

Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies

Special Issue:

**HUNGARIAN-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES:
SELECTED PAPERS**

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CONTENTS

Guest Editor's Introduction	3
The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941	5
<i>N. F. DREISZIGER</i>	
The Irrelevance of Ideology: The Fall of Marxism and the Rise of the Last Man	27
<i>ROBERT BLUMSTOCK</i>	
Searching for Land: The First Hungarian Influx into Canada	37
<i>MARTIN L. KOVÁCS</i>	
Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in Central Canada, 1921-1931	45
<i>N. F. DREISZIGER</i>	

Early Hungarian-Canadian Culture	55
<i>MARTIN L. KOVÁCS</i>	
Modern Hungarian Poetry in Canada	77
<i>JOHN MISKA</i>	
Concluding Remarks	85

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(continued on page 88)

Introduction

A little-noticed and even less-advertised 'revolution' seems to be taking place against the exclusiveness of old established academic disciplines. Instead of adhering, for instance, to topical and time-structured history or the traditional confines of geography, literature, sociology, anthropology, and on occasion, linguistics, cross-sectional disciplines often referred to as "studies" seem to be emerging. Thus, some time ago, the Canadian Studies Association was established, apparently to pull together the various related disciplines in one great effort. In a noteworthy way, its objectives appear to encompass the discussion of groups of Canadians of non-British and non-French descent. Some years back the Central and East European Studies Society of Alberta was formed, following the setting-up by the University of Alberta of a Division of East European Studies. Of course, that Division was not the first of its kind. By 1976, the Central and East European Studies Association of Canada came into being and it was under its aegis that the first versions of the papers comprised in this volume were presented at two conferences.

The term "Hungarian studies" has been known and applied loosely, depending on the context, for many years. One of its implications is the task for Hungarian Canadian and Hungarian American researchers of serving as mediators between their respective two cultures, "interpreters," if called upon in either direction. Until recently, this significant objective has not been carried out at all or only superficially. In fact, comparatively little is known about Hungarian Americans and Hungarian Canadians, either as urban dwellers or rural settlers. Even today there is a tendency to reduce their rich culture to the presentation of a few popular dishes and some "folk" dances in colourful costumes, declared by their makers as authentically Hungarian. Not much consideration is given to the fact that practically every region in Hungary has had its own folkloric characteristics.

The contributors to the present volume have been active for a comparatively long time in reviewing Hungarian studies, the scope of which has included what might be referred to as "Hungarian-Canadian" and

“Hungarian-American” studies. One may conclude from this practice that there is much common ground among these various types of “studies.” Nevertheless, there are great differences as well. Thus, for our purposes, “Hungarian Canadian (American) studies” implies the effort better to understand the immigration, settlement, cultural, and social adjustments, as well as achievements in humanities, science and other fields, of Canadians (Americans) of Hungarian descent, with the help of the methodology of the appropriate branches of knowledge. One of the foremost objectives for a student of Hungarian Canadian (American) studies to attain is the accumulation of sufficient data and materials for the determination of the nature and direction of the above processes and the factors affecting them.

M. L. Kovács

The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941

N. F. Dreisziger

The subject of the role of the Hungarian General Staff in the formation of Hungarian diplomatic efforts on the eve of World War II has been at once neglected and abused. It can be regarded as "neglected" in that, despite the mass of literature dealing with Hungarian foreign policy before and during the War, only a handful of historians focus on this question and treat it in a scholarly manner; and as "abused" in that usually it has been tied to the highly politicized issue of war-guilt, a question which defies impartial analysis. There is no need here to review the historiography of the broader problem of Hungary's involvement in the Second World War; however, a few words should be said about literature that centres on the role of the Hungarian General Staff in foreign policy. In Hungary the theme has been treated by a number of scholars who, in general, condemn the "Horthyite military" for aspiring to political supremacy in Hungary and for outdoing the country's civilian leaders — often without the knowledge or prior sanction of the latter — in the appeasement of the Germans.¹ Opinions on this subject are not appreciably different in North America. The earlier works of Professor C. A. Macartney notwithstanding, it is the impression of recent North American students of pre-war and war-time Hungarian history that the military, in particular the General Staff, made a conscious effort to determine the direction of the country's foreign policy and that it was, by and large, successful in this effort.²

There are no grounds for quarrel with many of the observations of Hungary's best scholars, and even less for disagreement with the overall conclusions of recent western studies. Still, there is need for a general reassessment of some aspects of this question, for in many ways the impression created by Hungarian and Western works is somewhat misleading. A careful study of the evidence reveals that the hold Hungary's soldiers attained over their country's external policies was rather precarious, and that effective meddling by the military in the conduct of foreign policy was not a permanent feature of Hungarian war-time

politics after 1939. Nevertheless, the influence exercised by the General Staff in foreign policy matters was at times extensive, causing much difficulty and embarrassment for the country's civilian leaders. It is an unfortunate fact of Hungarian history that the high point of the military's influence was reached in 1939–1941, a period in which Hungary's leaders were confronted by several fateful decisions, including the question of participation in the War.

One reason for selecting this particular period as the focal point of this essay is the fact that 1939–1941 represents the most crucial years of the Hungarian historical development during the Horthy Era. Another is that in recent years both the preceding period and that which followed have received detailed treatment by scholars from Western countries.³ In dealing with the events of this period, we shall try to avoid involvement in the controversial issue of war-guilt, hoping that the present study will help to explain developments rather than fix blame on certain groups or individuals. Yet, because of the very nature of the topic, it seems well-nigh impossible not to express opinions as to the question of responsibility for Hungary's drifting into the War. Besides, it is hoped that this study will shed light on a much larger historical question, the problem of some East European governments' weakened determination, or even virtual inability, owing to friction between civilian authorities and military commands, to resist German diplomatic pressure.

The nature and aims of Hungarian diplomacy during the opening phases of the Second World War cannot be well understood without a reference to the immediate post-World War I era, the formative years of interwar Hungarian policies and leadership. Most historians agree that this was a period of vast change in Hungary. But while war, defeat, revolution, foreign intervention and civil war caused severe dislocation in many areas of national life, Hungary's officer corps survived this time of troubles with surprising cohesion. True, the size of the country's military establishment was drastically curtailed by the peace treaty, but this fact had little effect on the officer class' *esprit de corps*. On the contrary, the real and alleged injustices that the country had suffered at the hands of peacemakers and left-wing revolutionaries, only inflamed the officers' nationalism and desire for revenge.

This feeling of outrage against the peacemakers who had carved up historic Hungary and the nation's "internal enemies" who had taken the country down the slope of revolution, was not confined to the officer corps. It was also felt by the country's civilian elite. It is not surprising under the circumstances that the foremost national aim of Hungary in the interwar period became the reversal of the misfortunes that befell the

country in 1919 and 1920, and the revision of the admittedly draconic provisions of the Treaty of Trianon emerged as the prime objective of its government. In this respect there was no fundamental disagreement between the country's civilian leaders and officer corps. Differences arose only in regard to the question of when and how to attain these aims.

In the quarter century from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second, the Royal Hungarian Army possessed an influence in public affairs out of proportion with its size. The reasons for this were numerous. It was the Hungarian Army, more than its Austrian counterpart, which appeared to have been the descendant of the imperial forces of Austria-Hungary. Because of the nature of the regime which was set up in Hungary after the revolutionary experiments of 1918-1919, high-ranking officers of the former Habsburg Imperial forces were allowed the choice of continuing their careers in Hungary. As a result, that country "inherited" several hundred of the late Emperor Francis Joseph's colonels and generals, many of whom were German-speaking. The second reason for the Hungarian Army's high profile was the fact that in the post-1919 era, rightly or wrongly, the military were looked upon as the country's "saviours" from the Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries. The Army were also seen by many Hungarians as the most likely tool for breaking the chains that their country had been put into by the peace-makers. Moreover, the interwar head-of-state, the Regent Miklós Horthy, was himself a member of the military profession, although as a naval officer he did not always see eye-to-eye with the army officers and did not always command their respect and devotion. More important than Horthy's military background was the fact that in 1932 Gyula Gömbös, an army officer, became Premier. Gömbös admired the Italian patterns of politics and, during his term in office, promoted like-minded officers to high positions in the *honvédség** and the civil service. Gömbös's programme was cut short by his death in 1936 and was not continued under his successors.

The problem of the military's influence on foreign policy was not a serious issue until the second half of the 1930s. The country's military and its civilian government concurred on the question of treaty revision and, until 1937 or 1938, there seems to have been a consensus that the time had not yet arrived for action. A serious divergence in views between the civilian government and the officer corps came gradually into

*The Magyar term for the Hungarian army.

existence only as a result of the disruption of the European balance of power caused by the rise of the Rome-Berlin Axis. This disagreement eventually turned into a bitter, though covert, tug-of-war between the government and the General Staff. The emergence of Italian and, especially, German strength in Central Europe had accentuated the differences of outlook between Hungary's civilian and military leaders. Most members of the former group looked askance at Hitler's and Mussolini's radical domestic and adventurous foreign policy moves. The latter, on the other hand, were impressed by the scope of Italian and German rearmament and admired the way Hitler had gradually and deftly freed Germany from the fetters imposed at Versailles. German economic and military strength and the effectiveness of Hitler's diplomacy contrasted sharply with the weakness of Hungary and the failures of her foreign policy. Relations between the country's civilian leaders and its more impatient military men became particularly strained during the late summer and autumn of 1938, when the Hungarian government refused to promise participation in the planned German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The invasion did not take place in 1938: the Munich "surrender" deprived Hitler of the strategic reason as well as a diplomatic excuse for his planned military adventure. Although Hitler had been cheated out of what he expected to be another triumphant march into another of Central Europe's ancient capitals, Munich appeared to have been a great victory for German diplomacy. But for Hungary, Munich was a disaster. Once German demands were satisfied, there was no reason why the Czechs and Slovaks should yield to further demands. At Munich, Hungarian aspirations for revision were not considered. After Munich, the conditions for the realisation of these aspirations were no longer favourable. In the end, in an arbitrary award, decided on by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna, Hungary was given back a part of the territory she had lost to Czechoslovakia in 1919. But the so-called First Vienna award did not satisfy the Hungarian military who continued to accuse their country's "timid" civilian leadership of "missing the boat" in September when a bolder policy might have led to a more drastically favorable revision of Hungary's northern borders.⁴

In 1939 recriminations between the civilians and the military diminished in intensity. In September 1938 the soldiers had been angry with the civilians for getting nothing for Hungary during the Munich crisis; in subsequent months, they also became resentful against the Germans for failing to give adequate support to Hungary's territorial claims during the negotiations which preceded the First Vienna Award. Growing German hostility towards Poland and the announcement in August of 1939

of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, also perturbed Hungarian officers whose anti-Bolshevism was genuine. The German attack on Poland also upset many. Most Hungarians were greatly sympathetic with the plight of the Poles. It is well known that the Hungarian Government refused to co-operate with the Germans in September of 1939 and even opened the country's northeastern borders to Polish refugees. There can be little doubt that the Government's stand was whole-heartedly approved of by most of the country's soldiers. But the detente between the more cautious elements in the Government and the more impatient members of the military was not destined to last for long. Neither the internal political situation nor the course of international events in Eastern Europe favoured the prolongation of such an accord.

The crises of 1938-39 had not passed without leaving indelible marks on Hungarian politics. The international upheavals of these two eventful years were accompanied by internal changes, many of which strengthened the influence of the military in national affairs. In particular, the year 1938 witnessed the long-awaited beginning of a rearmament programme.⁵ Even more important was the passage in 1939 of the Home Defence Act (*Honvédelmi Törvény*). This law re-introduced the principle of universal liability for armed service, restricted certain political freedoms (such as the freedom of assembly and association), provided for military supervision of the press and industries involved in the production of a wide range of war materials. The act created a new decision-making body, the Supreme Council of Home Defence, made up of the Regent, the members of the Ministerial Council, the Chief-of-Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. From then on, there was a body above the civilian government, a body in which the Armed Forces had direct representation, to make decisions in regard to the vital question of war and peace.⁶ But the significance of the rearmament programme and the new home defence act was surpassed by the changes which had taken place in this period, particularly during the autumn of 1938, in the composition of Hungary's civilian and military leadership.

Perhaps the most important of these changes was the dismissal of Kálmán Kánya from the Ministerial Council. He had always been a cautious man who distrusted the Axis leaders as he distrusted the Hungarian military. Prior to Munich, he had been the most adamant opponent of the idea of Hungary's collaboration in a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. Kánya's successor was Count István Csáky, a vain, impressionable, but talented diplomat. Csáky shared neither his predecessor's caution nor his distrust of the Axis. Kánya's departure from national politics, however, was counterbalanced a few months later by the

replacement of Béla Imrédy by Pál Teleki as Premier. During the Sudeten Crisis, Imrédy had become a convert to the Axis cause and for some five months he sponsored measures that were designed to bring Hungary's internal and external policies more in line with those of Germany and Italy. But his efforts alarmed Hungary's conservatives and liberals alike and he was manoeuvred into resigning from office. After assuming the premiership, Teleki made many efforts to prevent or delay the implementation of Imrédy's pro-Axis programme.

Another important change in Hungarian leadership during the autumn of 1938 was the appointment of General Henrik Werth as Chief-of-Staff. Werth was still another of the high-ranking officers of the General Staff with a German ethnic background. Moreover, he spoke German as his native tongue and had married a citizen of the Third *Reich*. There is no evidence that the above factors had played a significant role in Werth's selection, nor that there had been representations from Berlin asking for his appointment.⁷ But once established in his new post, Werth became one of the most persistent advocates of aligning Hungarian foreign and military policies with those of the Axis powers. Werth was to receive active support from General Károly Bartha, the Minister of Defence in the period under discussion in this paper.

The international developments of the first year of the Second World War had a further unsettling impact on Hungarian politics and, especially, on civil-military relations. The war, first in Eastern Europe and then also in the West, witnessed the crumbling away of a greater and greater portion of the international order established by the Paris peace settlements. This process increased most Hungarian leaders' expectations about new and more extensive revisions of the territorial settlement in East Central Europe especially in the East, at the expense of Rumania. Most Hungarian leaders were confident that the long-awaited opportunity to regain Transylvania would soon present itself. They had every reason to think so. Rumania's international position continued to deteriorate after September 1939. The existence of the secret protocol which accompanied the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was suspected in diplomatic circles at the time. While its details were unknown, there were few doubts that the Pact's provisions regarding Rumania had ominous implications for that country's future. Indeed, as early as November, Moscow began to voice its interest in Bessarabia, the region in Rumania which had belonged to Russia before the First World War. Rumania was also a possible target of attack by Germany, either as part of a joint Russo-German military occupation on the Polish model, or as a result of a pre-emptive strike by the *Wehrmacht*, undertaken to fore-

stall a possible Russian move into the oil-rich Ploesti region. Despite the guarantee Britain had extended to Bucharest in the case of a German invasion, Rumania had no real defence against the dangers posed by the new order which had unfolded in Central Europe in the fall of 1939.

Rumania's difficulties gave rise to various plans in Budapest for the solution of the Transylvanian question in a manner satisfactory to Hungary's expectations. How differently Hungary's civilian and military leaders approached this issue is illustrated by the plans that were advanced by ex-Premier Count István Bethlen and General Werth. The scheme of the former, outlined in a secret memorandum to the Government, started with the premise that Germany would lose the war. Accordingly, Bethlen argued, Hungary should remain neutral and preserve her strength for the attainment of her national aims at the end of the war. Bethlen hoped that by participating in some kind of a security arrangement for post-war Europe, and by not annexing Transylvania but allowing it to become an autonomous member of a loose East European federation, Hungary could solve the Transylvanian question according to her interests.⁸

Werth's plans were quite different. The Chief-of-Staff was not willing to wait until the outcome of the war was settled. Long before the Russian threat against Rumania became acute, Werth urged his government to prepare for the recovery of Transylvania by force should an armed conflict develop between Moscow and Bucharest.⁹ In April 1940 Werth submitted a memorandum on this subject to Horthy and the leading members of the Government. The Chief-of-Staff discussed at length the probable outcome of the European war. Unlike Bethlen, he concluded that Germany would more than likely emerge as the victor, but even if she did not, a complete German defeat was impossible because of the superior strength of the *Wehrmacht*. Werth, who had just held discussions with representatives of the German General Staff, informed his civilian superiors that the Germans had offered their co-operation against Rumania. But simple military co-operation was not sufficient according to Werth. Hungary should abandon her neutrality and become an ally of Berlin so that she could regain the lands she had lost in the wake of the First World War.¹⁰

To Werth's disappointment, a Hungarian-German alliance against Rumania never came about. From the late spring of 1940 on, Hitler was preoccupied with the Western front and, for the time being, did not wish to undertake any military ventures in the East. Interestingly enough, Hitler's desire to maintain peace in Eastern Europe and the Balkans nearly gave Hungary an opportunity to achieve revision in Transylvania

on her own terms. That, in the end, the solution of the Transylvanian question in 1940 should have been made on terms dictated not from Budapest but from Berlin, was in part the result of a conflict between the Hungarian Government and the military, in particular, a clash between Teleki and Werth.

The approach that the Hungarian leadership adopted towards the question of Transylvania differed appreciably from that advocated by Werth. Teleki was repelled by the idea of abandoning the country's neutrality and joining Germany. Unlike Werth, Teleki was doubtful about the prospects of a German victory. He felt that the superiority of moral strength and physical resources was on the Allied side. He could not accept Werth's suggestion that Hungary should become an ally of Germany. He rejected the Chief-of-Staff's proposals in a letter to Horthy. He stressed to the Regent that Germany's victory was not a foregone conclusion and, therefore, it was not advantageous for Hungary to side with her completely. Werth, the Premier argued, did not see the problem of Hungary's interests from the point of view of a Hungarian.¹¹

Although Teleki rejected Werth's plan of regaining Transylvania with German military help, he did not give up the prospect of attaining a revision of his country's eastern boundaries through some other means. The opportunity seemed to have presented itself in the summer of 1940. At the time Hitler was still hoping to force Britain to her knees and thereby to end the war in Western Europe. To do this Hitler needed peace elsewhere in Europe, especially in the southeast, from where came many of the foodstuffs, fuel and raw materials needed by the *Wehrmacht*. In the meantime, the Russians had decided to act. At the end of June they confronted Rumania with an ultimatum demanding the return of Bessarabia. The Soviet move caused much hectic activity in Hungary.¹² The *honvédség* mobilized and frantic efforts were made to ascertain Rome's and Berlin's attitudes to a Hungarian occupation of Transylvania in case of a Russo-Rumanian conflict. But that conflict never came about. Rumania surrendered Bessarabia without a fight. And from Berlin came word that Germany would be most unhappy about any disruption of the peace in Eastern Europe.¹³ Even though the best opportunity for regaining Transylvania was now gone, the Hungarians continued their menacing attitude towards Rumania, demanding at the same time that the dispute be submitted to a conference attended by the statesmen of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Rumania. Teleki's aim was evident: threatened by a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict at the time when Germany's interest demanded peace in Eastern Europe, the Axis powers would be forced to support the Hungarian claims in any

negotiations on the issue.¹⁴ But, for the time being, Hitler did not wish to act as a mediator. He rejected the idea of a four-power conference and told the Hungarians to negotiate with the Rumanians alone.¹⁵

The Hungarian-Rumanian discussions achieved nothing. Rumania was no longer an isolated power which had to make concessions. She had embarked on a pro-Axis policy, and had acquired a new friend: Germany. The Hungarians could do no more than continue their intimidating stance against Rumania and hope that Hitler would change his mind, and for the sake of peace in southeastern Europe, would intervene in the dispute.

At the end of July Hitler changed his policy. Almost overnight it seems, he decided to see to it that all outstanding international disputes were settled in Eastern Europe. The reason for this complete turnabout in Germany's policy lay in international developments. In July, the Nazis failed to force Britain to come to terms with them. To deprive the British of their last ray of hope, Hitler decided to smash the Soviet Union in a single huge campaign next spring. With Russia under German rule, Japan would be free to turn against the U.S., and Britain would have no hope of holding out against Germany. To prepare for this bold venture, Hitler needed tranquility in Eastern Europe, and to achieve this he had to settle the question of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. This was exactly what the Hungarians desired in August 1940, but they wanted Hitler to act as a mediator in the dispute and not as an arbiter. They did not want to see another Vienna Award announced in which Germany and Italy imposed a settlement favourable first and foremost to German interests. If everything else failed, Teleki was prepared to accept arbitration, but he wanted the Rumanians to ask for it: if Bucharest called for such an award, Budapest could insist on certain pre-conditions. Moreover, if the revision of the boundaries came about through arbitration requested by Rumania, the settlement would have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

The essential feature of Teleki's plan was to threaten war in southeastern Europe and compel the Rumanians to request Hitler's diplomatic intervention. But Teleki was double-crossed. At the critical moment, Werth informed the Germans that, as a final measure, Hungary was willing to accept arbitration rather than go to war.¹⁶ After such a disclosure it was easy for Berlin to call Teleki's bluff. In the end the fate of Transylvania was settled by another German-Italian dictum. The region was divided between Rumania and Hungary.

Werth's indiscretion deeply perturbed the sensitive Premier. He decided to resign and announced his decision in a letter to Horthy. Teleki

disclaimed any personal antipathy towards Werth. He complained of not being able to "prevail against the military." He accepted part of the blame for that unfortunate state of affairs; he had allowed the soldiers to become "too powerful." As a result, he no longer felt suitable to carry out the demanding task of leading the country in such difficult times. Someone else would have to be appointed who would end the division between the Government and the *honvédség*.¹⁷

Teleki followed up his letter of resignation with a memorandum outlining in detail the question of civil-military relations in Hungary. He began by saying that the existing legal framework of these relations was satisfactory. The problem was, he argued, that there had been a departure from that legal basis, and Hungary was drifting towards a sort of "military dictatorship" imposed from "below" rather than "from above." In Hungary, he continued, "there seemed to be two governmental machineries." One was the legal government, the other was the military establishment which extended to "all branches of civil administration" and whose activities the "lawful governmental system" was unable to supervise. What was needed, was to appoint a new premier who could end this state of affairs by gathering in his hands the highest executive powers.

In the last part of the memorandum, Teleki discussed the role of the military in foreign affairs. He admitted that the soldiers had to gather information abroad and had to have their own staff for this purpose, but this task needed to be done in tandem with the intentions and policies of the government. In Hungary, much was lacking in the co-ordination of the activities of diplomats and soldiers abroad. He, as Premier and Minister of External Affairs, was not receiving all the reports Hungarian military attachés sent home from abroad. It was imperative, he stressed, that he should at least see instructions that the Chief-of-Staff despatched to military attachés. If this had been done, many unpleasant misunderstandings might have been avoided. The Chief-of-Staff had caused great harm when he had informed the Germans that Hungary wanted arbitration in the future of Transylvania. In concluding his memorandum Teleki asked Horthy to convey to the military his request for the separation of civil and military authority in Hungary and the subordination of the latter to the former in all cases not exclusively military in nature.¹⁸

In response to Teleki's protest Horthy agreed to see to it that several of the grievances were remedied; but he refused to accept the Premier's resignation. Thus, Teleki remained at the helm of the Hungarian ship-of-state for another six months.

The half-year which followed the Second Vienna Award witnessed a

further erosion of Hungary's neutrality. The two milestones of the process are familiar to students of war-time history: Budapest's consent to the transit through Hungary of German troops destined for pro-Axis Rumania, and Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact. As well, civil-military relations remained tense, a fact which became evident during the next crisis in Hungary's external relations: the German-Yugoslav confrontation in the early spring of 1941.

The last months of 1940 saw a diplomatic rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Budapest's efforts to seek friendship with Belgrade were sincere. Although the issue of the Hungarian irredenta in Yugoslavia remained unsolved, the need for a neutral friend in a sea of Axis neighbours was a real consideration in the minds of Hungary's best statesmen. The rapprochement led to the signing, in December, of a peace and friendship pact between the two countries.

Better relations between Budapest and Belgrade were viewed with satisfaction in Berlin. The Hungarian-Yugoslav Pact of Peace was seen by Hitler as a stabilizing factor in southeastern Europe, and stability there was essential because of the approaching conflict with Russia. But Hitler's expectations were dashed when in March 1941 Yugoslavia's government was overthrown by anti-German elements of its military. Hitler, in his rage, decided to crush Yugoslavian resistance. To do this he needed the co-operation of Hungary. Accordingly, he despatched a message to Horthy, promising to return to Hungary large areas which had been awarded to Yugoslavia by the peacemakers in 1919. Hitler's price was permission for the *Wehrmacht* to march through Hungary as well as Hungarian participation in the hostilities. The final Hungarian decision on the German request was taken at a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council on the first of April, almost a week after Hitler's plan had been brought to the Hungarian Government's knowledge. It is revealing of the state of politics in Budapest that, prior to the convening of the Council, Horthy had replied to Hitler's message in a letter whose tone was quite affirmative,¹⁹ and that a tentative but complete agreement had already been drawn up between Generals Paulus and Werth on the details of Hungarian-German military co-operation in the coming campaign.²⁰ At the meeting itself, Werth, supported by several ministers including Bartha, demanded Hungary's unconditional participation in the German invasion of Yugoslavia. But Werth and his supporters were out-voted by those who felt that, for the sake of the country's reputation in the West, participation in the German campaign had to be limited and had to be tied to certain definite conditions. In insisting on these conditions, Teleki and his associates had hoped to maintain some of Hun-

gary's neutrality, save the nation's honour and, particularly, retain the goodwill of Britain. The next day, when he learned that the imposition of the conditions on Hungary's participation in the invasion would not be enough to achieve the last of these objectives and might not even forestall a British declaration of war, Pál Teleki committed suicide.²¹

The Yugoslav crisis of the spring of 1941 brought to a close still another phase of Hungary's descent to the status of an Axis ally and satellite. It did not prove to be a final stage; the consequences of the crisis were not so drastic as Teleki had expected: the crisis had not brought a British declaration of war. With military activities in the Yugoslav lands having come to an early end for the time being, Hungary returned to the state of precarious *de jure* neutrality in the European conflict. But this state of affairs was not to last long, for the next crisis in Eastern Europe, Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, meant the realization of General Werth's hopes for a German-Hungarian military alliance.

The story of the diplomatic and political antecedents of Hungary's involvement in the German invasion of Russia need not be repeated here.²² It should be enough to say that Hungarian participation in the preparations for the attack was not envisaged by Hitler: the Führer distrusted the Hungarians. Nor did Hungary receive an official invitation to join the war even after the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict. While German pressure for Hungary to join was there, the decision to enter the War was made in Budapest. And in this decision the country's military — in particular, Generals Werth and Bartha — played an all-important role.

