

RESUMES

ÁDÁM SCHWARCZWÖLDER TRANSGENERATIONAL NATION-BUILDING: KÁLMÁN SZÉLL'S ROAD TO SUCCESS

Kálmán Széll's (1843–1915) career in public service began at a very early age and stretched across the entirety of the Era of the Dual Monarchy. In September 1867, he married Ilona Vörösmarty, daughter of the great Hungarian poet Mihály Vörösmarty and ward of Ferenc Deák. As a 25-year-old, he was elected to the National Assembly of Hungary in June 1867. Seven years later, at the age of 32, he oversaw the consolidation of the national budget, which was in a shambles as a result of the 1873 economic crisis. It is true that unfortunate circumstances – namely the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina – impeded the upward arc of his career, but by the turn of the century he sat at the helm of the nation as prime minister (1899–1903). Having risen so high so quickly the question may be legitimately asked: How much of his unprecedented success was of his own doing? This short work attempts to find the secret of his early success by analyzing his extended family background.

Until the 19th century, none of his ancestors had been in a leadership role at the county level. His grandfather, János Széll (1763–1844), was a magistrate in Vas County. We see that the next generation of the Széll family enjoyed significantly more success. In addition to filling important managerial roles at the county level, all three of János Széll's sons also rose to national prominence. Two of Kálmán Széll's uncles were high-ranking judges, while his father, József Széll (1801–1871), was deputy sheriff of Vas County, dietary ambassador and representative in the National Assembly of Hungary in 1848 and again from 1865 to 1867. He served as high sheriff from 1867 until his death. Moreover, he enjoyed a close and fruitful friendship with Ferenc Deák. In terms of political career achievement, Kálmán Széll's was unquestionably the most distinguished in the family, but his younger brother (by two years) Ignác also had an exemplary career: initially serving as deputy sheriff of Vas County, then head of department and finally as state secretary in the Ministry of Domestic Affairs from 1895 to 1906.

Looking at educational attainment across generations, we observe a trend towards greater achievement. In the case of Kálmán Széll's grandparents, we do not have access to information indicating that they attended a public education institution.

Kálmán Széll's father and his brothers were pupils at Premonstratensian High School in Szombathely, which they followed up with degrees from law colleges located in western Hungary. Kálmán Széll and his younger brother were the first in their family to attend the University of Budapest, where they studied law and earned doctorates.

It is indisputable that Kálmán Széll, compared to, for example, Counts Albert Apponyi and Gyula Andrassy Jr., came from much humbler origins, but in addition to his individual qualifications, the launching of his career indirectly but greatly benefitted from the leadership roles that his father and Ferenc Deák* held in public life and their personal network.

* Kálmán Széll's relationship with Ferenc Deák grew even stronger as a result of his marrying Deák's ward Ilona Vörösmarty in 1867

RÓBERT HERMANN
AN INSTRUCTIVE LIST: THE SIGNEES
OF THE REHABILITATING DOCUMENT
OF GENERAL ARTÚR GÖRGEI IN 1884

Artúr Görgei, the onetime commander of the Hungarian Revolutionary Army in the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution, turned 66 years old in 1884. Over the course of spring, several former Army officers began a movement to rehabilitate General Görgei's reputation. Out of their meetings came an official statement in which the officers insisted that the surrender at Világos on August 13th, 1849, was not an act of treason, but rather an inevitable consequence of the situation on the ground. The officers then agreed to seek out as many of their brother in arms as they could and have them sign the statement, which was crafted on May 30th, 1884.

This study examines the list of 237 individuals who signed the document. The roster of Görgei supporters shows that they were primarily men who came from the societal elite of the Era of the Dual Monarchy. This in itself determined both the opportunities and limitations of their movement. Because of their disproportionate representation, they had the means to give strong voice to Görgei's cause in the media, in public life and at the academy, while simultaneously for the very same reason, the masses – generally following independent-minded public opinion – did not really hear from the simple soldiers and officers from the lower ranks making up most of the military units.

ÁKOS KÁRBIN
SÁNDOR WEKERLE AND THE CONTINUATION
OF CURRENCY REFORM DURING
THE SZAPÁRY GOVERNMENT ERA

In October 1870, Sándor Wekerle joined the Ministry of Finance, where he worked in numerous departments, gaining definitive work experience that would stay with him for the rest of his career. He enjoyed a close professional and personal relationship with Count Gyula Szapáry, who was appointed Minister of Finance in December 1878. Szapáry considered Wekerle as his right-hand man at the ministry. Thus, it was no coincidence that following the resignations of Szapáry and State Secretary Frigyes Köffigner in February 1887, Kálmán Tisza accepted the role of Minister of Finance and named Wekerle as state secretary.

As state secretary, one of his tasks was to continue the budget deficit elimination program launched under Szapáry. In the wake of his appointment as minister of finance in April 1889, Wekerle initiated one of his most significant projects: laying the groundwork for currency reform. This was not a smooth undertaking as the respective staffs of the Austrian and Hungarian Ministries of Finance did not see eye to eye on certain specifics. Following Tisza's departure, Wekerle was able to hold onto his role in the Szapáry government. During the Tisza era the Austrian and Hungarian Ministries of Finance attempted to work together on the reforms that would impact the whole of the Monarchy, while the Szapáry era brought forth fresh and significant advances in the preparation of the reforms as a result of the involvement of the representatives of the Austro–Hungarian Bank in the negotiations. International events also influenced the currency reform of the Monarchy. Thus, one example among many was the potential solution that the United States' Silver Purchase Act posed for the sale of the Monarchy's silver reserves, which gave the global market price of silver a shot in the arm, but ultimately failed to keep the price elevated in the long run. In my work, I present the role Wekerle played in the preliminary work of currency regulation that took place in the Szapáry cabinet negotiations between March 1890 and January 1891.

