legatees of the socialist tradition, but in reality they are obliged to pursue the same strategy of dismantling the state and promoting the market as neo-liberals.⁶

The wide open door of the party pluralism in the former Yugoslav republics directly reflected the differentiation of the political parties and their grouping around their program similarities in four basic groups:

- Group of ethnic political parties;
- Group of civil-liberal political parties;
- Group of socialist and social-democratic political parties;
- Group of other types of parties.⁷

As is stated in the "Politics and Institutions"⁸, all the political parties created at the beginning of the construction of the multi party system for instance in Macedonia are divided into:

- a) Ultra-left orientated⁹;
- b) Left orientated¹⁰;
- c) Political center¹¹;
- d) Right orientated¹²;
- e) Ultra-right orientated political parties¹³.

Political parties seek to take power for their leading members either for its own sake (the psychological, social and economic rewards of office), on behalf of some social group or with some ideological objective in mind¹⁴. In most of the South East European countries in most of cases is proved that the names of the parties are often a bad guide to their objectives and to the ways in which they practice the policy formation¹⁵.

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There are numerous political parties with unclear and undefined political programs, on the political scene. Generally, these are political parties focused on daily political issues from recent history¹⁶, and prior to elections, they always rely on votes from a more radical segment of the electorate.¹⁷

Although all the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia countries quickly introduced formal democratic institutions (free elections, multiparty system, rule of law, division of power etc.) after the collapse of communist regimes, it has been difficult for democracy to take root in these countries (excluding in most of cases Slovenia).

Citizens are deprived of access to the political process, so as a result they are cautious and do not trust politicians. They are more and more not interested in current political programs and most frequently they are not well informed about the issues that are on the top of political party agendas. Issues promoted by political parties and issues on which citizens are asked to contribute by becoming involved are simply not related to their needs and interests at all.

The slow progress of democratic development in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia is partly due to the series of ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Nevertheless, the ethnic conflict is not the sole reason why democratic development in the former Yugoslav zone has been slower than in Central Europe. Both democracy and republic can only function if power is not abused. One more major reason for weak democracies and republics in the former Yugoslav zone seems to be that power can easily be abused in new democracies.

In the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia countries the executive tends to be strong. Almost all of the countries have opted for a semi-presidential system with a strong president who was, in effect, above the constitution, and whose wish was to concentrate all power in his or her hands. The large apparatus of presidential power greatly exceeds the power of other state agencies: the president is allowed to rule by decree; controls the power of the purse; has influence over the judiciary; cannot easily be impeached etc.¹⁸

THE ABSENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PREMISES IN THE POLICY FORMATION IN THE POST-SOCIALIST FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS: THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE POLICY FORMATION PROCESS

Politics in most of the South East European countries often seem curiously insubstantial, with politicians reluctant to engage with the issues that are clearly predominant in the lives of the electorate. There is a clear incentive for the political elite to fill the public agenda with other issues, resorting to enduring historical disputes, identity politics, or simply trading allegations of corruption with their political opponents. Experts have characterized such democracies as 'feckless' 19.

In the transition conditions in the South East Europe, the political parties are synonyms of the subjects in charge of the policy formation within the political system of any of the states.²⁰

Political parties in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia are some of the most important and self-sustainable institutions. For instance neither, the judiciary nor any other institutions are the guardians of any these democracies as much as the major political parties. Whenever opposition weakens, the democracy weakens. Greater democratization within the parties will be reflected in the democratization of other state institutions, and vice-versa. So, it is important that more investment should be made in building the capacities of the political parties, providing training and improving their efficiency and democratic culture.

Unlike in many emerging democracies, where the executive grouping dominates the political process, parties in the former Yugoslav zone are strong and act as pillars of the political system. This makes politics more competitive, but also poses obstacles to the creation of a sense of national unity. Moreover, adherence to a party reflects deeper social affiliations, such as regional, family and clan loyalties, with parties playing a paternalistic role of looking after its

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supporters²¹. Party branches often serve as support networks when it comes to access to jobs, information and other opportunities. Hence support for a party often also has a vested economic interest.