While diplomatic relations between the German and Hungarian governments were cool, as illustrated by Hitler's refusal to inform Budapest of his planned campaign against Russia, contacts between the two countries' army officers of high rank were frequent and close. Contrary to what may have been expected, the contacts were not sought by the Hungarians alone. In the months before the start of Operation *Barbarossa*, the German High Command had to take certain precautionary measures of which the Hungarians could not be left out. The German military wished to be assured that Hungarian defence works on the Russo-Hungarian border were adequate against any possible Soviet incursion. Accordingly, they sent one of their staff officers to Hungary and, with the consent of the Hungarian command, had him inspect the new defence works in Subcarpathia.²³ The Germans were also concerned with what they considered to be the inadequate equipment and training of the *honvédség* in certain areas; for example, in communications. As a result, they pressed for and obtained an increase in the number of German

military advisers and training officers attached to Hungarian units. As well, close collaboration came to be maintained between the two countries' forces in the field of military intelligence operations.²⁴

In addition to these official contacts, there were direct, secret discussions between high-ranking German and Hungarian generals on several occasions during the long months before the German invasion of Russia. Whether these discussions had resulted in the Hungarian military being informed about Operation *Barbarossa* is an open question. Communist historians in Hungary claim that certain German generals informed their Hungarian counterparts of Germany's true intentions as early as the autumn of 1940 and repeated their warnings about the imminence of a Russo-German war during the Yugoslav crisis.²⁵ This claim is not borne out by reliable sources. Indeed, if any German officer informed the Hungarians, he did so in contravention of Hitler's orders. We have it on the authority of Field-Marshal Keitel and Paulus that any reference to Operation *Barbarossa* was forbidden to German officers holding discussions with the Hungarians.²⁶

Whether Hungary's military leaders were informed about Hitler's plans by their German counterparts, or whether they guessed the Führer's intentions from the Nazis' all-too-obvious preparations, is irrelevant. The fact is that by early May, General Werth seems to have been in full knowledge of the German plans.²⁷ And he did not remain silent. On the 6th of the month he approached the country's new Premier, László Bárdossy, with a memorandum. He argued that the need for new resources would soon drive Germany into a conflict with Russia, and in this war the Germans would expect Hungary to co-operate with them. He urged that the Hungarian Government should anticipate the outbreak of the Russo-German war by offering a military alliance to Germany. Bárdossy answered Werth by questioning the imminence of war between the *Reich* and the USSR, and by expressing doubt about Germany's willingness to come to a military agreement with a small country like Hungary.²⁸

Not satisfied with the Premier's reply, on the 31st the Chief-of-Staff approached Bárdossy with another plea for a Hungarian-German military pact. Arguing along the same lines as before, he asked for permission to take up this matter with German military leaders. Not having received a reply to his latest proposal, on 14 June Werth again submitted a memorandum to the Premier. He predicted that the question of war between Germany and Soviet Russia would be decided "very soon." He also assured Bárdossy that, in view of the *Wehrmacht*'s past record and the doubtful strength of the Red Army, it was certain that the Germans

would achieve victory in a short time. Hungary's participation in the war would last for a very short while. The reserves could be demobilized by "harvest time." It is interesting to note why Werth felt that Hungary had to participate in the expected German invasion of Russia. Hungary was already committed to the Axis. Her Christian and nationalist ideology and anti-Bolshevik outlook obliged her to participate. The preservation of the country's territorial integrity and of its social and economic order also argued for the elimination of the Soviet Union, a potentially dangerous neighbour. Another reason for participation, Werth stressed, was the question of Hungarian territorial aggrandizement. Hungary's expansion depended on his participation in the German campaign. The situation was critical, according to Werth. Rumania had already committed herself to participation in the German war against Russia. If Hungary refused to join, the Chief-of-Staff argued, she would not only have to give up hopes of regaining more of Transylvania, but would have to face the prospect of losing the areas she had obtained in 1940.²⁹

Werth's latest memorandum was discussed by Hungary's civilian leaders at a meeting of the Ministerial Council on 15 June and was rejected. That same day the message came from Ribbentrop informing the Hungarian Government that German-Russian relations would be "clarified" by the first week of July at the latest.³⁰ The note from Berlin did not mention the question of Hungary's role in the coming showdown. Evidently, Hungarian participation in the opening phase of the attack on Russia was not desired. More ominous was the fact that the Germans announced the planned visit to Budapest of a member of their General Staff for the purpose of conducting discussions with the Hungarian military command. In anticipation of these talks, Bárdossy felt obliged to remind Werth of the Government's position on the question of the country's participation in the war. But the Premier's warning proved unnecessary, for the German emissary, General Franz Halder, came to Budapest a few days later with the aim of obtaining Hungarian cooperation in minor matters only.³¹

Prior to the 22nd of June no demand was made by Berlin on either the Hungarian Government or the military to effect the country's involvement in the war. Nor did this situation change on the 22nd, the day of the launching of Operation *Barbarossa*. It was only on the following day that an ominous change took place in the attitude of the Germans. On that morning General Kurt Himer, the *Wehrmacht*'s special representative in Hungary, visited Werth to convey the view of the German High Command that support by Hungary would be most welcome. This sup-

port, however, would have to be offered voluntarily: Germany would make no formal requests.³²

Himer's message to Werth introduced a new factor into the growing clash of views within Hungary's leadership on the question of participation in the war. Up to this time it was only the Hungarian military which demanded involvement. Now it became known that this was Germany's wish also. The civilian government was still opposed; in fact, the Ministerial Council once more rejected the idea at a meeting held on the morning of the 23rd.³³ But the Cabinet does not seem to have been firm on its decision. A few of its members undoubtedly favoured participation in the war, while many others, including Bárdossy himself, felt increasingly uneasy about Hungarian inaction. To mollify those who demanded a demonstration of Hungarian solidarity with Hitler's "crusade against Bolshevism," the Council decided to break diplomatic relations with Moscow. This move may have given some relief to those who wished to avoid tackling the larger question of the day: the issue of Hungary's role in the German war. But it was temporary relief only, for the question of participation in the conflict was to return very soon to haunt Hungary's leaders.

When Bárdossy was informed of the contents of Himer's message, he summoned Otto von Erdmannsdorff, Germany's Minister to Budapest, for an interview and informed him that the question of Hungary's participation in the war was up to the civilian authorities to decide. His government would be willing to review the question, but only if it was asked to do so through diplomatic channels. Communist historians usually claim that Bárdossy refused voluntary participation in the war because he wanted to exact a price for Hungarian help. It is more likely, however, that he was still in favour of staying out of the conflagration but did not want to admit this before the Germans. Accordingly, he tried to avoid Hungarian involvement by insisting on what the Germans were not willing to provide: a formal request for Hungarian assistance.³⁴ But the pressure on Bárdossy to yield continued to grow during the next forty-eight hours. On the 25th a message arrived from Rome bringing Mussolini's warning that continued inaction by Hungary could have unfortunate consequences for the country. Later that day came the news of Slovakia's entry into the war. The Axis front was now almost complete, only Hungary was missing. And, on the next day, an incident occurred which resulted in the entry into the war of that country as well: the air-raid on the city of Kassa (Košice) and other points in north-eastern Hungary.

Much has been written on this perplexing incident of modern Hun-

garian history and yet next to nothing is known as to who carried out the attack and why. The raid, which in Kassa resulted in about sixty casualties and much material damage, was perpetrated by a small number of planes in broad daylight, in full view of Hungarian military authorities. Still, no positive identification of the aircraft was made, and commentators on the incident have been left guessing as to the nationality and motive of the attackers. The Hungarian military blamed the attack on the Russians, a view which became the official explanation of the incident at the time. Yet, already during the war, rumours circulated in Hungary that the bombing was the work of the Germans who wanted to drag the country into the war. This version was accepted after the war by Horthy and his supporters as the true explanation. Communist historians have consistently blamed German and Hungarian "fascists" and "militarists" for the incident, while a life-time student of Hungarian history, Professor C. A. Macartney, endorsed still another contemporary rumour, according to which the raid was carried out by Czech or Slovak deserters flying German planes, on their way to Russia.³⁵ In 1972 the argument came round full circle when the present writer argued in an article that neither the "German" nor the "Slovak" version stood the test of evidence and that the most likely explanation of the riddle was that Russian planes bombed Kassa by mistake.³⁶ Recently an American historian reopened the debate by presenting some circumstantial evidence indicating that the raid may have been masterminded by one or more members of Hungary's officer corps.³⁷

Who bombed Kassa and why may never be known. And it does not really matter. What is more important is that the bombing precipitated a number of decisions in Budapest which ended in Hungary's entry into the war. The report of the attack was first received by Werth, who, accompanied by Defence Minister Bartha, hurried to consult with Horthy. On hearing the news, the Regent became agitated and called for retaliation against Russia. By the time Bárdossy arrived at the meeting, a decision had been arrived at in favour of immediate action. Bárdossy insisted that before any steps were taken, the Ministerial Council had to be summoned. This was agreed to and the fateful meeting of Horthy, Werth, Bartha and Bárdossy came to a hasty end. By the time the ministers assembled the Premier had already made up his mind. The Hungarian military had wanted war all along. The Germans, whom he instinctively believed to be the real perpetrators of the air-raid, wanted Hungarian participation badly enough to resort to such vile means to achieve their ends, while the Regent clamoured for retaliation against Russia. In view of this situation, Bárdossy believed that there was only

one course for him to follow: to obtain the Cabinet's consent to a declaration of a state of hostilities between Hungary and the USSR. The Cabinet consented without much disagreement. It is ironic that Bárdossy may have been mistaken on two counts in his analysis of the situation. The Kassa raid may not have been a German "plot," and it is not certain that by calling for a reply to the attack Horthy meant a declaration of hostilities or only reprisals against a selected Soviet target.³⁸ But before matters could be clarified, the decisions had been taken and there was to be no retreat. And so it came to pass that on the morning of 27 June 1941, Hungary's involvement in the war was announced in Budapest.

Viewed from an historical perspective, the events of 26 June 1941 appear to have been the outcome of a trend in Hungarian politics which had its beginnings in the years before the outbreak of the Second World War. Ever since the premiership of General Gömbös, the influence of Hungary's military had been growing in the country's affairs. As war approached in Europe, this increased strength of the military resulted in a tug-of-war between the country's civilian leaders and its generals on the question of strategy in a rapidly deteriorating international situation. The country's soldiers, with few exceptions, favoured closer association with the Axis and a more energetic programme of "gathering in" the lands that Hungary had lost in 1919-20. The civilian government was often divided on these questions. Its best elements wished to follow a cautious approach: they wanted to avoid an irreversible commitment to Germany and involvement in a European war.

The division within Hungary's leadership was not the only factor which worked to the advantage of the country's officer corps. The international situation was increasingly conducive to a pro-Axis orientation. The fact that more and more of East Central Europe came under Nazi control, undoubtedly enhanced the influence of Hungarian officers advocating closer co-operation with Germany; and Hitler's stunning victories in 1939 and 1940 helped to confirm the wisdom of their arguments. In the mid- and late 'thirties it was still possible to argue that Hungary had much to risk by tying her fate to an aggressive Germany, but after the spring of 1940 such arguments carried little weight.

Still another factor which had helped the growth of the military's influence in Hungary had been the increasing radicalization of the country's politics after the mid-'thirties. Fueled by the discontent caused by the Depression and the slowness of social reform, right-radical groups and movements mushroomed in some segments of Hungarian society. They often drew their inspiration from the success of German economic recovery and rearmament as well as an effective German foreign policy.

Attempts to stem the rising rightist tide in Hungary brought only temporary relief. The country's conservative and liberal elements could only fight a rear-guard action against the rightist onslaught. Since the time of Gömbös, every Hungarian premier had come into office with the intention to reverse or at least to slow down this trend, but not one of them succeeded. Some, like Imrédy, became converts to the rightist cause, while others collapsed or gave up under the strains and frustrations of the struggle. The most obvious victim of this process was Teleki, but there were others as well. And the departure of such men from the top leadership of the country as Teleki, Kánya and Bethlen had drastic consequences for Hungarian policy-making. In their own time these men counterbalanced the influence of the radical right and the military. They restrained the Regent, this septuagenarian gentleman who was given to fits of temper and over-enthusiasm in times of crisis. In June 1941, however, Bárdossy, the only man who could have restrained Horthy, lacked the moral courage to do so.

The real tragedy of 26 June was that the two men who broke the news of the air-raid to Horthy happened to be two pro-German generals. By the time Bárdossy arrived at the meeting, the ex-admiral was in agreement with the soldiers on the need for immediate, emphatic action. As head of state, Horthy should have exercised more caution; while Bárdossy should have protested the haste of the soldiers. But, he seems to have lacked the resolve to resist when confronted by an emphatic and unanimous demand. Under the circumstances the Cabinet could do very little. A few of its members voiced their disapproval, but they were voted down. Only a statesman of much wisdom, foresight, and high moral scruples could have saved the country from the decision to join the German war. Hungary had several such statesmen during the Horthy era. But in June 1941 not one of them could be found among the top leaders of the country. They had fallen victims to the power struggles of the previous three years.

A fair assessment of the subject of the Hungarian military's relationship to diplomacy should include an examination of the war years, up to 1944 when the Horthy era came to an end in the midst of a Nazi *coup d'état*. Such a study is beyond the scope of this essay (and has been beyond the energies of this writer in spite of persistent plans to embark on it). Fortunately, considerable work is available on the subject,³⁹ which enables us to make some relevant observations.

The general belief among scholars not familiar with the best research on wartime Hungarian history seems to be that Hungarian diplomacy continued to be dominated by a pro-German orientation inspired mainly

by the country's military until about the time of German reverses in North Africa and at Stalingrad. But the evidence does not support such an interpretation. On the contrary, the available data suggests that the hold which General Werth and his followers had on Hungarian diplomacy was short-lived.

The fact is that Werth was removed from his post as early as September 1941. The circumstances of his dismissal cannot be related here in detail. It must suffice to say that the whole affair originated in a disagreement over the extent of Hungary's participation in the German war effort during the summer of 1941. The limited nature of Hungarian military help to the Germans irritated Werth. To bring about a larger Hungarian role in the fighting in Russia, Werth approached the government with another of his long memoranda in which he accused the civilian administration of obstructing the war effort and thereby conducting a policy detrimental to Hungarian national interests. Werth also made promises to the German General Staff for the escalation of Hungarian military effort against the Russians. But he overreached himself. Premier Bárdossy resented both the content and the manner of the Chief-of-Staff's protests and decided to complain to Regent Horthy.⁴⁰ At the same time Werth encountered opposition from an unexpected quarter. Another of the country's influential soldiers, Lieutenant-General Ferenc Szombathelyi, the commander on the Russian Front, spoke out against the Chief-of-Staff's views in a memorandum in which he deemed the outcome of the war uncertain, and the best policy for Hungary, a withdrawal of her troops from Russia. Next, Szombathelyi was summoned to Budapest for consultation. After hearing both sides of the argument, Horthy asked for Werth's resignation and appointed Szombathelyi as the Chief-of-Staff.⁴¹ Although Szombathelyi was also an ethnic German (his original name was Knauz), he proved to be a loyal supporter of the pro-allied orientation of Premier Nicholas Kállay (1942–1944). This change in Hungary's military leadership was a significant one and has been called a "reversal of policy" whose causes remain "one of the mysteries of Hungary's role in World War II."⁴²

What happened in September 1941 was not really a "reversal of policy" nor is it a "mystery." It can more accurately be described as a return to the situation which had prevailed before that eventful spring and summer of 1941. For blind and one-sided alignment with Germany was never the policy of Hungary's leaders, and the country's military, however influential and however meddlesome, did not completely dominate foreign policy except for a brief period in 1941. Prior to 1941 their attempts to gain an upper hand in diplomatic decision making had been

repeatedly frustrated. Gömbös's drive to create a new Hungary on the Italian model was obstructed. During the Czechoslovak crisis, the military's advice was disregarded. Next, their new-found ally, Imrédy, was driven from office. Werth's 1940 proposal for a military pact with Germany was dismissed. His demands next spring for unconditional cooperation in the German invasion of Yugoslavia was not heeded, though by this time the military almost had its way. Still later the Chief-of-Staff's calls for a German-Hungarian alliance against the USSR fell on deaf ears until the crises of late June unnerved the civilian government. The balance-of-power between the civilian leaders and the military had gradually become more and more precarious as the war progressed, and as Nazi armies scored one triumph after another. In the summer of 1941 the balance tipped in favour of the Hungarian military or, more precisely, its pro-German elements. But the supremacy of the General Staff in diplomacy proved to be a brief one; unfortunately for Hungary, it also proved to be one in which irreversible decisions were taken. Of course, it is by no means certain that Hungary could have remained neutral in the war much beyond 1941 even if Werth and his supporters had not been there to exert an impact on the country's affairs. One should not forget the fact that by this time Germany wielded enormous power in East Central Europe. One only has to think of the pressure which Berlin put on Budapest early in 1942 to bring about a great increase in the Hungarian war effort. Yet the country's civilian government, headed after March of 1942 by Kállay, was in command of policy and used it, as much as the difficult circumstances permitted, to further Hungarian, as opposed to Axis, interests.

ABBREVIATIONS

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| DGFP | R. J. Sontag, <i>et al.</i> , eds., <i>Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945</i> . Washington, 1949-1963. |
| DIMK | László Zsigmond, gen. ed., <i>Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához, 1936-1945</i> (Diplomatic Documents on Hungary's Foreign Policy, 1936-1945), Budapest, 1962f. |
| HK | <i>Hadtörténelmi Közlemények</i> [Studies on Military History]. |
| <i>Horthy Papers</i> | Miklós Szinai and László Szücs, eds., <i>Horthy Miklós titkos iratai</i> [The Secret Papers of Miklós Horthy]. Budapest, 1965. |
| MMV | László Zsigmond, <i>et al.</i> , eds., <i>Magyarország és a második világháború: titkos diplomáciai okmányok a háború előzményeihez és történetéhez</i> [Hungary and the Second World War: Secret diplomatic documents on the origins and history of the war], 3rd ed. (Budapest, 1966). |
| TMWC | <i>Trial of the Major War Criminals before the Inter-National Military Tribunal</i> , 42 vols., Nuremberg, 1946-1950. |

NOTES

1. Hungarian literature on the subject of Hungary's military before and during the war is too extensive to be reviewed here in detail. One representative sample is György Ránki's *Emlékiratok és a valóság Magyarország második világháborús szerepléséről* [Memoirs and the Truth about Hungary's Role in the Second World War] (Budapest, 1964), especially pp. 180–91. Another is János Csima's "Adalékok a horthysta vezérkarnak az ellenforradalmi rendszer háborús politikájában betöltött szerepéről" [Data on the Role of the Horthyist General Staff in the War Policies of the Counter-revolutionary Regime] *HK*, 15 (Fall, 1968), 3, pp. 486–510. For two other Hungarian works on this theme see footnotes 24 and 25 below.
2. The most recent North American treatment of Hungary's role in the Second World War is Mario D. Fenyo's *Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941–1944* (New Haven and London, 1972). A work which focuses on the specific problem of the military's role in foreign policy during the pre-war years is Thomas L. Sakmyster's "Army Officers and Foreign Policy in Interwar Hungary, 1918–41," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 10 (January 1975), 1, pp. 19–40. Still another work is this writer's "Civil-Military Relations in Nazi Germany's Shadow: The Case of Hungary, 1939–41," in Adrian Preston and Peter Dennis, eds., *Swords and Covenants: Essays in Honour of the Centennial of the Royal Military College of Canada, 1876–1976* (London, 1976), pp. 216–247, a study on which this paper is based in part.
3. The 1937–38 period by Sakmyster and the post-1941 years by Fenyo. The publications of both of these authors developed from Ph.D. theses written on these two periods respectively.
4. Thomas L. Sakmyster, "Hungary and the Munich Crisis: The Revisionist Dilemma," *Slavic Review*, 32 (December 1973), 4, p. 740.
5. For details see C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929–1945* (Edinburgh, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 212–19. Also, Sakmyster, "Army Officers," pp. 26f.
6. Gyula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája, 1939–1941* [The Foreign Policy of the Teleki Government, 1939–1941] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964), pp. 15–16. György Ránki, *Emlékiratok*, pp. 180–81.
7. Vilmos Nagy de Nagybaczon, *Végzetes esztendőök, 1938–1945* [Fateful Years, 1938–1945] (Budapest, 1946), p. 30.
8. *DIMK*, vol. IV, doc. no. 577. Also, N. F. Dreisziger, "Count István Bethlen's Secret Plan for the Restoration of the Empire of Transylvania," *East European Quarterly*, 8 (January 1975), 4, pp. 413–423.
9. Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. 1, pp. 388–89.
10. Juhász, pp. 103f.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 121–24.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 122–24. András Hóry, *Még egy barázdát sem* [Not even one Furrow] (Vienna, 1967), p. 38.
14. N. F. Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way to World War II* (Toronto, 1968), pp. 129–131. For a different interpretation of Teleki's aims, see Juhász, pp. 150f.
15. Juhász, pp. 144–49.
16. The evidence on Werth's indiscretion is a memo from Teleki to Horthy (see fns. 17 and 18 below). Historians have generally accepted this evidence.
17. Memorandum by Teleki addressed to Horthy, 1 September 1940. *Horthy Papers*, doc. no. 49 (pp. 233–39).

18. Appendix I to the above document. *Ibid.*, pp. 239–51. Dreisziger, “Civil-Military Relations,” pp. 230–32.
19. Horthy acknowledged the existence of Hungarian territorial claims against Yugoslavia and welcomed the proposed discussions between the German and Hungarian general staffs. *MMV* doc. no. 127; also, Nagy, pp. 61f. For an English translation of Horthy’s letter, see Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, pp. 475ff.
20. Juhász, pp. 301–2. *MMV* doc. no. 130.
21. On Teleki’s death see Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, pp. 486ff. Also, Loránt Tilkovszky, *Teleki Pál: legenda és valóság* [Pál Teleki: The Legend and the Truth] (Budapest, 1969), Chapter I and pp. 515f.
22. C. A. Macartney, “Hungary’s Declaration of War on the USSR in 1941,” in A. O. Sarkissian, ed., *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography* (London, 1961), pp. 153–165. Juhász, pp. 157–167.
23. The testimony of Lieutenant-General Gunther Krappe. *TMWC*, vol. VII, pp. 336f.
24. Joseph Kun, “Magyarország második világháborúba való belépésének katonapolitikai vonatkozásai” [The Military-political Aspects of Hungary’s Entry into the Second World War], *HK*, 9 (1962), 1, pp. 21–22.
25. György Ránki, “Magyarország belépése a második világháborúba” [Hungary’s Entry into the Second World War], *HK*, 6 (1959), 2, p. 40. Kun, p. 21.
26. W. Keitel, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel* (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), p. 156. The memoirs of Ernst Alexander Paulus are cited by Mario D. Fenyó, *Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary*, p. 13.
27. András Zákó, “Egy emlékezetes évforduló” [A Memorable Anniversary], *Hadak Utján*, 13 (June 1961), 146, p. 8. Also, Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. II, p. 18.
28. Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. II, p. 18.
29. *MMV* doc. no. 141.
30. *DGFP* Ser. D. Vol. XII, doc. no. 631.
31. Juhász, pp. 343f.
32. *DGFP* Ser. D. Vol. XIII, doc. no. 54. The German High Command had favoured Hungarian involvement in the war all along; however, Hitler had forbidden it to express this view to the Hungarians until after the start of the invasion.
33. Juhász, p. 346.
34. N. F. Dreisziger, “New Twist to an Old Riddle: The Bombing of Kassa (Kosice) June 26, 1941,” *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (June 1972), 2, p. 235. For a Marxist interpretation see Juhász, pp. 351–52.
35. Macartney, “Hungary’s Declaration,” p. 165.
36. Dreisziger, “New Twist,” p. 242.
37. Sakmyster, “Army Officers,” p. 36.
38. Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. II, p. 26, especially note 1.
39. The two most notable ones in English are Macartney’s *October Fifteenth*, vol. II, and Fenyó’s work.
40. *Horthy Papers*, doc. no. 59.
41. The official reason given for Werth’s resignation was “ill health.” György Ránki, et al., eds., *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország: német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról, 1933–1944* [The Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary: German Diplomatic Documents on Hungary, 1933–1944] (Budapest, 1968), doc. no. 441. Simultaneously with Werth’s dismissal, another pro-German staff officer, General H. László, the Chief of the General Staff’s Operational Section, was also replaced. His successor was General János Vörös.
42. Fenyó, p. 30.

The Irrelevance of Ideology: The Fall of Marxism and the Rise of the Last Man

Robert Blumstock

Hungary has, since the end of World War II, staggered from a slavish obeisance to Soviet directives; through a heretical and violent outburst in 1956; an innovative, yet failed plan to decentralize industry and generate efficiency and profit; to a current impasse, which sees centralized controls returning, while the doctrinal laxity generated in Kádár's famous dictum, "those who are not against us, are with us,"¹ has fostered a situation in which official declarations of socialist solidarity meet with a public ennui supported and accompanied by the inscrutability of macro-economic theory linked to dialectical postulates.

Wandering around the streets of the inner city of Budapest, does not give the casual visitor the impression that he is in the centre of a society in which the austere maxims of Marx and Lenin really touch the lives of many people. The chic young men and women staring at the window displays on Váci utca, the murmur of the polite and often multi-lingual conversations in the crowded coffee shop of the Duna Intercontinental Hotel, and the musty chandeliered, decaying elegance of the Gerbaud, now the Vörösmarty café, where an older clientèle dip into their creamy cakes, sip their brandy, and fondle their glasses of soda water while in heated discussion about the results of the latest soccer game, defines this second city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as surviving in its own way despite the alien and imposed constraints enforced by the presence of Soviet troops. The wags of the city, cheerfully and with a droll cynicism characterize Hungary as, "the best barracks in the whole camp."

To a North American, the crowded and yet frequently available buses and the streets busy with shoppers carrying net bags full of an assort-

ment of groceries, is an archaic and nostalgic sight. The form of the city mirrors Vienna, with its ring streets and broad avenues. The older homes of the departed aristocracy, now largely transformed into embassies and offices for official state enterprises, line Népköztársaság út (Avenue of the People's Republic), which is still called Andrásy út, because its socialist nomenclature is too awkward, much as 6th Avenue in New York City has never been fully accepted as "The Avenue of the Americas." Further away in the hilly region of Buda, is Rózsadomb, another centre of the grand style of the late 19th century, now more fittingly an area where the new rich and powerful graciously display their achievements. In this area on frequent occasions, the black, chauffeur driven Chevrolet of János Kádár passes on its way to deliver the aging leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party to his residence high in these hills, or to take him to the headquarters of the Party on the banks of the Danube.

The apparent political and economic tranquility is to a considerable extent symbolized by Kádár, once the hated courier of Soviet intervention in 1956, who has been instrumental in calming the fractious elements, both in the Party and outside it, into accepting the reality of Soviet domination, while yet allowing a considerable degree of internal laxity in the definition of what socialism entails. Kádár is the central figure in a peculiar drama in which the stage is set by the Soviet Union. The actors, props and stage hands are the Hungarian Apparatus, and the sparse audience, the Hungarian population, watching and critically commenting on the performance in hushed whispers, so as not to distract the players, and hoping, if not for a happy ending, at least for a pleasant diversion.

Kádár's popularity in Hungary is unmatched by any other leader in the Soviet Bloc. He has managed to all but erase the memories of the depredations of the Rákosi regime, and to enhance the separation between public and private spheres, which increases the distance between an imposed socialism and the bourgeoisie value sub-structure which continues in spite of strenuous attempts to alter it.²

This enterprising compromise of Hungary's has not been a simple matter to achieve. The major instrument in this alteration has been the emphasis on planning and coördination, managed by experts who have replaced inexpert functionaries who were loyal to the demands of the Soviet Union. With this emphasis on planning, a dual Hungary³ is in process of forming, in which the state and society are two separate entities with little attention paid by the masses to public pronouncements unless they intrude on the defences constructed to insulate and protect their privacy.

This duality and the protective distancing developed, is most visible in the activities of the 'political planner', who is no longer the committed Party worker informing on the indiscretions of his co-workers, but a management expert using the tools of the social sciences to acquire useful information to enhance productivity, irrespective of what may be felt and thought by those performing the tasks. This rôle of expertise has fostered the generation of research institutes in which data gathering on attitudes and opinions is seen as a prime mechanism for the ultimate achievement of an enhanced commitment to socialism.

This shift in emphasis began a few years after the Kádár régime consolidated its hold, when in 1960 the acceptability of social science research was announced with the publication of three articles, one on social science methodology, another on the reaction of young people to jazz, and a survey on the uses of leisure and moral and political concerns.⁴ In the ensuing years, both a Sociological Research Institute and a Public Opinion Research Centre linked with the Radio were established. The formation of the Sociology Institute was initially placed in the hands of András Hegedüs, the Prime Minister during the final months of the Rákosi regime. However, the transformation of Hegedüs from an unquestioning and loyal servant to a critic of Soviet policy culminated in 1968, when he signed with others a proclamation condemning the Warsaw Pact nations' invasion of Czechoslovakia. At this point Hegedüs was replaced at the Institute by Kálmán Kulcsár, a more acceptable, if apolitical figure, who is still at the helm of the Institute.

Hegedüs brought into the Institute a number of young people, who were not all formally trained in the social sciences, amongst whom were several students of György Lukács. Hegedüs and his staff saw the alternatives which Sociology could adopt in its milieu,⁵ and his leadership was based on a toleration for a diversity of perspectives. In recent years, however, some of the researchers have concentrated inordinately on the contradictions within the policy formulations of the Party, which has resulted, for some, in exile, and for others, enforced silence. Consequently it has become increasingly obvious that the desired and acceptable stance of the social sciences in Hungary is that of a handmaiden to the Apparatus in its desire to eliminate ideologically based criticisms, and to achieve a greater commitment to socialist values. This end-of-ideology approach has not, however, resulted in the attainment of the planned enhancement of social cohesion. On the contrary, the available data show if anything a conscious lack of personal investment in socialist shibboleths. The basis for this assertion is founded on a range of studies completed to date, especially in the area of Public Opinion, which show a clear and unmistakable lack of interest on the part of most

sectors of the population in the nature, form and substance of the governmental machinery to which they are subject.⁶ It would, however, be premature to see this indifference as an indicator of the essential illegitimacy of the political form of the nation. Rather these responses may simply be defined as a measure of the distance between what most people would see as important issues which concern them directly, as opposed to those that are fixed and consequently not subject to debate or discussion.