LÁSZLÓ L. LAJTAI

HOW THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL NATION WAS ASSERTED BY REVAMPING THE CONTENT OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN THE ERA OF THE DUAL MONARCHY

This study takes a look at how the concept of nation entered Hungarian history textbooks during the Era of the Dual Monarchy, to what extent and in what context it rose to prominence, to what extent it showed continuity and in what respect was a change or a shift in emphasis evident in the associated narrative.

When Act XLIV of 1868 (“Equality of Rights of the Nationalities”), the law regulating official use of languages in Hungary, was passed, Hungarian legislation defined the term “nation” for the first time, specifically in the preamble, and referred to the residents of a unified Hungarian nation. Although the law did not differentiate based on mother tongue (that is, between ethnic Hungarians and non-Hungarians) in respect to practicing political rights, and made numerous concessions related to public use of non-Hungarian languages, in terms of use of language, an asymmetrical relationship nonetheless developed between ethnic Hungarians and those people who were Hungarians in citizenship only. This hierarchical cultural relationship also appeared in the passages of history textbooks, although the authors attempted to make the *political* character of the term *nation* in Hungary as clear as possible. Over time, this endeavor was intended to be strengthened by emphasizing more strongly the ethnic neutrality of the political nation, which was synonymous with the state, while the narrative found in textbooks began to regularly align with national-characterological templates that laid the groundwork for linguistic-emotive assimilation. These were used to demonstrate the inherent higher-order ability for state organization of the Hungarian population. In distinction to the geopolitical and culture-transmissive role of 1,000-year-old Hungarian statehood and the emphasis put on the antiquity of Hungarian constitutional organization, increasingly less attention was paid to Hungarian ethnic aspects, with which the political character of the Hungarian nation concept was meant to be strengthened, thus providing adequate firepower to take on rival ethno-cultural collective identity discourse.

DÁVID LIGETI

APOSTLE OF PREVENTIVE WAR: GENERAL FRANZ CONRAD VON HÖTZENDORF AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY (1906–1911)

Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925), *k. u. k. Feldmarschallleutnant* (*Lieutenant-General*) and later *k.u.k. Feldmarschall* (Field-Marshal) became Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army and Navy in 1906 as a confidante of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. As a talented and prolific military writer, he developed a number of military reform proposals. He improved the quality of officer training and the financial health of the army. As Chief of Staff, he was politically active, repeatedly calling for preventive strikes against the potential enemies of the Monarchy. He thus morphed into an apostle of preventive war. In this regard, his greatest adversary and counterweight was Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Conrad ultimately played a decisive role in the Bosnian (annexation) crisis of 1908–09, clashing with Emperor Francis Joseph I in the lead-up to action. Although his feud with the Foreign Minister led to his dismissal in 1911, Conrad was reappointed to the post one year later. As a result, it was he who led the military forces of the Monarchy into WWI. He would remain at the helm until March 1917. His modern approach and attempts at reform were only partially able to offset the disadvantages that doomed the Austro-Hungarian Army to failure. Thus, his overall performance (or lack thereof) during his first stint as Chief of Staff greatly affected how the events of WWI played out, ultimately leading to disaster and the eventual collapse of Austria-Hungary.

LÁSZLÓ ANKA

TWO “POLITICAL SCIENTISTS” DEBATED: ISTVÁN TISZA
AND OSZKÁR JÁSZI ON ELECTORAL LAW

István Tisza and Oszkár Jászi were the foremost political ideologues and politicians of the later years of the Era of the Dual Monarchy, so much so that their influence on Hungarian political thought is still felt today, one hundred years later. Tisza was an adherent of classical liberalism and the leading figure in the governing Liberal Party, in whose colors he became prime minister for the first time. Later he went on to be prime minister again, as head of the National Party of Work. He was considered to be a dependable representative of the system established by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Oszkár Jászi was the leader of the Civic Radicals. Initially, he organized their media affairs and later the political party itself. Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the end of WWI, he served as Minister for National Minorities in the Mihály Károlyi government. The two men found themselves on opposite sides in the debate on electoral law that had begun in 1905. In order to defend Hungarian supremacy and to preserve liberal parliamentary hegemony, Tisza opposed the introduction of an electoral law that was based on democracy and equality and used a secret ballot. On the other hand, Jászi, whose primary objective was to sweep away the prevailing system (which he considered as feudalistic), expressed his support for universal suffrage. Tisza believed that abolishing the census would advance the interests of the national minorities and lead to the breakup of Greater Hungary, while Jászi surmised that once minorities entered parliament en masse, the agitation would cease. Tisza envisioned the end of parliamentarism, while Jászi expected social reforms to be spurred along by a *népparliament* (People's Parliament). From the same starting point, they came to two vastly different conclusions. In their introductory works, as if they were political scientists, they objectively laid out the expected consequences of their modified electoral laws in great detail, calculating parliamentary mandates and enumerating to what extent the proportion of representation would change among the various political parties and the national minorities in the Hungarian Parliament. The two men never argued with each other in person. Instead, they shared their respective electoral law opinions in written form, published in a staggered arrangement. Having already begun this

custom before WWI, they kept it in later years. They came to opposite conclusions on the same subject. Their difference in opinion on what a multicultural state should look like symbolically defined the two camps (supporters and dissenters) throughout the debates on electoral law that occurred during WWI and ultimately led to enactment in 1918. The time has come to compare the two points of view side by side.

