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GERMANY À LA CARTE

Hungarians in cross pressure between German and American influence

1. Popular attitudes

Popular attitudes towards Germany and towards a German orientation of Hungary are to be assessed against the background of the cross pressure between a deeply rooted patriotism and the agenda of euro-atlantic integration. The question „Who is a Hungarian?” posed in the political and cultural debates in the course of and in the years following the regime change is commonly referred to by accepting the self-definition of the individual. We observe, however, a divide between civic and cultural concepts of citizenship, more explicit among the intellectual elites, and present, but confused, in the population at large. In late 1994, a citizenship (*Gesellschaft*) based national identification was found to be prevalent in the population (59 %), while a community, origin, language and culture (*Gemeinschaft*) based concept of identity was shared by 17 %. (M. Vásárhelyi quoted by Csepeli 1996:275) One year later, the Hungarian data of the *International Survey Program* revealed a moderate increase of political and cultural nationalism and, as a response to Western economic penetration (the strongest factor of which has been the growing weight of German economic power), a strong increase of economic nationalism. (Csepeli 1996: 275) This trend is continuing. While some years ago, the correlation between homogenizing nationalist attitudes as opposed to multiculturalism, on one side, and socio-economic deprivation, on the other, was found to be pre-dominant (Csepeli 1996: 281), recently, parallel with a strong and broad support for euro-atlantic integration, we experience the growing attraction of the idea of a particular Hungarian national third way (Sonderweg) also in the middle and even the upper strata. (Gazsó - Laki 1998).

The paradox is that while stereotypes of Germans are not too positive and German power, both in its soft and hard - economic -version, (Katzenstein) is widely experienced, Germans, Germany

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are felt to be quite acceptable. One could even formulate that they appear as 'second best' to Hungarians proper. One half of Hungarians (49 %) agree with the statement „Germans are arrogant, used to dominate”, while the other half (51 %) rejects it. (Unpublished data from 1994, Institute of Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.) All the same, there is a strong feeling among Hungarians that Germany (taken together with Austria) is similar to their country:

Table 1

The similarity of Hungary with other countries and regions

Percentage of responses

Germany and Austria	20 %
Czech R., Poland, Slovenia	8,5 %
Yugoslavia	1 %
Neighbors (other)	14 %
Eastern Europe	0,8%
the West	8 %
no response	48%

Source: Csepeli 1996:283

Regional or national similarity implies sympathy with the people in question outside the context of a particular nation state as well. The German minority in Hungary (especially when compared to the strong rejection of Gypsies, reservations vis-a-vis Jews and ambivalence even to ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania seeking refuge in their 'mother country') enjoys a relatively high degree of acceptance.

Table 2

Distance from ethnic minorities in % in 1993

Attitudes to ethnic groups	Exclusive	Selective	Inclusive
Germans in Hungary	15	35	50
Hungarians immigrating from Transylvania (Romania)	17	40	43
Jews	23	40	37
Gypsies	68	25	7

Source: Szabó I.- G. Lázár: Nemzetkonceptiók a mai magyar társadalomban. MTA.PTI. Etnoregionális Kutatóközpont Munkafüzetek 35. Budapest, 1997.29

In the Hungarian public, we understandably encounter a certain measure of consumers' patriotism. In the following table we demonstrate the degree of this protectionism in a number of post-communist countries: Hungary (H), the Czech Republic (CZ), Slovakia (SK), Poland (PL), Bulgaria (BG), Russia (RUS), Romania (RO).

Table 3**Consumers' patriotism**

„Rate on a scale from 1 to 7 (1=fully disagree, 7=fully agree) your degree of agreement for each statement”

Grade 6+7

%	Total	H	CZ	SK	PL	BG	RUS	RO
Buy products manufactured in our country instead of making others rich by buying their products	40	40	35	48	48	40	52	17
Domestic products above all	30	22	17	31	45	39	37	19

Source: FESSEL - GfK Omnibus Survey in Central and Eastern Europe 1998

What we see here, is, on one hand, a relative high degree of global identification with a kind of socio-economic protectionism, but, on the other hand, a much more cautious attitude to categorical („above all” type) economic nationalism, especially in the traditionally Westernized Czech Republic, in Romania keen for Western consumer goods and in Hungary with a materialist and pragmatic population.

In Hungary, we witness, however, not only a rather half-hearted support for consumers' patriotism, but also a very strong bias in favor of German versus not only domestic, but even American products. Against this background, declarations in defense of domestic products might be interpreted as lip-service failing the test of real choices.

Table 4**HUNGARIAN CONSUMERS' EVALUATION OF GOODS „MADE IN...”**

Motivation of choice	Japan	USA	Germany	Hungary
Good quality	54	38	62	15
Good design	42	31	40	8
High Tech level	63	32	51	4
Well-known brand	58	39	57	11
Durability	37	22	52	8
Competitive	61	38	51	12
Good price	43	13	39	27
Sympathetic	37	21	44	32

Source: Fessel + GfK Institut, MTU 1994

The calculated indicator of sympathy for German products is 44 in Hungary, 31 in the Czech Republic and 21 in Poland, in all cases substantially higher than for US goods. In the Hungarian sample, among consumers with higher education, we find an overrepresentation of the 'good German quality' judgment.

The centuries old saying „*Extra Hungaria non est vita*” („There is no life outside Hungary”) has kept much of its relevance. A practical consequence of Hungarian patriotism is the very limited willingness to emigrate voluntarily. Still, we clearly encounter the “Germany as second best” syndrome in this context too.

Table 5

LIFE OUTSIDE HUNGARY

„Could you imagine to live in a foreign country, for a certain time at least?” (in %)

	no	USA	Germany	Austria
TOTAL	38	11	17	14
15 -19 age	15	23	22	14
40 -49 age	33	8	18	19

Source: GfK Hungary - Paul Lazarsfeld Gesellschaft (Vienna),
National Pride - Awareness of Identity, 1996.

We encounter a new generation which is more cosmopolitan and mobile, and for which Germany, compared to the US, tends to lose its „second best” distinctiveness. Such shifts do not, however change the basic pattern of emotional attitudes to nations, cultures and countries. In a recent empirical survey of political and mental attitudes of the Hungarian population, the relative pre-eminence of a pro-German orientation is reconfirmed, at an aggregated level at least.

Table 6

Emotional attitudes to nations, ethnic groups, international organizations and to capitalism

	Like	Indifferent/not know	Dislike
EU	47	45	8
NATO	39	46	15
Germans	22	65	13
Americans	19	62	19
Poles	14	72	14
Capitalism	10	57	33
Jews	9	74	17
Gypsies	3	37	61
Romanians	3	55	42

Source: Marián - Szabó 1999:729

An analysis of the data by the authors reveals the very strong differentiating role of age. We also see a rather close correlation between national openness and the acceptance of capitalism. The young are more cosmopolitan, more transnational, less anticapitalist and very definitely more pro-American. The correlation between higher education and stronger support for euroatlantic integration plus less resistance to capitalism is a banality, but the explanatory power of education for pro- or anti-German and -American attitudes is ambiguous. As to the role of income differences, the relation is less complex: the poorer you are, the less you sympathize with capitalism, with Americans, with Germans and with euroatlantic integration.