In spite of the lack-lustre evidence produced to date, these studies continue to be supported by the Agit-Prop directorate of the Central Committee. Several possible explanations for this are given by the workers in the area. One is that the development of the critical faculties of the people has not had a sufficient time to develop,⁷ and consequently these studies should not be halted by circumstances which will be altered in time. There is also an awareness on the part of researchers in the field that the population is quite suspicious about the uses to which such information may be put. The breaking down of this wariness to respond is also seen as requiring time.⁸ Finally, these studies continue, even given the dearth of useful data, as they are defined as contributing to the development of more refined and accurate methodological procedures.⁹

As long as these studies do continue, they are indicators of the dominance of the 'liberal' component in the leadership structure, who care less about day-to-day ritual allegiance and more about long-run macro-economic and social developments.

This gap in information and the general thrust of development on the part of Hungary's leadership suggests that there is a covert conflict between the assumptions implicit in the original Marxian postulates concerning the 'new man', combined with the planner's desire to generate an informed and aware public, and the announced lack of interest in these issues exhibited by the population. The ideological directives designed to develop this ideal, appear to have actually enhanced the privatized and publicly irresponsible individual Nietzsche called the Last Man.¹⁰

No shepherd and one herd! Everyone wanteth the same; everyone is equal; he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the mad-house.

We have discovered happiness . . . say the last man and blinketh thereby.

The unanticipated outcome of this new emphasis on manipulation has reopened the door to a virile return of extreme bourgeois-like individualism,¹¹ in which political and economic controls are seen by many

as hurdles to be vaulted, rather than as guidelines and constraints enhancing the development of a higher moral order.

Given the inert public audience, and the continued attempts to cajole it into a concern with the commonweal on the part of the Agit-Prop and its technically proficient yet ineffective consultants, the outcome obviously disappoints those inclined toward a pristine Marxian orthodoxy. However, it is possible to see in this, that the rational emphases with a coordinated society linked to the distant achievement of utopian goals, displaces the concept of morality with cooptation, while ethical action is replaced by a systemic concern in which the major stress is on technical manipulation and management.¹² Man in this guiding perspective becomes an exterior creature, devoid of substance, who fulfills his quotas, and readily accepts his place, and who never reacts in any way but those defined from above as acceptable. The growth of this simplistic creature devoid of passion and desire, who conforms to both the formal and substantive criteria of rationality, returns us to the 'iron cage' of organization that so overwhelmed Max Weber.¹³

In Hungary, this separation of the world of the planners and the people simply confirms the irrelevance of the initial visions of the end of the divisiveness of toil and the isomorphism of the general and individual wills. These issues are distant from the programmatic demands of coordination, and it is largely left to Western Marxist scholars to continue the debate over these critical issues.¹⁴ The dissociation of ideology, efficiency and morality from the private concerns of the population has fostered in Hungary an alienation from public policy pronouncements which is only relieved by a traditional fatalism and a cynical coffee house humour in which individuals seek solace and relief from the stresses imposed by removing themselves from the battleground and focusing on simpler, immediate and more mundane pleasures.¹⁵

The appeal of this Hungarian resolution is widespread among the populations of the other Soviet Bloc nations, and tourists from East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union flock to the sophisticated delights of Budapest.

For those few within Hungary who are unable to quietly tolerate the contradictions, ostracism has been refurbished as a technique for removing potential dissidents. For yet others, defection to the West remains an alternative, when and if the opportunity presents itself. Among those who remain, silence is acknowledged as the most effective posture in coping with the charade of benevolent domination.¹⁶

Nearly 150 years ago, De Tocqueville in viewing the United States feared the potential for despotism in a nation committed to individual-

ism. In Hungary today, the managed, humanized socialism which has developed illustrates more the outcome, rather than a prelude to totalitarianism.¹⁷

Each of them, living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children, and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country.

Other Variations

The Hungarian practice of inadvertently encouraging an alienation from public involvements is an extreme, yet effective mechanism for keeping Hungary quietly within the socialist camp. The examples of some of the attempts to bring public concerns and private interests together have not been lost sight of in Hungary. For example, the attempt in Czechoslovakia to re-establish ties to its Social-Democratic past resulted in invasion and a renewal of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. None of the other alternatives which have developed come close to affording the privacy available to Hungarians. Roumania has, for example, forcefully maintained a high order of internal orthodoxy and control, while its foreign policy links to Israel symbolize a search for a modicum of autonomy from the Soviet presence. In Poland the strong religious tradition embodied in the Roman Catholic Church's defense of Polish nationality against the encroachments of the Protestant, Germanic West, and the Russian Orthodox East, remains the one potent moral force containing the strains of an inefficient economy. The Church retains a powerful capacity to minimize the potential repression which might be used by the hand-maidens of the Soviet Apparatus to ensure acquiescence to their directives. This tie between the Polish Party and the Church remains all the more anomalous, as publicly the Church is the standing challenge to the Marxist faith.

East Germany presents the unique case of successfully combining doctrinal orthodoxy and public involvement with industrial and agricultural efficiency. The reconsolidation of the East German Apparatus and the Trade Unions after 1956, and the subsequent building of the Berlin Wall has led to the development of a more sectarian and garrison-like posture, more closely tied to the Soviet Union's aspirations than anywhere else in the Bloc. There are several possible reasons why the leadership of the GDR is as successful as it is. Firstly, there is the ever-present model of the good bourgeois life provided by West Germany and the felt necessity to develop a more stringent and cohesive ideologi-

cal argument to buttress doctrinal purity. East Germany's comparative poverty contrasts with the abundance of its Western neighbour, and provides a niche for more pristine emphases.¹⁸ Secondly, there is the severe limitation on travel imposed on the citizens of the GDR, which prevents them from savouring alternatives.¹⁹ Finally, in the GDR the remnants of Prussian respect for authority may simply combine readily with the latest accretion of totalitarianism.

Yugoslavia and Albania present two heretical postures, one based on relative affluence, the other on poverty. In the case of Yugoslavia, an early decision was made to establish its own fellowship, in which the leadership of Moscow was rejected. With the aging of Tito, overtures to bring these errant souls back into line are repeatedly suggested, but Yugoslavia remains too involved with its own problems to be easily courted. In Albania, isolation and poverty have combined to foster an extreme set of controls in which the orthodoxy of the Soviet Union looks bland and compromised.

The greatest deviation from Soviet orthodoxy is not to be found within the boundaries of its satellite states but in the rise of Communist Parties in Western Europe, where the possibilities of assuming power are imminent. The announced intentions of these parties is to seek their own paths rather than follow the model provided by the Soviet Union. The combination of a volatile political tradition in such countries as Portugal, Spain and Italy, which have been subject to the totalitarianism of fascism, and the moral emphasis visible in their uncontaminated and untried Marxism, suggests that their pronouncements may well enhance the confusion and perplexity of what is entailed in socialism. It is perhaps not surprising to see that János Kádár will be among the first of the satellite leaders to go to Italy to discuss the dimensions of what portends to be another schism in the fabric of socialist solidarity.²⁰

The extent of the variations so far developed, illustrates the visible forms of compromise taken to reduce the strains and alter the impact of directed economic growth. The continued existence of the myriad problems faced by these countries and the variations in the interface between technique and naked domination point to the general complexities in the struggle for control and the strange allies that will be sought out in order to maintain hegemony by the Party.

Resolution

There is no precise way to describe the many possible scenarios that may be forthcoming from these modifications in doctrinal emphasis. If Hungary's example is, as suggested, an extreme yet acceptable position,

within the defined limits, then the two elements, bureaucratization and privatization, pose a tenuous resolution to the unsolvable problems of ideological control and the hopes for the development of a new and higher socialist morality. It should not be forgotten that one of the central sources behind the modifications in orthodoxy results from the effort to raise the level of living. The achievement of relative affluence has had a greater impact in calling into question the traditional controls than any other single result of the technical efforts directed within Eastern Europe. The paradox of affluence in these societies, as in the West, is that it has neither generated the hoped for relaxation in social divisiveness, nor enhanced the moral component of social relations. On the contrary, the rise in the standard of living has fostered an unbridled individualism in which crass manoeuvring for advantage seems a likely if undesired outcome. With this loosening of constraints over individual action, the problem of control becomes, to the governing body, one in which private excesses ought to be regulated so as to provide for the common good. This regulation and manipulation take the place of individual belief and commitment. Yet regulation without a common value core provides the seed of its own ultimate destruction. No contract was ever created which does not contain enough loop-holes for the artificer to wander through in maximizing his own interests. The rise in the standard of living through technical means is a prime factor in the transition from sectarian exclusiveness to churchly laxity. This change in organizational style increases the distance between ideology and organization, and minimizes the expressive involvements of individuals in the very structures which control and regulate their instrumental energies. The result appears to portend what Durkheim called the 'moral mediocrity'²¹ of an unrestrained individualism in which the vitality of the social sphere is replaced by Faustian excesses which are unconstrained by normatively internalized limits. This is a perplexing outcome for those who look for more in humanity. Yet this separation of the public and private spheres of meaning has captured the interest of many in the West who also see a decline in the coherence of liberal political structures.²²

To those in Eastern Europe to whom the assertion of creating a 'new society' and a 'new man' carry reminders of the murderous deprivations of the past combined with crass and empty moralizing, the option of substituting private meanings for public irrelevancies does offer, if not the same range of options as in the West, the possibility of a lonely yet euphoric sense of deliverance. How far this can go is, of course, a moot point. Much as the Reformation created Weber's 'iron cage' of con-

formity, there are no doubt traps in this alienating construction. While we can see the deadening social outcomes to the masses in the Soviet Union and its satellites, who are burdened with the organized unaccountability of totalitarianism, and who have only begun to savour the possibilities of carving out their lonely, private niches, the challenge is inviting.

NOTES

1. The original religious source of this quotation, Matthew 12:30, "Those who are not with us, are against us," has a more closed, protective and exclusive character than its newer Hungarian variant. The reversal in the quotation indicates both a movement away from an intolerant sectarian posture in favour of an open accommodation to existing social divisions and a realization that the generation of cohesion will not be advanced by maintaining a divisiveness which defines sectors of the population as enemies of the faith.
2. Bennett Kovrig, *The Hungarian People's Republic*, Baltimore, 1970; Peter A. Toma and Ivan Volgyes, *Politics in Hungary*, San Francisco, 1977.
3. Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, 1971, pp. 121-142.
4. Robert Blumstock, "Public Opinion in Hungary" in *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems*, eds. Walter D. Connor and Zvi Gitelman, New York, 1977, pp. 132-166.
5. W. F. Robinson, "Hegedus, His Views and His Critics," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, April 1969, pp. 124-125.
6. Robert Blumstock, *op. cit.*; Peter Toma and Ivan Volgyes, *op. cit.*
7. Róbert Angelusz, "To a Definition of the Concept and Structure of Public Opinion," in *Public Opinion and Mass Communication-Working Conference*, Budapest, 1971, p. 51.
8. Edit S. Molnár, "Véleményalkotás és Információszerzés" (The Creation of Opinion and the Acquisition of Information) in *Az Információtól a Közéletig* (From Information to Public Life), ed. T. Szecső, Budapest, 1973.
9. Ferenc Békés and Edit S. Molnár, "Az 1971 Évi Omnibusz felmérések módszertani tapasztalatai," *Módszertan*, MRT Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Vol. 3, No. 7, March 9, 1972, p. 4. (Methodological Experiences Gained with the 1971 Omnibus Surveys).
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, trans. Thomas Common, New York, 1927.
11. Bennett Kovrig, *op. cit.*
12. D. H. Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," *American Sociological Review* 26:2, April 1961, pp. 183-193. Systems analysis is quite popular among sociologists in the Soviet Union. Talcott Parsons, whom many radicals in the West excoriate because of what appear to be his conservative positions, is also very popular in Soviet sociological circles; see A. Simirenko, *Soviet Sociology*, Chicago, 1966.
13. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, New York, 1958, p. 181.
14. The Lukács group, consisting of Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, Mihály Vajda, and György and Marissa Márkus, and András Hegedüs, even though the latter was not technically a student of Lukács, have all been silenced and dropped from the Party. At the moment Hegedüs is the only one living in Hungary.

15. One of the visible manifestations of stress is the fact that Hungary has the highest suicide rate in Europe. However, this rate has been high for the last 100 years, but only now is this reaching the awareness of the general population. See Mihály Gergely, *Röpirat az Öngyilkosságról* (A Flyer on Suicide) Budapest, 1972.
16. In addition to the silencing of the Lukács group, Iván Szelényi, a sociologist, was 'invited' to leave Hungary and is now Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Flinders University in Australia. A writer, György Konrád, was allowed to stay, but on the condition that he refrain from publishing any new work which might be contentious. He is currently travelling in Europe and North America.
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York, 1954, Vol. 2, p. 336.
18. "Communist Party Membership by Occupation" in L. J. Cohen and Jane Shapiro, eds., *Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective*, New York, 1974, p. 526. Proportionally there are more members of the Communist Party in the industrial labour force in East Germany than elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc.
19. This presents an interesting example of an attempt to maintain sectarian principles by isolation.
20. *New York Times*, April 24, 1977. Section 1, p. 12.
21. E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. J. W. Swain, London, 1957, p. 427.
22. T. Luckmann, "Belief, Unbelief, and Religion," *The Culture of Unbelief*, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 21-38; T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion*, New York, 1967.

Searching for Land: The First Hungarian Influx into Canada

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It is a well-established fact that the first groups of Hungarian immigrants to the Canadian West¹ came from south of the border, where they had found employment and often spent several years working in coal mines, foundries, and factories mainly in Pennsylvania. In this context, the question arises as to what compelling reasons had prompted these people to leave their jobs in the United States and undertake the strain and expenses of a transfer to the west of Canada. The study of the newspapers from the mining areas in the eastern United States reveals the main characteristics of an economy free in the extreme from social and safety legislation of any kind. In conformity with the leading ideas of the age the American business magnates firmly believed that their task was practically exhausted in the achievement of the greatest possible profit and that it was up to the individual worker to protect and represent his interests as best he could. Consequently, what we would nowadays call industrial disputes were the order of the day. In the ensuing strikes and violence the Eastern and Central European immigrants, including, of course, the Hungarians, were usually thrown in between the two warring camps of the workers and the employers. As a rule, it was the immigrants who had to bear the brunt of any fight. Thus the employers could use newly arrived immigrants to become strike breakers and force a settlement with the strikers. On the other hand, it was not unusual for the trade unions to utilize immigrant miners or factory workers as shock troops against sheriffs and suffer severe losses when shooting occurred. As to job opportunities, the inexperienced and untrained immigrant, often illiterate and usually without any command of English, was last to be employed and first to be dismissed particularly during times of economic recession or depression. Moreover, owing to the same qualities it seemed natural for him to receive the most dangerous and therefore least desirable assignments in factories, foundries or underground in the mines. Yet in view of such circumstances, it would have been cheaper, if not more humanitarian, to employ persons with skill and greater com-

mand of English, and thus reduce the likelihood of accidents. Nonetheless, reports abound in the press about minor and even major industrial calamities also in later years. Such items were reported regularly and in detail by the American Hungarian press. By the late 1890s the *Amerikai Nemzetőr* (*American National Guard*) and afterwards the *Szabadság* (*Liberty*) were the principal distributors of news among Hungarians in America. The American Hungarian press supplied the newspapers of Hungary with source material concerning industrial accidents in the eastern United States. Such information was not only published in many newspapers of Hungary, but often received editorial comment as well. The main motive behind this approach lay in the government's desire to counteract success stories continually arriving from overseas, and to discredit and undermine the immigration movement as a whole. Whatever their original intentions, such reports serve to show some darker aspects of the life of Hungarian immigrants in America and present instances, in their midst, of alienation of varying severity.

A single issue of a newspaper contained accounts of industrial accidents and other mishaps symptomatic of alienation during an apparently brief period of the summer of 1895. Thus, owing to the cracking of a blast furnace at the Carnegie Steel Works at Braddock, Pennsylvania, nine workers lost their lives and sixteen were wounded; except for the foreman, all were Hungarians. In an explosion at the Cornwall mines near Lebanon another Hungarian worker was hit by a piece of iron which broke his ribs, killing him. At Scranton, András Kruni's right leg was amputated after its having been crushed by a cart in the Jessup coal mine. At Wilkesbarre a Hungarian miner was buried by coal and perished of severe lacerations. A Hungarian factory hand at the National Sugar Refinery, Yonkers, was pulled by his apron into a machine and later expired in the hospital bed. Fear of illness and abject poverty prompted two Hungarians to end their lives with revolver shots.²

Worries of various kinds, cares, tensions and perhaps the very fact of migration, often proved too nerve-racking. Thus an immigrant, upon reaching the border of Hungary, turned violently insane and had to be removed from the train.³ Apparently little change was seen in this respect as time went by. A letter written by a Hungarian immigrant in America and published by the Hungarian newspaper reports

... seldom is the day that a dozen or fourteen men should not be killed by the iron and the Americans only laugh that yet another Hunky is finished. There is enough men, one couldn't see so many maimed persons even in a war as in America, whose hand or leg has been cut off by the iron. . . . The American is very angry because Hungarian and other immigrants come, because he cannot make a living due to him. Besides,

the poor Hungarian is despised and cannot very well get a job since they cannot talk with him.⁴

Not much improvement could be noticed, despite the passage of years, in the way of life of the coal miners either. According to a report in 1903 the working time of coal miners underground lasted from five in the morning until seven at night. This would prevent them from seeing the sun at all for weeks on end. In the opinion of the writer of the report, every Hungarian immigrating to America would do well to tell his relatives: "I'm kissing you for the last time, I'm hugging you for the last time, I shall be gone forever — since I don't know whether I will ever return alive from the coal mines."⁵ Apparently one of the worst years on record, in respect to economic development, occurred in 1907 and 1908. Beginning in the middle of 1907, the United States coal and steel industries were hit by an extremely severe depression. In consequence, thousands of workers were dismissed and lost their bread. Also, 1907 witnessed one of the most tragic disasters in the history of mining, at Jacob's Creek near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on December 19. According to an article in a Hungarian newspaper this particular mine was known to have an extremely bad safety record; a great many workers had been killed in various accidents there, including more than one hundred miners. In the current disaster 315 men including 110 Hungarians were reported to have lost their lives. The journalist was moved to make the following comments:

This new world is very strange. Everything is greedy here. . . . Even the earth. . . . It wants the life of that despised foreigner. . . . The stay of the derided and ridiculed Hungarian in the bowels of the earth is nothing but struggle and agony. He earns a few cents for himself and accumulates heaps of money for the mining companies. All this is not enough. He must throw in his body as well, as sacrifice for the interior of the earth. Let also the body be reduced to carbon . . . so that the coal for sale might be augmented with charred bodies.⁶

The receiving society's feeling of superiority and general attitude to "foreign" immigrants were clearly and outspokenly indicated through labelling certain groups with mocking nicknames. The most frequent such name used in reference to Hungarians was the word *Hunky*. It is not quite clear whether the word had derived as an abbreviation of the word 'Hungarian' or come from the name of the ancient horse-riding nomadic tribe of the Huns. The adjective Hun has become very pejorative since its unfortunate use by the Emperor of Germany in connection with the Boxer Rebellion in 1900–1901.⁷ Nevertheless, some of its deprecating implications might have been anticipated in the older nickname *Hunky*. In any case, Hungarians of the time felt hurt and degraded

through its use and complained bitterly about it. What kind of adverse value judgment contemporaries felt the sobriquet contained can be seen from this particular newspaper story:

The ignorant foreign worker is driven by the hundred into the mine infiltrated with gas and thousand other dangers — and none of them will come back. Will the public opinion be upset? Oh no! . . . What does it matter, they are only Hunkies. — In the city of Gary a certain Andras Ribar who was singing in the street in Hungarian during the night was shot dead by a policeman. . . . The mayor of the city of Gary felt prompted to say . . . “Andras Ribar who has been killed was not a man but only a Hunky.”⁸

Towards the end of 1910 the *Szabadság* (the Hungarian language newspaper of America) strikingly summarized the labour safety position in a large cartoon on its front page. Healthy muscular young workers are seen to march into a factory through its right-hand entrance; through the exit on the left a large group of cripples, one-legged and on crutches, and elderly are trudging outside. These victims of the factory are led by a legless man placed on a hand-cart propelling himself with his hands.⁹

At that stage very little, if any, financial or other assistance was available for those workers who were permanently or partly incapacitated. Thus, some of them could find only one solution for their troubles at the final stage of alienation, in the form of suicide.

An ex-peasant from the Nyírség, for two years a miner, found a particularly gruesome way to demonstrate his despair over the fact that he could not obtain work owing to an illness. While at work in the mine he had apparently put aside a stick of dynamite which he now placed in his mouth and detonated. The pieces of his body had to be collected within a circle some thirty feet in diameter and they were buried in the midst of the great and understandable sympathy of his Hungarian fellow workers.¹⁰

The traumatic experiences of Hungarian peasants in American factories and mines have filtered through into folksongs and poetry as well. The songs sung on the shores of the Huron and the Erie are at the same time interesting specimens of how English language elements have penetrated the American Hungarian language:

A letter went from America somewhere [in Hungary]
It is so sad that even its seal shows mourning
My dear mother do not weep for me, it is all in vain.
It's a small matter, only one miner will be missing from the mine.¹¹

The other folksong holds up the lack of interest which Francis Joseph, the Emperor and King of Austria-Hungary, was supposed to have felt towards the problem of emigration in Hungary.

Francis Joseph is travelling in the direction of Eger.
Three 'bodies' are leaving for the new country.
Francis Joseph is asking them what is new?
"The taxes are too high, the country cannot bear them."¹²

A poem, published in the *Canadai Magyar Farmer* (Canadian Hungarian Farmer) under the neutral sounding title of *A Hunok* (The Huns), deals in an epic manner with the suffering and accidents of Hungarian peasants as foundry workers. At the same time, it reflects the identity crisis felt owing to a clash between the folk pride felt about the supposed Hungarian-Hun relationship maintained in many legends of the peasants as well as in medieval chronicles, and the poor American image of the Huns.

Migration has eternally continued on this earth . . .
Atilla's late descendants have set out to move,
They, the disloyal degenerate offspring, the helpless weaklings,
Who are taunted as *Huns* by the people of America,
Keep on toiling in terrible drudgery day and night
Where the poisonous fumes of the fire are densest.
There the Huns are pushed by members of hostile races,
The Huns, the despised offspring of the great Hunnish army
Of whom their ancestors had been once in deadly fear.
Who would stand up for them, they who are alone;
They, the toilers designated for death by flames!
Their lean bony faces glow in the fierce glare,
Contempt of deadly danger glitters in the eyes of each.
The ardour by which the world had been subjugated once upon a time,
Once again flares up in the degenerate progeny.
Woe is him, who turns dizzy even for a moment;
He will vanish without a trace from this planet.
Not even dust will be left in the hungry blast furnace,
The red-hot radiation will not even be dimmed.
Another hand will take his place in no time.
Who cares! The offspring of the Huns are a dying race.
They do not possess a brother in this world.
Also their glory now amounts to nothing, but a fairy tale and dream!
He who is not reduced to ashes, will lose his leg,
His hard-working arms, or the sight of his eyes.
And then . . . that the grotesque sufferers cannot be seen,
They are transferred to a distant island.
There they will be extinguished slowly and forgotten,
The destitute regiment of the poor *quasi* Huns.¹³

The poem appears to have been composed on the basis of the romantic Hun-Magyar kinship often stressed in folk legends, and it contains a definite message about the sorry fate of many a peasant factory-hand of the time. Besides, a clear doubt is expressed about the future of pre-1914

Hungary and latent fear concerning the chances of survival of Hungarians as a nation.

A newspaper item in Hungary written by a Hungarian visitor to America, provides a less sentimental and more realistic evaluation of Magyars as workers. In the opinion of this observer the fact that the Hungarian is a hard worker is acknowledged by the Americans; however, the Hunky is despised owing to his unassuming and simple way of life. They do not seem to approve of his apparent greediness to earn much money within a short time and at any price so that he can return to his native village and purchase land there. Consequently, the Hungarian worker is not very choosy as to work; he is not above becoming a strike breaker in a strike and therefore, the American employer will often resort to pitting Hungarian immigrants against the organized American workers. Since he does not even want to reach the American standard of wages, he is likely to keep down the level of wages. The writer of the article found that most Hungarian immigrants employed in the mines in iron and steel foundries were subject to dismissal without notice, since no legislation existed protecting the worker, or if it did, it was not carried out. No concern was shown towards the life and bodily health of the individual since everyone was expected to look after himself. "In this respect the American employer is ruthless and merciless."¹⁴

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Peter Németh should have contrasted the positions of Hungarian workers in Canada to those of their fellow-countrymen in the contemporary United States. He did this pointedly in the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* (*American Hungarian People's Voice*):


... here in Canada Hungarians are respected and honoured. ... Things and persons called Hungarian are synonymous with "best." This claim sounds almost incredible when we Hungarians living here in a strange world have been accustomed to being degraded and disparaged every now and then and to being called Hunkies.¹⁵

No doubt in addition to the attraction of land, to the possibility of returning to farming, their ancestral occupation, this quiet appreciation — north of the border — of the person and personality of the Hungarian immigrant was a factor in persuading him to settle on the Canadian prairie.

NOTES

1. For further information with respect to emigration from Hungary and immigration to English-speaking America, see M. L. Kovacs, "Aspects of Hungarian

- Peasant Emigration from Pre-1914 Hungary,” in I. Volgyes, ed., *The Peasantry of Eastern Europe*, 2 vols. (New York, 1979), I, pp. 119–132.
2. *Felsőmagyarország* [‘Upper Hungary’], August 28, 1895.
 3. Mihály Karakó, of Kenézlő, Szabolcs, since no proper medical facilities were available at Csacza, the famous border crossing place where several hundred thousand emigrants passed on their way to America, had to be placed under police arrest for his own sake. *Nyirvidék* [‘Nyir Area’], March 23, 1902.
 4. *Nyirvidék*, April 27, 1902.
 5. *Nyirvidék*, March 22, 1903.
 6. *Resicai Lapok* [‘Resica News’], January 16, 1908. The reporter, of course, is indulging in rhetorics when generalizing without restraint: “America is now in our eyes a country of misery and horror.”
 7. References to the episode, often only partly accurate also with respect to the Huns, have circulated widely, as, for instance: “*Huns* . . . the barbarous race of Tartar origin, invading Italy under Attila, the Scourge of God, A.D. 451–53. Name applied to and claimed by the modern Germans. Derived from the ex-Kaiser’s advising the German troops sent to China in 1900 to act like the Huns under Attila.” Charles Annandale, *Home Study Dictionary* (London, n.d.), 355.
 8. *Resicai Lapok*, July 15, 1909.
 9. *Szabadság* [‘Liberty’], October 31, 1910.
 10. *Nagykároly es Érmellék* [places in eastern Hungary], March 18, 1911.
 11. *Resicai Lapok*, January 14, 1912. The Magyarized English words in the Hungarian text: ‘majner’ = miner; ‘majna’ = mine.
 12. *Resicai Lapok*, January 4, 1912. *Eger*: a city in Heves County in northeastern Hungary. ‘Bodi’ (body) seems to have been taken over from the practice of counting how many ‘bodies’ have entered or left the shafts and underground.
 13. *Canadian Hungarian Farmer*, November 15, 1913.
 14. *Temesvári Hírlap* [‘Temesvár News’], January 4, 1913.
 15. Péter Németh, “The Canadian Hungarian Farmsteads” [A Kanadai magyar tanyák], in Géza D. Berkó, ed., *The Festive Album of the Canadian Hungarian People’s Voice Jubilee, 1899–1909* (New York, 1910), 79. Péter Németh was a very recent immigrant at that stage from the United States and, as a journalist, had a reasonably good grasp of the life and social status of the Hungarians there. Nevertheless, the fact that, for several decades, a “war” for immigrants had been going on between the two otherwise friendly countries must not be lost from sight. On top of that, Németh’s newspaper, the *Kanadai Magyarorság* (*Canadian Hungarians*), later *Kanadai Magyar Farmer* (*Canadian Hungarian Farmer*), heavily depended on government support. Yet the self-employment and relative independence of the farmers of the later peasant communities on the Canadian prairie were to justify many of the early expectations. Cf. Kovacs, “Aspects of Hungarian Peasant Emigration . . .,” pp. 121–123.



Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in Central Canada, 1921-1931

N. F. Dreisziger

In many respects the history of Canada's Central and East European ethnic groups is an unexplored field. This is especially true in the case of Hungarian Canadians. Aside from the work of Professor M. L. Kovacs on the Saskatchewan settlements, and a sociological study by the late John Kosa on some one hundred Ontario families, no professional scholar so far has done research on the history of these people.¹ No substantial work has been undertaken, for example, on their largest settlements, the Hungarian neighbourhoods of Central Canada's big cities.² This paper is a part of a larger effort to fill in this great gap in Hungarian Canadian historiography, mainly dealing with a critical period, the 1920s, when the most significant growth in Hungarian immigration took place, and when Central Canada's largest Magyar "ghettos" emerged in Toronto and Montreal. Besides offering some statistical information on the subject, the author will try to find out the contributions by various factors to the bringing about of the same. By doing so, we hope to make some progress towards answering the question, why immigrants flocked to the cities just at that time, in clear contradiction to Canada's "officially stated immigration policy . . . 'Only Farmers Need Apply.'"³

According to the 1971 census, 131,890 people of Hungarian origin lived in Canada. In this context, the census records reveal two important characteristics. First, it was a highly urbanized group; second, its core was to be found in Central Canada. According to the official statistics, 81 percent of Hungarians resided in cities, compared with only 76 percent of Canada's population as a whole. Only nine percent of Hungarian Canadians were referred to as farm residents. The census also shows that almost 60 percent of Hungarians lived in Central Canada, mainly in Ontario.⁴

The picture presented in the 1971 figures sharply contrasts with the group's distribution during the early part of this century, their formative period in Canada. Detailed figures exist only for 1921 and they list 13,181 Hungarians. Of these, only about one ninth lived in cities with

populations of 30,000 and over and only about 14 percent in Central Canada, mostly in Ontario. The rest lived mainly in Saskatchewan.⁵

The half-century between 1921 and 1971 saw great changes in the group's extent of urbanization and geographic distribution. The casual observer might seek explanation for these developments in the massive industrialization undertaken during and since the Second World War, and in the post-war influx of new immigrants. Indeed, both of these developments should be regarded as contributory factors. But a close examination of Hungarian Canadian records reveals that the greatest, most important impetus towards these changes had come between 1921 and 1931. Indeed, a study of the census figures of these two years reveals this decade as a watershed for Hungarian Canadians, separating their predominantly rural past in Saskatchewan from a largely urban future mostly in Central Canada.

The decade separating the censuses of 1921 and 1931 caused important differences in the immigration and settling patterns of the group. The fact is that the years 1924-1930 saw the immigration of Magyars to Canada on a scale unprecedented and unequalled until the coming of the refugees of the late 1950s. The roots of this trend seem to go back to developments outside Canada. In East Central Europe, the First World War and its turbulent aftermath had seen the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary. These events caused grave and long-lasting problems for an already weak economy because of which a growing proportion of the population became desirous of leaving their homeland and beginning a new life overseas. Before 1914 most Hungarian emigrants were heading for the United States. By the early 1920s, however, the Republic's gates were virtually shut to East Europeans. Hungarians wishing to leave war-torn and impoverished Europe had to look for solutions elsewhere. When the wartime ban on Hungarian immigration was lifted by Ottawa in 1923, many Magyars decided to come to Canada. The following spring the "new immigration" to Canada began and by the end of the decade close to 28,000 Hungarians had made their way to the Dominion.

The size of this population movement was limited only by the reluctance of the Hungarian government to allow a mass-exodus, and the insistence of Canadian policy-makers that only "bona-fide" agriculturalists (farmers and farm-workers) should come to the country. Although the Canadian government tried its best to keep non-agrarian elements out, many Hungarians who were not really peasants, or did not really have in mind working on the land after arriving, managed to come to Canada — even if to the West, the enforced destination of the vast

majority of newcomers. Their subsequent migration to cities, no doubt, helped to increase the rate of urbanization of the Hungarian-Canadian group during the second half of the 1920s.

But even new Hungarian immigrants from rural Hungary were different in many ways from the Hungarian pioneers who had come to Saskatchewan and Manitoba a generation earlier. Being the products of the twentieth century, they underwent better schooling (relatively speaking) and had gathered broader experience as soldiers during the war or its aftermath, including a taste of life in the big cities and in foreign countries. They had also been exposed to new political ideologies and systems. It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that many of them lacked the perseverance necessary to "make it" in prairie farming. Many early pioneers tended to stay on their homesteads because they knew no other lifestyle. For the bulk of the newcomers working on a farm was not so much a calling or tradition, but a means to save some money to pay debts, or the passage of a loved-one, or to return "rich" to Hungary. For these people a well-paying city job was just as attractive as or even more so than farming. When the demand for farm labour declined, or when urban employment promised to be better paying or more steady, the new immigrants seldom hesitated over moving to the city and even leaving the prairies altogether.

Given the nature of the new immigration, it is not remarkable that in the 1921-1931 period Hungarian-Canadian society should have undergone not a mere three-fold increase, but also two other marked demographic changes. One was their dispersal across much of Canada, the other, their rapid urbanization. A brief look at census data will illustrate the magnitude of these processes. Between 1921 and 1931, despite the enormous influx of newcomers, Saskatchewan's Hungarian population increased by only 48 percent. In this same time Manitoba's more than doubled, and Alberta's increased five times. More importantly, Ontario's already substantial Hungarian population underwent an eight-fold increase, and Quebec's grew from less than a hundred to over four thousand. In 1921 slightly more than two-thirds of Hungarian Canadians lived in Saskatchewan. A decade later, less than a third did.⁶

The progress of the group's urbanization seems equally remarkable. In 1921 some 9,748 of Canada's 13,181 Hungarians were rural residents. Not more than 3,433 lived in towns and cities. A decade later, over twenty thousand did, very nearly half of the group. In 1921 only 11 percent lived in cities. By 1931 this figure grew to 30 percent.⁷ From being the 25th most urbanized ethnic group in 1921, Hungarians advanced to the rank of 12th in the course of a decade. The original group

of five cities with over 200 Hungarians grew to more than a dozen, half of them with at least a thousand.⁸

Central Canada played a major role in the transformation of the distribution of the Hungarian-Canadian population in this period. It was in this region that the greatest growth took place, and it was the cities of the Lower Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Valley which attracted the most Hungarians. These places had acted as recipients of Hungarian immigrants in an earlier period, in the decade before 1914. We know that Hungarians, coming in some instances from the United States, in others from the prairies, had appeared in many parts of southern Ontario soon after the turn of the century. By about 1914, Hamilton, Welland, Brantford, Windsor, Niagara Falls, Galt, etc., all had nuclei of Hungarian colonies.⁹

Little or no population growth seems to have taken place in the midst of Hungarian Canadians between 1921 and 1923. These were the years of the post-war economic depression when the wartime ban on immigration from Hungary was still in effect. But in 1924 things began to change; the recession ended and the immigration of Hungarians was once again permitted by the Canadian government. The result was the renewed growth of the Hungarian element in Central Canada's towns and cities. The first signs of the new expansion came in the region which had experienced the greatest influx during the pre-war years: Southern Ontario. In 1926 a journalist from Hungary toured this region and, in addition to encountering his countrymen in their older, pre-war centres, found some in Oshawa, St. Catharines, Port Colborne, Thorold, and St. Thomas. But the region's largest Hungarian conglomeration was in Hamilton. In fact, the observer described this city as the "Hungarian capital of Eastern Canada." Hamilton's Magyar neighbourhood, after a growth until the post-war economic slump of the early twenties, declined to a couple hundred people. But with the return of better economic conditions in 1924, and the settling in of the new immigration, it began to flourish again. By the time of the 1931 census, it numbered well over two thousand.¹⁰

The largest centres of Hungarian life in Canada today are to be found in Toronto and Montreal. Neither city possessed a Magyar community worthy of note before 1914. It was only during the mass immigration of the 1920s that viable Hungarian neighbourhoods developed in them.

Of the two cities, Montreal was the first to have a small core of a Hungarian population. During the pre-war days, several families and single people took up residence in the city. The size of the city's Hungarian community did not change for many years, but after 1925 it began to grow. Organizational life started with the establishment of a congre-

tion by the United Church in the spring of the following year. This was followed, two years later, by the founding of a Roman Catholic parish. In the meantime, the colony's first lay organization, the Hungarian Social Club, also appeared on the scene. Subsequently, others came into being, including the Szekely Cultural Society, the German-Hungarian Club and a sick-benefit association. By the end of the decade, Montreal's Magyar population was approaching the 3,600 mark, and may have even exceeded that figure during the winters as a result of the usual influx of unemployed agricultural workers.¹¹ Montreal's Magyar population surpassed all other Hungarian Canadian centres in size. Its position, as the most influential centre as well, depended not only on the growth potential of the much older centres such as Winnipeg, but on the rate of increase of the newly established Magyar neighbourhood in the rival metropolis of Toronto.

Toronto's Hungarian community had a rather late start. A few immigrants from Hungary, mainly Jews, had settled in the city prior to the war, but were not joined by too many others until the 1920s. Organizational life among Hungarians in Toronto had its beginning in 1926. In the spring of that year the Presbyterian Church founded a mission among Hungarian Calvinists. Two years later both the Lutheran and the United Churches followed suit. In the meantime the community's growing Roman Catholic congregation was also being served by missionaries; but late in 1929 the Hungarian Catholic Club, Toronto's first important lay organization, was formed. It soon began working towards the establishment of a Roman Catholic Parish.¹²

Despite its size, well over a thousand people by the end of the decade, Toronto's Magyar community remained a satellite of the older southern-Ontario communities in smaller urban centres. Hungarian Toronto's proximity to centres like Hamilton and Welland prevented it from becoming an influential organizational centre in the 1920s. A generation later this very same geographical factor was to help the city's Hungarians eventually to assume leadership and outshine all its rivals.

By the time of the 1931 census five Central Canadian cities contained Hungarian communities with over a thousand members: Montreal, Hamilton, Welland-Crowland, Toronto, and Windsor.¹³ This represented a remarkable change considering that ten years earlier the largest colony, Brantford, numbered less than 300. Even more striking is the fact that the largest of these new Magyar colonies grew up in Montreal, a city which had hardly had a Hungarian population in 1921.

The growth of the urban settlements of Central Canada heavily reflected the group's geographic redistribution within Canada. By 1931,

Ontario's Hungarian population, a mere 13 percent of the Canadian total ten years before, surpassed that of all other provinces, including Saskatchewan. It constituted a full third of the national total. Together with Quebec's four thousand Hungarians (mainly residents of Montreal), Central Canada accounted for 44 percent of the country's Magyar population.¹⁴

Limitations in space preclude a long discussion of the causes of these impressive changes. It should be enough to say that both the "push" and "pull" factors of immigration seem to have been active in the process. As far as the former are concerned, we need only to refer to a few Western Canadian developments. Thus, by the second half of the decade only marginal land was available for homesteading. At the same time, the general economic prosperity inflated the price of good land and placed rapid mechanization within the reach of farmers. The boom was followed by the great bust of 1929-30 which witnessed the collapse of the wheat economy. These developments contributed to the driving away of people, especially newcomers, from the prairies. As the cities of the West could absorb only a small portion of these people, the work-seekers had to try their luck in the East.

The "push" of the West was supplemented by the "pull" of the East, that is, the attractions of the cities of the Lower Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River region. Until 1929, the main factor at work here was the availability of jobs. The expansion of manufacturing, service industries, and public works created a demand for both skilled and unskilled labour. In the Niagara Peninsula the main employer of immigrant labour was the Welland Canal improvement project. Also important were the blast furnaces and shops of Welland and Hamilton.¹⁵ In Toronto the demand for immigrant workers, especially unskilled labour, was rather limited; nevertheless, the city did offer a livelihood to numerous immigrants including (after 1926) many Hungarians. In the Province of Quebec, Montreal provided employment for thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled people. In many of the city's industries, wages were low and work lasted only while the port of Montreal was open to navigation. The resulting hardships — low incomes and long periods of unemployment — made these industries unattractive to native Canadians. Immigrants, often thankful to have any means of income, moved in and became the chief source of cheap labour in the city.¹⁶ Montreal's special attraction for Hungarians was its Hungarian Consulate whose offices most Magyars in Central Canada visited at one time or another during their first years of stay in Canada.

The more Central Canada's Hungarian neighbourhoods grew, the

more attractive they became to Hungarians outside them. The degree and quality of social and religious life that was made possible by large, fairly compact urban groupings, proved almost irresistible to many newcomers from Canada's agricultural, mining, or lumber frontiers, whose craving for social and spiritual fulfillment had rarely been satisfied since they had left Hungary. This factor continued to attract Hungarians to the cities of Central Canada long after the job market had collapsed with the coming of the Great Depression.

The push of the prairies and the pull of the eastern cities did not equally affect all sections of Hungarian Canadian society. Census statistics show exactly which elements of Canada's Magyar community participated least and most in this great migration. They reveal, for example, that the trend towards urbanization was not strong among second-generation Hungarian Canadians. Less than 38 percent of these were urban dwellers in 1931. New-immigrant Hungarians, on the other hand, were 56 percent urbanized. Moreover, the data also reveal the existence of an inverse relation between the immigrants' length of residence in Canada and their extent of urbanization. In fact, the least urbanized Hungarian-Canadian group were the immigrants who came before 1910. Only 29 percent of them lived in towns and cities in 1931. The percentage for the 1911-1920 group was 39. For the post-war groups the ratios were markedly higher. It was 54 percent for those who came between 1921 and 1925. For the very numerous 1926-1930 group it was 62.4 percent. To put it simply, less than a third of the "old" immigrants had ended up in the cities by 1931, while almost two-thirds of those who arrived in the late 1920s had become urban residents. Moreover, the ratios were even higher in Central Canada. In Ontario approximately three-quarters of the post-1926 arrivals had become city dwellers by 1931.¹⁷

The growth of Hungarian neighbourhoods in Central Canada's cities in the 1921-31 period was primarily the result of the new immigration. So many of the new arrivals abandoned the prairies and flocked to Central Canadian cities that already existing Hungarian cores vastly increased in size, and large Magyar neighbourhoods came into being where none had existed before. The size and impact of this migration can only be understood when we realize that 92 percent of the population of Ontario's Magyar urban groupings was made up of post-1921 arrivals. The equivalent figure for Montreal's Hungarian population is even higher — about 97 percent.¹⁸ These figures suggest that what really happened in the period under discussion here was nothing less than the birth of a new and different Hungarian Canadian entity, an ethnic group

concentrated in Central Canada, more precisely, in Central Canada's cities.

Little is known at present about the genesis of this new, increasingly "Central Canadian" Hungarian population. From a few, rather unreliable sources historians can trace the milestones of its development. They can even speculate on the causes of its beginnings, although in this connection too, more extensive research is needed. Least known of all is the actual process of internal migrations which resulted in the Hungarian-Canadian group's drastic demographic redistribution during the 1921-1931 period. What this paper has tried to argue is that the birth of the "new" Hungarian Canadian groupings in the 1920s was primarily the outcome of post-1924 immigration. If this indeed is the case, a fuller understanding of this process can come first and foremost from a careful and exhaustive historical study of the nature of this immigration and of the life stories of its members during the first several years of their stay in Canada. Such a study would require a major archival and aural research effort. One hopes that the opportunity for undertaking it will come before the passage of time and the inevitable deaths of this migration's participants will have made aural research impossible, and the disappearance of more and more of such primary sources as personal letters, diaries, and photographs will certainly render any research on the subject more difficult.

NOTES

1. Martin Louis Kovács, *Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1974). John Kósa, *Land of Choice: The Hungarians in Canada* (Toronto, 1957).
2. John Kósa, "Hungarian Immigrants in North America: Their Residential Mobility and Ecology," in *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 22 (August 1956), 3.
3. Howard Palmer in the *Canadian Historical Review*, 58 (December 1977), 4, p. 502.
4. *1971 Census of Canada*, vol. I, Part 3, "Population: Ethnic Groups," Table 3.
5. *Census of Canada, 1931*, vol. I (Ottawa, 1936), Table 35.
6. Based on figures provided in *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, vol. I (Ottawa, 1924), and W. B. Hurd, *Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People, 1931* (Ottawa, 1942), Table 6.
7. *Census of Canada, 1931*, vol. I, Table 35; Hurd, *Racial Origins*, p. 97 and Table 40.
8. *Census of Canada, 1931*, vol. II (Ottawa, 1933), Table 33.
9. Jenő Ruzsa, *A Kanadai Magyarság Története (The History of Canadian Hungarians)*, Toronto, 1940), the chapter on Ontario. Ödön Paizs, *Magyarok Kanadában (Hungarians in Canada)*, Budapest, 1928), 197-215. Peter A. Vay, *Amerikai naplókivonatok, utijegyzetek, levéltörédek (American Diary Excerpts,*

- Travel Notes, Letters*, Budapest, 1910), p. 118. Interview with Géza Kertész and László Jakus, August 1973. Also, *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, vol. I, Table 28.
10. Paizs, 198–206. Ruzsa, 210f. *1931 Census*, vol. II, Table 33.
 11. Mihály Fehér, *Jubileumi Emlékkönyv: Jubilee Album 1926–1966* (Montreal, 1966), I. Ruzsa, 287–312. John Kósa, *Immigration and Adjustment of Hungarians in Canada*, ms., 364.
 12. Ruzsa, 162–63 and 176f. Fehér, 17. *Canadian Hungarian News* (Winnipeg), 14 July 1928. Interview with the Rev. Charles Steinmetz, 28 November 1976.
 13. Statistics for the Central Canadian centres are as follows: Montreal, 3,514; Hamilton, 2,183; Welland-Crowland, 1,680; Toronto, 1,354; Windsor, 1,078; Port Colborne, 946. By comparison, the figures for Winnipeg, Regina, and Calgary are 1,664, 822, and 688 respectively. *1931 Census*, vol. II, Table 33.
 14. *1931 Census*, Table 31. The provincial breakdowns were as follows: Ontario 34%; Saskatchewan 33%; Alberta 14%; Quebec 10%; Manitoba 5%; British Columbia 3%.
 15. Interview with Géza Kertész and László Jakus, August 1973 (see fn. 9). Paizs, 198–206.
 16. Terry Copp, *The Anatomy of Poverty: The Conditions of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897–1929* (Toronto, 1974), esp. Chapter 9.
 17. *1931 Census*, Table 30. It is interesting to note that some 71% of the 1926–30 arrivals who settled in Saskatchewan remained on the farms.
 18. *Ibid.*

Early Hungarian-Canadian Culture

Martin L. Kovács

Nowadays very few observers are aware of the existence not only of a considerable body of prairie poetry and other early writings in Hungarian, but of the fact that one or two of the pioneers, now in their eighties, still continue to give vent to their emotions in their ancestral language. Perhaps even scarcer are those who appreciate the significance, cultural and social, of the one-time communities of Magyar peasant farmers of the Canadian West. The objective of the present study is to discuss, to some extent at least, these important aspects of Canadian prairie history.

Prior to the 1920s, Saskatchewan contained most of the Hungarian Canadian settlers and practically all of what might be termed "bloc settlements." Particularly during and since the Great Depression considerable out-migration has taken place from the province, mainly to Ontario and, in a smaller measure, to British Columbia. The number of Hungarian-Canadian residents of the province may be estimated at about 16,000 with more than 3,000 residing in Regina.¹

A folk community

Békevár, situated some ten miles south of present-day Kipling, was a Hungarian-Canadian farmer community established in 1900.² For several reasons this settlement can be regarded as the major centre of Hungarian-Canadian folk culture in the West and as being almost unique, for that matter, on this continent. One factor is that the community very closely resembled a *folk society*, so eminently described in anthropo-sociological literature.³ To express it in a nutshell, the pioneers of *Békevár* had come largely from three regions of the old country.⁴ All were part of the folk society at large which had preserved the folkways, customs, and traditions of the rural style of life that had already become extinct in Western Europe many decades before, together in a great measure, with its cultural expressions. Newcomers to the great plains at the beginning of the century were left largely to their own devices and were expected to conquer from "Mother Nature" and civilize a virgin

area of the prairie. They obviously did what they could, which in the long run included the transfer of as many institutions and other cultural traits of their native communities as appeared feasible and useful within their new environment.

Not unlike in other rural communities of the prairies, the churches became the strongest and most important institutions in this settlement of Calvinist Reformed and Baptist farmers.⁵ Communal cohesion was strengthened by systems of kinship, neighbourhood, and co-villager groupings, as well as by practically exclusive use of the native tongue. Also such "idioms" as costume, gestures, facial expressions (often deriving from the greater movement of the lips and the mouth, characteristic of Hungarian speakers), and other bodily movements tended to act in the same direction. Consequently, their ways, the folkways, appeared strangely out-of-date for farmers of British background whose ancestors had already lost touch with folk society and who, being already well established by the time of the arrival of the newcomers, were inclined to look down upon them as inferior, which circumstances proved to be one of the strongest socio-cultural boundaries around Békevár.⁶

Self-sufficiency

The new colony had to be almost self-sufficient socioculturally, providing its own entertainment, building its own homes, barns, stables, and furniture. Its members made many of their own tools, unless brought along from the old country. They produced material for clothing, which they cut and sewed up for the family. In sum, they carried out all the major and minor operations connected with farming in accordance with the ways of the folk tradition adhered to since time immemorial in their native communities. These ways included a strong emotional attachment not only to the soil, but to the landscape as a whole. They tended to regard everything around them as somehow *human*, somehow *personal*; hence sloughs, hills, domestic animals, and even unusual trees were given personal names. There was a belief, at least with a number of the farmers, that spirits of the departed still retained an interest in the living and that supernatural phenomena might occur in their physical environment.⁷

Socio-cultural changes

The major changes that have occurred in the Hungarian Canadian colony can be summed up briefly: most of the institutions such as the baptismal, wedding and, to a large extent, funeral rites in the Hungarian styles have been replaced by the ceremonies of the society at large. Other

institutions have been transferred to Kipling to merge with similar institutions, as in the case of the former Reformed congregations which now appear under the name of the Békevár Presbyterian Church.⁸ The small schools of the colony — named, in certain cases, after folk heroes of the ancestral tradition — have given way to a centralized school in Kipling and to a high school that transfers the student into a non-Hungarian environment, reduces facility in the ancestral tongue, and at the same time provides major incentives for the complete mastery of the language of the surrounding society through the availability of higher education and the possibility of socioeconomic mobility. A side product of the same process is the free mingling between members of the young generation coming from several ethnic groupings with resultant spectacular increases in interethnic marriages and steep decline in the command and use of their forefathers' language. However, most members of the former Békevár population above about thirty are still able to speak fluent and largely correct Hungarian, yet they seem to be resigned to the impending disappearance of their culture. This state of affairs seems not only similar to, but in most places of the province, far more pronounced than in Kipling.⁹

The Békevár culture

Particularly, the pre-1914 Hungarian immigrants tended to come from folk communities of the "advanced" kind (already considerably affected by the technological change taking place in their native country); nonetheless, they preserved most characteristics of the folk communities, though usually in attenuated forms.¹⁰

The term *culture* is applied here to convey a process as well as its results or products. The process that refers to the production of something artistically, culturally, or expression-wise new or unique may be termed "creativity" and its outcome creative art. The Békevár culture is both inherited and adapted to the ever-changing circumstances. Thus, it is both repetitive and digressive. In these respects, it does not differ greatly from the cultures (sub-cultures) of other Hungarian Canadian communities.¹¹ However, until recently Békevár could be regarded as a creative centre whose people, besides fulfilling adaptive and repetitive functions, proved capable of creating cultural "goods" on a comparatively large scale. As a result, many poetical texts — including that of a very long epos¹² — as well as numerous such prose items as short stories, reminiscences, and diaries, survive. Some of them have also appeared in print. Still, creative activity at Békevár also possessed — amongst others — an abstract, yet instrumental function. Owing to the psychological

starvation caused by distance from one another just as much as by socio-cultural nearness to the sharers of the culture, face to face presence was a major requirement for the members of the community; hence, after a while each member of the community came to *know* the others. *Knowledge* in this context meant a more thorough and deep knowing than would be the case in an urban situation. This knowledge rested on a large cluster of common expectations derived from the possession of the same folkways, *mores*, and traditions including the ancestral tongue. This intimacy of communication was accompanied by a high degree of lack of contact with the outside society. The closeness of the interaction resulted in an emotional atmosphere in which the actors readily and (as a rule) without any prompting would reveal their momentary sentiments, whether joyous or traumatic. It was a society in which there were mechanisms built in for the purpose of reducing what nowadays would be referred to as "stresses," or expressed differently, for the achievement of periodical *catharsis* (or outlet) to pent-up emotions. Some of these remedial activities were music, singing, and poetry.

Music

The approach to music was twofold; for the few who were able to play musical instruments, the experiencing of the satisfaction derived from playing them in a *creative* fashion and the psychological interacting with their listeners had a greatly supportive effect. The *passive* music lovers tended quickly to transmute their passivity into a creativeness of their own either by becoming partakers of the melody through joining in and singing, or by yielding to the human instinct of moving their limbs and bodies in the rhythm of the music. The types of music that prevailed at Békevár were not exclusively folk music of the kind that have been made widely known and socially acceptable through the musical collections and compositions of Béla Bartók¹³ and Zoltán Kodály,¹⁴ but they also incorporated, in accordance with the rules of the general cultural change, snatches of tunes and words taken from such sources as operettas, musical plays, and songs composed by professionals for a variety of purposes and occasions. It is a folk-characteristic to be receptive to what is coming from the other segments of society, particularly from the urban settlements.¹⁵ The average informant would treat the researcher to a mixed diet of traditional, gypsy, operetta, and patriotic songs without much awareness of any difference among them.¹⁶ Most of the interviewees would be prepared to share their accomplishments in singing because of their inclination to be proud of their musical heritage.¹⁷ Although there existed at Békevár several orchestras and bands (albeit not

at the same time) which usually comprised young men, their musical creativity has never reached, at least to the knowledge of the present writer, the level of composing new tunes apart from the adapting of old ones to their own style.

Poetry

Poetry, as well, may act as an instrument of catharsis. Poems can be regarded as attempts to cleanse the mind of painful doubts about oneself, about the community, about society at large, about such feelings as love of various types, solidarity, loyalty, or such aspects of nature as land, seeding, harvesting, animals, and of course, moods related to them. They also might represent purification on a large scale through experiencing vicarious heroism in extolling the deeds and qualities of one or more charismatic persons on the communal or societal level. Nevertheless, the remedy of catharsis could be applied on the personal-heroic level by the writing of an epos of the autobiographical sort.¹⁸ In this, heroism is emphasized through the expressive denial of it. The person becomes a hero through not acting like one.

Statements may be made in prose about anything. However, poetry and music, particularly when combined to form songs, prove to be a way more expressive and relieving of emotional reaction to influences of the environment, whether social or physical. Poetry is a kind of artistic expression that gradually emerged over many centuries or even millennia, in which process rhyme and meter served to aid in the memorization and retention of the lines, not only for the sake of the retention of the contents. Some of the pieces of poetry of old delineated and presented shorter or longer accounts of the history of a group, a community, or a tribe, as a rule describing the unusual and heroic deeds and events of the time.¹⁹

Also in this respect the people of Békevár were a folk community who, without paying much attention to actual dates or minor details, tended to have a strong consciousness of the history and significance of the establishment of their colony and found occasion to describe their memories and views as well in poetical forms. The poetry of Békevár in the first few years of the colony was virtually identical with the literary output of Kálmán Kovácsi,²⁰ the minister of the Reformed congregation, who was very much addicted to the cult of Louis Kossuth²¹ and the concomitant anti-Habsburg sentiments and politics of the contemporary opposition in the old country. Therefore, he was disposed to choose topics from this circle of notions in his poetic works dealing even with anniversary celebrations, as in the case of the jubilee, in 1911, which

commemorated the foundation of Esterhaz twenty-five years before.²² However, the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the foundation of Békevár, in 1910, though marked by a considerable amount of publicity — through the displaying of the *banderium*, and by flags, speeches, and the entertainment of large groups of visitors — had no poems or songs written for the occasion.²³

A folk poet

Quite different are the intellectual tendencies and the emotional bases which characterize another and longer poetical effort. The author, Benjamin Szakács, the Eldest, the one-time *biró* (village mayor) of the folk community Botrágy in the old country,²⁴ had assumed the tone of the speech of the Old Testament prophets from his continual study of the Bible.