ÁGNES VARGA

ISTVÁN MILOTAY AND *NEW GENERATION* (1913–1919)

István Milotay's personality and journalism innovatively combined the principles of turn-of-the-century reform-conservatism with the elements of nascent radical rightwing thought. Through the synthesis of the two, his worldview and use of language defined a future independent (*perszónáluniós* [personal union]) Hungary, a hoped-for national flowering which looked out for the interests of the Hungarian collective via ethnic (racial) preservation, (popular-national) social democratization and the bourgeois process. His articles covered a multitude of topics. He wrote positively about agriculture, affording the peasant class access to land, defending the interests of the countryside and the benefits of the credit union system. In the interests of engendering a bourgeois middle class, he also wrote about driving Hungarian youth interest in the processes of the capitalist economy, pushing back against Jewish financial, industrial and commercial monopolistic power and societal self-organization as modeled by ants. "[...] The Hungarian collective, if it wishes to live and rule, must learn that success is only possible through the Ant Method of social, economic, cultural and political organization. [...] All who form part of the national bond are laborers of and party to the national idea. The immense network of solidarity weaves them into one great unit, a solidarity that conveys a consciousness among members and represents an unbreakable interdependence. It is a consolidation of strength, an uplifting sensation from helping one another."

MÁTÉ GALI
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN–HUNGARIAN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE *BARTHA–HODŽA AGREEMENT*

For the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Hungarian history, 1918 was a decisive year. In addition to enemy combatants on the war fronts of WWI and a growing number of mutinies, strikes and street demonstrations on the home front, the Dualist State heard louder calls for sovereignty by minority nationalities.

The Hungarian political elite considered maintaining the territorial integrity of Greater Hungary as essential, in contrast to the neighboring ethnic minorities who believed it was their right to seize the lands granted to them by the Entente in secret agreements made during the war.

In the wake of the Aster Revolution, Count Mihály Károlyi, who had come to power on October 31st, 1918, and his government trusted that the inexorably hostile attitude of the victorious Entente powers towards Hungary could be softened by making peace with the nationalities striving for independence. Oszkár Jászi, Hungarian Minister of Nationalities, advocated for a federative Hungarian state modeled on the Swiss canton system instead of self-determination for nationalities, which the Great Powers backing them supported. Although cognizant of the slight likelihood that his cantonization plan could be implemented, Jászi tried to make an interim deal with the nationalities in the lead-up to the Paris Peace Conference.

With a possible deal in mind, in November 1918, Jászi engaged in talks first with the Romanians and then the Czechoslovaks. The negotiations ended in failure because the Hungarian government had nothing to offer the nationalities that they could not obtain through other means. *On December 6th, 1918*, even as Hungarian Minister of Defense Albert Bartha came to an agreement with the Czechoslovak envoy to Budapest Milan Hodža *on a demarcation line in the Hungarian Highlands that more or less followed ethnic lines*, Prague was not at all impressed.

The Czechoslovak leadership, whose territorial desires were far bolder, rebuffed Hodža. Later in Paris, the agreed-to temporary borderline was superseded in the Czechoslovaks' favor by a revision that more or less traces the present-day border. Thus, by the final days of 1918, the short-lived Bartha–Hodža Agreement had been invalidated.

GÁBOR HOLLÓSI
THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR SUFFRAGE CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY IN HUNGARY DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The study does not examine any historical suffrage abuses that occurred, but rather the specifics of the law that established the legal consequences (penalties) for suffrage abuses in Hungary in the twenties and thirties. Referencing the period literature, we not only provide an introduction, but also call attention to the undeniable anomalies in the system, and we make an effort to uncover the most significant problems of the system as determined by today's generation of law historians. Moreover our goal is to gather all of the criminal rules of the period related to suffrage in one place, so that we may conveniently analyze them. Although Vol. 7 of Pál Angyal's handbook, who was one of the most famous Hungarian criminal law professors of the era, acquaints us with the suffrage crimes, we believe it to be unnecessary to include the precise dogmatics of the special part of the criminal law, which he applied in his handbook. From a distance of ninety years, it would seem to be unnecessary; our goal is only to provide the reader with a summary about this topic from a historical aspect.

KRISZTINA BOGNÁR-KISS THE THEATER ACADEMY IN THE INTERWAR ERA

Founded in 1863 and opening its doors two years later, the first higher education state institution in Hungary dedicated to the performing arts was the *Országos Színészeti Tanoda* (National Theater School). From the beginning, the school had, within the world of theater, endeavored to pass on the highest level of knowledge to its students, operating as a vocational school with a middle school foundation. It was only in 1948, however, that the school was designated a higher education institution. As a result of numerous organizational and locational changes, the educational program was under steady evolution in the first decades of operation. Founded as the training center for the future performers of the National Theater, the school was tightly bound to the premier theater in Hungary and its artistic direction throughout every era. The lively theater scene of the late 19th century and the emergence of modern theater principles forced the school to change its increasingly outdated pedagogical and teaching methods.