2. Intellectual attitudes -

GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURAL POLITICS

The historical dimension

Intellectual attitudes towards Germany since the beginning of the gradual regime transformation in the late 80s have been shaped by contradicting experiences of long durée history, of the interwar years and also by the impact of the recent Communist past. The most remarkable fact is the persistence of a cultural and political divide dating back to the rule of Joseph II the enlightened, but autocratic Habsburg emperor at the end of the 18th century whose modernizing and at the same time Germanizing policies divided the ruling Hungarian aristocracy and gentry forcing them to choose between - as it was termed and has remained in the public discourse ever since - between „Fatherland” and „progress”. Although there were some relatively short intervals in the history of Hungary when an alliance between inward-looking patriots and outward looking „progressives” was struck (the great moment of symbolic importance was the national-bourgeois revolution of 1848/49), the general political climate has been characterized by a constant tension. (Bibó)

Capitalist development in Hungary - as in a number of other countries of East Central Europe (for definition cf. J. Szűcs) - took place in the context of *dual social structures* (a term coined by F. Erdei). In a multiethnic - for long semi-sovereign - country, historical, traditional ruling classes faced a bourgeois segment of society. The bourgeois segment of the dual society consisted mainly of Jews - culturally ever more integrated, increasingly and voluntarily „Magyarized” and remaining in many aspects „Germanized” - side by side with other ethnic minorities out of which Germans were the most important. In the golden years of the k.u.k. Monarchy between the reconciliation with Austria in 1867 and WW1 the main dividing line cleaving political elites and intellectuals was between the 1848 minded „independentists” and the 1867 minded realists. At the turn of the century Budapest became a Central European Cosmopolitan metropolis, a formidable model of early multiculturalism with a mix of national traditions and of Kulturübernahme mainly via German and Austrian mediation.

This was valid for political life, as well. The beginnings and the first decades of Hungarian social democracy and the trade union movement for example were shaped by Austro-German influence. The 1903 program of Hungarian socialists - remaining valid up to the liquidation of the party by the Communists - was drafted by Karl Kautsky.

Following the post-WW1 peace treaty producing a situation in which the full independence of the country coincided with its „truncation” (mutilation), intellectual debate focused on national and territorial identity and, in this context, on the desirability of a German orientation of the country, *in sharp contrast to our days, when a debate on the issue of German influence and power, in spite of its topicality, is simply avoided in the public discourse.* This debate of the 20s and 30s has, in a special way, continued to shape even pre- and post-1989 attitudes providing the framework of post-communist cultural politics on the basis of cumulated territorial and cultural cleavages. (Lipset - Rokkan 1967, Lipset 1969)

Without considering the typology of cultural, political and intellectual attitudes in interwar Hungary one cannot understand present political conflicts effecting the intellectual and political

attitudes to Germany. Three currents dominated the scene each implying an important „German” dimension:

1. The Christian-National Course of the ruling political elite with the decisive focus on boundary revision was the ideology legitimating the socio-economic and political power of „Christian, gentlemanly middle classes”. The Feindbilder, the foes of these identity politics were externally the Western powers responsible for the Peace Treaty of Trianon, internally the cosmopolitan Jews seen as united with anti-national leftist-liberal currents. The foes of our foes are our friends: thus Germany (taken together with fascist Italy up to the middle of the 30s) was the power to assist Hungary in bringing about the revision of borders. There was, however, a kind of schizophrenia - increasing with time - in this alliance of Hungarian „gentlemanly” political and cultural elites with Hitler’s Germany.

2. Populist („völkisch”) intellectuals, mainly writers, wanted - in opposition to „gentlemanly Hungary” - ‘to elevate the peasantry into the body of the nation’ and opted for a romantic non-Western „national third way”. A central figure of this current, the writer László Németh differentiated between „deep” and „shallow” Hungarians. The völkisch movement stood for a ‘spiritual national self-defense’ both against Germanization and Jewish infiltration. But the völkisch current contained heterogeneous attitudes to Nazi Germany. Some of them remained antifascists rejecting German influence and power (with a number of pro-Soviet, pro-Communist personalities even co-opted by the post-1948 totalitarian regime), while a pro-Nazi orientation was also present.

3. The „urbanizers” were liberal, bourgeois and leftist, radically opting for catch-up modernization, the adaptation of a Western model of Hungary, with a very strong component of Budapest intellectuals of Jewish origin. They were anti-Nazi, of course, but not anti-German. The 1933 visit of Thomas Mann in Budapest became a big event for them: A laudation of the Europeanism of the German thinker in the token of humanism and anti-fascism was expressed in a poem by the Hungarian poet Attila József welcoming „a European among whites”.

Post-communist cultural politics

The post-communist party landscape long dominated by top-down organized intellectual milieu parties, has revived the prewar division of intellectual elites in a slightly modified version. The pre-eminent set of political cleavages confronts traditionalists with westernizers. (For a more detailed historical background and the actual cleavage basis of Hungarian party politics see: Márkus 1999 a,b.) Party competition in Hungary escalating to Kulturkampf could be made familiar for experts of German history, if we refer to the famous *Historikerstreit* of the early 80s in the course of which the spiritual guardians of the continuity of German history, of a particular German national identity and organic development fought a desperate literary battle with radical Westernizers (such as Jürgen Habermas and Richard Augstein) who opposed any kind of German *Sonderweg* and supported the idea of a definite break in German history with the end of WW2. Hungarian party politics, inseparable from historical, cultural and even aesthetic and literary debates, has been constituted as if intellectuals from opposing fronts of a *Historikerstreit* would elevate their cultural controversy to the level of a friend-foe party politics. These typically East Central European cultural politics (Lipset 1969) have brought about two camps. One has been the Lager or pillar of the inward looking, national-Christian-völkisch **traditionalists** split between national modernizers and anti-globalist and anti-modernist nationalists, i.e. successors of the pre-war rival völkisch and national-Christian currents united however by the shared all-embracing priority of an ethnocentric community of destiny.. The other has been the camp of **Westernizers**, heirs to the „urbanizers” joined by modernizing post-communists.(On the cleavage structure: see Annex.)

What is amazing, in this context of cultural confrontation is the fact that a consensus embracing practically all antagonists has emerged: the acceptance of a „Germany à la carte”. This Hungarian experience appears to be a telling illustration of the strange relationship between Germany and the smaller European states described by Peter Katzenstein: „...Germany has varying effects on the institutions of the smaller European states. At times, *these effects reflect imbalances in power or a spontaneous coordination of conflicting objectives*. More typically, they are mediated by a variety of institutions. These institutional effects do not occur in isolation from broader international or domestic developments.” (Katzenstein 1997:251) (Italics added.)