The fierce struggle of political parties for the control of the state and its institutions combined with the way in which the state institutions have become subordinated to and used by political parties has bred a general apathy in the region like in many other post- communist countries.²² Under circumstances of the systems covered with the apathy the civic society elements and media very often are treated and blamed as members of the *fifth column* and with that rejected in the policy formation and even very often abused.

The basic role of the civil society and the media in the policy formation should be treated in two-tracks. Civil society might be a corrector (opposition) and (or) a partner to the policy makers (political parties, governments).

When the parties are in opposition or when come to power usually at the start of exercising power they are willing for the cooperation with the civil society elements- with an aim usually to get their support for political motives. In such a case the parties accept the civil society elements as partners. But, in the rest part of the mandate of the parties and when civil society start to play a role as a corrector in the policy formation, then there is no room for the voice of the civil society ²³ and its elements are treated as a threat.

The decision making of the parties on some elementary affairs (political, economic, security, foreign affairs) are usually shaped by the leaders themselves, without any expertise, advices and suggestions of the local experts and intellectuals. With only two-three intellectuals in the party board no one can see a long-term future perspective for the parties.²⁴ Those who run the parties are everything: the leaders and advisers at the same time, businessmen, fathers of the nations, etc. As a result of that there are brought usually weak decisions of the politicians and parties, discourses characterized with weak speeches (which only in rear cases are written by the experts on the speech-writings) and old-fashioned campaigning.

In western countries, party professionals play a significant political role in policy formation. That is reverse to the practice in the Balkan region where the decisions usually are made *ad hoc*.

There is still only a little progress in improving the internal democratic procedures of the political parties and their way of policy formation. The overwhelming influence of party structures over decisions taken at governmental level remains unchanged. These problems need to be tackled quickly so as to ensure that the country moves further forward on the road to stability.

Elections usually bring about a change in state and not only in government since every political party that comes to power fills the state institutions, such as the judiciary, customs, secret services, the army, and so on with its own people. This in turn undermines both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the institutions. Institutions have not been built around a wide political consensus that would have endowed them with much needed stability and continuity.

The practice in the South East Europe shows that usually the alternation of power seems only to trade the country's problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country.

The democratic system that has evolved in most of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia over the last two decades, is dominated by centralized political parties- all characterized by a low level of internal democracy and a lack of checks and balances. On the top of these party pyramids that are so reminiscent of communist times stand the party presidents, who enjoy significant political and financial power. Because of this, elections in Serbia and Macedonia, for instance have always taken on the aspect of highly personalized conflicts between the party leaders and their closest collaborators.

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In most western countries either with liberal, democratic or republican premises of their systems, the main obvious communication function of political parties is to contest elections- selecting candidates in constituencies, canvassing and organizing voters, composing and delivering election addresses in constituencies and running local poster and national media campaigns. In the region is the contrary. The communication function of political parties might be everything else apart from the above-mentioned functions.

There is a widespread popular belief that politicians are very corrupt. As a result of such a perceptions, there is very difficult to be achieved a successful policy communication, because that in turn has reduced public trust to the political parties, politicians, state institutions, which combined with the corrupt and dysfunctional state institutions the efficiency of the state in collecting revenue, implementing and making policies, has been undermined. Under such circumstances the favorite way of the local politicians to engage electorate is through the nationalistic rhetoric, which still in the region is popular and is one of the best ways how to shift the electorate's attention from the perception about the corrupted political elites.

The elites that took power from the communist in and after 1989 did so in the name of democracy. The slogan of democracy proved extremely effective in demobilizing loyalty to the communist system, largely because it was legitimated by tacit or explicit reference to the success of the *West.*²⁵

In any case, the new political elites were handicapped by the struggle that they themselves had fought with communism. As in any extended conflict, the contending parties gradually acquire characteristics of the other and the democratic opposition was no exception to this cultural rule. Because the language of democracy legitimated the new system in the Balkans, society identified *democracy* not as understood in the *West*, but as the seemingly irrelevant bickering, the empty contests for symbols and moral purity that had no bearing on everyday existence, above all the rapid and continuing economic deterioration. Identical was the situation with the *republic*.