The revolutions in 1918–1919 did not cause significant changes in the life of the Theater Academy. During the time of the Republic of Councils, plans were drawn up to erect a Theater College, but these were not brought to fruition. The reform proposals that were formulated during the Interwar Era, however, included many of these earlier elements. Sándor Hevesi, Director of the National Theater in the 1920s, and Árpád Ódry, who ran the Academy between 1930 and 1937, believed that the foundational pillars of modern theater were dramatic interpretation of text, stylistic familiarity of a given piece and character development via affinity and experience. They concluded that mastery of basic theatrical tools through strengthened practical instruction was the most important aspect of theatrical training. Having identified the new challenges facing the world of theater, the director and the film actor sought to expand the educational framework with training. Due to a lack of suitable candidates, the new departments were not realized, but the steady improvement of the curriculum and the strengthening of practical training signaled the arrival of contemporary artistic principles in the educational program of the Academy.

The 1,056 students who studied acting at the state institution during the Interwar Era spent the three years it took to earn a degree in a strict academic and disciplinary

environment. Talented but poor students received discounted tuition, scholarships and/or financial aid. The social and economic conditions of the time were also reflected in the makeup of the student body, the vast majority of whom was born in Budapest, raised Roman Catholic and came from a middle- or upper-class bourgeois background.

KÁLMÁN ÁRPÁD KOVÁCS
RACIAL THEORY, NAZI IDEOLOGY
AND PROTESTANT PUBLIC OPINION IN 1932–36

We believe the relationship among racial theory, Nazi ideology and Hungarian Protestant public opinion is once again a subject worthy of study. Even more so since the Communist leadership compulsively feared that their ideology of the 1940's and 1950's would be equated with the Nazi ideology of the 1930's, leading to denominational resistance against them just as fierce as what the Nazis had faced. Therefore the study of anti-Nazi resistance had to be presented on an ideological basis. By the 1932–36 period, Hungarian Protestant public opinion had already followed with great interest the developments of *Kirchenkampf* in Germany. The Hitlerian *Kirchenkampf* was a concept modeled after the Bismarckian *Kulturkampf*, and referred to the *Gleichschaltung* of the Church to wit, the subordinate organizational and political status of the Church in the Third Reich. While Bismarck's policy attempted to convert the Catholics residing in Germany into German Catholics, Hitler wished to make the unified whole of German Christianity radically accept the thinking behind racial theory. The "German Christians" (*Glaubensbewegung der Deutschen Christen*, abbreviated DC), whom contemporary Hungarian public opinion considered as the religious wing of the Nazi Party, were ardent to meet expectations. During the examined period, Hungarian Protestant public opinion regarded neither racial theory nor Nazi ideology as part of the Jewish question; instead they tried to defend their position from a religious point of view. On this basis, Hungarian Protestant public opinion clearly took the side of the "German believers" (*Deutsche Bekenntnisfront*, *Bekennende Kirche*, abbreviated BK), yet esteemed their own internal complexities, having more anomalies than the Germans, with misgivings. Unemployment among young intellectuals was similarly a major social burden. The perverted reasoning of the German Christians (the DC) (*Christentum und Volkstum*) was mainly rooted in a liberal theology that, as a result of earlier cultural relationships, was traditionally strong in Hungary as well. Because of its distinct character, Protestantism could not use its liturgy as a cover as Catholics could. Denominational contradictions and divergence in terms of piety and comprehension broke even BK unity. The ecclesiastical situation was similarly unpredictable and complicated. As a matter of fact, the timing was ripe for an enemy power to capitalize on the "divide and conquer" principle via the tools of persecution

and deception. The duration of the study goes to the end of 1936; the reason why is that the intellectual center of gravity concerning the substantiation of racial theory and National Socialist ideology had moved towards the preliminary work leading up to the ecclesiastical events of 1938, which in addition to the allure of serious opportunities presented major challenges to aspirations of Christian unity.

ANDRÁS JOÓ

“...*LIKE A LISTLESS PIRATE SHIP, I FLOAT
IN THE GREY UNKNOWN...*” – EXCERPTS FROM
THE 1944 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JOURNALIST
SÁNDOR HOLLÓSI AND DIPLOMAT JÁNOS WETTSTEIN

In the aftermath of March 19th, 1944, the day the Germans invaded Hungary, the country went through a difficult and tragic period. In the remaining months of the year, all hope faded of exiting the war without suffering major losses. During this time, János Wettstein, a diplomat who had served as Hungarian minister in Bern, Switzerland, until September 1943, and journalist Sándor Hollósi (aka Holländer), who had been in the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an extended period and had done intelligence work on behalf of Hungarian diplomacy for nearly two decades, exchanged numerous letters. The information found in their occasionally quite frank correspondence sheds a light on the obscure and contradictory periods of Hollósi's career. Hollósi spent the greater part of his life abroad, in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland. In 1920, he played a rather inglorious role in the show trial of Szeged's Chief Rabbi Immanuel Löw, a glaring example of the rising tide of domestic anti-Semitism at the time. The contradictions of his own era, the crisis-laden decades of the 20th century, were apparent in Hollósi's talented, intelligent but contradictory personality, and are perhaps best illustrated by the unusual stops he made during his career. In the 1920's, Hollósi, who was most likely raised as a Jew in the Hungarian Highlands, turned up in Munich during the Weimar Republic, joined the Nazi movement and eventually became one of the editors of the party newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter*, working together with none other than Alfred Rosenberg. His real role on behalf of the Hungarian government came to light only after many years had passed, so later he was forced to flee Hitler's Germany. He continued his service in Switzerland, where he was commissioned by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write pseudonymous articles, mainly for the *Neue Zürcher Nachrichten*. Through his role as minister, János Wettstein came into contact with Hollósi. In 1944, Hollósi kept his covert status through the Hungarian Embassy in Bern, by which time Wettstein had retired to Ascona. By summer 1944, Hollósi no longer wished to follow the official government line of occupied Hungary; instead he strongly focused on raising international awareness of the persecution of Jews in Hungary. In his letters, he wrote about the Swiss reaction to the deportations in Hungary. In his replies, János Wettstein broadly analyzed the causes of the tragedy unfolding in Hungary and offered prognosis. The introductory study looks at the