Now, in a context of a reinvigorated Kulturkampf accompanied by fierce ideological and cultural debates, members of the Hungarian Parliament demonstrate a remarkable unity in their sympathy for Germans.

Table 7

Indicators of sympathy
Members of the Hungarian Parliament rating the sympathy of citizens of a certain country with Hungarians

Poland	4,54	very friendly
Germany	4,10	
the Netherlands	4,00	
Austria	3,89	
Bulgaria	3,51	
Czechia	3,46	
Croatia	3,32	
France	3,24	
Ukraine	3,10	
Russia	2,97	
Rumania	2,25	
Slovakia	2,11	
Serbia	2,08	very hostile

Source: Simon J., Barátaink és ellenségeink, Népszabadság, January 9 1999 29.

The relative high rating of Germany in the broader population (with 22% „I like...”, 13 %” I dislike” and 65% „indifferent/not know” as demonstrated in Table 6) is differentiated according to partisan sympathies in the following way. (*A description of the Hungarian party system - including full names and abbreviations - and of the cleavage structure is contained in the Annex.*)

Table 8

Emotional attitudes of party supporters

	Fidesz	FKGP	MIÉP	MSZP	SZDSZ
EU	49	49	-5	28	47
NATO	34	34	-23	11	39
Germans	15	4	3	14	9
Americans	12	-2	-28	-2	2
Poles	-3	-1	10	-6	9
Jews	-7	-7	-31	12	11
Romanians	-39	-37	-54	-45	-31
Gypsies	-61	-54	-70	-67	-45
Capitalism	-16	-34	-20	-27	-16

Source: Marián - Szabó 1999:732

(Discriminating background variables calculated by the authors)

Compared to attitudes to Americans expressing a strong antipathy of the supporters of the MIÉP (Party of Hungarian Truth and Life), a radically nationalist force close to neo-Nazism, in the case of Germany we find no negative figure. There is an equally significant attachment from the senior - moderately nationalist - governing party (Fidesz - Alliance of Young Democrats) and from the strongest opposition party (post-communist Socialists - MSZP) with a strong Westernizing commitment, followed by the Free Democrats (SZDSZ), the successor party to the liberal-libertarian, Cosmopolitan Democratic Opposition as to the recent past and to the „urbanizer” intellectual current as to the pre-war period.

The close net of elite contacts: „Wahlverwandtschaften”

The „Germany à la carte” consensus is even more amazing, if we come to outline the pro-German mentalities of important individual political actors - being mostly outstanding intellectual figures - on a scale ranging from ethnocentric traditionalists to post-communist social democrats and many radical libertarians of Jewish origin surviving the Holocaust.

On the top level of heads of government, the Kohl era was characterized by the German chancellor's role of the Western patron number one of the Hungarian EU accession. Helmut Kohl gave considerable support and - what is even more important: money - to Kádár-successor Károly Grósz, interim party leader and prime minister skeptical of Gorbachovian reforms. The next distinguished protégé was the Németh - Horn government which not only prepared the ground for and actually started the regime change, but opened the Austro-Hungarian border for East Germans delivering a mortal blow to East German statehood („Arbeiter- und Mauerstaat”). And the following friend of Kohl was József Antall, the head of the first democratically elected government, the leader of the national-Christian Hungarian Democratic Forum, a historian like his German colleague, with profound affinity to traditional German culture who made no secret that he wanted to remodel his party taking the blueprint of the CDU. The next and the last Kohl protégé was the antagonist of Antall, ex-communist Gyula Horn, minister of foreign affairs in the transition government whose merits of the border opening were not forgotten either by the Christian and liberal governing parties or by the social democrats and the Greens. A certain cooling down seems to have come with the new constellation Schröder vis-a-vis prime minister Viktor Orbán, an aggressively anti-(post-)communist and, conservative-national politician.

There has been a tension-ridden dualism of German official and societal foreign policy of the last ten or more years. Germans, on one side, have remained prisoners of an Ostpolitik à la Brandt-Bahr-Genscher in a context in which the old concept of the Ost has lost its meaning, while, on the other side, they have been committed to regime change undermining the *raison d'être* of this very Ostpolitik. This is a general, i.e. all-partisan, dilemma, although it hits the Social Democrats more, than the bourgeois parties. *I remember the occasion of the inauguration of the Budapest Office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in October 1989 when I interviewed party leader J. Vogel asking him: in spite of the past merits, would he not think that Ostpolitik in the traditional sense was not any more relevant and it ought to be rethought. His response was a definite no: we have no reason to give up a successful policy, only to enrich it, e.g. by establishing contacts with the revived social democratic parties in the East.* This ambivalence even turned useful from 1993 onwards, when it became obvious, that successor parties in particular and numerous members of the old establishment and elite in general were to have a say, important places and - first of all - power in the new democracies. The German foreign policy dualism proved to be appropriate with the dualism of the Central European societies with two segments in symbiosis: social structures, attitudes and values rooted in late communism and a segment of the new capitalist society with corresponding values, mentalities and patterns. In Hungary and quite clearly also in Poland, in the two countries with a negotiated transition implying a certain trade-off, even a kind of Faustian deal with the old technocratic (ex-)communist elites, a delayed militantly anti-Communist back-lash has recently taken place. (Dauderstädt - Gerrits - Márkus 1999) The new governing parties in Hungary represent the social groups who feel they have not benefited adequately from the deal and aim at a re-definition of the rules of the game. This approach is in conflict both with the described dualism of German foreign policy and with the acceptance of the type of consociational democracy tying smaller European states to Germany (Katzenstein).

The relations between German social democrats and Hungarian communists and socialists

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party with its leader János Kádár occupied an important place in the foreign relations of the German social democrats. As the Hungarian party tolerated even promoted, reforms without questioning the leading role of the Soviet Union, favoring the Hungarian communists could play a double function for SPD leaders: it was an excellent demonstration of status quo oriented détente, but also a sign of support for cautious, gradually *softening* changes (Auflockerung without taking risks.) The market orientation of Hungarian reform communists was often instrumentalized as an argument of the modernizing current within the SPD against orthodox pre-Godesberg thinking.

Let me make a personal remark. In the course of a longer interview with Helmut Schmidt in July 1986 I got the impression that János Kádár was not only one of his favorites, but it seemed to me that a kind of „Kádárization” of the Eastern Bloc was the maximum objective of a realistic Ostpolitik. (He told me he had even once warned Kádár to be cautious when he had been asking about the chances of a Hungarian entry into the Common Market: „Vergessen Sie es, Herr Kádár...” (Forget about it...))