Republic like the *democracy* was discredited as the new post-communist governments sought to deal with the multiple crises, which they faced, by the tried and failed method of over-regulation. Both the communist and the pre-communist traditions had been marked by this belief that issuing regulations, directives, instructions and the like was a substitute for action. The post-communist systems drew on these traditions heavily.²⁷

The new democratizing elite was in any case so persuaded of the appropriateness of its democratic beliefs and in its own democratic credentials that it never seriously thought that democracy had antagonists. It proceeded to impose a democratic structure on post-communist countries without any attempt to consult the population.²⁸ In the post-1989 euphoria, the *West* was believed to be deeply committed to the maintenance of democracy throughout Europe and anti-democratic or non-democratic discourses were impossible to articulate at this time. Yet as soon as the impact of democracy began to be felt, it became evident that not all of society was as enthusiastic as had been thought.²⁹

The consequence of this was a lack of ability to run both republican and democratic system. It proved difficult to accept that in the real world of power politics, transactions were generally blurred and muddy and that the abstract intellectual and moral criteria that had been so effective in undermining communism - a construct legitimated by intellectual categories and therefore vulnerable to intellectual attack - were counterproductive in a republican and democratic system.

The identification of the state and state policy formation with the political party in power is a prevailing phenomenon in the region of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia. This seems to be one of the enduring communist legacies that most of the South East European countries have not been able to overcome. One of the unfortunate consequences of the party – state phenomena has been the fail of the state along with that of the political party in power. Therefore, the constant re-making of the state has been the main factor of state weakness and instability.

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SPECIFIC FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE ABSENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN IDEA IN THE POLITICAL PROGRAMS AND PROCESSES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Each of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia is characterized with a lack of republican proliferation of the parties in their political organization. In no any former Yugoslav republic there isn't fluent any major political party with a republican concept.

For instance Macedonia is a typical post- Yugoslav country with not developed republican idea. No any of the parties with republican orientation has won any seat in the Macedonian multiparty Parliament so far. The candidates' lists of the Republican Party of Macedonia in the last central elections 2002 did not win any seats. Only few hundreds voters in total in all six electoral zones has been voting for the Republican Party of Macedonia.³⁰

Within the fifteen years of the multiparty system there have been existed some four parties with the republican orientation and all of them has been quite small parties with few hundreds party membership and votes at the electoral processes. All of them have remained to be marginalized in the political scene as minor parties in opposition with no any significance, or has already been disbanded.³¹

There has not been invested almost at all on developing the *republicanism* in the former Yugoslavia. The fall of the mono party system and the dissolution of former Yugoslav federation in the region coincided with the series of ethnic conflicts, peaceful processes and enormous enthusiasm for establishing the democratic institutions.

Therefore the emergence of political pluralism in the region was characterized with: the appearance of plenty political parties overwhelming of them with democratic orientation; formal transformation only of the previous communist parties in most cases into democratic or social- democratic parties; with political discourse over-dozen with the of nationalistic rhetoric; and with less time and opportunity for making work and developing the new republics and introducing the republican oriented political parties.

All the energy and focus of both international and local political factors has been directed at providing the security, stopping the ethnic conflicts and peace reconciliation, rather than building functional new states- republics with the real functional republican performances. This kind of priority issues have been occupied the new states- republics that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslav socialistic federation and following the fall of the communism.

One might clarify following specific factors that have been barriers in making work the republican idea in the post-Yugoslavian region, wasting the time and capacities of the new emerged states as they needed to cope with these priority issues rather than being focused in developing the functional republicanism:

- Providing security;
- · Democratic consolidation, and
- Solving the lack of legitimacy.