broader connections among the highlighted excerpts, even as the sentences often speak for themselves. The source materials used in the study are from the private papers of János Wettstein. The keeper of the letters, the grandson of Wettstein's brother Miklós (whose name also happens to be János Wettstein), has graciously provided them to the author of the study.

KATALIN TAKÁCS-OROSZ – LÁSZLÓ OROSZ
“GOOD ADVICE FOR THE FEW WHO WEEP...”
THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE EXPULSIONS
OF THE SWABIANS FROM VESZPRÉM COUNTY
AS PRESENTED IN THE LOCAL MEDIA (1945–46)

In 1910, at the time of the last census in Greater Hungary, out of a total population of 230 thousand in Veszprém County, approximately 30 thousand residents claimed German as their mother tongue. By the end of 1945, however, their number had drastically fallen. In the wake of WWII, the territory of the county underwent significant changes. A section (referred to as a *járás* in Hungarian) was lost, while three new ones were added. Since the Germans did not principally live in the impacted areas, we must look for the cause of the above-referenced demographic change elsewhere: in the ethnic cleansing that occurred after the war.

In the Soviet-occupied zones of Europe after 1945, the fate of ethnic German residents everywhere, including Hungary, were determined on the basis of “collective guilt”. In some countries, the “collective guilt” of the minority Germans resulted in their complete expulsion, while in other countries (such as Hungary), it was only partial. Our work does not attempt to provide a new perspective on German expulsion in a national context, but rather by using the increasingly popular approach of researching local history. In other words, instead of analyzing the macro picture, we look at microhistory, which in this case, means the systematic depiction of the events that occurred in Veszprém County. This project was begun in 2017. Within the framework of the project, we attempted to review every issue of every newspaper published in Veszprém County between 1945 and 1948. We plan to publish the findings of our work in a volume, which will follow the precedent set by the collections that have already been published examining how the expulsions were covered by the national media. Our work, in contract, focuses on the Veszprém media exclusively.

The current study on the understanding and propagandistic presentation of the Swabian question by local opinion-forming circles – looks at an intentionally shortened time period due to length constraints: instead of considering the entire interval during which the countywide expulsions were transpiring, we focus on only the period up to the departure of the first railroad cars, on the preliminary phase when an unsympathetic portrayal of the Swabians was being imposed on the public.

On the basis of the county newspapers, a somewhat more nuanced picture unfolds compared to the voices of the national media. The assertion that the Communist Party and the Peasant Party’s incitement of hatred and advocacy of a radical solution

to the Swabian question was offset by the levelheadedness of the Social Democratic Party, Smallholders Party and Civil Democratic Party fails at the county level. The demeanor and attitude of the latter parties showed no resemblance to their national counterparts. Instead, the local parties came to a consensus agreement with the communists that the removal of the Swabians offered the possibility of a new “bloodless” conquest of the Hungarian homeland.

DÁVID KISS
THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZING GUARD
OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1946–1947

Founded in 1945, the Organizing Guard (OG) had become the army of the Hungarian Communist Party by 1947. Because of limited means of transportation and communication at the time, formation of the OG progressed rather slowly. Therefore in the early stages, the OG was deployed in the capital and surrounding areas only. The emergence of OG units in the Hungarian countryside, their outfitting and training took place between 1946 and 1948. It was at that time that the OG became a serious fighting force on behalf of the Communist Party. It is important to note that besides armed training and manpower, the Hungarian Army did not possess tanks, an air force etc. at the time. These factors and the immeasurable influence of the Communist Party in the various armed units ensured a strong “home front” for the Party, not to mention the presence of Soviet forces not only in Hungary but also the neighboring countries. The lone exception was Yugoslavia, which was still considered an ally at the time.

In terms of how events would unfold, the 1947 elections proved to be decisive. The victory of the Hungarian Communist Party led to additional significant positions. In the wake of the election, on November 20th, 1947, at a joint Hungarian Communist Party–Social Democratic Party Organizing Guard leadership meeting, a resolution was accepted to form an intermediate committee that, according to the official explanation, was to facilitate cooperation among the various guards. In reality, however, it was the first stage of the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party, which is a study for another time...