Also this poem amalgamates aspects of old-country history with those of the past of the colony. It tends to be critical of the traditional social system of the ancestral society with the generalization that “it had not created happiness, its people have never been happy.” But, the people as such (in fact, the whole nation) is taken to task, in that “it had never reached the stage of having been able to make a wise election.” The poet, following biblical precedents, pinpoints the reason for their inclination to not being above committing sins.²⁵ “So the successive invasions of the old country by foreign powers were due to rightful divine punishment for internal discord on the part of its aristocrats, and war followed as if the consequence of a *curse*. The divine punishment was caused by reluctance to coöperate, since lack of concord and peace must end in disaster.” The sufferings of peoples derive from their being too short-sighted to realize that Jesus was the greatest representative of peace, and from their reluctance to know God. The poet identifies the obtaining of land as a quasi-magic²⁶ event by which all newcomers were electrified into persistent toil. The lines also express the improvident, yet necessary, tendency of the penniless new settlers to select wooded land as their homesteads for the sake of the availability of trees for building and heating purposes, not anticipating the price to be paid later in the tremendous effort of clearing the land which was, as a rule, hilly and rocky.²⁷ Not only were the first cottages unassuming, but the dwellers also lacked complexity of personality. Looking back from the distance of a long time the author sees the blissful vision of the community’s thorough harmony during its first few years, when

the hearts of the people constituted the church, as yet unbuilt; they were seeking their fellows’ company, since they bore no hate towards

one another. The church services were eagerly looked forward to [to obtain psychological support as well from discussion and company]. He who lived with us, dwelt with us; we shared one another's joys and woes.²⁸

Indeed, the whole environment, too, is presented as almost idyllic, with the forests and meadows teeming with pheasants, prairie chickens, and snowshoe rabbits. Every little slough is full of water, crowded with flocks of ducks. Besides, death is described as an infrequent visitor, and even illnesses as practically absent. The poem ends with an exhortation towards "concord, humility, and peace." The whole mood of the lines reflects the deep involvement with religiosity of the traditional type so characteristic of the early folk community.²⁹

Then the year 1925 — which was, at the same time, the landmark for the first quarter-century of the existence of the community³⁰ — was generating poems that reflected the outlook and emotions of many of the people of the colony. One of these poetical endeavours resulted in the creation of what was regarded as the "hymn of Békevár" written by Alex Daku.³¹ It revealed the religious inclination of the pioneers and, further, expressed their gratitude for having been given the colony as their place of abode, and their desire that it should be "the home of brotherly love and peace."

Much more complex and revealing is the poem written by George (Gyula) Izsák,³² in connection with the same occasion, entitled "The Conquest of Our New Home." In the first place, not only is the poem as a whole longer, but each of its seven eight-line stanzas tended already externally to create the impression and mood of an ode, to which the poem indeed amounts through its contents. The first stanza is designed to sum up the nineteenth century self-image of the people of the old country, strengthened by the experiences of the First World War and its dramatic aftermath: despite the sacrifices of the wars to contain the invasion of western Europe by the Mongolians and the Osmanli Turks,³³ Hungary stood dispossessed and reduced to poverty.³⁴ The next two stanzas sum up the settling of Békevár a quarter of a century before in the country of the "Aurora Borealis." It is not really the actual settling which is expressed in the second stanza, but the mood of resolution and dauntlessness with which the small "caravan" of the founders set out in search of a new home. The next stanza reflects the mood of the colonists after the "conquest" of the prairie. It shows that the colony incorporated people from diverse regions of the old country and stresses the contrast between the hunting way of life of the migratory Indians and the one which produces "golden wheat in the rich virgin soil." One line already

hints at the ambivalence of the early pioneers who were at times in doubt whether they had acted wisely in exposing themselves to the trials and tribulations of pioneering on the prairies and in giving up the emotional support of the well-known native community and landscape.³⁵ The fourth stanza is a direct reference to the nostalgia of the recent immigrants, which makes their native region appear in their memories charming and attractive far beyond reality and, conversely, their environment on the prairie far less appealing than in actuality. Indeed, a few settlers of the colony could not resist the temptation of far-away landscapes, or more correctly, their former village communities. However, some of them who returned to the old country found before long that their emotional states had reversed and soon, yearning for the colony of Békevár, set out for it once again.³⁶

For George Izsák the era of what may be referred to as “the Spiritist Controversy”³⁷ was indeed very memorable and significant. To the uninitiated the next stanza does not seem to have much to do with the Békevárians; it much rather seems to address itself to the Magyars in general. However, the lines very tactfully and diplomatically remind the main actors in the conflict, with most of them still alive in 1925, that in the Spiritists’ view the main victim of the struggle around 1910 was nothing else but “brotherly love.” Of course, the term may be an indirect allusion to the fact that the first minister of the community and the mentor and theoretician for the Spiritists of Békevár, was forced by the anti-Spiritist opposition to leave the colony forever.³⁸ Nonetheless, he was not ever forgotten by his followers and his statement containing his reminiscences and good wishes was read out and published in connection with the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Celebrations in 1925.³⁹ The use of the term *curse* is a reference to a long-standing myth mainly in the Hungarian romantic tradition according to which the Magyars’ affliction had been the scourge of continual discord and factional fighting.⁴⁰ Yet it is pointed out that everything comes to an end, and that even the internal strife at Békevár would change into productive and prosperous times for the colony. The prairie had been turned into fertile soil, with wheat growing in abundance; yet enough pasture was left to maintain large numbers of cattle and horses. Nevertheless, the same stanza reflects the feeling of insecurity in the 1920s with the apparent prosperity lacking any solid foundation: “how long will good fortune last?” The last stanza constitutes a terse summation of the thoughts and emotions of the poem as a whole. The last line of every stanza is a reminder for “the God of Hungarians” not to overlook them. The phrase “magyarok Istene” (also implying “the Magyar God”) may be a very ancient phrase that still refers to their pre-Christian era.⁴¹

The initiator and one of the founders of the colony, John (János) Szabó,⁴² did not survive the year of the Twenty-fifth Jubilee. Although his health had been gradually deteriorating, his passing away was a shock not only for his kin, but also for his friends and co-villagers. George Izsák, a relative and admirer of Szabó's, had a religious outlook that was — not unlike the former's — tempered with Spiritism, and felt prompted to pour out his emotions in a historico-lyrical poem named after the deceased.⁴³ After an excusably exaggerated introduction ("even the ground becomes soaked with the tears of the women"), the author refers to Szabó's great feat in "having conquered a large area for our fellow-Magyars." However, he does not leave unmentioned the fact, although with some imprecision, that "the red Indian people had lived there fifty years ago." The merits of the founder are succinctly expressed with the help of a few contrasts: a herd of wild buffalo roaming on the prairie as opposed to the wave-like movements of the sea of wheat in newly broken land; will the man who had given shelter to many, find shelter somewhere in his new life? Will anyone now comfort *him* who had been a comforter to many? Szabó, "whose brotherly love provided the bond for all, the wise adviser, the master singer, now lies in a casket with a still heart."⁴⁴ The poet envisages reverence for the deceased on the part of Békevár, "not only while Hungarians persist there, but while Buda yet stands in the old country."^{*} The last two lines may be regarded by the initiated as significant: "In time a pretty flower will grow from your dust . . . but your *spirit* will keep on guiding and directing."⁴⁵ The application of the words "dust" and "flower" are not really meant metaphorically; they constitute an allusion to transmogrification of the soul, or rather, the eternal transformation of matter into new life, paralleled by the release of the soul from its body and not yet reembodyed (as expressed in the last line); that is why Szabó's soul-spirit was expected to provide further guidance and direction through the poet, the one-time head of the Békevár Christian Spiritists' Association.⁴⁶

Another sequence of rhymed reminiscences deals with the informal description of the ecology of the region and the struggle of the pioneers with the physical and mental obstacles which were hampering them in civilizing the landscape. Apparently, Béni Szakács, Sr. had inherited appreciably from the poetical talents of his father whose lyrical creativity has been discussed above. The poet recalls the early days when the church service was still conducted by the Rev. Kálmán Kovácsi at the

^{*} Reference to the line "the Magyar is still alive; Buda still stands erect. . . ." K. Kisfaludy's (1788-1830) elegy "Mohács."

Kossuth School⁴⁷ where practically all members of the community would meet on Sundays. Also for him the past assumes a golden hue when viewed from the distance of some seventy years. First of all taxation was in those days almost negligible, not amounting to more than a cent per acre, and good shoes were to be had for less than two dollars. There was, in addition, a local mill at which flour cost them only two dollars per sack.⁴⁸ Further, he was witness to a great abundance of wildlife:

They practically covered the *peri* [as the pioneers called the prairie] and the sloughs; when the farmer went into the bush only a small distance he could shoot from eight to ten snowshoe rabbits at a go. Besides, the *ketrics* [as 'cartridge' was named at Békevár in those days] was inexpensive and, with a well-aimed shot one could hit from eight to ten ducks.

The author cannot recall ever having seen between Kipling and Kennedy any trees whose diameters exceeded one inch. In his recollection the reason for this circumstance had been a prairie fire just before the turn of the century. People from Béni Szakács's neighbourhood were compelled to go as far as *mosimaimton*⁴⁹ (Moosomin town) in search of wood. The prairie fire of 1900 occurred as a consequence of a devastating drought — devastating, except for Sexsmith and Toppings,⁵⁰ who could make hay in what in other years was Bender Lake. Of course, such a drought was unbelievable a few years later when the sky could not be seen owing to continual rain for days on end. Then, the meadow was bountiful with grass and the cattle were so fat that they could hardly move; nor were they inclined at all to run around, since, in addition to having been fattened on the big pasture, their hide was soaked by the steady rain. White Lake contained such quantities of fish that whoever desired to do so could capture them with hook or net. In his youth he and his uncle, Charles Szabó,⁵¹ were in the habit of catching fish once a week, which operation would yield about ten fish apiece.

Since there was no school yet in their township, he and other children attended a school situated in a small log cabin at Kennedy.⁵² That is where they learnt their first English: "not too many Hungarians were knowledgeable in it." However, after school he had chores to perform on his father's farm; he had to feed the horses and milk the *mulika* ("milch-cow"), for which work he received the princely wages of one dollar a week provided his *pap* (pop, father) remembered it. He still recalls with disgust and disappointment the case of the old woman for whom he had been sawing and splitting wood for three long weeks and did not receive more than a dollar in the end.

Because our poet did not start studying English until his teens, he

experienced great difficulties in the process. For instance, he could never pronounce the "th" in the word *mother*, "because one has to twist one's tongue." He found communication with English speakers straining and ineffectual. In fact the only sentence he could say was "do you see my cattle?" This circumstance at times resulted in curious situations and occasional frustrations, as on the occasion of his great yearning for prunes. Being fond of that fruit, which was on sale at the *stor* (store), it was to his great sadness that he did not know its English name. However, he did know the colours black and white. When asked by the storekeeper what he wanted, his answer was "I want something black." The man began smiling and led him around; they inspected every box in the store until they came upon the one containing the item. "These are prunes," said the storekeeper and that was a great object lesson for the boy, well remembered even in his old age.

One memory leads to another; old Béni recalls another memorable event from the past, when Andrew Izsák and Peter Biró persuaded him to go to Esterház⁵³ (only the very old pioneers remember the proper name of the oldest Hungarian Canadian settlement in Saskatchewan, which can easily be mixed up with Esterhazy, the later town). The three arrived in Whitewood in the evening and Béni was deputized to find a hotel room. He found one, but, unfortunately, it contained only one bed, across which the three were obliged to lie. This experience was far from pleasurable. On the other hand, the accommodation cost them no more than seventy-five cents. This left the three of them with another "six bits," for which they were able to buy a bottle of brandy (consequently they reached Esterház singing at the top of their voices).

Érdűhelyi on the prairie

Another early poem connected with Saskatchewan and dealing with aspects of life in it came from the pen of one of the main actors in the conflict that has been named "The Hungarian Question," which took place as a minor yet not unimportant portion of the later part of the *Manitoba School Question*. The Rev. Melchior (Menyhért) Érdűhelyi (1860-1925) was a Hungarian priest who, with his very arrival in Saskatchewan in 1908, added to the tensions which gradually led to a bitter confrontation owing to the unbridgeable differences between the political objectives of the Archbishop Langevin and the desire of the Hungarian-Canadian parishioners and a group of Liberal intellectuals. The Hungarian Question controversy took place between approximately 1908 and 1912.⁵⁴ It was during this period of time that Érdűhelyi managed to write the poem entitled "Harvest in Canada."

The nine stanzas are descriptive, partly philosophical, and mixed with a measure of historical contemplation. They also reflect the nostalgia of the recent immigrant and the feeling of alienation of a priest who was denied a status within the church which would have been commensurate with his qualifications, experiences, and self-respect. The poem is introduced by a terse and appreciative description of early Saskatchewan at harvest time.

We are allowed to visualise the large number of people required for harvesting about 1910, despite the availability of "the whirring swather." The workers perspire while they are gathering the crop and deliver it into the barns. The writer sees in the Hungarian Canadians' wheat crop the most beautiful ornament for prosperous Saskatchewan. The priest, also an expert farmer, who had studied various aspects of wheat farming and had a farm in Bácska,⁵⁵ one of the most fertile wheat-growing regions of Hungary of the time, and who also took up a homestead in the Székelyföld⁵⁶ Hungarian-Canadian settlement north of Cupar and carried out all the manual work connected with farming, could state with authority that "you can feast your eyes with pleasure on its [Saskatchewan's] durum wheat which is just like the one in Bácska." In the third stanza the poet claims, with pardonable pride and exaggeration, the fact as "accepted" that the Hungarian Canadian is the foremost of farmers and can work harder than the members of any other ethnic group.⁵⁷ Yet this happened, he points out, despite the circumstance that having arrived without any capital they had to start right from the bottom of society. They achieved advancement, since they proved indefatigable in breaking the sod and turning the wilderness into fertile land. The sixth stanza contrasts the early penury with their position in 1910 when the settlers of older vintage could already afford "to ride about proudly on their prancing horses and live happily in abundance and plenty."⁵⁸ Perhaps, just a trace of self-pity can be detected by the observer in the lines of Érdúj-helyi who, at this stage, was receiving a very small income even compared with the stipends of other, much more junior clergymen.

This is the point at which questions start to throng our author's mind. He stresses the contradiction between the diligence of these immigrants, the wealth, the fertile land of their native country and their need to emigrate to a distant overseas country where they will one day lose their ethnic identity. It is in the last stanza that he volunteers the answer to the riddle by referring to, as well as representing the viewpoint — in rather unrestrained language — of many Hungarians in connection with the state of affairs of their native country:

Poor Hungary! You native country of heroes, you have been afflicted

by the German curse for a thousand years. Your people cannot prosper.
You cannot be free; you are smarting under a heavy burden, the Austrian yoke.

This stanza expresses very succinctly a puzzling fact, or rather a fact which appears puzzling in retrospect. How was it possible with this type of feelings and public utterances, not only in Saskatchewan but all over the world right up to the spring of 1914, to experience a *volta face* and suddenly see Hungary on the side of Austria in the great conflagration that was to follow in a few months time that same year?

Early experiences

Some of the poems concern reminiscences of persons and episodes of the past when life, although theoretically much more difficult, appeared in retrospect to be golden and thoroughly enjoyable. This was so probably because most of the pioneers at that stage were young and rooted in the less sophisticated, but safer, ways of their folk community in which everything and everyone within the settlement was known to all and the strong social and cultural cohesion provided a sense of safety to all. Stephen Tóth,⁵⁹ who originally lived in the vicinity of Whitewood, but later married a Békevár girl and settled down to farming at Békevár, had happy memories amongst other matters and persons, of Mrs. Charles Fodor⁶⁰ of Whitewood. In his poem written in her memory, he recalls the common recollection of the pioneers of contemporary Békevár of their respective arrivals around 1900. Her log cabin in the shade of poplars functioned almost as an informal clinic and recreational centre at which the newcomers were provided with advice, information, and a new hope as to their future on the prairies.

How many homeless persons did she admit into her home;
She always provided the breadless with food.
There came also the first settlers in Kaposvár,
Who had settled there in 1886.
They came on cold winter days on hot horses
To the city of Whitewood to drink steaming tea in Mrs. Fodor's house.
Only a few survive to recount the romance of that era.
They spent many a joyful evening in that house
In Mrs. Fodor's good and clean company.

All this was true not only of the Kaposvárians before the turn of the century, but of the groups of new arrivals who settled southeast of Whitewood in and around the later Békevár, and became new claimants for the hospitality and humanitarian inclinations of Mrs. Fodor.

But this home was a blessing not only for the north,

But also for the south: it was about 1900 that there came
A handful of people into the wilderness of the prairie.
The place is called Békevár nowadays,
Where the tiny group established a settlement.

Thereafter they would go to the city of Whitewood
Into Mrs. Fodor's kind hospitable home.
Many of us are connected through numerous sweet memories of this house:
With its kind-hearted and clean hostess.
She was the motherly figure for the pioneers.
Let her memory be preserved in our hearts.
Let her kind spirit hover amongst us.
May her ashes rest peacefully in the Whitewood cemetery.

Mrs. Fodor was an outstanding woman pioneer.
She was capable of holding her own in a foreign country.
She saw to the education of her children and thus
Excellent scholars came from her family.

Another type of early experience concerning the life of the pioneers is presented by Béni Szakács in a more descriptive style.⁶¹ The prairie fires had been a scourge of the great plains even after large portions of land had been broken up by the pioneers of the area, including the Hungarian Canadians. In Béni's interpretation the life of the pioneers, as they gradually established themselves as farmers, went on in the following manner:

The Hungarians came to Canada in 1885,
Replacing diverse groups of Indians.
The many Magyars were swarming over
The land to become Békevár.
They came here and took up land.
They would work with great joy.
He who had only a horse and a cow
Would make them into a team
In order that his plough should work.
After having purchased his small walking plough
On credit, he would, while following it, kick this way and that.
He kept on doing so all the time
Because lumps of soil would fall back into the furrow.
He just could not have any rest on the endless prairie.
The poor man had his rump so active in this operation
That not even a sharp-shooter could have
Achieved a direct hit on it
However great his skill.

The farmer would cut down tall trees in the forest
For the cottage
And strip off their bark,
And thus he placed them one upon the other.

He fitted them into the shape of a square.
 He put logs across on top
 And virgin sods above;
 Lo and behold, the house was ready.
 This was quite good in fine weather,
 When there was no rain;
 However, when it was raining, it was sad.
 Nowadays only the poorest
 Possess such a chicken coop.
 The Hungarians of today already
 Live in houses which are like palaces.
We took up our land in 1905.
 It had very good soil, to our great joy.
 We built our sod house on it
 As well as our *karaj* ('corral') for sixty cattle.
 There were also two heaps of hay
 Not yet built up into stacks.
 It was fall. My parents were gone to Whitewood;
 This village was forty miles away from us.
 One had to go there to buy food.
 Forty miles may not appear excessive to you,
 But if you have to take a cart
 Your bones will truly rattle and shake
 While you approach your destination through rocks and undergrowth.
 After my parents had departed from home
 With the weather very fine and oppressively hot,
 I and my two sisters, I ten and they seven and four,
 Were in charge, with me also as the handyman.
 Suddenly at sunset big smoke arose.
 A prairie fire was being driven by a pleasant westerly.
 Like a thousand trains burning with a thousand furnaces
 It was racing across the plains straight in our direction.
 Having heard of the prairie fire,
 I quickly prepared water and sacks.
 My two young sisters also took up position,
 In order that we might save our little world through defiance.
 Thank God; when it seemed that everything would catch fire
 Our many good neighbours appeared on the scene
 And nothing was destroyed.

As can be seen in the simple and natural folk-poetical wording of the poem, the community was a real community at that state in the sense that they were well aware of the doings of one another and were ready as they had to be, for communal action when disaster threatened. As to the poetical skill of the author, it is worthwhile to take note of the brevity of expression and almost ballad-like presentation of events. One might say that with a few strong strokes and the application of some vivid verbal

colours, the poet succeeds in depicting, in one broad picture, the main features of the past and present of the colony in his youth.

The lyrical vein

On a higher level the minds of some of the poets would encompass the whole of the province of Saskatchewan. One of the pioneers of Békevár in his younger days expressed his emotions in a short, but memorable, lyric poem entitled in its original Hungarian spelling "Szaskacséván."⁶²

Szaskacséván
The pretty one,
Where that girl dwells
For whom my heart swells.
Another such woman
There's surely none
In any part of
Szaskacséván.
She is as dear, I trow,
As a slim doe:
Her voice as sweet
As a fairy's, indeed.
I wouldn't leave that lass
For aught that the world has,
Including all its
Riches.

As an instance of simple and pleasant expression of the enjoyment of the new environment, a shorter poem is presented:

In the very core of dense, dark forests,
I live my days in a quiet, beautiful colony.
Among the upright people of the good Magyar race,
Nothing reaches here of the din of the outside world.
Each person here has his work and function.
One day is just like the others.
Envy has no chance here; revenge is not in evidence.
We spend the day engaged in hard toil.
Wherever I glance around me in the area,
Cheerful people teem, reaping and stooking.
I listen to the merry songs; I watch their glowing cheeks.
I myself feel joyful in their midst.⁶³

Finally, we shall pause to consider two items of folk poetry proper — that is, poems of which the authors are unknown and which were most probably created in a light-hearted fashion in the course of everyday life. In both cases the charm of the words and rhymes sounds exquisite in the

original and the translation provides only a poor substitute for it. However, these also provide the historian with useful information.

Although nothing could be uncovered about *Kate*, the “actor” of the first poetical item, the stanza may be regarded as containing the structure of the situation and the fate of one and all pioneering women: doing the farming and household chores to distraction, not to mention the giving birth to and the looking after of a dozen or more children.

Kate's a'baking,
Ironing.
In foolish mood:
A'scrubbing.

As to the second little gem, it was Imre Dezső who, on retirement from farming, purchased in 1925 and continued on a smaller scale with the store set up by George Izsák. He and his wife could only with difficulty make a living; the “anonymous” poet had an eye only for the humorous aspect of the position. “Uncle Dezső” passed away in 1928 and thus was spared the experiences of the Great Depression.⁶⁴

Uncle Dezső's tiny shop
Is smaller than where chickens hop.
When two shoppers take the floor,
There's no room for him any more.

Poetical creativity at Békevár

One of the most telling traits of the culture centre of Békevár was its relatively great poetical and other literary creativity. Practically all culture-minded members of the community attempted to or did write poetry at some time in their lives; however, besides Kálmán Kovácsi, the most successful, persistent, and productive poets of the Békevár-Kipling area have been George Izsák, Béni Szakács the Elder and the Eldest. In fact, the younger of the two Bénis — now 85 — has tangibly shown his great poetical ability until recently through creative production of a few elegant poems for some festive occasions, but only to an ever-diminishing audience. Some of the poetry of Békevár has contained lasting and intrinsic beauty and value, yet all surviving poems constitute part not only of the cultural records of the community, but specimens of a unique but vanishing culture. Though the decline of poetical creativity had begun to be noticed in the early 1960s, no young Hungarian Canadian poet writing in Hungarian has emerged in the Kipling area. Of course, the manuscripts of quite a few poems of older vintage survive, besides the known ones, and possibly may remain undetected and unappreci-

ated. The passing away of the folk poetry of Békevár is yet another sign of the receding of the Hungarian-Canadian folk culture.

NOTES*

1. In 1961, there were 16,059 Canadians of Hungarian origin in Saskatchewan, with about only 86 females per 100 males. About 10,000 of them were listed as rural. Census of Canada, 1961, Series 1.2, Population Bulletin 1, 2-5.
2. For a more detailed history of the Békevár-Kipling area, see M. L. Kovács, *Peace and Strife: Some Facets of the History of an Early Prairie Community* (Kipling, 1980) — obtainable from Kipling District Historical Society, Box 131, Kipling, Saskatchewan, Canada, S0G 2S0. Townships 10, 11, and 12, Ranges 4, 5, and 6 contain the largest part of the Békevár region south of the town of Kipling. Cf. M. L. Kovács, *Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada* (Regina, 1974), 51.
3. See, for instance, R. Redfield, *The Little Community* (Chicago, 1955).
4. The Counties Bereg, Jász-Nagy-Kun-Szolnok and Szabolcs. Ecologically, Bereg and Szabolcs constitute a unit under the name *Tiszahát* and the third county falls in one called *Nagykunság*. Cf. L. Kósa and A. Filep, *A magyar nép táji-történeti tagolódása [The Ecological and Historical Distribution of the Hungarian People]* (Budapest, 1975), 151-152, 185.
5. The twin-spired "Great Church of Békevár" was built after the pattern of the Reformed Church of Debrecen, Hungary, in 1912. It is no longer in regular use. Its functions have been taken over by the "Békevár" Presbyterian Church, Kipling. See Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 27-33.
6. There is a strong temptation for the average person to infer from the degree of mastery of the dominant language achieved by an immigrant, to his cultural background and mental capacity and to categorize him accordingly in respect of social distance. Cf. N. Sealy, "Language Conflict and Schools in New Brunswick," in M. L. Kovács, ed., *Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education* (Regina, 1978), 311.
7. Many of the folk customs of the village communities concerned the dealing with supernatural occurrences. See T. Dömötör, *Hungarian Folk Customs* (Budapest, 1972), 49.
8. See note 5 above.
9. The principal Hungarian Canadian settlements in Saskatchewan were Esterház-Kaposvár-Esterhazy, Sokhalom-Stockholm, Cana, Otthon, Lestock-Leross-Magyar, Székelyfő-Máriavölgy-Arbury-Quinton-Cupar, Pinkeföld-Plunkett, Szent László-Howell-Prudhomme, Mátyásföld-Wakaw, and Békevár-Kipling.
10. A very detailed analysis of the diverse changes affecting the folk society and its economy between the time of the abolition of serfdom and the beginning of the First World War is provided in I. Szabó, ed., *A parasztság Magyarországon a kapitalizmus korában [The Peasants of Hungary in the Era of Capitalism, 1848-1914]*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1972).

* The poetry quoted in this paper has been translated from the Hungarian original by the present writer. If not otherwise stated, interviews referred to in this study took place in Kipling, Saskatchewan or its area.

11. Sokhalom-Stockholm shared cultural leadership with Kaposvár among Hungarian Canadians of Roman Catholic persuasion from the 1920s on.
12. John Szatmári (1869–1947), a member of the wider Békevár community, described his life story, immigrational and farming experiences in an epic poem, unique amongst eposes, of which some 140 pages survive. The present writer has completed a study of the poem, which he hopes to publish together with the translation before long.
13. Béla Bartók (1881–1945) is famous for his collecting and studies of Hungarian folk song and folk music. He helped to develop a characteristically Hungarian musical style. The opera “Bluebeard’s Castle” and the mime-play “The Miraculous Mandarin” might be mentioned as the most outstanding of his compositions.
14. Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967) worked together with Bartók in the collection and editing of Hungarian folk songs. His musical idiom is milder than that of Bartók. Perhaps the best known of his compositions are the “Psalmus Hungaricus” and the opera “Háry János.”
15. Cf. Redfield, 123.
16. A good example of this was the interview with T. Tar, Kipling, July 30, 1976.
17. Numerous informants allowed themselves to be persuaded to sing portions of songs in the Békevár and other Hungarian Canadian settlements in the course of these seven years.
18. The Szatmári epos (see note 12 above) is both autobiographical and cathartic.
19. Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* would come to mind in this context.
20. See Kovács, *Esterhazy*, 42–45.
21. Concerning the significance of L. Kossuth (1802–1892), see note 23 below. The memories of Kossuth were probably the most vivid in eastern Hungary, wherefrom most of the Békevárians hailed. The city of Debrecen, in which Kovács had received his education, was, as it were, the “seat” of the Kossuth cult. Besides, the first school district of Békevár bore the name “Kossuth.”
22. The Compromise of 1867 was an uneasy one with L. Kossuth passionately opposing it from abroad. The successive pro-Compromise governments had to face the liberal anti-Habsburg opposition which represented the majority of the nation. Cf. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (Edinburgh, 1962), 176–179. Also see note 23 below.
23. There is no doubt that the influence of Kálmán Kovács upon the cultural life of the members of the folk community of Békevár was momentous and persistent. The poems that he wrote at Békevár were listened to when declaimed and read when published in the Hungarian paper of the time, the *Kanadai Magyar Farmer (Canadian Hungarian Farmer)*. The subject matter, the mood and the images, all projected well, represent the outlook of the Hungarian Canadian settlers of the pre-1914 period. Two of his odes were fondly remembered in later years as well and their texts were preserved and the poems themselves were recited by heart on suitable occasions in the colony. The March 15 Celebrations provided an annual rehearsal for the Kossuthist and anti-Habsburg sentiments of Békevár. Kálmán Kovács’s *A szabadság ünnepére (On the Festival of Freedom)* was written for the occasion of the sixty-second anniversary of the beginning of the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848. The celebrations of it (March 15) constituted also the major socio-cultural event of 1910. The text of three of the ten stanzas, translated below, fairly reflects the politico-emotional climate of the time.

True Magyar souls, this world around, the mood
Of psalm and prayer, today and hence, exude.
’Tis Easter, with the dawn of vanquished doom

And Magyar freedom charging from its tomb.
 That with its vanishing in the blood-stained dusk that follows,
 Our flag-poles have been turned into gallows;
 And that the hurrahs were drowned by unbearable pain,
 My nation, do not remember, do not grieve again.
 Let the watch fire blaze! Let black despair disappear —
 The shades of Kossuth and Rákóczi hover near.
 We are watched over by the Lord in war unfazed,
 Who once the lofty Tower of Babel razed.
 The fiery souls of the heroes fallen for liberty
 Roam over the whole world restlessly.
 Awaiting the war-cry, all these will march along
 Who still wear the manacles of the oppressor strong.
 Do you see? How, like a comet flashing
 The valiant Csaba and his gallant army come dashing.
 Nor will he return to his heavenly habitation
 Until the huge, world-rescuing confrontation
 Will finally end in a victory resounding
 Until there will come from Freedom's temple bounding,
 Expelled by a flaming sword the many profiteers
 And at the Christmas candle of peace for many years
 All men will chant their song of gratitude.