Both democracy and republic in the region came as a gift to the citizens. People of the South East Europe in general they didn't fought at all for republic or for democracy, nor made any particular effort to win it. The democracy and the republic in the region appeared as a result of the former Yugoslavia's disintegration, particularly since the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The new republics didn't break completely with the old system inherited from the communist period. The institutions and system mainly remained the same, but with different names. In practice it continued to function similarly.³²

However, the *Republic* is not new form of organization in the region of the former Yugoslav republics. It dates before the end of the fall of communism and emergence of the new republics. The region has traditional preconditions for the republicanism. For instance even before the First World War, in 1903 there was established the first Republic in Macedonia, known as Krusevo Republic³³.

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But, that traditional preconditions regarding the republican idea has not been materialized and developed in terms of the state organization and political proliferation of the political parties when there was the best opportunity following the emergence of the pluralism and creation of the new states.

Apart from above- mentioned factors and reasons that outcome is as well as due to other factors such are: the problems with the identity crisis of several nations and countries, high level of the regional interdependence of the countries, the dependence of the post-conflict countries from the international presence that mainly has been tried to reconcile peace in building the democratic institutions, etc.

The absence of the republican idea in the political organization in any of the former Yugoslav republic is as well as due to the regional influences regarding the level of the spread of the republican idea in the neighboring countries. The countries of the region are traditionally interlinked with each other and both advantages and disadvantages affect countries among them. It could be sufficient the republicanism to have been developed in any of the countries of the region and it could be spread up to others as well and vice versa via the functioning transnational political links.

The political parties from any of the countries have a significant influence over the orientation of the political parties that represent the population of the same ethnic communities in other neighboring countries. Due to the developed transnational linkage the former are part of the policy decision making of the later.³⁴ In absence of being developed the political parties with the republican orientation in any of the countries of the region, there have not been introduced the republican parties nor in the neighboring countries which ethnic communities have been comprised in the transnational political linkages with them.

Though several documents and publications³⁵ so far distinguish democracies with their demagogues and upheavals from orderly republics, democracy and republic all around the world have over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries converged conceptually. Both identify the body of citizens as the fount of political authority and the overlap between the two regimes has obscured distinctive political structures that might limit recollections of Roman institutions only to republics. With the absence, indeed impossibility, of direct democracy, both democracies and republics have taken on representative forms of government and most democracies have adopted variations of the Polybian mixed regime.

A return to republican ideals of political virtue and engagement in the former Yugoslav republics in the Balkans has not surfaced in an effort to address what is portrayed as the excessive individualism of citizens in liberal democracies.

Among contemporary communitarians, ancient republics are symbols of a lost political world where citizens found fulfillment in political life, not in the pursuit of economic success. This evocation of ancient republics has revived discussion about the role of republican ideals during the founding of the new states in the region that emerged from the dissolution of the former federation of the republics of Yugoslavia with no any communitarian approach that would be eager to find in the early years republican rather than democratic and liberal roots.

CONCLUSION

In no any of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia there is manifested the modern concept of the republic to which the communitarians appeal which should go well beyond the people as the fount of political authority and the mixed regime to the intangibles of political virtue and a shared life of the ancient republic³⁶.

As a result of that most of the former Yugoslav countries the republics doesn't function at all (with some exclusion to Slovenian case), rather there have been invested efforts in making function only the democratic ideal. In fact democracies and republics have been converged toward the common aim of completing the transition. Republic of Serbia, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Kosovo, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the typical cases in the region today where the republican ideal is forgotten and abandoned and the republican concept exists only formally in the last two decades, despite the existence of the traditional preconditions for making work the republicanism.

These are typical cases of non-functionality of the republic today into the political practice, although that the republican premises are manifested and are quite present in the constitutional regulations of the new states. That is a common case

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with each of the former Yugoslav republics (except of Slovenia in most of the cases) where the transition paradigm and the concentration on the democratic cause only, have left into the shadow the republican ideals.

keywords: paradigms; republican ideas; former socialist Yugoslavia

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¹ Republic, A. Saxonhouse, W. (2002): University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.