Here we might quote Katzenstein's argument about the 'moral obtuseness' of German foreign policy in general and Ostpolitik in particular. "Germany's neglect of the domestic conditions of the regimes it sought to engage and embed in Europe through peaceful means predates unification and is not a sign of a newfound assertiveness. Indeed, throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, under SPD-led and CDU-led governments, Germany's search for a durable détente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had been based on a similar, perhaps unavoidable moral obtuseness." (Katzenstein 1997: 293) The example of Hungarian contacts puts this evaluation into another context. Unlike the GDR contacts, the support for the soft dictatorship bringing about modest prosperity, some degree of freedom and a contribution to peaceful co-existence could be easily reconciled with broader moral principles, in a pragmatic way, as illustrated by Helmut Schmidt. There was a minority current (represented e.g. by Gerd Weisskirchen, present MP) which stood for a priority of contacts with dissidents (or at least for a modified balance), but, all in all, the objective of support for Kádárism prevailed combined with an attempt to soften up the regime from within.

Facing the obvious facts of the implosion of the East Central European regimes, the SPD mainstream - mainly through the mediation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation - came to a reorientation. Giving their reform communist contacts a lower profile, they turned, on one side, as an intermezzo lasting a short year before the first parliamentary elections (April 1990), to a revived traditional social democratic party proving very soon to be a complete disaster, on the other side, attempting to strengthen a social democratic - social liberal orientation of the ex-dissident Alliance of Free Democrats, unwilling, however, to join the Socialist International preserving the memories of having been dispreferred by the SPD vis-a-vis the ruling elite. (For a more detailed analysis of East Central European social democracy see: Dauderstädt - Gerrits - Márkus 1999)

The German orientation of the national-Christian current

The Hungarian Democratic Forum which became the first freely elected senior government party (1990 - 1994) had emerged in 1987-88 as a semi-oppositional populist-plebeian movement continuing the mainstream current of the pre-war populist writers opting for a Hungarian national third way. A change came about when József Antall took over party leadership and tried to counterbalance the *völkisch* component by turning, on one hand to the traditions of Hungarian national liberalism of the pre-WW1 historical and middle classes and - partially at least - to the traditions of the pre-WW2 national-Christian course, and on the other hand to the German model of Adenauer's CDU combining the traditionalist, identity-focused position with a decided commitment to embed Hungary into the Western community. Through his gestures, his intimate relationship with Chancellor Kohl, his cultural preferences, it can be assumed that his European commitment implied the support for Germany's leading role. American culture was distant for Antall and his entourage.

The MDF was divided. In his political struggle against the *völkisch* and aggressively revisionist group around István Csurka, which led to a split in 1993 and the emergence of Csurka's Party of Hungarian Truth and Life, Antall and his followers got the support of the European transnational party family including an especially strong backing from the CDU.

After 1994, the electoral defeat of the national conservative parties, German center right political foundations played a significant role in bringing about a revival of the moderate national conservative forces with the leadership of Fidesz (a party arriving from the liberal Westernizing cleavage front to the traditionalist side).

There was a spectacular turn of the Budapest office of the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung close to the FDP changing its policy and executive management away from the radically westernizing Free Democrats - having become the coalition partner of the ex-communist socialists - and ever closer to an increasingly conservative Fidesz. This has contributed to the preservation of a certain dose of pro-German orientation within the framework a more US-centered, and, in the European context more diversified orientation of the Fidesz-led government.

The mutual love of radical Hungarian westernizers and German intellectuals

A very important and seemingly strange component of the „Germany à la carte” syndrome is the friendly connection between left libertarian, ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectuals of Jewish origin mostly near (or in) the Alliance of Free Democrats (labeled as ‘the Jewish party’ by the radical cultural right) with a high prestige and influence in arts, literature and the media, on one side, and German intellectuals, on the other.

Their German partners are mostly academics from universities, institutes, several types of civic organizations and/or just circles of friends who had in the 80s all tried to provide the that time marginalized and professionally discriminated colleagues from Hungary with jobs, shelter, scholarships, sympathy and protection, they organized to publish and to popularize German publication of their works. Some of them lived in Germany several years. This tradition continues, the writers György Konrád, István Eörsi, György Dalos, Péter Nádas and Auschwitz survivor Imre Kertész are perhaps better known and more read in Germany.

These Hungarian Jewish „Mitteleuropäer” having grown up intellectually with Marx and later - even personally - with Georg Lukács and arriving to a world view in which human rights plus multiculturalism

are supreme values, are committed to a Hungary closely connected to Germany in a united Europe. In the recent debate in connection with the bombing of Serbia, most of them (e.g. Konrád and Eörsi) have seen a competition of an American and a European world view in the background. Their explicit or implicit message is the imperative of a Hungarian option for a Euro-German orientation within the broader euro-atlantic community. The strength of the positive attitude of this particular segment of the Hungarian cultural and political elite towards the FRG and the German role in shaping a united Europe including Hungary is due also to the remarkably profound *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* („coming to terms with past”) that has taken place in the (West) German society.

Attempt at theorization:

the relevance of the German model of semi-exogenous modernization

In the search of a substantive explanation as to the to the overarching attraction of Germany, we emphasize the special historical and territorial context of modernization. We invoke the argumentation of Alain Touraine (standing close to the concept of Alexander Gerschenkron according to which modernization always represents a certain combination of the universal and of the particular) pointing out the special characteristics of the German model of semi-exogenous modernization. In divergence from the purely rational American model, the German one includes „non-rational political and cultural forces such as national independence or the national language” for catch-up modernization. (Count István Széchenyi, a symbolic figure of the modernizing reformism of the progressive segment of Hungarian aristocracy coined the phrase permanently quoted ever since: “The nation lives through its language”.)

„Germany was the first and the most important focus for this national modernization which has triumphed not only in Japan and Italy, but also in Turkey, Mexico and Israel... This national-cultural modernization is not dangerous in itself, indeed, it is essential wherever modernization cannot be entirely endogenous. It can, however produce a regime...which uses modernization as a mere instrument for political mobilization.” (Touraine 1995:308-309). Accepting this conceptual framework, we may conclude that a united Germany as a tamed power (Katzenstein 1997) can offer a model both to nationalists and universalists. That country has overcome the imminent threats rooted in its own semi-organic development having Westernized, Europeanized and to a considerable degree even *Americanized* herself under special geopolitical conditions ranging from occupation by its former antagonists, through Cold War and division to becoming a pioneer of détente, and as a united Federal Republic both an embedded and a leading power in Europe.