The *Tenth Anniversary Celebration* (July 1910) was a major event in the process of the emergence of the Békevár identity. See Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 35–41.

24. Béni Szakács, the Eldest (1871–1959), having been the *biró* of Botrágy village, found himself in violent conflict with the village notary and departed for Canada. He became also in Békevár one of the communal leaders. His poetical gift was inherited by his son, the present-day Béni Szakács, Sr.
25. Béni Szakács' ethico-religious views inclined towards greater strictness over the years. The Baptist congregation appeared to express his views to a greater extent, and so he joined it.
26. Cf. B. Malinowski, "Magic, Science, and Religion," in J. Needham, ed., *Science, Religion, and Reality* (New York, 1925).
27. Thus, the land taken up by the first settlers of Békevár was more wooded and less fertile than the quarter-sections selected by later-comers.
28. An observation echoed by other elderly informants.
29. Moreover, of course, the church would be the most important social institution in the early prairie communities. See Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 20 and 27–33.
30. Békevár celebrated its Twenty-fifth Anniversary in a "Jubilee Festival" on July 19–21, 1925, which was attended by several hundred visitors as well, including the Hon. H. W. Newlands, Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan, and Armand Hann, the Consul General of Hungary. For accounts see the *KMU* ("Canadian Hungarian News") July 19–21, 1925 and the (Regina) *Leader*, July 25, 1925, and Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 119–123.
31. Alex (Sándor) Daku (1880–1964), having retired from farming to Kipling in 1944, spent much of his time on communal and church affairs. Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 12.
32. George (Gyula) Izsák (1884–1960) belonged in the cultural nucleus of Békevár. He worked himself up to become an intellectual and a well-to-do man only to lose almost everything during the Depression. He was a most productive Hungarian Canadian poet, writing well into the 1950s. His historical reminiscences provide some of the most useful source material in the past culture of the colony.

Later, he became a community and church leader in Toronto. Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 90 and 206.

33. These are some of the most traumatic experiences in the Hungarian identity. See Macartney, 32-33.
34. Reference to the Peace Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, *ibid.*, 206-207.
35. Very few members of peasant societies were leaving their native countries with an intention other than "to get rich quick" and return to the ancestral villages and buy land there. Cf. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Boston, 1920), vol. 5, pp. 8ff.
36. One such person was J. Szatmári. See note 12 above. However, very few Békevárians returned to the old country for resettlement there.
37. The Spiritism of the Békevár kind served to promote the intellectual-cultural "appetite" of the participants besides deepening their religious interests. G. Izsák was the first and only head of the "Békevár Christian Spiritists' Association." However, Spiritism was strongly and effectively opposed by the majority of the Békevárians. (Interviews with several informants in Kipling, Saskatchewan, Canada.)
38. The Rev. K. Kovács, the first minister, was forced to make an exchange of ministries with the Rev. John Kovács in Otthon. (Interviews.) See Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 44-45.
39. On July 19-21, 1925. See *KMU*, July 19-21, 1925.
40. Also a theme of the Hungarian National Hymn by F. Kölcsey (1790-1838).
41. Cf. V. Diószegi, *A pogány magyarok hitvilága [Creeds of the Heathen Magyars]* (Budapest, 1967).
42. John Szabó (1852-1925), the initiator of the founding of the colony and also its name giver. Kovács, *Peace and Strife*, 4-8.
43. J. Szabó was one of the main supporters of the Spiritist movement in the settlement and also a kinsman of G. Izsák.
44. Reference to the claim that many of those who had accepted Szabó's hospitality, food, and good advice in the beginning, later turned against him in the course of the Spiritist Controversy.
45. The statement expresses Spiritist beliefs.
46. The Association was at its heyday between about 1908 and 1912. (Interviews.)
47. In the first seven years of the existence of the colony the Kossuth school, No. 948, was at the same time the social-cultural hall as well as the quasi-church for the community. Two other early schools were the *Magyar* and the *Rákóczi*. The three school districts were established: Kossuth and Magyar in 1905 and Rakoczi in 1910 (Education Department Records, Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Regina).
48. The Rev. John Kovács set up and operated a flour-mill, first in the neighbourhood of the manse, later in Kipling. (Interviews.)
49. Many English words were *magyarized* by the Békevárians.
50. Two of the earliest Anglo-Canadian settlers northwest of Békevár: Jim Sexsmith (1859-1957) and William H. Toppings (1858-1943).
51. Károly Szabó (1879-1956), the elder son of John Szabó, moved to British Columbia in the 1920s.
52. Kennedy, a settlement northeast of Békevár, east of Kipling, contains numerous Hungarian Canadians, many of whom are still in close contact with the Kipling-Békevár community.
53. Esterház was the first Hungarian settlement in what has become Saskatchewan. For further information see Kovács, *Esterhazy*, 17-19.
54. See M. L. Kovács, "The Hungarian School Question," in *Ethnic Canadians*, 333-358.
55. Bácska constitutes an ecological unit in the southernmost portion of the plain

between the rivers Danube (Duna) and the Tisza; now its largest part is in Yugoslavia. Cf. Kósa-Filep, 59–61.

56. A comparatively sizable settlement of Bukovinian *Székelys* next to Máriavölgy, another community of the same origin. Concerning the Székelys, and their role in the Hungarian Question controversy, see Kovács, “The Hungarian School Question.” Cf. note 54 above.
57. Not possessing the mastery of the English language and other essential social skills, the Central and East European peasant farmers simply *had* to succeed on the land.
58. It might be a reference to the *banderium* (a group of local horsemen dressed in folk costumes to act as escorts on festive occasions).
59. Stephen Tóth (1888–1964) established himself at Békevár through an ‘invention’ of his when he constructed a mechanical saw. He went around to the farms and offered his services, which were welcomed by the farmers who had previously no option but to saw firewood by hand. He was in several respects one of the progressive Békevárians. As well, he wrote a number of poems. His widow, Mrs. Julia Tóth, became interested in social activities through “Steve.”
60. One of the early pioneers, Peter Debreczeni (1882–), recalls that he received full board with the Fodors in 1902, when they were already elderly. At that stage they had six Hungarians with them as boarders. His impression about Mrs. Fodor was similar to that expressed in Stephen Tóth’s poem. (Interviews in Abbotsford, B.C.)
61. Béni Szakács (1895–), now “Sr.” — the son of Béni Szakács the Eldest — has likewise developed into a fine poet. He has written a number of poems, often dealing with his family, with his feelings about changes around him, and of course, with his experiences in his long life.
62. Berti Daku (1900–1978) was still in his twenties when he poured out his emotions in this poem. What is more, the item was found by the Hungarian newspaper to be worthy of publication. *KMU*, December 21, 1929.
63. The title of the poem is “Otthon” (formerly the name of a market village for the second-oldest Hungarian Canadian colony of the same appellation southeast of Yorkton). “Otthon” (home) is one of the infrequent geographical designations of Hungarian origin still officially used. The writer of the poem, Christine Stanik, the daughter of an early homesteader in the settlement, had the ambition to become a teacher. The poem was published in the *Canadian Hungarians* [*Kanadai Magyarok*], one of the earliest issues of the earliest Hungarian language newspaper (as far as the present writer knows) printed in Canada (September 1905; initially it was a monthly).
64. *KMU*, June 30, 1928. These two short ditties were recollected by Mrs. Emma Szakács in the course of one of the numerous interviews with her and her husband, Vilmos Szakács.

Modern Hungarian Poetry in Canada

John Miska

It is a pleasure to write this paper on Hungarian poetry, not only because I am myself of Hungarian origin but also because there exist outstanding achievements in this field. Contemporary Hungarian literature in Canada is in its flourishing state. Magyar authors are active in literary groups and authors' associations across the country, publishing their works in anthologies, annals, literary magazines and weekly newspapers within and outside this country. Indeed, the comprehensive bibliography on ethnic and native Canadian literature, recently completed by me, also includes about 350 citations of Hungarian reference material and books of poetry, prose and drama.¹

Dr. Watson Kirkconnell, the late student and mentor of ethnic Canadian authors, stated in one of his last papers:

... But an up-to-date literary community really materialized after the great migration of 1956, and the founding of *Kanadai Magyarság* and *Magyar Élet* as vehicles for the outpourings of that community, presently gathered up in book form. Preeminent in this new wave in Toronto were Ferenc Fáy, with several volumes of distinguished verse; András Tamás, whose *Öröm a házat* is masterly and mature and Márton Kerecsendi Kiss, whose *Hetedhétország: Mesejáték* is alight with imagination. . . . The laudable growth of a whole circle of Magyar poets came with the founding of the *Hungarian-Canadian Authors' Association* (Kanadai Magyar Írók Köre) in 1969, with a series of striking books of poetry and prose entitled *Antológia: a kanadai magyar írók könyve*, edited by János Miska of Ottawa and Lethbridge. All contributors deserve to be cited, but under pressure of space I shall mention only Ernő Németh, Sándor Domokos, Ferenc Fáy and György Vitéz. . . .²

Indeed, our ethnic and native Canadian bibliography deals with 57 authors of Hungarian descent, 47 of whom have published, within the last two decades, 86 volumes of poetry, prose and drama. According to these figures, the over 100,000 Magyars in Canada encompass 57 writers: one author for every two thousand Hungarians — quite an impressive figure by any standards.

What are the reasons for this mushrooming in creativity? First of all,

Canada received a host of Hungarian intellectuals, teachers, research scientists, lawyers, and authors, following World War II and the 1956 uprising in Hungary. A more tangible reason than this, however, is that Hungarians, as do many others in east Europe, tend towards emotionalism, inclined to give vent to their innermost feelings in rhyme and rhythm. The Magyar language, owing to its agglutinating structure, lends itself to the interpretation of fine intricacies which are so much a part of lasting poetry. Poetical expansion is an organic part of Hungarian artistic traditions. Hungarians consider poetry a sacred art and those who practise it are almost looked upon as Old Testament prophets.

This projection is not quite so absurd as all that if Hungarian literature is examined in the light of the past. Hungarians, throughout their long history, have often lost confidence in their politicians, their military leaders and even their *literati*, but they have retained relatively unshakable faith in their poets, and not without foundation. It was the "initiated" poet who kept up the spirits of his people when times were hard. Therefore, the poet sought to provide leadership even during the nation's attempts to effect escape from four centuries of foreign oppression. He was the seer who raised his voice against the futility of war yet he provided the slogan "freedom" in 1956.

The expatriate Hungarian poet hopes to continue as a "champion of freedom," in the memory of the "Old Country." Many of his followers in exile consider him a source of spiritual inspiration and a saviour of the traditional culture. These self-imposed crusading functions reflect the heroic-emotional aspect of Hungarian Canadian poetry.

* * *

Of the many talented authors writing in Hungarian perhaps Ferenc Fáy is the most exciting poet. At 56, Fáy has authored several volumes of outstanding poetry, including *The Writing Will Be Discovered*, *A Song of Indebtedness*, *The Lamentations of Jeremiah*, *Crying for Myself*, *The Flood*, and *Petrification*.³ He also contributes regularly to leading Hungarian literary periodicals published outside Hungary.

Writing in the tradition of the "Occidentalists" (Nyugatosok, Mihály Babits, Dezső Kosztolányi, Árpád Tóth, and Attila József) Fáy occupies the void existing between two worlds: the world of rural existence, experienced in his childhood, and the urban way of life. His wide scope extends from the parched land of Pécel, his hometown near Budapest, to the asphalt-milieu of his acquired home, Toronto.

The land and its people constitute the main themes of Fáy's poems together with a personalized, anthropomorphic God and the image of a subjective universe in the background. But these concepts appear to be

only tools wherein Fáy provides the most suitable metaphors through which to project his image of the world onto a canvas larger than life. In the poem *Batár bácsi* (Uncle Batár), an old man with bearded wheat growing over his eyes rocks the sun on his knees, while the trees sit intent, like amused dogs, in a circle around him. In another poem, *Isten* (God), the Lord ripens fruit of the field in his huge peasant palms and treads on the earth with unseen footsteps. In the poem *Pécel*, Fáy's father sticks the sun to his hat as one would a rose, and cheerful stars shine on his sun-tanned forehead.

In his earlier poems Fáy appears to nurture an almost compulsive homesickness for Pécel, a town he describes in his poems as a speck of dust that he was at one time eager to shake off his shoes. His self-inflicted torture is somewhat more comprehensible in the light of his personal tragedy. Here is an educated person who, having given this country thirty of his best years, is compelled still to support a large family by scrubbing the floors of Hungarian churches and prosperous community halls in Toronto.

But the main reason for Fáy's devotion to his native town Pécel is his awareness of the historical role played by the Hungarian rural society in general. The Hungarian village has been regarded as the source of national consciousness over the centuries. The Magyar language and cultural heritage have managed to survive — in a homogeneous peasant society — the systematic onslaught of Latin, Turkish, German, Russian and other alien influences. The impact of a dynamic *népi kultúra* (folk culture) has resulted in a national revival through the work of such authors as György Bessenyei, Mihály Csokonai, and Sándor Petőfi or through the work of our contemporaries, Gyula Illyés, László Nagy and Ferenc Juhász, in addition to the influence of such composers as the nation-minded Ferenc Erkel, Ferenc Liszt, Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály.

In this country, the countryside plays a minor part in the development of Canadian identity. This may be attributed to the fact that the relationship to the land tends to be an economic one without much emotional attachment. Farming in Canada, unlike that in Hungary, is regarded as only an occupation, rather than a vocation. Occupations as such lack any meaningful permanence as far as social or national continuity is concerned. In Fáy's poetry the images of Pécel, of Uncle Batár, and of the parched land of the town are regarded as symbols of Hungarian identity, without which no meaningful poetry and, consequently, no worthwhile human existence can be posited.

Some of his reviewers note Fáy's emotional inclinations. The fact is,

however, that the Fáy approach is based upon the personification of the universe and — as Fáy has demonstrated time and again — the most effective way of implementing that technique consists in presenting a subjective world in emotional terms.

Another equally talented member of Fáy's generation is the priest-poet Tamás Tűz, whose real name is Lajos Makkó. Born in 1916 and educated in Roman Catholic seminaries, Tűz has published ten volumes of poems, including *Angel, Say it in Half, On the Threshold of a Country, On Restless Wings, Fingerplay in the Mirror, Selected Poems, and I have been there*,⁴ as well as a book of short stories and literary essays. He has resided in Canada since 1956.

In contrast to Fáy's naturalistic-realistic approach to poetry, Tamás Tűz is a student of the surrealist and metaphysical schools. He has a philosophical mind; the stoic outlook is integral in Tűz's poems.

His career falls into three distinctive phases covering the period between 1940 and 1970. The early poems are a manifestation of his innocent faith in man. Despite his reservations about the then existing social and political order, these poems radiate warmth, self-assurance and a sense of personal and national identity. Because this is the age of the great populist movement in Hungarian literature, Tűz has not remained indifferent to the dominating philosophies of leading Magyar authors of the day as for example, László Németh, Gyula Illyés, Lőrinc Szabó, László Mécs.

The second phase marks a deviation from the early idealized representation of man. This is the period of devastating war resulting in destruction, mass-migrations and other human misery. Man, according to Tűz's biblical-surrealistic analogy, has fallen from his Creator's grace and finds himself in total isolation in an alien environment.

The final phase completes the cycle: man comes to terms with his fate and, in a higher, metaphysical state of mind, makes peace with his Creator.

Tamás Tűz, owing to his experimental poetry and to his willingness to give preference to the global rather than the national, has become a poet of consequence on both sides of the Hungarian border. His creative genius lies in his talent for giving vent to his emotional and intellectual self in terms of universal techniques. The Hungarian clergy of all religious denominations have given the world a host of outstanding poets. Tamás Tűz is one of these.

A second group of poets is represented by members of a younger generation who left their native land at a tender age and spent their formative years in Canada. A few who have made English their creative

language, such as George Jónás, György Porkoláb, and Steve Buri, are not discussed here, while others — quite a few of them — have decided to make good in Hungarian.

Perhaps the most gifted in the latter group are László Kemenes Géfin and György Vitéz (real name György Németh), both of Montreal. Kemenes Géfin (b. 1937) has published three volumes of poems: *Frost-works*, *Zenith* and *Pagan Diaspora*.⁵ An experimental poet, he finds it inconceivable to express two ideas in identical forms. He has shown much talent combining the modern with the traditional by means of expressing up-to-date, complex ideas in archaic idioms.

György Vitéz, a clinical psychologist, has been published in literary periodicals within and without Hungary. He has also translated Allan Ginsberg's *Howling* into Hungarian.⁶ Kemenes Géfin and Vitéz are equally familiar with their native Hungarian traditions and their acquired English and French Canadian cultures. Although they are urban and cosmopolitan, themes of Canadian nature are favoured subjects for them. Vitéz appears to be the more conservative of the two, yet the other strives for greater simplicity. In Kemenes Géfin's estimation pure poetry is the highest achievement attainable by a poet. His poetry, with its strict economy of words, is somewhat akin, in its simplicity, to Bartók's experimental music. Some of his short poems called "songs" have a chance of becoming folksongs; this eventuality is considered by most Hungarian poets, since the poems of Sándor Petőfi more than a century ago, as a great honour and achievement.

* * *

There is something courageous in someone's pledging loyalty to his mother-tongue in an alien land. He is likely to find himself isolated, cut off from the mainstream of society in a cultural world of his own. He might also be caught between countries, and he may exist in the possibility of belonging to neither. Life in such a cultural vacuum might also have an adverse effect on the creative growth of the individual. Yet, a considerable portion of world literature has been created by authors living abroad, as is the case with Herodotus, Ovid, Dante, Hugo, Rákóczi, Joyce, Hemingway, not to mention our own Livesay, Laurence and Richler.

These Hungarian-language authors, like their colleagues writing in others of Canada's unofficial tongues, must have weighed the odds against their decision before preparing themselves for long, solitary lives. The shortcomings arising from being a member of a minority group notwithstanding, the poets represented above are doing remarkably well. Some literary experts in Hungary, a country formerly so

anxious to write off her expatriates, and where literary competition is really fierce, have lately come to the conclusion that these Hungarian-Canadian poets are capable of adequate literary expression. They have even gone so far as to encourage poets resident in Hungary to study the forms and techniques developed by these authors. It is hoped that Canada also will take a close look at the works of Fáy, Tűz, Kemenes Géfin, Vitéz, or for that matter at the works of Iwaniuk, Jávör, Bauer, Betanzos Santos, Viirlaid, and a host of others. Our cultural lives would be much poorer without them.

NOTES

1. John Miska, *Ethnic and Native Canadian Literature, 1850-1979: A Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Materials* (Lethbridge: Microform Biblios, 1980), viii, 355 pp. The compilation includes 2,921 entries relating to primary and secondary publications in any language including English and French.
2. Watson Kirkconnell, "A Canadian Meets the Magyars," *The Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies*, 1, 1-2 (1974), 1-11.
3. Ferenc Fáy, *Áradás*, "Flood" (Toronto, 1972).
 Ferenc Fáy, *Az írást egyszer megtalálják*, "The Writing Will Be Discovered" (Toronto: Magyar Kultúra, 1959).
 Ferenc Fáy, *Jeremiás siralmai*, "The Lamentations of Jeremiah" (Toronto: Magyar Helikon, 1956).
 Ferenc Fáy, *Kövület: versek*, "Petrification: Poems" (Toronto: Vörösváry Publishing Co., 1977). Dust jacket includes letters by Gy. Határ, P. Ignó, and Gy. Rónai.
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Concluding Remarks

Americans and Canadians of Hungarian descent, as a rule, are not indifferent to the culture and history of their 'old' country, which fact often shows up in their reading and research interests. Thus, two papers represent the study of Hungary or, rather, two important aspects in the shaping of recent Hungarian society. The studies also help to throw light on the causes of newer waves of immigration from Hungary to Canada. While Professor Dreisziger's paper is entitled "The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941," it also deals with broader aspects as well as some incidental processes that contributed to Hungary's gradual drifting into the War.

One obvious factor that emerges is the woeful inadequacy of the Hungarian General Staff of the time as regards its difficult tasks. The higher ranks included officers who were well past their prime in terms of age and military strategy, being still permeated with loyalty to the "*K und K*" (*Kaiserlich und Königlich*: Imperial and Royal) spirit of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. They lacked experience with modern weapons and had been trained to keep away from politics other than that based on the status quo. On the other hand, the younger ones, owing to their quick promotions, possessed insufficient military knowledge and experience. While those in command were understandably still influenced by the traditions of German scholarship and strategy, also the more junior officers found it difficult to resist tradition. The unspoken conclusion wants to be stated that many, or perhaps most, of them suffered from a corresponding lack or ignorance of British and American political views and methods. Another point that emerges was the apparent endeavor of the military (and the one-time Hungarian government) to divert attention from social, economic, and political weaknesses by the stressing of irredentism.

Professor Blumstock, in his study "The Irrelevance of Ideology: The Fall of Marxism and the Rise of the Last Man," gives some hints of the vast changes that have taken place in Hungary in the last few decades and shares some of his apprehensions concerning the present and future. Blumstock manages to condense to a few pages his own insights combined with the impressions of authors of publications on post-1956 Hungary. He skillfully paints the picture of a growing conflict there between the Marxian "new man" and the Nietzschean "last man." He

seems to perceive, as one of the consequences of the 1956 upheaval, an overwhelming shift of interest among Hungarians from matters political to such as the satisfaction of everyday needs and the acquisition of status symbols. The premier, János Kádár, is presented as a quasi 'honest broker' who adroitly mediates, in the midst of conflicting demands, including those of the common people and the political leaders. The scene of these developments is Hungary, formerly an easternmost member of the West, now a westernmost show-window for the Eastern Bloc of Europe.

Two other studies address themselves to the discussion of immigrational and settlement problems, mainly in Canada. The present writer argues in his "Searching for Land: The First Hungarian Influx into Canada" that important motives for many peasant immigrants to leave the mines and factories of the USA and settle on the Canadian plains derived from the *laissez-faire* and highly violent nature of the industrial scene in late nineteenth-century America. The other study, Professor Dreisziger's "Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in Central Canada, 1921-1931," examines the seeming contradiction between Canada's avowed immigration policy "Only Farmers Need Apply" and the flocking, from the 1920s on, of Hungarians into the cities of Central Canada. Most of these people arrived in the wake of the "new immigration" of the seven years from 1924 on and established extensive new neighbourhoods in the cities of Central Canada with particular reference to Toronto and Montreal. This development has meant, for Hungarians, a dramatic shift of emphasis from the prairies to Central Canada both as regards numbers and in the reformulation of Hungarian identity.

The relocation of emphasis and the reshaping of identity alike, are reflected in cultural creativity, with particular reference, in the present case, to poetry. Especially Hungarian Canadian poetry of the older type, constitutes the subject of the present writer's second paper, "Early Hungarian-Canadian Culture." The poetry of the peasant communities on the Canadian plain seems to have been influenced by the traditions of the *historiás* of the native villages. These folk-poems still preserved their old-time function through recording, in an epic manner, and tersely, significant happenings. Some poems, particularly the ones that suited communal expression and were accompanied by a tune, tended to discharge a cathartic role, both for the community and the individual. The Békevár community actually reached the level of a culture centre in which thoughts and emotions came to be expressed in rhymes and prose alike. Creative writing tended to be reinforced by traditional songs, dances, hymns, passage rites, long-standing culinary tastes and skills, and the

ancestral language, all forming a coherent and interacting whole. The culture shown in these facets was the most important characteristic of the prairie or old Hungarian-Canadian identity.

John Miska, himself a writer and a poet, an almost tireless observer and advocate of belles-lettres among Canadians of Hungarian stock, provides elements for the crystallization of the new or urban Hungarian-Canadian identity, with particular reference to the cities of Central Canada and British Columbia. In his "Modern Hungarian Poetry in Canada" he considers and interprets the literary creativity of contemporary Canadian Hungarian authors who, for the most part, have organized themselves into an association. They tend to be poets belonging to various "schools" and different age groups. Their common denominator — in addition to writing in Hungarian — appears to be that they are practically all urban dwellers (who, sometimes, give expression to their nostalgia for the distant countryside) and *literati*, often preoccupied with the problems of the individualistic intellectual in the context of Canadian society.

A significant connecting link among the six perspectives presented in this volume is seen in their interpretive function, between the respective cultures, of their authors. The papers exhibit some results of work carried out in different fields of competence inside the framework of Hungarian Canadian (American) studies, as contributions to a body of findings on which a more comprehensive effort may be built at some time in the future.*

* The editors do not necessarily concur with opinions expressed by individual contributors.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS (continued from page 2)

Enlightenment, as well as Romanticism and, more recently, Hungarian Canadian Studies. Some of his publications in the last six years have been *Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada* (Regina, 1974), *Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation* (with A. J. Cropley, Sydney, Australia, 1975), *Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education* (Regina, 1978, as editor and contributor), and *Peace and Strife: Some Facets of the History of an Early Prairie Community* (dealing with Békevár; Kipling, Saskatchewan, 1980), as well as chapters in books, e.g., "Aspects of Hungarian Peasant Emigration from Pre-1914 Hungary" in I. Völgyes, ed., *The Peasantry of Eastern Europe*, 2 vols. (New York, 1979), vol. 1. He was an organizer of and a participant in the research team working at Békevár between 1973 and 1975, supported by the National Museum of Man.

As a librarian and bibliographer, JOHN MISKA is well known for his comprehensive bibliographies, which encompass *Agriculture 1906-1972: A Bibliography of Research*, 5 vols. (1973), *Solonetz Soils of the World: A Bibliography* (1975), *Irrigation of the World, 1964-1974*, 4 vols. (1976), *Pea Aphid: A Bibliography* (1977). In preparation is *Canadian Fiction: A National Bibliography of Secondary Material*. He is very active not only as a member of literary associations, but also as an organizer. A writer of essays and fiction, he has achieved a broad reputation. He works as chief librarian for the Lethbridge Research Station Library and as area co-ordinator for the Alberta libraries of Agriculture Canada. His publications comprise volumes such as *A Mug of Milk: Short Stories* (1968), *Antológia: a kanadai magyar írók könyve (Anthology: A Book of Canadian Hungarian Writers*, 3 vols., ed., 1969-1972), and *The Sound of Time: Anthology of Canadian Hungarian Authors* (1974).

The Canadian-American

REVIEW

of Hungarian Studies

The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703-1711

JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Marriage and Internal Migration in Moson County: Féltorony as a
Case Study: 1827-1920

BLAIR R. HOLMES

Auteurism in the Modern Hungarian Cinema

GEORGE BISTRAY

Budapest—Washington, 1956

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CONTENTS

The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703–1711	91
<i>JOHN B. HATTENDORF</i>	
Marriage and Internal Migration in Moson County: Féltorony as a Case Study: 1827–1920	103
<i>BLAIR R. HOLMES</i>	
Auteurism in the Modern Hungarian Cinema	135
<i>GEORGE BISZTRAY</i>	

DOCUMENTS

Budapest—Washington, 1956	145
<i>ANDOR C. KLAY</i>	
Obituary: Philip Uren, 1923–1979	163
Errata	164

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The Rákóczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703-1711

John B. Hattendorf

Hungarian liberties, religious toleration, and Habsburg absolutism were some of the issues which lay at the heart of the Rákóczi-led *Kuruc* revolt in Hungary. In England, most of these matters were little understood and of no apparent concern. Yet, the ministers of Her Majesty's Government in London had the deepest interest in ending the insurrection.¹

English interest centered on two aspects: supporting the Protestants in Hungary and preventing the revolt from being a diversion to the use of imperial troops. The religious aspect of Rákóczi's cause predisposed the Government in London to seek a solution which favored the Calvinists in Hungary. A few months after the outbreak of the rebellion, Queen Anne stressed the point in a personal letter to the Emperor Leopold in which she asked particularly for freedom of religion for the Hungarian Protestants who supported the insurrection. ". . . We consider it just for us to beg this the more freely from your Imperial Majesty," the Queen wrote,

since we ask nothing from you that we ourselves have not already done. Believing it not possible to compel the conscience in matters pertaining to religion, we have granted to our subjects professing the Roman Catholic faith the same peaceful, quiet and free use as is enjoyed by the rest of our subjects. . . .²

Religion was the closest tie which Englishmen shared with the followers of Rákóczi, but they also had a common appreciation for the value of parliamentary power in placing limits on royal authority. Englishmen who were aware of events in Hungary were impressed with the similarity of outlook and values between their own domestic system and Rákóczi's. Focusing on the religious issue and with further appreciation for the parliamentary aspirations of the *Kuruc*, England based her policy toward Hungary on the belief that what was appropriate in English domestic affairs was also a sound basis upon which to construct her

attitude in foreign affairs. Although the Habsburg court in Vienna was a key ally in the War of the Spanish Succession, the English Government could not ignore the persecution of Protestants in Catholic lands merely for the sake of international power politics. Personally, Queen Anne considered herself the leader of Protestant Europe. For that reason, she and many of her ministers felt it necessary to intervene on behalf of Protestants. She explained to the Elector Palatine, earlier in 1703,

We cannot but be moved by their anguish, as is meet, and by compassion, nor are we capable of shunning that which we consider to be our duty (since we profess the same religion as they). . . .³

England naturally sympathized with the Hungarian rebel aims since they called for toleration of the Protestant minority, but the relative importance of the issue was determined for England by the relationship of the Hungarian revolt to Austria's efforts in fighting France. As the revolt progressed after 1703, England saw Vienna send more and more troops to Hungary. The English Government believed that these troop movements created a serious obstacle to carrying out the grand strategy of the war against France. Moreover, Englishmen came to think that this action represented bad faith by Austria since they believed that the revolt could easily be quelled by acquiescing to Hungarian demands, particularly their demand for religious freedom.