² As above, here as well as the term Political 'system' is being used here in a loose sense to denote a complex of interconnecting political activities in society or societies – it does not imply the adoption of any particular. Politics is not just about how states are run.

³ There are a series of political parties that were derived from the transformation of the Communist Alliance and developed into new political parties with socialist or socialdemocratic profiles. Most politicians in these parties were previously active in politics and continue with old methods and work practices. Therefore, the following question is frequently raised: are undemocratically structured parties capable of developing a democratic society?

⁴ In one-party states or states dominated by one party, organization remains the most closely related to the assumed structure of state power.

⁵ After Richard Crempton, "Balkan Politics"The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. University of Massachusetts - Amherst. 25 July2005, http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY. html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e1042>.

⁶ Their appeal in the mid-1990s, which has begun to fade (communist successor parties lost elections in Poland, Lithuania and Bulgaria), was based on a claim to efficiency rather than the correcting of in-justice.

⁷ This division is taken from the Ph.D dissertation of Master of Arts Gorgi Spasov, "Faktori na oblikuvanje i prirodata na partiskiot sistem na Republika Makedonija", ISPPI, Skopje, (1993): pp-57-59.

⁸ See: Klimovski S. (2000): "Politics and Institutions", Linking Publishing Co., Ltd., Taiwan, pp. 544-545.

⁹ Actually there exist no any major parties with this orientation in Macedonia. At the beginning of the multi-party system in this groups were located Labor Party of Macedonia, Socialist Party of Macedonia; at the beginning of the multiparty system was active the Party for the Complete Emancipation of Romanians, etc.

¹⁰ Social Democratic Party of Macedonia; Democratic Union of Integration, Liberal Democratic Party. All these three parties are composing the current coalition government of Macedonia established in October 2002.

¹¹ Some minor parties like League of Democracy, Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party. Party for Democratic Prosperity is left orientated but in fact its activity and concept makes it to be enumerated in political center.

¹² For instance, the Democratic Party of Albanians.

¹³ For instance the party VMRO-DPMNE; then the minor National Democratic Party which is known with its federalist concept; etc.

¹⁴ E.g. national independence, socialism, etc.

¹⁵ E.g. in some countries parties with the prefix 'democratic' or 'liberal' in their names practices the policy formation similar to the way of authoritarian regimes, socialistic parties, etc.

¹⁶ Daily issues and topical events influence the political scene, for several reasons. Firstly, political parties for instance from Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Kosovo in particular draw their political strength from recent war history and "their" contribution to the development and preservation of existing conditions. Secondly, on a global level, economic priorities take precedence over politics. Political parties, particularly reform-oriented, multiethnic parties, have made progress in the development and running of several political campaigns focused on a couple of the most significant reform issues. However, they have not been capable of responding to the challenges of

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
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social needs and the expectations of voters, because they are still constrained by old style patterns of political behavior and the absence of wide party support (support of party members) for the undertaking of political changes.