The attraction of the German model for opposed political and cultural forces (in Hungary at least) is due to the circumstance that it offers a viable way of mediation between a too crude and aggressive universalism and a particularism obsessed with identity. (Touraine 1995) In a strange way, Germany plays a role that Touraine historically attributes to Jewry. „Countries which played an eminent role in the creation of modernity tended to identify with one or another form of universalism. This is as true of Great Britain as of France or, more recently the United States...A nation was in direct communion with universally valid principles. Even though we can still understand why that belief arose and why it was so strong, it is now obvious that it is artificial and ideological... From Herder onwards, German thought has often tried to reconcile the quest for modernity with the defense of a culture or a people which had apparently been marginalized by history. Neither claims to having a monopoly on universality nor pretensions to absolute specificity can be allowed to triumph. Rationalization is bound up with the emergence of a subject which is both a demand for freedom and an affirmation of a personal and collective memory. Hence the influence of Jews in particular... /whose/ majority were remarkably successful at reconciling the universality of thought, science and art with a very strong sense of identity and a historical memory.” (Touraine 1995: 301-302)

The institutionalization of German influence

Attitudes to Germany are shaped by the widely diffused and multi-dimensional presence of German soft and less soft power throughout Hungarian society reflecting a considerable measure

of dependence. We point to the following aspects:

1. Government level. Since the emergence of Ostpolitik both SPD and CDU led governments have declared themselves - supported by overwhelming Bundestag majorities - to be patrons, i.e. „advocates of Hungary” which has materialized in various forms ranging from credits, economic, cultural and international cooperation to the support of the Hungarian aspiration for membership in the euro-atlantic community.

2. Business level. The share of German investments in the total sum of foreign investments in Hungary in the period from 1990 to 1997 amounted to 28 % compared to a 16 % share of the US. (Data of the State Agency for Privatization in the Political Yearbook of Hungary 1998, 861). Germany as the number one export market for Hungary has stabilized her share on a 37-38 % level by 1997-98. The FRG is also the intermediary distribution center for multinational corporations active in Hungary. (Source: Report on the Hungarian Economy in 1998 by the Research Institute on Finances - *Elágazások* - Pénzügykutató Részvénytársaság, Budapest 1999 88) The effect of the high proportion of German ownership (Berthelmann, Axel Springer) of the printed press also has a strong, but indirect political and cultural component.

3. Cultural level. There are intense *mutual* ties on the level of „high culture” in practically all fields. For many Hungarian artists, writers, scientists Germany is their second „home country”. In spite of the efforts of German (and Austrian) institutions, German remains second to English in language learning. In mass culture, entertainment, even Americanized German products of the cultural industry lag behind US films, shows and TV series.

4. Societal foreign policy. German political foundations are indispensable partners for most Hungarian political parties. To a certain extent, some of them even directly influence political life, although - even if they would like occasionally - they can not change the basic trends. They contribute, however, significantly to a German-European type of evolution of the political structure. Quite often they follow supra-partisan causes standing for the spread of the German model of democracy.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Hans Böckler Foundation e.g. as mediators of the German experience of Einheitsgewerkschaft (united trade union movement) being skeptical versus fragmented Richtungsgewerkschaften (ideologically and politically divided trade union movements) have considerable merits in bringing closer together the six rival actors of the Hungarian union landscape.

5. Civil society level. We have to take into account the strong impact of contact nets spreading a very welcome soft German power in the sphere of social movements, of Churches, voluntary organizations, city partnerships, universities and high schools etc. and last, but not least, the volume of tourism in both directions.

As a practical outcome of the „Germany à la carte” consensus of the elites with a high degree of popular acceptance, the „negotiated transition” has produced a number of important arrangements consciously relying on a **German blue-print**:

- An *electoral system* with a FRG-like mix of proportional and constituency-related majority voting that, together with the more direct German partisan influence, seems to produce a German pattern of the *party structure* with two major parties reflecting bipolarity, modified, however, by the Parliamentary presence of a few minor parties, taming and coloring this dualism.
- The strong position of the executive headed by a rather powerful *Chancellor-like Prime Minister* whose position is underpinned by the stipulation of „constructive non-confidence motion” pattern.
- The constitutional autonomy of the *Hungarian National Bank*.
- An especially important and active role of a *Constitutional Court*.

We may also note two fields with a major divergence from Germany. One is the complete lack of federalist arrangements. The other is the weakness of neo-corporatism notwithstanding the efforts or declarations of governments of different political color. Generally speaking, there are some formal and partially practical components of a consociational democracy typical for Germany and the smaller European states (Katzenstein). The pre-eminence of cultural politics in a zero-sum-game context of growing inequalities, declining or stagnating living standards, and of the re-shuffle of resources following the regime change determining the distribution of economic power for generations hinders, however, the emergence of consensual policy making, the establishment of broad elite cartels.

3. Social market economy or social nationalism

Social market economy is one of the strongest attraction of the German model both - spontaneously - for the population and for political parties in search of their programmatic identity. This is more or less an issue standing above parties and elite segments. Not a single Hungarian government could, however, neglect the reality of constraints, pressures and dictates which came not only from Washington, but also from Brussels (the „convergence criteria”) and also from Bonn. The attraction of the social market economy made in Germany versus the neo-liberal monetarist model of the Chicago Boys expresses the contradiction between **the Rhine or Continental European model of capitalism against the Anglo-Saxon model.** (Albers) The paradox is, that the Rhine model of capitalism mediated through German social market economy to Hungary, ever more loses its strength, even in Germany. (see the Blairite-Clintonite turn of Schröder’s SPD). Thus, in a context of globalization and global capitalism without alternative, when Hungary (East Central Europe) is supposed to face the choice between an American and a Rhine model of society, we experience the pressure and the tendency in the fields of economy and culture, as to Germany herself and the EU as a whole, to become, in a certain sense, less German and less European. The extent of this metamorphosis, is, however, not pre-destined, but depends on the future orientation and the power of a deepened and widened Europe. In traditional Western democracies and in postwar (West) Germany there has been a correlation between capitalism and democracy. The popular acceptance of regime change introducing both capitalism and democracy in Hungary is very ambivalent. This is demonstrated in the following table:

Table 9

Agreement (on a scale of 100) with the statement:

REGIME CHANGE HAS CAUSED MORE HARM THAN GOOD

Age group between 18 and 29	41
Age group between 30 and 45	51
Age group between 46 and 59	55
Over 60	51
Without high school degree	56
With high school degree	42
Feel much poorer than the average	62
Feel somewhat poorer than the average	53
Feel average income	46
Feel above average income	28
FKGP supporter	68
MDF supporter	50
FIDESZ supporter	48
MSZP supporter	42
SZDSZ supporter	23
All respondents	50

Source: Marketing Centrum in Magyar Narancs, March 26 1998 p.22

A year later more than 3/4 against 23% of the respondents expressed some measure of disappointment in the regime change. The reason for dissatisfaction is plausible: rising inequalities and a feeling of declining living standards. 10 % declares that they lived worse, 22 % that they lived approximately at the same level, while 68 % lived better before the regime change. This feeling divides citizens as to the problem solving capacity of democracy, only 54 % believes in it. (GfK Hungary 1999 - unpublished).

The specificity of the German social market economy as a variant of the „European model of society and economy” is the realization of the principle that the normal functioning of markets needs a political counter power bringing about a taming of capitalism. This could be done on the basis of the class cleavage and/or on the basis of cultural/religious cleavages producing the social democratic and the Christian democratic welfare regimes hardly different by now.