PÉTER MIKLÓS
ESZTER ZSÓFIA TÓTH
“FOR THE CHRISTIAN MUST WORK NOT ONLY
FOR HIS OWN SALVATION BUT THAT OF SOCIETY’S...”
ISTVÁN BARANKOVICS’S LIFE THROUGH STATE SECURITY
DOCUMENTS AND MEDIA SOURCES

István Barankovics, architect of modern Hungarian Christian democracy, was General Secretary of the Democratic People’s Party. In February 1949, following the dissolution of his party, the communist dictatorship forced him to flee Hungary. Using heretofore unknown state security documents and media sources, we attempt to provide additional clarity to the image that has developed of the Christian Democratic politician. Two altogether different aspects come out of the state security papers devoted to him. On the one hand, we see the mechanism of the communist apparatus as it denigrates him, leading to a deeper understanding of the mindset of an espionage agent. On the other hand, even through the distorted lens of the secret reports, there are glimmers of the richness of Barankovics’s ideas, his Christian humanism and his struggle for equality and justice. His life exemplifies how the great historical cataclysms of the 20th century could break in two a promising political career, how the dictatorship would not allow the emergence and evolution of the program of the Democratic People’s Party, which enjoyed widespread support in Hungarian society. István Barankovics’s life also demonstrates that the struggle for democracy was just an illusion following the Soviet occupation of Hungary. There was no leeway for political beliefs that were not aligned with the communist dictatorship.

KRISZTIÁN GLAUB

BROUGHT TO JUSTICE: THE CASE OF SPA OFFICER
ERVIN FALUDI THROUGH THE DOCUMENTS

1956 was a consequential year in Hungarian history. In July, as a result of altered international and domestic circumstances, the Soviets forced the Stalinist dictator Mátyás Rákosi to step down. Thereupon, the question of who was responsible for violating the legality of socialism was once again raised. In October, accordingly, another wave of arrests took place among the ex-officers of the State Protection Authority (SPA), whom Rákosi's successor Ernő Gerő blamed for the criminality committed against the individuals of the labor movement. Against that backdrop, 29-year-old Ervin Faludi was detained. Despite his youth, Faludi had already experienced great tumult in his life when he had showed himself to be one of the SPA's cruelest and most effective interrogation officers in 1949–1950. Faludi's interrogation began in October, at which time he was unwilling to admit to many of his earlier crimes. However, detailed summaries from the testimonies of Faludi's earlier victims were simultaneously being compiled of Faludi's activities and responsibilities. After a comprehensive perusal of the documents, we can state that Faludi's version of events, to put it mildly, did not reconcile in most cases. The pertaining minutes recall merciless psychological and physical torture. They are a sad relic of an inhumane era, exposing a criminal "law enforcement" organization, ruthless enforcers and their means of "justice". In this context, Ervin Faludi's culpability was beyond debate and without question, even taking into consideration that in a show trial in April 1957, he was found guilty in thirty-eight cases of making false accusations of criminal wrongdoing. However, the spotlight of the show trial was not chiefly shone on Faludi, but rather Vladimir Farkas, his primary co-defendant, and Farkas' father Mihály Farkas, onetime Minister of Defense, who was sentenced – after János Kádár's personal intervention – to sixteen years in prison by the Supreme Council of People's Tribunals. Sentenced to four years' confinement, Ervin Faludi shared a prison cell with the two Farkases at the Budapest Penitentiary and Prison. However, he was granted clemency and freed on September 17th, 1958. In August 1962, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party issued a party resolution that named several former state protection officers – including Ervin Faludi – as responsible for the lawlessness of the Rákosi Era (although by then a number of them had already been set free). Ultimately, the worst offenders – with the exceptions of Mihály Farkas and Gábor Péter – were never brought before a judge and sentenced.

JUDIT ANTÓNIA FARKAS

“WHAT THEY WERE ALLOWED TO SAY THEY SAID;
THE REST THEY CENSORED.” THE 1956 HUNGARIAN
REVOLUTION THROUGH THE EYES OF BUDAPEST-BASED
CORRESPONDENTS OF ITALIAN COMMUNIST
NEWSPAPERS – PART III

Journalist Indro Montanelli of *Corriere della Sera*, one of the most widely read Italian newspapers, wrote the following in his article on November 25th, 1956: “It seems to me the communist media stubbornly persist in their belief that the Budapest uprising and the unbelievable, superhuman resistance against the Guberniyk tanks that followed were the work of fascists, ex-Horthy Era officers, landowners, bourgeoisie and aristocrats. I cannot argue with these assessments. Three of my communist colleagues who had been with us in Budapest – Jacoviello, Bontempi and Perucchi – have already written what they have been allowed to say in their articles; the rest they have censored. Certain censorship in certain newspapers is more eloquent than anything that has been written.”

It is well known that in Italy, which at the time was home to one of Western Europe’s largest and most influential communist parties, not only did the violent crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution send shockwaves through the public, it also led to a major crisis within the Italian Communist Party. Among all the political parties, only the communists referred to the Hungarians’ revolution as a “counter-revolution” and “fascist coup”, welcoming the popular uprising’s suppression by the Soviets. In the first two parts of our study, we analyzed the articles of correspondents from *l’Unità*, the flagship daily of the Italian Communist Party (ICP), and *Vie Nuove*, a communist weekly, sent to Hungary to report on the events of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution to show how these organs misled, through editorial censorship and the correspondents’ self-censorship, their readership and falsified the facts surrounding the tragic events in Hungary. In the third and concluding part, we take a look at the articles written by Giorgio Bontempi, correspondent for *Il Paese*, a communist daily based in Rome, which challenged the Italian Communist Party’s dogmatic stance on the revolution, in contrast to the other communist newspapers. From the beginning, *Il Paese* Director Tomaso Smith published Bontempi’s articles, who exhibited no pro-communist bias and in fact sided with the Hungarian revolutionaries. In contrast to the other communist papers, Bontempi provided detailed accounts of the Mosonmagyaróvár massacre and of the events occurring in northern Hungary. He inter-

viewed many eyewitnesses, including the leader of the Thököly Road freedom fighters. Despite constant pressure from ICP leadership, Tomaso Smith still published Bontempi's article, but due to a definitive difference of opinion, he stepped down from his position at the helm of the paper.