The English concept of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession was based on the premise that, in order to defeat the most powerful single country in Europe, France's superior military strength had to be engaged on as many fronts as possible so that she would be compelled to divide and, thus, to weaken her forces. For this reason, England believed that it was essential for the allies to attack France from the United Provinces, Germany, Savoy, and from the sea while at the same time engaging French forces in Spain. In this way, the superior strength of France could be reduced to proportions which were manageable by the smaller allied armies. The key element in English thinking was the stress placed on simultaneous attack on several sides. The cabinet in London believed that this required the utmost effort on the part of each ally. In the light of this viewpoint, the revolt in Hungary was a serious distraction to the Austrian military effort in fighting France.⁴

In 1701, the aristocratic Hungarian patriot, Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi, had escaped from prison in Vienna. After nearly two years of refuge in Poland, he returned to Hungary in June 1703 with his associate Count Miklós Bercsényi and put himself at the head of the *Kuruc*, peasant revolt. Shortly after Rákóczi's return, George Stepney, the English

envoy in Vienna surveyed Vienna's position in the war against France. He saw that Austria had various problems: difficulty with the elector of Bavaria, the lethargy of the Imperial army, and the revolt in Hungary. "We want but one disorder more to be in as miserable a state as possible," he wrote.⁵ In the back of his mind, he had speculated that this one disorder more might be Turkish support for the Hungarians and a renewal of the war in the east which had ended only five years before with the Peace of Karlowitz. The English envoy to Prussia, Lord Raby, sympathized with the Imperial position, "the misfortune of the poor Emperor is but too plain for the rebels are almost at the gates of Vienna, and the elector of Bavaria with the French are ready to enter his hereditary countries on the other side, so that he can hardly find a place in his dominions where he can be safe."⁶

In the United Provinces, the duke of Marlborough served as commander-in-chief of English forces in the Low Countries and ambassador to the Dutch while also a key political figure and a member of the cabinet at home. In his reports Marlborough assured the cabinet that he understood entirely the serious effect of the Hungarian problem on the prosecution of the war, and that he lost no opportunity in pressing the Imperial envoys to urge their court to bring about peace with the Hungarians. He believed, however, that diplomatic pressure would not be effective while Hungarian demands were so unacceptably high.⁷ At an informal discussion in 1704 sponsored by the English and Dutch envoys to Vienna, the *Kuruc* leaders demonstrated that they intended to do more than correct what they believed were immediate political abuses. They sought the restoration of the elective monarchy and the right of the Hungarian nobility to oppose with arms any violation of the kingdom's law and constitution. In addition, they wanted foreign powers to guarantee the settlement with Vienna, while at the same time suggesting that Transylvania be re-established as an independent state with Rákóczi as its prince. The Habsburg court in Vienna found the rebel leaders to be far too obstinate and ambitious to negotiate over these demands or to accept willingly anything else.⁸

In 1704, the English envoy in Vienna was ordered to present Marlborough's campaign against Bavaria as a special favour to the Emperor, which could be appropriately reciprocated by quieting the disturbances in Hungary.⁹ This line of approach was repeatedly used by England, but it met with little success. As Marlborough progressed toward the Danube, Stepney continued to hear reports that if the confederate armies should defeat the Bavarian Elector Max II Emmanuel, Austria would probably order her leading general, Prince Eugen, to Hungary with a

large army to suppress the revolt. Stepney diplomatically told an Imperial courtier that he was

fully persuaded such designs were far from the Emperor's inclinations and true interest, which was to come to a speedy conclusion with his own subjects, and if the Elector of Bavaria should chance to be defeated, then to turn all the forces that can be spared out of the Empire toward prosecuting the war in Italy.¹⁰

The cabinet in London hoped that the further action which it had taken in sending a prestigious general, Lord Galway, with additional forces to Portugal would also be seen as a further assurance of English support for Habsburg interests. They hoped it would deserve the repayment of peace in Hungary. The allied success against Bavaria led London to believe that the Hungarians would be more willing to make peace.¹¹ It was logical to conclude that the defeat of such a very powerful prince would have an effect on less powerful dissenters within the Empire, but the situation proved to be quite different. On the one hand, this success seemed to lead some in Vienna to "a persecuting spirit" encouraging the use of large detachments of the Imperial army in Hungary.¹² On the other hand, the Hungarians now seemed to be even less receptive to the idea of making a peaceful solution. Following the defeat of the Bavarian and French armies by the English, Dutch and Imperial forces at the Battle of Blenheim in August 1704, neither France nor Bavaria was likely to provide any direct military support for the Hungarian revolt. However, Stepney speculated that the Hungarians might now turn to seek support from the Turks.¹³ In late August 1704, Stepney and the Dutch envoy at Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel Bruyninx, jointly approached Count Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, the imperial vice-chancellor, attempting to learn more about Imperial policy toward the Hungarian revolutionaries and "to improve any fair opportunity" that the Hungarians might have in reaching a peaceful solution.¹⁴ But all seemed to be of no avail. In late November, Secretary of State Robert Harley ordered Stepney, at the Queen's express command, that he "in the most warm and engaging terms press" the Emperor to make peace in Hungary. "All the zeal and affection that Her Majesty hath showed to the interest of the House of Austria," Harley lamented,

all the success which heaven hath blessed Her Majesty's arms with will be to no purpose, for not only the Turk will necessarily be brought into the War on one side, but the French will be strengthened on the other side and Her Majesty her allies will be weakened if not disabled from affording assistance to those who will do nothing towards their

own deliverance, but rather embarrass their own affairs and weaken others.¹⁵

The remote affairs of Hungary could well have been the rock upon which English grand strategy foundered. In English eyes, the spectre of renewed war between the Turks and the Empire was increased by Austrian insistence on putting down the Hungarian revolt by force. The failure of the Imperial court to react to this situation and to put clear priority on the war against France caused an increasingly cynical English attitude toward the Empire's contribution to the war. Richard Hill, the English envoy to Savoy, echoed the common sentiment when he remarked, "we owe little, God knows, to the Emperor, who can neither make peace in Hungary, nor war in Lombardy."¹⁶ For the moment, the war in Italy was to be sustained only by the hope of the 8,000 Prussians for which Marlborough had negotiated.¹⁷

By the summer of 1705, the insurrection in Hungary had reached such serious proportions for English plans that Lord Sunderland was dispatched on a special mission to establish the basis for peace between Austria and the Hungarians.¹⁸ The Government in London was quite willing to use every available argument in support of its view. Doing just that, Harley wrote to Vienna wishing Sunderland and Stepney success in the negotiations with "those Heathen magicians which oppose you" and suggesting that if peace could not be speedily reached in Hungary, it would neither be easy to give aid to Italy "nor will our Parliament here be ready to continue their supplies for carrying on a war to support those, who will not (though they can) help themselves."¹⁹ As the principal parliamentary manager for the Government as well as a secretary of state, Harley's words should have carried weight when reported in Vienna.

While both the Hungarians and the Emperor had accepted English mediation, there seemed to be a great reluctance on the part of the Austrians to accept an English guarantee of Hungarian rights. Without that, there was little hope that the Hungarians would agree to any terms. Even before leaving for the continent, Lord Sunderland was pessimistic about the success of his mission. "I fear I am going upon a very fruitless errand," he wrote.²⁰

After arriving in Austria, Sunderland found that, despite his urgent pleas, there was very little hope of preventing the Imperial army from forcefully putting down the revolt.²¹ By December 1705, the situation had not changed. Both sides in the dispute seemed more intransigent than ever, and there were additional fears that disorders in Bavaria would further hinder the war effort against France. Prince Eugene's

army in Italy was in need of every kind of support.²² Despite these difficulties, there was one ray of hope: the clash of arms in Transylvania during Austria's reoccupation of the area had not brought the Turks into the war. Sir Robert Sutton, English Ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Stepney that the plague, corruption, and confusion in the government of the Ottoman Empire allowed little opportunity for direct entry into the war.²³ Sutton believed that the Turks would go no further than merely encouraging the Hungarians to persevere in their revolt and "favouring them underhand" with arms in Wallachia and Moldavia.²⁴ By late spring 1706, Stepney had been able to make progress in mediating a two-month truce between the Hungarians and the Habsburgs.²⁵ The English and the Dutch had great expectations for the success of the conference convened at Tynall on 25 May 1706. This was the first formal peace talk between the Emperor Joseph and his Hungarian subjects after three years of war. Despite English optimism, the conference foundered on Rákóczi's uncompromising demand for the restoration of complete independence for Transylvania. George Stepney and his Dutch colleague worked hard to obtain a compromise, however the Emperor's claim to sovereignty in Transylvania backed by the success of his army in subduing the province gave little reason for the Habsburg court to concede to Rákóczi's demands. At the expiration of the truce in mid-July, the negotiations broke down and the armistice was not renewed. The Dutch and English mediators were optimistic about reaching a settlement in due course, but the prolonged period required would delay and obstruct the Imperial military campaign in Hungary. Viewing the negotiations as only a delay, the Habsburg court broke them off and resumed military operations.²⁶

The English and Dutch mediators were outraged at the failure of these negotiations. They interpreted Habsburg intransigence as evidence of insincerity, not only in its dealings with the Hungarians, but with the wider aims of the Grand Alliance against France. The continued presence of thousands of Austrian troops in Hungary weakened the allied effort against France. To Englishmen this appeared to be a weakness caused only by the selfish and unwarranted aims of the Habsburg monarch. Given English perceptions of the situation, the government in London could not support Vienna in suppressing protestantism or the rights of the Hungarians. In one respect, English support for Rákóczi only prolonged the agony of his inevitable defeat, yet the suppression of the Rákóczi insurrection was no more in England's interests than its continuation as a drain on Austrian resources.

Shortly after the collapse of the peace talks at Tynall, Stepney was

transferred to The Hague to replace the incapacitated Alexander Stanhope as envoy. Soon after his arrival there, Stepney learned that the Dutch had ordered their envoy in Constantinople to exhort Turkey to carefully adhere to the treaty of Karlowitz, the treaty which had brought an end to the Turkish war in 1699. Stepney held little hope that such a course of action would be effective. "In my poor opinion the most natural method of preserving the peace would be by persuading the Emperor to be reconciled with the Hungarians," he wrote.²⁷ The Hungarians were the key to preserving the peace in east central Europe, and Stepney went so far as to suggest that in order to prevent war, the Emperor should relinquish Transylvania entirely to Rákóczi. Unknown to the English, Rákóczi's envoys were already in Constantinople seeking aid from the Turks, but in Stepney's opinion, Turkey was not a natural ally for the Hungarians. Prince Rákóczi, himself, had told Stepney that he would not have recourse to the Turks unless there was no other alternative in attaining his goals.²⁸ With this advice in mind, the cabinet approved the instructions to the new English Ambassador to Vienna. Sir Philip Meadows was told that his major concern would be to prevent diversion from the war against France, stop the war in Hungary, and avoid Turkish interference. "It can not but give us and our allies much concern," the royal instructions stated, "if we should have any ground to apprehend that there will be less force employed against France the next year than was this. The only way to prevent that is to procure an honourable peace in Hungary."²⁹ English representations in this matter, however, had little effect. By the autumn of 1707, there were reports that additional Imperial troops were to be withdrawn from Italy and sent directly to Hungary.³⁰ Some of the forces mentioned included the Hessian and Saxe-Gothans in English pay serving in Italy.³¹ In February, reports were received in London that the Emperor intended to send some of the Danish troops in Austrian service to Hungary.³² Although these troops were paid by Austria, the English diplomats in both Vienna and Copenhagen were instructed to protest against this action and to ensure that the troops were used against France. However, when it was learned in London that Denmark had agreed to the Emperor's proposal to use Danish troops in Hungary, England acquiesced in order to prevent further stress within the alliance.³³

From 1708, the English Government appeared to take little interest in the Hungarian situation, enduring it as best they could. The envoy in Vienna admitted at one point that he never troubled London with news from Hungary although the court in Vienna seemed "more concerned for the success of that war, than at what may happen on any frontier of

France.”³⁴ In January 1711, the new Government in London under Robert Harley which replaced the Godolphin ministry renewed appeals for a peaceful accommodation in Hungary. Seeking support from the States-General, Lord Townshend was ordered to ask the Dutch to join in England’s plea for an end to a war which risked Turkish interference and which served French interests.³⁵ Despite continued assurances from Constantinople that war was unlikely, London suspected that these were only pretenses for the Turks to put themselves in a good military posture before attacking the Habsburg Empire. The safest course to follow, Secretary St. John believed, was to procure peace in Hungary.³⁶

In 1710, the chances for English grand strategy to succeed had been reduced following the defeat and capture of General James Stanhope at Brihuega in Spain and the continued lack of a vigorous attack on France from Savoy. In London, however, the cabinet continued to believe that a military solution to the war could only be won by carrying through the original concept of war strategy. The plans for the campaign of 1711 stressed the full use of the Imperial army against France and an active campaign by Victor Amadeus II, the duke of Savoy, complementing the other allied armies in the Low Countries and in Spain.

As war weariness and financial pressures stretched allied military resources to the utmost, English ministers believed that the Hungarian situation must be settled quickly in order to win the war. Hungary, in St. John’s words, had become “the great hinge of the war.”³⁷ Without the settlement there, he could see “no prospect of reducing France, and of obtaining an honourable Peace.”³⁸

The military situation in Spain had fallen to such a level that it appeared far too difficult a situation for the allies to retrieve. Secretary of State St. John outlined the dilemma:

Suppose what number of troops you please sent into Catalonia, they will have hardly ground at first to stand upon or provisions with any tolerable convenience, neither can they hope easily or in any reasonable time to be able to extend themselves blocked up by such an army, and in such a corner of the country.³⁹

The situation might be saved, the Government believed, by strong action in the other theatres. As St. John put it, “if we were able to gain a footing in France whilst we lost it in Spain, we might hope to have the opportunity of making a safe and honourable peace.”⁴⁰ English troops in Flanders were substantially increased to offset the preparations of the French.⁴¹ The best opportunity appeared to be an attack in Provence or Dauphiné.⁴² However, the ability of the allies to gather a strong army in

either of those places clearly depended on peace in Hungary and the subsequent transfer of Imperial forces to the French front. 20–30,000 troops had been deployed in Hungary during the insurrection and by the end of 1711, this figure may have been more than 50,000 or nearly half of the entire Austrian army.

England's expectations were raised by the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Hungarian insurgents and the Habsburg ruler in May 1711. The peace which England had sought for so many years seemed to be at hand. The revolt was over, and English ministers moved quickly to encourage the movement of Imperial troops out of Hungary.⁴³ They watched the results of their efforts carefully for they were designed to be a test of Vienna's intentions and of the viability of English grand strategy in achieving a military victory in the war. The new government which had come to power under Robert Harley in 1710 was committed to ending the war. The new English government pursued the same basic war strategy which had been followed since the war against France had broken out in 1702.⁴⁴ If possible, they wished to achieve a military victory along the lines which the Marlborough-Godolphin government had followed. The new leaders saw the difficulty of achieving success with a purely military strategy and, at the same time, they were exploring other alternatives. They believed that short of a clear cut military defeat on the battlefield, the alliance could still achieve its goals by using allied military preparations as a means of negotiating from a position of strength with France. Failing even allied agreement or cooperation to do that, English leaders believed that they could achieve their own national aims through a separate peace. In any case, the Government in London needed an effective Austrian army attacking France on her borders as part of England's conception of grand strategy for the war. Now that the Rákóczi insurrection had been put down, the English cabinet could see no further excuse for Austrian failure to join fully in the war against France. Secretary of State Henry St. John put the issue clearly when he wrote,

The Malcontents have hitherto been the scapegoats which have borne the blame of all deficiencies we have had to charge the House of Austria with. Hungary has been the gulf wherein the plunder of Bavaria, and of Mantua, the revenues of Milan and Naples, and the contributions of the Italian princes, all gained by the assistance of the Queen and States, have been swallowed up. But these excuses can no longer be pleaded. . . .⁴⁵

The obstacle which the Rákóczi-led insurrection in Hungary had

presented to English grand strategy had been removed, yet the English did not see the desired results after the end of the revolt. The cabinet in London concluded that the Emperor's removal of the troops from Hungary which had formerly been used to suppress the revolt would be "a final test of their good or their bad intentions to that Common Cause where the greatest stake is their own."⁴⁶ Consequently, opinion in London became bitter. After peace had been achieved in Hungary, the Imperial army remained there and it seemed England must pay even greater subsidies to Austria at a time when English finances were precarious. If that would be the case, St. John concluded bitterly, "the misfortune will indeed be general, but the fault will only lie at the Imperial Court."⁴⁷

* * *

The Hungarian revolt most certainly weakened the Grand Alliance by increasing tension between Vienna and London. Englishmen showed little appreciation for the realities of the situation in Hungary or for Habsburg objectives in Hungary. There was a lack of understanding and a clash of basic interests. For the English officials, the Rákóczi Insurrection was an obscure problem in a distant land, yet the diversion of troops to Hungary was the principal reason which prevented Austria from participating in the war against France in the manner and to the degree which England wished. The Habsburg court had other competing interests which distracted it in other areas as well, but the lack of cooperation which England felt in regard to Hungary was the situation which London used to test Vienna's sincerity in the Grand Alliance. The Habsburg court's unwillingness to achieve a speedy peace with the Hungarians, in part, spelled the failure of England's strategy for military victory against France.

England was sympathetic toward the rebel cause in Hungary, although she provided little beyond diplomatic support for Rákóczi. The rebels attracted England by a broad similarity in ideology, but English motives in pressing the issues were based in *real politik*. England was probably correct in thinking that the Grand Alliance needed to employ all of its armed force in order to defeat France in battle. However, England calculated allied victory on a number of factors which included the full and undiverted employment of the Austrian army on the French border. English leaders believed that the revolt in Hungary was the major diversion for Austria. They concluded that peace in Hungary would free the Austrian army to operate in the west without hindrance. This conclusion was unrealistic since it would have involved the abandonment of long standing Habsburg ambitions in Hungary. Furthermore, it meant

that Austria would refrain from military involvement in Hungary and would, in fact, yield that country of Rákóczi's forces. English plans also presumed that the victorious Hungarians would not align themselves with France or with Turkey in any way that would create a threat for Vienna. Perhaps the only situation which would have satisfied English aspirations was the creation of a Hungary which would be uninvolved in international politics, and whose laws, constitution—and Protestants—were somehow protected from the power of an absolute monarch. But such a Hungary could only be conjured up by Englishmen who held a curiously incomplete and unrealistic vision of that country as an isolated and distant nation whose external and internal problems had no influence on the general European situation. The greatest weakness in England's war policy was the dichotomy between her keen appreciation for power politics in constructing a war strategy, and her failure to understand Allied domestic affairs which militated against that strategy's implementation.

NOTES

1. For a general outline of Austrian and Hungarian reaction to English policy, see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "The Rákóczi Insurrection and the Disruption of the Grand Alliance," *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies*, vol. V, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 17-29, and in particular, Charles W. Ingrao. *In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy* (West Lafayette, Ind., 1979), pp. 123-160; Ladislas Baron Hengelmüller, *Hungary's Fight for National Existence* (London, 1913).
2. Queen Anne to the Emperor, 25 September 1703 in B. C. Brown, *The Letters of Queen Anne* (London, 1935), pp. 126-127.
3. Queen Anne to the Elector Palatine, 20 February 1703. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
4. For a detailed exposition of England's concept of grand strategy, see my "England in the War of Spanish Succession," Oxford D. Phil. Thesis, (1979).
5. P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo. 253: Stepney to Hedges, 22 August 1703.
6. P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo. 206: Raby to Hedges, 18 December 1703.
7. Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xiv, p. 254: Marlborough to Harley, 29 June 1704.
8. Ingrao, *Quest and Crisis*, pp. 126-28.
9. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 2: Harley to Stepney, 30 May 1704.
10. P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 327: Stepney to Harley, 18 June 1704. Report of a conversation with Count Kaunitz.
11. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 9: Harley to Stepney, 4 July 1704.
12. P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 423: Stepney to Hill, 22 July 1704.
13. P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 1: Stepney to Harley, 2 August 1704.
14. P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 32v: Stepney to Harley, 20 August 1704.
15. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 26: Harley to Stepney, 21 November 1704.
16. P.R.O., S.P. 92/27, fo. 7: Hill to Hedges, 4 January 1705.
17. The treaty with Prussia, signed 28 November 1704.
18. P.R.O., S.P. 104/203: Instructions to Sunderland, 28 June 1704. Sunderland

was not yet a secretary of state. He received the seals on December 1706, a year after his return.

19. P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fos. 73-33: Harley to Stepney, 14 August 1705.
20. West Sussex R.O., Petworth House Archives MSS. 14: Sunderland to Somerset, 21 July 1705.
21. Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,056, fo. 319: Sunderland to Godolphin, 9 September 1705.
22. Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xvi, p. 358: Marlborough to Harley, 22 December 1705; H. Snyder, ed., *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, (Oxford 1975), p. 514.
23. P.R.O., S.P. 80/27, fo. 250: Stepney to Harley, 26 December 1705.
24. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 111v: Stepney to Harley, 24 March 1706; S.P. 105/77: Sutton to Stepney, 31 March 1706.
25. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fos. 203-6: Stepney to Harley, 12 May 1706.
26. P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 347: Stepney to Harley, 13 July 1706; fo. 395: [Report of Stepney, Rechteren and Hamel Bruyninx to the Emperor at the Favourite on the miscarriage of negotiations with Hungary], 1 August 1706. Ingrao, *Quest and Crisis*, pp. 134-41.
27. P.R.O., S.P. 84/230, fo. 101: Stepney to Harley, 28 December 1706; see also Király and Pastor, "The Sublime Porte and Ferenc II Rákóczi . . ." in A. Ascher *et al.* *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds* (New York, 1979) pp. 129-148.
28. *Ibid.*
29. P.R.O., S.P. 104/203, fos. 247-54: Instructions to Meadows, 12 April 1707.
30. Blenheim Palace: Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 102: Sunderland to Meadows, 8 October 1707.
31. Blenheim Palace: Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 105: Sunderland to Meadows, 21 October 1707.
32. P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 56: Boyle to Pultney, 24 February 1708; fo. 57, 27 February 1708.
33. P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 58v: Boyle to Pultney, 30 March 1708.
34. P.R.O., S.P. 80/30: Palmes to Boyle, 18 February 1710.
35. P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fo. 14: St. John to Townshend, 30 January 1711.
36. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Palmes, 30 January 1711.
37. P.R.O., S.P. 104/52, fo. 97: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711.
38. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.
39. P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 8-11: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Marlborough to Heinsius, 10 February 1711. B. van 't Hoff. *The Correspondence of John Churchill and Antonie Heinsius* (The Hague, 1951), p. 539.
42. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.
43. Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D (W) 1778, V/188, fo. 164: Cabinet Minutes, Kensington, 17 May 1711.
44. See my "England in the War of the Spanish Succession," pp. 290-348.
45. P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 18 May 1711.
46. P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 115v-116: St. John to Raby, 18 May 1711.
47. Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fo. 247: St. John to Peterborough, 22 May 1711.

Marriage and Internal Migration in Moson County: Féltorony as a Case Study: 1827-1920

Blair R. Holmes

While geographers, historians and demographers frequently employ registers of births and deaths and census records in their examinations of society's trends and changes, there has generally been considerably less implementation of the detailed information contained in marriage registers.¹ In the case of the village of Féltorony (present-day Halbturn, Burgenland), the register of marriages encompasses the period from 1827 to 1920 inclusively and contains details which can be used in describing the lives of the inhabitants of this rural village in extreme eastern Austria. With the exception of the years 1865, 1866, 1881, which are missing, the records usually contain the names, ages, occupations and places of birth and residence of the bride and groom; the names and occupations of the parents of the marriage partners; and, in some cases, birthdates of the bride and groom and the names and occupations of the witnesses to the marriage. Prior to 1896 the marriage records, being under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, were written in Latin; while the introduction of civil registration in 1896 required the information to be recorded in Hungarian. Examples of the aspects of the daily life of the village's inhabitants which are possible to examine are the percentage of intra-village marriages (which provides an index of the community's isolation); the distance and direction of inter-village marriages; and the role of age, occupation and marital status in determination of spouse selection.²

Located in the Hungarian border province of Moson, part of which was incorporated into the Austrian Burgenland following World War One, Féltorony was selected at random and is assumed to have been representative of the predominantly German villages in western Hungary.³ The population of the village rose from 1150 in 1821 to 2449 in 1920, an increase of 112.9%, which was a much greater rate of increase than was experienced by the surrounding region.⁴ Between the years 1827-1920 there were 1657 marriages. Few women had occupations

listed, but of the men 57% were engaged in agriculture; approximately 19% were artisans; 9% followed commercial pursuits such as merchants, innkeepers or carters; 5% has pastoral occupations; while the remaining 10% was comprised of day-laborers, domestic servants, public officials, school teachers, military personnel or other miscellaneous livelihoods.

Primary among the factors which influenced a person's selection of a mate were the population of the surrounding territory, the distance from neighboring villages and local customs governing marital choice.. If, for example, the nearest village was at a greater distance than the average person could walk or ride within the space of a few hours, it is unlikely that there would have been much long-range courtship and few inter-village marriages.⁵ If the average person did not possess the means to travel great distances, there would have been little social contact outside one's own village or its immediate environs.⁶ The population of one's native village and the nearby area was also significant. If the population was dense, this provided a large number of potential partners and reduced the desire or necessity to search elsewhere. Also, the belief of the

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND THE DISTANCE OF
BIRTHPLACE FROM FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920

<i>Distance (km)</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
2-3	64	18
3-4	113	166
4-5	44	23
5-6	6	3
6-7	24	21
7-8	0	0
8-9	0	0
9-10	44	15
10-11	44	14
11-12	28	31
12-13	27	5
13-14	8	10
14-15	22	22
15-16	31	30
16-17	15	8
17-18	13	9
18-19	5	3
19-20	10	10
Total	498	388

Hungarian peasants that “everyone should choose a fitting mate within the village”⁷ militated against selecting a mate who was not well known to one’s family and friends.

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the relationship between the number of marriages and distance decreased sharply as the distance from Féltorony became greater. It is evident, when the places of birth and residence are compared, that there was a general tendency for movement toward Féltorony and, hence, more spouses were chosen from those who resided within a small radius. Table 3 reveals the tendency for a close proximity of residence to determine spouse selection. More of the brides and grooms were residing outside of Féltorony than were born outside and their residences were closer to the village. A large portion either resided in Féltorony or within a small radius. More than half of the men and two-thirds of the women were village residents, while an additional one-quarter of both genders resided within five kilometers. Very few persons lived at a distance exceeding twenty kilometers.⁸

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND THE DISTANCE OF
RESIDENCE FROM FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920

<i>Distance (km)</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
2-3	50	10
3-4	352	399
4-5	40	14
5-6	3	1
6-7	30	17
7-8	10	0
8-9	26	31
9-10	20	2
10-11	33	7
11-12	17	3
12-13	23	4
13-14	6	2
14-15	16	3
15-16	31	21
16-17	9	1
17-18	3	1
18-19	2	0
19-20	4	1
Total	675	517

TABLE 3
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DISTANCES OF
BIRTH AND RESIDENCE, 1827-1920

<i>Distance</i>	<i>BIRTH</i>						<i>RESIDENCE</i>					
	<i>Men</i>			<i>Women</i>			<i>Men</i>			<i>Women</i>		
	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cum%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cum%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cum%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cum%</i>
Féltorony	741	51.7	51.7	947	64.5	64.5	905	55.7	55.7	1092	67.3	67.3
0-5km	221	15.4	67.1	207	14.1	78.6	442	27.2	82.9	423	26.1	93.4
5-10km	118	8.2	75.3	53	3.6	82.2	122	7.5	90.4	58	3.6	97.0
10-20km	149	11.1	86.4	128	8.7	90.9	111	6.8	97.2	36	2.2	99.2

These figures, however, do not take into account the important factor of population distribution around the village. Because the probability of Féltorony residents marrying each other was a function both of distance and population, it is necessary to standardize the number of marriages for the surrounding area. This is accomplished by dividing the number of marriages, according to residence within a particular radius, by the corresponding population of the same area. Because the population structures of the neighboring villages are not known, it is assumed that they were similar to Féltorony. The average size of the population of each community and area was determined by calculating the running and weighted averages from years in which censuses were taken.⁹ (Table 4.)