- ¹⁷ Many reports point to the fact that the membership of these parties in South East Europe has declined in the last years, though explanations are multi-causal. And, party activism has declined as well. Explanations are multi-causal with electoral outcomes being particularly significant.
- ¹⁸ Typical examples of such an omnipotent executive are Serbia, Croatia and Russia. The Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and the Croatian president FranjoTudjman used to have a full control over the Parliament and judiciary and it was practically impossible to remove them from office. The Russian president's power is so great that he is able to dismiss the government elected by the Parliament.
- ¹⁹ Thomas Carothers, 'The end of the transition paradigm', Journal of Democracy, Jan. 2002.
- ²⁰ As Tansey in his book Politics: The Basics (2nd ed., Routledge, London 2000), says
- "Political parties may be thought of as social groups that seek to wholly or partially take over the government of a country, usually by contesting elections" (Tansey: 2000: 198).
- ²¹ See the chapter on democracy of Tansey S. (2000) in his book Politics: The Basics, 2nd ed., Routledge, London.
- ²² The apathy condition is one of the most major barriers in the political process for the normal functioning of the civil society in the policy formation.
- ²³ In general terms, the civil society do not play significant role in the policy formation in the political scenes of most of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The democratization of the parties and the systems of the Balkan countries can't be completed if the authorities-politicians would not open the gates to the civil society in the policy formation. Meanwhile, the civil society should be more active and more consequent in this view and not running some periodical campaigns only.
- ²⁴ The process of the policy formation is always handicapped if there is not contained the consultation segment- the contribution of the experts within the parties and generally policy formation. What the overwhelming of the political parties in the South East Europe has a common among many other aspects is the characteristic that they do almost skip the essential phase of the consultation with experts and advisers during the policy formation. Lets' focused on the case of Macedonian political scene. On the board of the political parties of ethnic Albanians may be everybody else involved but not the experts who would play a significant role during the consultations.
- ²⁵ The interpretation of the West that was current both at the elite and the popular level was, however, flawed. The West was not understood as a complex social, economic, political and cultural entity but as a political and economic success, which had won the Cold War The externals of high levels of prosperity and sophisticated technology were regarded as the hallmarks of the successful competitor and it is no exaggeration to suggest that for many people 'democracy' was little more than an appendage to the economic triumph Thus their expectations were that the introduction of 'democracy' would automatically bring with it a Western level of prosperity.
- ²⁶ Schopflin G. (2002): The New Politics of Europe: Nations, Identity, Power, 2nd ed., Hurst & Company, London, 196.
- ²⁷ Attila Agh, 'A kiabrabdulas kora' Valosag, vol.36, no. 10 (October 1993), pp.62-73.
- ²⁸ There were important external pressures that would have made non-democratic alternatives impossible to legitimate.
- ²⁹ Andrzej Tymowski, 'The Unwanted Social Revolution: Poland in 1989', East European Politics and Societies vol.7, no.2 (spring 1993), pp.169-202.
- ³⁰ See the State Election Commission supplementary report on the conducted elections for Members of Parliament in 2002 in Macedonia.
- ³¹ Actually, there exist only two parties with the republican orientation: Republican Party of Macedonia of Milan Sareveski and the Democratic-Republican Party of Macedonia (DRUM) established on November 2004. Both of them has a low number of the membership.

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³³ On 3 August 1903, the rebels of the Ilinden uprising who uprised against the Ottoman Empire took the town of Krusevo (positioned today in Central Macedonia) and established a revolutionary government. They proclaimed the Krusevo Republic, which was the first ever in the Balkans.

The Republic lasted 10 days, from August 3 - 13, and had as its President Nikola Karev, a well-known Macedonian revolutionary and socialist.

From among the various nationalities who lived in this part of Macedonia (Macedonian's, Albanian's and Vlach's), a Republican Council was elected with 60 members - 20 representatives of each nationality. The Council chose an executive body, called the Provisional Government, with six members (2 from each nationality), whose duty it was to ensure law and order and see to such things as supplies, finances, and medical care.

The "Krusevo Manifesto" was published. Written by Nikola Karev himself, it outlined the aims of the Uprising, calling upon the population to join forces with the government in the struggle against tyranny and enslavement to attain freedom and independence.

A surprised Ottoman Empire authorities took extensive military measures to quell the uprising: 176,000 soldiers, 3,700 mounted troops and 444 cannon's were sent to Macedonia. After battles near Sliva and Meckin Kamen, the Turkish forces managed to destroy the Krusevo Republic and disbanded the rebels's groups in Krusevo and other places.

³⁴ That cross border linkage and influence is a case with the major political parties of Albanians from Kosovo and political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia; of the major Serbian parties in Belgrade and those of Serbs in Kosovo and Bosnia; of major Croatian parties in Zagreb and those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.

³⁵ The original distinction is made in *The Federalist Papers*, Hamilton A, Jay J, and Madison J, Editors, Random House, New York, 1788.

³⁶ For more on this see: Rahe, P A. (1992): Republics Ancient and Modern, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.