In Hungary, contrary to initial illusions, the population, in its attitudes to markets, is divided into three nearly equal thirds: one is for free markets, the second against, while the third does not know. (SOFRES MODUS - EUROBAROMETER, Political Yearbook of Hungary 1998, 739.) As for structural and subjective reasons, no strong class cleavage per se could emerge. There have been two other options to articulate anti-market values and interests. One is the nostalgia for the late years of goulash communism. This was the case for voting in the ex-communist socialists in 1994. That party, however, proved to be, on one hand, a radically Westernizing political force fulfilling the harsh economic requirements preparing the way of the country to European integration (similarly as the Spanish socialist did it), and on the other hand, the political arm of the old-new technocratic managerial elite rejecting the taming of capitalism both for ideological and interest-related reasons. An alternative way of articulating social protest against self-regulating markets in an age of global capitalism in general and in the context of Western capitalist penetration of Hungary in particular is the combination of social protection against markets with the defense of national (plus cultural, i.e. religious) identity. This is a world wide political current I would call it *social nationalism* as represented from Ziuganov over Le Pen, Haider to Buchanan. (Dauderstädt - Gerrits - Márkus 1999 :102 - 105)

Hungarians react in a divided way to the growing presence of supranationally determined capital: on one side, they - especially the younger age cohorts - welcome westernization, but at the same time demand a special national way to be followed. This revival of ambitions for independence may be interpreted as a cultural identity based resistance to a market dominated society in which the adverse effects of the markets are brought into a context of foreign domination.

Table 10

**The acceptance of Westernization
Age group 18-35**

Respondents in %	national sample 1994	Budapest 1997	Countryside 1997
<i>Categories</i>			
unanimously positive	57,8	38,8	47,4
rather positive	34,8	41,0	37,6
rather negative	5,6	9,1	6,3
unanimously negative	1,8	3,4	1,4

The huge support for a general concept of Westernization is, however, mixed with a strong sympathy for a national(ist) *Sonderweg*.

Table 11
The acceptance of a particular „Hungarian way”
 Age group 18-35

Respondents in %	national sample 1994	Budapest 1997	Countryside 1997
<i>Categories</i>			
unanimously positive	45,3	25,7	30,0
rather positive	27,5	30,2	30,4
rather negative	13,6	17,6	13,8
unanimously negative	7,2	10,9	11,5
no definite opinion	6,4	15,6	14,3
	100	100	100

Source: Gázsó F. - Laki L. 1998 *Esélyek és orientációk. Budapest. OKKER.159, 161.*

The danger of nationalist isolation and xenophobia is apparent in the 31 % agreement in 1996 with the statement containing the demand: „More influence for nationally committed people in the economy and in politics.” Many Hungarians feel: companies with foreign capital “take away profits (increase of yes: 20 to 47 % between 1992 and 1997), „they sell out the country “(increase of yes from 14 to 35 %) The challenge for a Hungarian employee to have a direct foreign superior may represent a combination of economic and national/cultural dependence. Compared to 27 % in 1992, and 40 % in 1996, more than 36 % in 1997 refused to be subordinated to a „foreign boss”. Half of the respondents were ready to work under a foreign boss, although with huge differences depending on the nationality of the would-be superior. *How attitudes to Germans are effected in the context of this nationalist resistance against markets?*

Table 12
ACCEPTANCE OF A FOREIGN BOSS

In 1998 48,8 % of Hungarians would have been ready to work directly under a foreign boss. Out of this half of the population, the following nationals would have been accepted as superiors (in %):

	1992	1998
Germans	44,7	43
Americans	11,3	21,5
British	9,9	9,9
Austrians	6,9	8,6

Again, we see here Germans as „second best” and Americans as „third best” to Hungarians, but clearly with a decreasing share for Germans and increasing for Americans. The latter are more liked among the young, in Budapest and surroundings, while Germans are more attractive to men, to the middle-aged, to the elderly and the inhabitants of the North of the Hungarian Plain. The decisive explanation seems to be traditional cultural affinity, although one might ask, why is the difference so marked between the acceptance of Germans and Austrians. (The answer is probably the belief of German technological superiority, on one side, as also demonstrated by consumers' attitudes, and, on the other, the greater geographical distance to the FRG, i.e. more suspicion vis-à-vis the neighbor.) We also suspect an indirect relationship. People might have some idea about the German type of the welfare state and may have a stereotype of the American way of life... *The acceptance of a German boss may indirectly express a preference for living and working in a Rhine model capitalist economy compared to an American way of life and work.*

4. The context of Euro-Atlantic integration

The comparison of pro-German and pro-American attitudes in Hungary in the context of supranational integration and of a capitalist transformation sheds light that these are less contradictory, but more complementary phenomena. Data analysis reveals that attitudes to Germans, to Americans, to the EU and NATO ought to be approached as components (with somewhat differing weights) of **one single factor**: euro-atlantic integration. (Marián - Szabó op.cit.)

Focusing now on the role of the German component *in puncto* European integration we mention first *the symmetry between the German approach to European smaller nations and the Hungarian view of Germany in the context of EU accession*. German leadership with 'a softness of power and a culture of restraint' manifests itself in "Germany's willingness to give the smaller EU members disproportionate power" (Katzenstein 1997:3). The German attitude to Hungary as would-be member is very much the same, although we may note with Schröder a certain increase of a quasi-natural national selfishness. Similarly, Hungarians, both citizens in general and - at least prior to the recent Orbán government - political elites, acquiesced to the fact of Germany being a soft, but leading power within the EU.

The other analogy with Germany (but also with Spain, Portugal and even France as pointed out by Katzenstein) is the combination of national interest, national identity and European integration. As to the data of MODUS for late 1997 2/3 of Hungarians believe in "the European myth". The strongest intensity of expectations is related - together with the hope of economic rise - to the more efficient promotion of cultural and national identity (more than 2/3) including even the more efficient protection of the Hungarian ethnic groups abroad and a widening of the maneuvering room of Hungarian foreign policy. But *the image of the EU is that of a more or less German Europe*: knowledge about the EU, about member states is very poor. There are two countries that 3/4 of the citizens can identify: first Germany and then France. We might suggest: focusing on middle aged and elderly intellectuals, the reservations facing German power in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland, are parallel to Hungarian reservations versus France. Taking into consideration the skepticism towards France because of her role in the Versailles Peace Treaty, we assume that the supposed power of Germany in Europe is in correlation with the measure of her being known as a founding member state. (Source of data: Modus, Political Yearbook of Hungary 1998).

The vast majority of Hungarians is realistic enough to be aware that their country's fate will be strongly dependent on external factors, on international and foreign influence. The following table demonstrates how Hungarians felt in the time span from 1992 to 1997: which nation or which region or transnational organization would be the most decisive one in shaping the fate of this country.