JÁNOS RÁCZ

EXCERPTS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN-AMERICAN ÉMIGRÉ COMMUNITY AND THE RETURN OF THE HOLY CROWN TO HUNGARY

The last chapter of the “American adventure” of the Holy Crown of Hungary focuses on Hungarian emigrant protests against returning the coronation regalia to the communist Hungarian state. Heated debates among the overseas Hungarians, irrespective of when they had arrived in America, made consensus surrounding the question impossible. There were some in each of the major Hungarian emigre groups (1944–45, 1947 and 1956) who did not disapprove of repatriating the Holy Crown to Hungary. In 1970, *New York Times* journalist David Binder publicized the theretofore unimaginable news: The Nixon Administration was prepared to give back the coronation regalia provided that relations with Hungary continued to improve. Thanks to the waves of protests and Cardinal József Mindszenty’s intervention, President Nixon backpedaled from his plan. In 1971, however, another publicized masterstroke shocked the Hungarian emigres. Paul Scott, a well-known American journalist, wrote that the reason why Henry Kissinger and President Nixon wanted to return the Holy Crown to Hungary was to show that they recognized Soviet authority over the nations of Eastern Europe. En masse, the Hungarians once again began making telephone calls and collecting signatures for petitions that protested the stance of the State Department. In 1975, spurred into action by a Texas congressman Charles Wilson’s draft resolution, Dr. Zoltán Béky, Bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church of America and President of the American Hungarian Federation, sent a protest petition to the State Department, demanding an immediate response. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter had hardly been sworn in when the *Volt Politikai Foglyok Országos Szövetsége* (National Alliance of Ex-Political Prisoners) demanded concrete answers; his decision was leaked on November 4th, 1977, which engendered another wave of protests. The mass demonstrations of the Hungarian emigres were ultimately in vain, however. The repatriation of the Holy Crown to Hungary generated many articles in the Hungarian expatriate press. Neither Ferenc Nagy (onetime Prime Minister of Hungary), Béla Király (Commander of the 1956 Hungarian National Guard) nor Imre Kovács (Peasant Party politician) was immune to criticism for supporting the return of the Holy Crown to Hungary. The study examines these debates and the protests that President Carter’s decision provoked.

PATRÍCIA GECSÉNYI
MODEL EXPERIMENT ON THE BOUNDARIES
OF TWO GLOBAL SYSTEMS
OUTLINE ON AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS, 1970–1989

In the years that followed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Austro-Hungarian relations, which had repeatedly experienced bouts of frigidity, were eventually resolved in a gradual step-by-step process and with great difficulty. The decisive breakthrough occurred with Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Kreisky's visit to Budapest in October 1964 and his Hungarian counterpart János Péter's return visit to Vienna in April 1965. Not only were the issues related to property law finally settled, the possibility of clearing the western border of minefields arose as well. The pro-détente sentiment of Austrian foreign policy did not diminish even when the Austrian People's Party, under the leadership of Josef Klaus, formed a new one-party government in October 1966. This was demonstrated by Chancellor Klaus' visit to Budapest in May 1967, on the one hundredth anniversary of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Encouraged by János Kádár's decision to host the chancellor at the Central Committee headquarters of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, negotiations took place in a favorable atmosphere and would continue in much the same manner one year later, when Prime Minister Jenő Fock traveled to Vienna.

These official meetings would lay the groundwork for the next twenty years of continuously improving relations between the two countries, a period which is now associated with Bruno Kreisky, who was elected chancellor in 1970 (in particular from 1971 onward, when he was able to look to "monochrome" socialist governments for support). During those years, the Soviet Union, supportive of the thawing process for a time, allowed Kádár-run Hungary some room to maneuver, which Hungarian foreign policymakers – not independent of domestic steps taken – used to the country's advantage. This "small steps" tactic (which was not without its own difficulties) led to János Kádár's mid-decade visit to Vienna, which the Austrian media christened with the "*kaiserlich und königlich*" (Imperial and Royal) moniker, a reference to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of yesteryear and of peaceful side-by-side coexistence, a European model for good relations. To better understand this all-encompassing process and its impact on the numerous segments of society (political, economic, cultural and even civil) requires additional fundamental research.

ZOLTÁN DÉVAVÁRI
THE YUGOSLAV WARS AND HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC
POLICY (1991–1993)

The culmination of the Yugoslav crisis, the violent disintegration of the “Southern Slav Land” caused major economic harm to Hungary. In the final year before hostilities began, Hungarian-Yugoslav foreign trade amounted to \$700 million (\$1.3 billion adjusted to today’s dollars).