Table 13**The option of Hungary's orientation****„To which country/region is the future of Hungary tied most?” (% of all respondents)**

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
USA	15	12	10,4	14,5	22,4	20,2	21,8
EU	27	23,5	22,3	26,6	26,6	42,6	53,1
Germany	12	6,4	9,4	14,4	10,1	8	11,7

SOFRES MODUS / EUROBAROMETER In: Political Yearbook of Hungary 1999 p.764

The steep rise of the European factor from 27 to 53 contains, in our view, the image of both a Europe with a powerful Germany in its core and in its relation with Hungary and of a European(ized) Germany.

A coexistence of the factors „national pride - EU - Germany” is also obvious from the data on the attitudes of Hungarian MPs in 1998: national consciousness is strongest, but the awareness of European identity is (on a scale reaching to seven) is over 6, surpassing the 3,9 average indicator measured in the German Bundestag. The background is the overarching sympathy of the political elites for Germans as demonstrated in Table 10 (Simon J., *Népszabadság*, January 9 1999)

5. Changing constellations, changing generations

In post-war years, following the deportation of a large part of ethnic Germans from Hungary, an anti-fascism containing an anti-German component, became part of a state ideology, especially in the Stalinist stage of communism. Even as late as in 1983, intellectual attitudes still reflected strong resentments against Germans, looked upon as number one antagonists in the history of Hungary, followed by .Turks, Austrians and at the last place by Russians.(Survey data from this time have to be read with caution, this was still a time of authoritarianism.)

Table 14**Antagonist nations for Hungarian intellectuals in 1983****„We did not harm them, but they have done harm to us”(%)**

Germans	54
Turks	47
Russians	17
Austrians	30

The blame for Hungarian participation in WW2 was equally distributed among the leaders of Germany and Hungary, and a third of respondents dared already at that time to attach responsibility to the Versailles (Trianon) Peace Treaty.

Table 15

**Responsibility for war participation
(% of responses in 1983)**

Trianon Peace Treaty	33	-
Hungarian leaders	67	
Nazi Germany	66	

Source: Csepeli 1992 201

When asked about the responsibility for the Hungarian Holocaust demanding a loss of 500 000 lives, the German leaders were found to be blamed first, and the Hungarian pro-Hitler government only to a lesser degree. „The peoples”, however, both Germans and Hungarians, were exempted (including also the Hungarian gendarmes playing an active role in the deportation).

Table 16

**Responsibility for Holocaust
Responses in % in 1989 (Sample of intellectuals)**

German government	42
Wehrmacht (German Army)	17
German people	1
Hungarian government	30
Hungarian people	2
Hungarian gendarmerie	1
Others	6

The anti-German propaganda of communist hard-liners was, of course, restricted to the FRG, East Germans were allies, anti-fascists and brave.

When neither free speech nor real surveys were allowed, public attitudes were often revealed in the urban folklore of jokes. I remember the following one from the 70s. „Question: Is there a difference between East Germans and West Germans? Answer: No, there is no difference, but the East Germans have *even*(‘sogar’) to be loved.”

With the on-coming implosion of the regime, the dislike for the GDR regime was openly admitted among intellectuals. In 1989 a Central European orientation (including both *East Central Europe* and *Mittleuropa*) prevailed among intellectuals:

Table 17**Affinity and similarity with Hungary
Intellectuals' attitudes in 1989****„Is that country similar to Hungary?“ Responses in %.**

Aspect:	Austria	Czechoslov.	Poland	GDR
economic development	4	57	44	23
political culture	11	31	67	5
arts	58	37	38	6
historical events	44	41	71	6
every day life	47	51	39	5

Source: Csepeli 1992 170

There was no question concerning West Germany, but from the manifestation of the rather positive attitude to Austria we may suspect that the FRG could have also scored well.

National pride in Hungary coexists with a strong tendency of weakening collective memory. It is remarkable, how regime changes could effect the subjective memories of citizens, especially of the up-growing generations. While in communist time the anti-fascist - anti-German - pro-Soviet socialization made many youngsters believe that Hungarians had been fighting on the side of the Soviets, the transformation following the implosion of communism did not restore historical memory, but distorted it even more. A survey conducted among students of the Teacher's Training College of the city of Kecskemét, for whom a selective admittance exam in the subject of history had been obligatory, revealed: more than a quarter believed that Hungary and the Soviet Union had been allies (*anyway, an increase of realism compared to 1977 when one third of young people responded in this way*), and even more thought that Americans and Germans had been allies. As to the role of Germans: 6 % had no idea, while 4 % responded that Germans and Russians had been allies.

Table 18**Allies and Enemies in World War 2****How students of Kecskemét Teachers' Training College know history?****1994-1995 (Percentage of respondents)**

COUNTRY	allied with Soviets	fought vs. Soviets	not know
US	63	27	11
Hungary	26	64	10
Germany	4	89	6

Source: Szabó I. - Á. Horváth - B. Marián: Történelem és politika a főiskolások állampolgári kultúrájában. Forrás. 1997/149.

In spite or just because of this subjective re-evaluation of history, we see a difference: compared to grown-ups, the young generation of 14-18 years demonstrate much more openness, a decrease of negative attitudes not only towards Germans, but also to ethnic minorities and foreigners in general.

Table 19

**The impact of age on attitudes
Negative socio-metric preferences in % of negative choices (1995)**

Ethnic groups	Adults	Teenagers
Gypsies	74	58
Jews	30	28
Ethnic Hungarian migrants from Romania.	25	8
Germans	15	11

Source: Csepeli 1996 287, data of I. Szabó and A. Örkény.

In the teenager generation, we find a persistence of national pride together with an increase of multiculturalism.

Table 20

Emotional attitudes among teenagers

Item	I like	I dislike	unable to decide(%)
The Holy Crown of Hungary	62	11	27
Americans	55	16	29
French	48	22	30
Jews	23	30	47
Gypsies	5	69	26
Capitalism	23	36	41

Source: Szabó I. - A. Örkény 1998 29

Comparing the data for the teenagers and the national representative sample on emotional attitudes (Table 6), we witness - even considering an absolute increase of positive feelings for Germans (Table 22) that the relative rise of US sympathies is so marked that in this age bracket, at least, Americans may replace Germans as „second best to Hungarians”.

In the Hungarian population in general, there is a considerable aversion against the internationalization (*Überfremdung*) of every-day life. Most Hungarians are „chauvinists of the belly”. This ‘taste nationalism’ expresses itself in the high degree of the rejection of ‘McWorldization’

(to rely on the term McWorld for the Americanized mass culture coined by Benjamin B. Barber). A survey question referred to the rapid spread of American fast food, pizzerias and Chinese restaurants. The aggregation of responses reflects strong rejection, breaking them down reveals, however, a marked generation gap of attitudes. (For the sake of comparison, we have just taken out two age groups)

Table 21

Attitudes to „McWorldization”

„Are you angry, if you find restaurants offering Hungarian dishes closed down, and McDonald’s, Chinese restaurants or pizzerias opened at their place?”