With the crisis deepening, trade between Hungary and the crumbling Yugoslav state went into a steep dive. According to contemporary estimates, Hungarian losses reached between \$100 million to \$140 million (\$251 million adjusted).

Losses stemming from a collapse in both traditional and shopping tourism were significant. In the first six months of 1991, traditional tourism lost 1.9 billion Hungarian forints (HUF) (nearly 23 billion adjusted to today’s HUF).

In addition to direct losses, Hungary was also negatively impacted in numerous indirect ways. The unfeasibility of the Adria oil pipeline consumed 7.3 billion HUF (approximately 90 billion HUF adjusted) in unplanned expenditures, while the Hungarian Defense Forces and the Ministry of the Interior, as a consequence of the fighting to the south, subsequently spent an additional 1.3 to 1.8 billion HUF (approximately 22 billion HUF adjusted), 520 million HUF (approximately 6 billion HUF) and 2 billion HUF (about 24 billion HUF).

As a result of economic sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (by then consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro) by the United Nations Security Council in 1992, which were further increased one year later, the Hungarian economy suffered damages of \$340 million (approximately \$611 million adjusted) in 1992 and \$800 million (about \$1.4 billion) in 1993, respectively.

A change in the geopolitical situation in the region allowed Hungary to partly and from a certain perspective successfully counterbalance these huge losses and its domestic economic hardships.

By 1992, in a Europe undergoing transformation, Hungarian commercial cooperation with both Croatia and Slovenia had intensified, stimulated by many bilateral agreements. A good example was the upswing seen in Hungarian-Slovenian trade, which grew 100 percent year over year.

JÁNOS SÁRINGER

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: A FEW CHARACTERISTICS
OF CORPORATE AND BUSINESS DIPLOMACY

The several thousand year-old history of diplomacy is closely tied to commerce and economic relationships. Commerce also played an important role in the origin of diplomacy. By the 21st century, the basic function of diplomacy, which stretched back to the distant past, had once again come to the fore. New subordinate, dominant and lateral relations emerged from the ashes of WWII on both the victorious and losing sides in parallel. In the new European framework, although the principle of international sovereignty among the states remained, cracks appeared in the principle of exercised power over a given territory (known as Westphalian sovereignty). Viewing from the perspective of today the state-centric mechanism of the hierarchically-structured Westphalian system (which was based on subordinate and dominant relations among the states) that formed in the mid-20th century, we can state that the concept of international relations is the sum of the various players (or actors) in international life. Typically these are the states, the transnational non-governmental organizations (TNGOs), the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The sum of trans-border interactions among them (communication, negotiation, agreement, meeting etc.) make up international relations. We can differentiate between foreign relations and foreign policy, which are both more narrowly defined than international relations.

Transnational monopoly capitalism developed in the new phase of capitalism. The emergence of an international industrial-service-financial super-monopoly and the national and international convergence of the process of capital accumulation are two emblematic features of the era of global capitalism. Homogenization is a further characteristic of globalization. For example, every product can be made anywhere and likewise sold anywhere. Capital holders set up production in the lowest cost places and sell their goods where, with the objective of maximizing profit, they can earn the highest margins. In addition to globalization, another trend is direct contact among companies through hired lobbyists who advance their interests. Compared to earlier eras, investment, the promotion thereof and capital transfer are all significantly emphasized.

The ensuing financial and organizational transformations in the global economy were felt by capital holders, multi- and transnational companies and the governments of individual states. At the governmental level, economic policy decisions were made in the best interests of the state, while some states also carried out government-level organizational and structural transformations in the hopes of strengthening economic diplomacy. In several countries (Australia, Canada, Belgium and Hungary, for example) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade were consolidated. As a result, the boundaries between traditional diplomacy and economic policy diminished. In Hungary, economic policy was set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which had oversight of the Hungarian Export Promotion Agency (HEPA) and the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), two tools at the disposal of Hungarian economic policy.

The point of economic diplomacy is to tie tightly together on the state level the objectives of foreign policy with the economic policies that foster the material welfare of the citizens of the state by using diplomacy, the peaceful tool of foreign policy. The point of company diplomacy is to help a given company better align with the international system, to ensure intracompany and trans-border cohesion between the sending and receiving countries (between the parent company and its subsidiaries) and to lay the groundwork for cultural and habitual interoperability. A business diplomat is more accurately referred to as a lobbyist. Economic diplomacy is therefore a state or governmental endeavor, in contrast to company or business diplomacy. Likewise, the government of a state may entrust individuals with tasks of a business diplomatic nature.

MIHÁLY NOSZKÓ-HORVÁTH
INSTITUTION OF SOVIET FORCED LABOR AS REFLECTED
IN HUNGARIAN RESTITUTION LAW AND IN THE RELATED
RESTITUTIONARY DOCUMENTS

In the wake of the System Changeover, providing legal (both ethical and monetary) restitution to the victims and / or the heirs of the victims of the earlier dictatorial regime became a possibility in the newly democratic Hungary. Eligible for restitution were individuals whose property had been seized, whose personal freedoms had been curtailed or who had lost a loved one at the hands of the political system. Among injustices qualifying for restitution, Soviet forced labor holds an elevated position in terms of sheer number of cases as well as in dedicated legislation. In the study, when disclosing elements for consideration in restitution, I concurrently share the history of the legislation as it relates to individual cases of injustice, considering initially the size of recompense, followed by a general introduction of the documents that resulted from the restitutionary process.