	VA	A	M	W	OK
Total (in %)	22	18	22	10	26
Out of this:					
15 - 19 years	15	10	22	14	38
40 - 49 years	27	19	23	8	22

VA: very angry

A: angry

M: somewhat angry („medium”)

W: weakly angry

OK: not at all angry

Source: GfK Hungary - Paul Lazarsfeld Gesellschaft (Vienna) 1996

Our assumption of an increasing generation gap may be further underpinned by the results of a comparative ad hoc research of GfK Europe (Project ‘Hopes and Fears’ 1997) on European young opinion leaders based on in-depth interviews and psychological tests with selected boys and girls from the 14-15 and 16-19 age brackets (about 30-40 teenagers from each country). The executive summary of the conclusions for Hungary ends with the following statement: „...In connection with the EU, they are a little bit anxious about the loss of national identity. They lack, however, this national identity. They acquire an Americanizing cosmopolitan life style, since this is dictated by the turbulent life around them...They are ready to a struggle for their own happiness in which they unconditionally believe. Whether others also succeed, it is of no interest for them.”

The search of happiness is limited to themselves and their direct families and „is not connected to a home in a broader sense: to the home country or to the nation”. ‘If life is not good at home, I go somewhere else..’ is, as the interviewers find, a simple fact for them.(Cf. Table 5) They are culturally tolerant, anti-racist and apolitical. These Hungarian kids like to have their meals at McDonalds’, they prefer American films and especially TV entertainment to Hungarian and German programs, instead of reading books. The vast majority of brands they adhere to, is American, although they are attracted by German cars and Adidas shoes. Young Hungarian opinion leaders are ardent believers of the EU myth, they expect mobility, high income for hard work, mass consumption.(Source: Life feelings of European youth - Hopes and Fears, Qualitative research results, Hungary - Budapest, GfK Hungary, 1997.)

Their distance from traditional Hungarian nationalism is coupled with a distance from both the Rhine model of capitalism and the concept of solidarity as embodied in the German model of the social market economy. It seems to be an open question whether this detachment from the „Germany à la carte” orientation typical for the older generations will remain stable or whether trendy teenagers will just outgrow it with time. Generations replace each other, attitudes change, not however the geopolitical, the geoeconomic and the geocultural location of Hungary, not even in a context of globalization.

Annex

Political Cleavages and Parties in Hungary

Sets of Cleavages

1. The family of territorial and cultural cleavages

Traditionalist forces stress historical continuity, Hungarian nationhood, favour community over society, are for strong authority, strong church. Their value orientations are more particularist than universalist, they have an inclination ‘to love the rural’, even if they are urban Westernizers are outward-looking, for catch-up modernization, they favour individualism, multicultural diversity, they stress secularism and human rights.

2. The family of post-communist cleavages

This set of cleavages has several dimensions

- an ideological dimension of anticommunism which can be based either on particularist national, religious identities or on the universalism of individual human rights and rationality;
- a political dimension expressed in the relationship to the Socialist Party looked upon as the successor party;
- a power dimension of competing elites and of the re-definition of the rules of the game outside and inside politics;
- a structural dimension reflecting the symbiotic dualism of the present society with a sector rooted in late communism and a sector of emerging capitalism¹; an emotional and biographical dimension.

3. The family of socio-economic cleavages

With economic transformation progressing and with an overwhelmingly materialist electorate this set of cleavages has become central in the society, but the early freezing of the party system structured along the above mentioned two cleavage sets is still complicating the clear translation of this divide into programmatic and public policy alternatives. One pole of this cleavage family is radical commodification, deregulation with a high speed and broad extension of marketization, privatization, a primary market distribution of wealth and incomes with marked inequalities, the other is the limitation of the market, a certain measure of decommodification with extended welfare statism, with an active and strong state regulating the economy, helping the poor, enhancing mobility and broad middle classes.

The Hungarian party system - in spite of self-locations and self-definitions - can hardly be adequately described in the traditional terms of a Left-Right continuum, since what can be termed as culturally „Left” is often paired with „rightist” socio-economic positions and vice versa.

Major Parties

The Alliance of Free Democrats - Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)

The constant element of SZDSZ is its commitment to radical Westernization with decisively anti-nationalist, secularist individualist and human rights centered positions of social libertarianism. The party is rooted in the tradition of the pre-war Budapest centered intellectual current of

Hungarian Socialist Party - Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)

Growing out of the reformist wing of the former state party this conglomerate party very strongly cleaved in itself is embedded in the post-communist cleavage family in a double sense: as to membership and supporters, political culture, traditions of informal decision-making, clientelistic relations, it is rooted in the surviving late-Kádarian sector of the Hungarian society. At the same time it is intertwined with mighty segments of the economic, financial and professional elites running the sector of emerging capitalism. As to the way and style of policy-making, there are also rival late-Kádarian and anti-Kádarian groups in the party. In the dimension of the territorial-cultural cleavages, from 1995, the party has practically become the leading force of radical Westernization.

As to the location of the party in the socio-economic cleavage, there is a marked contrast between the policy of radical commodification pursued from 1995, on one side, and the actual welfare statist preferences of the majority of its voters corresponding more to the social democratic self-definition of the MSZP.

Parliamentary seats:

1990: 33 1994: 209 1998: 134

Alliance of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party- Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége - Magyar Polgári Párt (FIDESZ-MPP)

We might call FIDESZ a strategic party, a free-rider of political cleavages, in the meaning that its cleavage roots, membership basis and organizations are weak but it is consciously looking for the social and cultural cleavages enabling it to occupy a political space with the best chance of collecting a majority of votes and getting into the gravitational center of the party system. At the point of its establishment by fresh university graduates (mainly coming from the faculty of law) FIDESZ had just two fixed points: its radical opposition to the communist regime and the protection of its organizational autonomy. In the context of the cultural divide between SZDSZ 'urban' westernizers and MDF national-popular traditionalists they declared first to be the children of divorced parents. This corresponded also to their social background: they were mostly first generation intellectuals coming from 'the province'. When they had decided, however, that liberalism was the ideology most distant from communism, they became radical westernizers, secular, alternative, actionist, anti-nationalist. This brought them as close to SZDSZ that they got looked upon as 'the younger brothers and sisters' of the Free Democrats. When the 'cultural struggle' resulted in a rapprochement between SZDSZ and MSZP, they first reiterated their standing above the cultural divide. Having realized that there was no space for centrists in a system of cultural politics, they crossed the cleavage line and defined themselves as a party of national liberalism. Seeing the vacuum on the side of moderate Christian Democratic parties, they came to stress Christian values. They have arrived at an intermediate position of 'soft westernization' or national modernization.

In opposition to the soft market liberal approach of the governing MDF they had chosen to be strongly market liberals in a very pragmatic fashion. Later, they responded, however, to the neoliberal monetarism of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition by stressing social protection and growth induction arriving as the leading party of government at the position of 'soft commodification', guided by a strong, centralized and active state.

Parliamentary seats:

1990: 21 1994: 20 1998: 148

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Data sources are referred to in the main text.