When the standardized number of marriages is multiplied by 1000 ($M = 1000s/\frac{1}{2}p$) and the logarithm of the resulting product is plotted against the distance from Féltorony, as in Figure 1, the relationship approximates a straight line, which indicates a constant rate of change. The correlation coefficient (r) of the distance (D) and the $\log M$ gives further strong and nearly equal evidence of the relationship between the place of residence of a marriage partner and the distance of that residence from Féltorony. For males $r = -0.79$; while for females $r = -0.74$.

The information contained in the marriage registers varied in amount and nature according to the proclivities of the village priest and the demands of the church or state. On occasion, the earliest years of the register excluded the place of birth or residence, while the entries for the years following 1907 periodically omitted the birthplace of those not born in Féltorony or the neighboring villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof.¹⁰ As a result, the calculations for the years following 1907 are somewhat distorted and could be misleading.¹¹

Although the earliest parish register entries sometimes failed to list


TABLE 4
SPOUSES, ESTIMATED POPULATION, AND
STANDARDIZED NUMBER OF SPOUSES IN
THE VICINITY OF FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920

<i>Distance (km)</i> <i>from Féltorony</i>	<i>Spouse(s)</i>		<i>Average</i> <i>Population (p)</i>	<i>Standardized Spouses</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>		<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
2-3	50	10	1416	0.0706	0.0141
3-4	352	399	473	1.4884	1.6871
4-5	40	14	2454	0.0326	0.0114
5-6	3	1	2048	0.0029	0.0098
6-7	30	17	missing	—	—
7-8	10	0	145	0.1379	0.0000
8-9	26	31	missing	—	—
9-10	20	2	2234	0.0179	0.0018
10-11	33	7	2533	0.0261	0.0055
11-12	17	3	2757	0.0123	0.0022
12-13	23	4	3995	0.0115	0.0010
13-14	6	2	1710	0.0070	0.0023
14-15	16	3	4577	0.0070	0.0013
15-16	31	21	6894	0.0090	0.0061
16-17	9	1	4056	0.0044	0.0005
17-18	3	1	1605	0.0037	0.0012
18-19	2	0	799	0.0050	0.0000
19-20	4	1	3290	0.0024	0.0006
Féltorony	905	1092	1857	0.9747	1.1761

$$\text{Standardized Spouses} = \frac{s}{\frac{1}{2}p}$$

the place of birth or residence, it is evident that slightly more than half (52.3%) of the grooms and two-thirds (65.4%) of brides were born in Féltorony. When the place of residence is considered, a slightly larger percentage of the grooms (55.7%) and brides (67.4%) were living in Féltorony at the time of marriage. The lower percentage of male spouses resident in Féltorony stems, in part, from the fact that it was more common for men than women to leave the community to obtain employment. Men who changed their residence were also less inclined than women to return to the village of their birth for the marriage ceremony. More often, it was the bride's town of birth or a different village to which both had moved where the wedding occurred. When the neighboring villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof are included, the trend for women to change residence less than men becomes more clear. While three-fifths (60.2%) of the men were born in one of the three villages, in excess of three-fourths (76.9%) of the women were native. Of the men

FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP OF LOGARITHM OF STANDARDIZED NUMBER OF MARRIAGES TO DISTANCE FROM FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920



who married in Féltorony, three-quarters (77.5%) were resident in one of the villages, while more than nine-tenths (91.9%) of the women were residents. (Table 5.)

When it is considered that nearly 40% of the men and 23% of the women who were married in Féltorony were not born there or in the adjacent villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof, it becomes apparent that there was a significant amount of residential change in Moson county during the period being studied. This hypothesis is given further credence when a comparison is made between those who spent their lives from birth to marriage in Féltorony and those wed in the community who had either been born there and moved elsewhere or had been born elsewhere and moved into the village. Nearly half of the men and forty per cent of the women who were married in Féltorony were not natives, i.e., persons who were born and resident in the village. (Table 6.) The amount of residential change, however, was less than apparent because of those who were born and resident in a single village other than Féltorony. Approximately one-fifth (18.8%) of the grooms and one bride in nine (11.4%) who were wed in Féltorony were natives and residents of some other village. As a result, a high and similar percentage

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES BORN OR RESIDENT IN
FÉLTORONY, CASIMIR AND WITTMANNSHOF, 1827-1920

<i>Date</i>	<i>BIRTHPLACE</i>					
	<i>Féltorony</i>		<i>Casimir/Wittmannshof</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	58.3	80.2	1.6	5.8	59.9	86.0
1839-1849	53.9	73.8	4.6	9.7	58.5	83.5
1850-1860	43.6	61.3	2.6	5.8	46.2	67.1
1861-1871	52.0	69.5	9.1	7.3	61.1	76.8
1872-1882	50.7	55.7	7.2	14.2	57.9	69.9
1883-1895	47.5	63.7	5.9	7.4	53.4	71.1
1896-1908	51.7	60.1	9.3	13.4	61.0	73.5
1909-1920	66.7	69.4	25.4	25.4	92.1	94.8
Total						
Average	52.3	65.4	7.9	11.5	60.2	76.9

<i>Date</i>	<i>RESIDENCE</i>					
	<i>Féltorony</i>		<i>Casimir/Wittmannshof</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	68.6	77.0	10.1	10.9	78.7	87.9
1839-1849	62.2	73.4	13.4	15.4	75.6	88.8
1850-1860	57.7	73.3	23.7	22.4	81.4	95.7
1861-1871	63.1	79.3	20.1	19.6	83.4	98.9
1872-1882	54.6	66.5	24.8	30.7	79.4	97.2
1883-1895	54.3	70.6	26.0	27.6	80.3	98.2
1896-1908	52.1	59.6	23.6	29.6	75.7	89.2
1909-1920	39.9	48.9	28.5	32.3	68.4	81.2
Total						
Average	55.7	67.4	21.8	24.5	77.5	91.9

of men (68.1%) and women (72.3%) had never changed village of residence prior to marriage.¹²

Approximately one-third (31.4%) of the men married in Féltorony were migrant, i.e., had changed village of residence prior to marriage. Of these 436 persons, only 47 (10.8%) had been born in Féltorony, moved elsewhere and returned to their native village to marry. With only one exception, each returned to Féltorony to marry a native girl. The single exception married a person who had moved from her village of birth and settled near Féltorony. One-third (144) of the migrants had moved to Féltorony, while 245 (56.2%) had been born and changed residence outside of Féltorony. When the number of men who were either born

TABLE 6
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES BORN AND
RESIDENT IN FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920

<i>Year</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	54.8	72.2
1839-1849	51.4	61.8
1850-1860	42.4	58.4
1861-1871	50.9	68.6
1872-1882	49.8	55.7
1883-1895	45.2	62.6
1896-1908	47.0	55.2
1909-1920	57.2	60.1
Average	49.3	60.9

and/or resident in the village are totaled, it is somewhat surprising to learn that 37% of the men wed in Féltony were neither born nor resident there. This high figure becomes more credible and is reduced when the figures of those who were born or resident in Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof are added. With the three villages treated as a unit, the percentage of married men who were born and/or resident increases to 74.4%, while those who were born and maintained residence in either Féltony, Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof totaled 56.3% of the grooms.

It was relatively rare for a woman to marry outside of the village in which she resided, as less than one in twenty did so, whereas men were more likely to wed outside their village of residence. Even so, a large majority of both sexes was married in the village of residence. Of the women, three of four (75.4%) were either born or resident in Féltony. Taking in addition Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof, 86.9% of the brides were born and/or resident in at least one of the three villages, while 70.5% of the women were born and resided in the communities. In comparison to the men, a slightly smaller number of women (399), which is 29.8% of all brides whose birthplace and residence are known, were migratory. Of this group, 142 had moved to Féltony, which was only slightly higher (35.6% women; 33.0% men) than the percentage of grooms who had done the same. A larger number of women (66) than men (47) had been born in Féltony, moved elsewhere and returned to marry. In the case of both genders, most of those born in Féltony who left the village settled in Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof. Of the 943 brides born in Féltony, only 18 did not establish residence in one of these villages, while only 11 native-born men did likewise. Only 1.9% of

the women and 14.4% of the men married in Féltorony were born and residing outside the three associated villages. A total of 945 (67.7%) of the men wed in Féltorony never changed residence. Of these non-migrants, slightly more than one-quarter (27.2%) were neither natives nor residents of Féltorony, but 98 of the grooms who had never moved were residents of Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof. A total of 16.8% of the non-migratory men lived outside the three communities. A higher percentage (72.3%) of the women wed in Féltorony had never changed residence, but of the 1040 non-migratory brides, only 25 (2.4%) were not natives of Féltorony, Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof.

It is apparent that the various economic, social and technological changes introduced during the nineteenth century had a minimal effect upon the migratory trends of the population of Féltorony and its environs. One could expect that an increasingly dynamic regional economy and improved transportation systems would result in a marked increase in residential change, but such was not the case. Between 1827 and 1860 the mobility of both males and females tended to increase, but afterward, with one exception, there was a steady decline. When linear regressions are plotted, it emerges that both sexes tended to decrease their residential mobility between 1827 and 1920, although female mobility was always less than that of the men and decreased at a faster rate.¹³ This decrease in migration can be attributed partially to the increase in the village's population and the economic growth of the surrounding area. Greater employment opportunities and a larger choice of mates would logically contribute to the decline in residential change. Women displayed a more consistent pattern of mobility with less pronounced fluctuations than men. The men ranged between 45.6% and 17.6%, a difference of 28%; while the females ranged between 36.5% and 18.6% mobility, a difference of 17.9%. (Table 7.)

Because of the limited possibility that a person would marry someone who was not a resident of his own village or a nearby community, the likelihood of stable, i.e., non-migratory, natives marrying each other was closely related to the amount of inter-village migration. In Féltorony slightly more than half (54.5%) of the marriages were between persons who were non-migratory. However, nearly two-thirds of both sexes (men 67.5%; women 69.8%) had never changed residence. Of the stable women, then, three of four (78.1%) married non-migratory men; while a higher percentage (80.7%) of the stable men married non-migratory women. Nearly one marriage in six (17.2%) was between mutually migratory persons, while 28.3% involved one stable and one migratory spouse. However, short-range migration did not preclude

TABLE 7
PERCENTAGES OF MIGRATORY SPOUSES
1827-1920

<i>Years</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	23.8	23.4
1839-1849	26.5	32.2
1850-1860	45.6	36.5
1861-1871	35.7	29.3
1872-1882	34.1	33.0
1883-1895	35.4	32.1
1896-1908	33.5	29.9
1909-1920	17.6*	18.6*
Average	32.4*	29.8*

* After 1907 the parish register frequently failed to list the birthplaces of the grooms who were not born in Féltorony. Consequently, the mobility of men was likely higher for the 1909-1920 period. When this period is omitted from the calculations, the average percentage of male mobility is 34.0. When the same period is omitted for the brides, the average percentage of female mobility is 31.3.

marriage between village natives. The percentage of marriages between village natives was higher than is indicated due to the practice of one partner (usually the groom) obtaining employment in a neighboring village and returning to wed someone in the village of his birth. Although nearly half (45.5%) of the marriages contained at least one migratory partner, the distance of migration played a major role in determining whether the persons born in Féltorony married each other.

Throughout the century the majority of marriages was composed of persons who had never changed residence. Only in the period from 1850 to 1860 were less than half of the marriages constituted of mutually stable spouses. Otherwise, there was an increase in the percentage of mutually non-migratory partners. For the mutually migratory couples there was a substantial variation of percentage with a slight increase, i.e., increasingly more marriages were composed of migrants as the century progressed. Overall, there was a trend for both marriage partners to be persons who had changed residence or persons who had not. Increasingly fewer marriages were contracted in which only one member had changed residence. There was also an increase in marriages between non-migratory village natives, which decreased the likelihood that a migrant would marry a non-migrant. Throughout the century there was an increasing trend for fewer persons to return to their native village to

marry, while stable natives became less inclined to marry migrants and fewer persons were changing community of residence. The number of mutually migratory and mutually stable couples increased by 20.2% during the century. In the 1827–1838 period, one-third of the marriages had one member who had changed residence, but by 1909–1920 only one-fifth of the marriages had a partner who had moved. (Table 8.)

Residential change was dependent upon several factors. Age was one partial determinant of the frequency and distance of migration. Young men, who had a potentially larger selection of marriage partners than older men and less apparent reason to choose a spouse from outside the village, were less migratory. Until the age of 36, more than two-thirds (69.0%) of the grooms had not changed residence, but half (53.8%) of the older men had moved. Older men were more likely to be seeking a second wife and were under greater economic pressure to marry, so the goal of finding the ideal spouse would have been less important.¹⁴ Few young men were married under 20 years of age and none had changed residence. The majority of men (70.2%) married for the first time between the ages of 21 and 30, with the average age being 27.5 years. As the century progressed, there was a tendency for the mobility of the men in the 21–25 age group to increase while the older men decreased their migration. In the 1827–1838 period 92.3% of the men between 21 and 25 years of age were stable, but by 1883 the percentage had dropped to less than 57% and remained at that level until after 1908. Beginning at the age of 26, there was a trend for mobility to decrease at a faster rate, i.e.,

TABLE 8
PERCENTAGES OF MIGRATORY AND
NON-MIGRATORY SPOUSES, 1827-1920

<i>Years</i>	<i>Mutually Stable Couples</i>	<i>Mutually Migratory Couples</i>	<i>Husband Stable Wife Migratory</i>	<i>Husband Migratory Wife Stable</i>
1827–1838	58.9	7.4	14.7	18.9
1839–1849	52.9	11.0	20.6	15.4
1850–1860	42.7	24.8	12.1	20.4
1861–1871	51.4	16.0	13.3	19.3
1872–1882	54.4	21.2	11.5	12.9
1883–1895	54.3	21.7	10.4	13.6
1896–1908	54.9	17.8	13.1	14.1
1909–1920	72.4	7.3	11.4	8.9
Average	54.5	17.2	13.0	15.3

men between 26 and 30 years of age experienced a slight decrease in mobility, while each successive older age group witnessed a greater decrease in mobility than the former group.

The relationship between age and migration for women differed from that of the men. Whereas most men (84.4%) were married between the ages of 21 and 35, women entered into marriage younger, within a narrower age span, and with less difference in mobility between age groups. The average age for the first marriage of women was 23.6 years. Nearly two-thirds (65.7%) of the women were married between the ages of 21 and 30, which was less than the men (70.2%), but whereas less than 14 per 1000 of the males were married under the age of twenty, 205 per 1000 of the women did so. Thus 86.6% of the women were married before the age of thirty. With the exception of those over 40 years of age, the brides revealed a relatively constant and low level of migration for all ages. As in the case of the men, there was a trend for those in the 21–25 age group to change residence increasingly often, but unlike the men, the older women (those over 30) also increased their mobility throughout the century. The least amount of migration occurred within the 21–25 age bracket (23.8%) for women and the 26–30 year-old men (30.2%). For both sexes those beyond 40 years of age experienced the greatest amount of residential change (51.4% women; 46.0% men). The higher percentage of migration by persons in the upper age levels could partially be explained by their relative economic freedom. Because they would be less likely to have small children and could pass their holdings on to their heirs, older persons would find it easier to change residence. Also, older persons, because of their longevity, would have had more opportunity to change residence. (Table 9).

Remarriage was a relatively frequent phenomenon in the village. Slightly more than one-sixth (17.0%) of the grooms and exactly one bride in eight (12.5%) had previously been married.¹⁵ The average age of widowed men who chose to remarry was slightly more than 38, with the women of a similar status averaging 37 years. Because few women beyond the age of 35 and men beyond the age of 40 remarried (only 6.4% of all brides and 8.4% of all grooms), those who chose to marry later in life or remarried, apparently needed to search a wider area to locate a spouse and thus evidenced a higher degree of mobility. On the other hand, those who remarried were limited in their mobility because of children, property holdings or other obligations and would be inclined to select a mate from among the local populace. Most of the inhabitants of Féltorony who had lost a spouse chose not to remarry. Those with adult children or who did not require a marriage partner to manage the

TABLE 9
PERCENTAGES OF NON-MOBILITY ACCORDING TO
AGE GROUP, 1827-1920

Years	Age Groups													
	16-20		21-25		26-30		31-35		36-40		41-50		50+	
	M*	F**	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1827-1838	100	85.7	92.3	100	80.0	75.0	50.0	75.0	66.7	100	—	—	—	—
1839-1849	100	57.1	70.8	83.3	76.9	84.6	33.3	80.0	00.0	100	66.7	—	—	—
1850-1860	100	70.3	75.0	72.7	54.9	34.6	33.3	50.0	11.1	50.0	61.5	—	50.0	33.3
1861-1871	100	76.9	60.4	76.5	75.0	66.7	66.7	73.7	33.3	50.0	42.9	—	—	0.0
1872-1882	—	65.5	71.4	74.2	71.0	55.6	65.4	70.6	47.4	55.6	36.4	30.0	50.0	100
1883-1895	—	64.3	56.8	74.5	65.9	65.9	77.8	50.0	80.0	57.1	66.7	55.6	25.0	66.7
1896-1908	—	66.7	59.4	74.1	67.3	61.9	80.8	66.7	100	50.0	53.8	66.7	100	100
1909-1920	—	75.0	86.1	81.3	83.3	95.3	81.8	66.7	83.3	66.7	66.7	50.0	50.0	—
Totals	100	68.8	67.4	76.2	69.8	67.2	67.6	65.9	52.9	60.5	55.6	45.8	47.4	54.5

* M = Male

** F = Female

home and children or direct the farm or workshop had less reason to wed again. This is demonstrated by the small number of men beyond the age of 50 and women older than 45 who remarried.¹⁶ This also explains why there was only a slight difference in the percentages of migration between single men and widowers. Approximately two of every three men, regardless of marital status (single men 68.2%; widowers 64.1%), did not change residence. These nearly equal percentages are misleading, however. Until 1860 those who had previously been married were slightly less migratory than single men, although both groups revealed the same trend. Between 1861 and 1883 the single men were less apt to change residence. From 1883 to 1908 the situation was reversed, with the widowers becoming increasingly less mobile at a sharp rate. After 1908, however, the movement of previously married men increased rapidly while single men revealed an extreme degree of stability. Considering the period 1827-1920 as a whole, there was a slight tendency for single men to lessen their mobility, while men who had previously been married becoming increasingly migratory.¹⁷

Marital status was a stronger determinant of the mobility of women than it was of men. There were also greater differences between single women and those previously married. On the average, nearly three of every four women (71.1%) who married between 1827 and 1920 had never changed residence, while less than half (49.4%) of the previously

wed had never moved. Throughout the century there was little variation in the percentage of single women who were mobile, although there was a slight trend for residential stability to increase. The range of single female stability was between 66.9% and 82.4%, a difference of 15.5%; whereas the non-movement of widows fluctuated between 77.3% and 23.1%, a range of 44.2%. In spite of such widespread fluctuations, there was only an extremely slight decline in the mobility trend by previously married women.¹⁸ (Table 10.)

TABLE 10
PERCENTAGES OF STABILITY
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS, 1827-1920

<i>Years</i>	<i>MEN</i>		<i>WOMEN</i>	
	<i>Single</i>	<i>Previously Married</i>	<i>Single</i>	<i>Previously Married</i>
1827-1838	75.3	83.3	76.3	72.7
1839-1849	71.4	77.5	66.9	77.3
1850-1860	59.7	53.5	67.2	50.0
1861-1871	67.5	48.4	74.4	23.1
1872-1882	66.9	61.1	68.4	58.1
1883-1895	63.9	68.8	69.8	50.0
1896-1908	66.2	78.6	69.7	73.3
1909-1920	86.3	36.4	82.4	69.2
Average	68.2	64.1	71.7	49.4

It is logical to assume that a person's occupation would influence his mobility. Those with extensive property holdings, for example, would likely find it much more difficult to change residence than an itinerant day-laborer or artisan. The village's parish records list numerous occupations for men, but relatively few for women. Of the 1657 brides wed in Féltony, only 142 had occupations attributed to them. Ninety of the brides were servants, 38 were day-laborers or cottagers, seven were bondswomen, six were cooks, and one was a midwife. For the male population a large number and variety of occupations were recorded, which this author has categorized in seven groups: commercial, artisan, agriculture, service (including domestic servants, day-laborers and bondsmen), professional, pastoral and miscellaneous.¹⁹

A slightly disproportionate share of the men who did not change residence were engaged in agriculture. While composing 47.6% of the

grooms, the tillers of the soil accounted for 57.3% of those who were non-migratory. Four of every five (80.7%) farmers had not moved prior to marriage, while 65.8% of the artisans, 41.7% of the commercial class and 55.7% of the service category were stable.²⁰ Until 1895 those in agriculture maintained a high and dominant level of stability, but between 1896 and 1908 only slightly more than half did not change residence. Following 1908 the non-mobility of farmers rebounded to near its previous level. Throughout the century the non-mobility of those practicing agriculture declined at a rate nearly equal to that of the entire male population, while the stability of the artisans and those in the service and commercial categories increased after experiencing substantial fluctuations. Between 1827-1838, 68% of the artisans had not changed residence and each subsequent decade (except for 1872-1882) until the end of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in their mobility. By 1895 only 42.9% of the artisans in the preceding decade had not moved. After 1900, however, there was a sharp increase in the stability of artisans. The most migratory occupational category included the domestic servants, day-laborers, manual laborers, cottagers and the like. From 1827 until 1895, 53% of those in the service occupations were migratory. Like the artisans, they too, after the turn of the century, witnessed a tremendous change and became much more residentially stable. Between 1896 and 1902, 80.6% of the service group were non-migratory. During the years 1827-1920 those in agriculture declined only slightly in their residential stability, whereas the artisan and service groups tended to increase their residential permanence at a much faster rate.²¹ (Table 11.)

TABLE 11
PERCENTAGES OF MALE MIGRATION
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920

<i>Years</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Artisan</i>	<i>Service</i>	<i>Commercial</i>
1827-1838	16.7	32.0	—	—
1839-1849	14.5	31.8	45.7	—
1850-1860	22.8	38.5	59.6	—
1861-1871	17.9	50.0	44.8	—
1872-1882	8.2	35.7	52.7	68.8
1883-1895	2.9	57.1	54.9	63.2
1896-1908	42.2	21.7	18.9	50.0
1909-1920	18.5	6.2	21.1	—
Average	19.3	34.2	44.3	58.3

The amount of migration between Féltorony and the surrounding area between 1827 and 1920 clearly indicates that inter-village contact was common and that the possibility of marrying someone from another community was substantial. The alteration of one's residence, however, did not necessarily lessen the likelihood of marrying a person from one's own village. In spite of the frequency of residential change, most of those born in Féltorony married someone from their native village. A total of 852 marriages were conducted of which one or both spouses were stable natives of Féltorony, had moved from the village prior to being wed, or had been born elsewhere but had immigrated to the village. In 66.3% of the cases both partners were natives who had not changed residence. In the neighboring villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof a large majority of those who had moved into or emigrated from one of the two hamlets married someone else who has also migratory. In Albert Casimir slightly more than one marriage in six (17.6%) was between stable natives, while only two per cent of the marriages in Wittmannshof were between natives who had not moved. It is evident that Féltorony, whose population grew rapidly, exercised a strong attraction for persons residing in small or declining communities. In Féltorony only one male native in eight (12.4%) and one female native in approximately six (17.4%) married someone who had moved, even if only to a neighboring village to work. In Albert Casimir 56.2% of the men and 47.7% of the women who were stable natives married someone who had moved.

There was little tendency for those born in Féltorony or any of the surrounding villages who had moved elsewhere to return to their own community of birth to marry. It was exceptionally rare for a non-migratory native of Féltorony to marry someone who was neither born nor residing in the community. Only seven of 645 men (1.1%) and 29 of 684 women (4.2%) did so. In Albert Casimir, the stable, native males found one-fifth of their spouses from among those who had never resided in the community, while only 6.8% of the native women took their husbands from among outsiders.

A person's age also partially determined whether one wed a non-migratory native, someone who had migrated locally, or an outsider. Only one of the native Féltorony men who married prior to the age of 20 had changed residence. Between the ages of 21 and 35 an average of 69.5% of the native men who wed had not migrated. After the age of 35, however, the percentage of non-migratory males native to Féltorony dropped to an average of 55.3%. As age increased, males born in Féltorony became increasingly likely to move from the village prior to marriage. When all age groups are considered, a majority (68.4%) of the

women residing in Féltorony married non-migratory village natives. Stable, native Féltorony women constituted a higher percentage of marriage partners for a wider span of ages. Between 16 and 40 years of age, non-migratory Féltorony women comprised three-quarters (75.2%) of all brides. After 40 years of age the percentage of stability decreased sharply. On the average, 72.1% of the men married in Féltorony wed native, non-migratory women. (Table 12.)

TABLE 12
PERCENTAGES OF STABILITY OF FÉLTORONY NATIVES
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920

<i>AGES</i>	<i>MALE</i>	<i>FEMALE</i>
16-20	92.3	65.8
21-25	67.3	76.1
26-30	69.9	70.9
31-35	73.3	74.0
36-40	54.8	76.7
41-50	56.1	42.1
50+	53.3	50.0
Average	68.0	72.1

The selection of a mate from one's own native village, in spite of the change of residence, was also a function of the distance of migration. A change of residence within only a short distance of one's village would not effectively remove someone from the influence of friends or family, nor would the choice of potential mates, due to continued contact with one's native village, be greatly altered. Also, because parents commonly participated in the choice of mates for their children, the selection would often fall on someone already well known to the family, usually someone who lived nearby. Obviously, those whose distance of migration was small were less likely to find mates outside their home village. Although age or occupational group might have a high percentage of members who changed residence, a greater understanding of such migration is received when related to the distance of migration. In the case of Féltorony, the strong propensity of the village's natives to inter-marry is attested to by the fact that the vast majority of spouses born in the village did not relocate outside of it. For both sexes an overwhelming portion (93.6% men; 93.0% women) of those born in the community did not change residence prior to marriage. The native women of Féltorony who

migrated but returned to the village to marry demonstrated a higher incidence and distance of outward migration than men. Of 688 grooms born in Féltorony, 47 changed residence, but only 11 settled at a distance greater than five kilometers; whereas 66 brides emigrated, 18 moving more than five kilometers. (Table 13.)

TABLE 13
DISTANCE OF OUTWARD MIGRATION
BY FÉLTORONY NATIVES, 1827-1920

<i>DISTANCE</i>	<i>MALES</i>	<i>FEMALES</i>
0-5 km	36 (76.6%)	48 (72.7%)
5-10 km	1 (2.1%)	5 (7.6%)
10-20 km	3 (6.4%)	7 (10.6%)
20-30 km	3 (6.4%)	4 (6.1%)
30+ km	4 (8.5%)	2 (3.0%)
Total	47	66

Migration from the village by Féltorony natives was rare and largely limited to those of younger ages. Of the 39 men whose ages are known, who moved from the village, all except five were between 21 and 35 years of age. Nine of the males settled at a distance of more than five kilometers. Thirty female natives migrated from the village, most being between 16 and 35 years of age. Only five brides established residence further away than five kilometers. (Table 14.)

Marital status had a slight effect upon emigration. While single men constituted 83.0% of the grooms, they were a higher percentage (87.2%) of the Féltorony emigrants. For the women there was a slight opposite trend. Single females comprised 87.5% of the brides and 86.2% of the out-migrants. Women, whether single or previously married, tended to move further than men. Whereas over three-fourths (76.6%) of the out-migrant native men remained within five kilometers, 72.3% of the women remained equally close. Of the single women born in Féltorony, 93.3% remained in the village, while an additional 4.9% did not move more than five kilometers. Only 15 of 836 single, native-born brides moved further than five kilometers, and only two emigrated more than 20 kilometers. Of the previously married women born in Féltorony, 90.8% remained in the village and 6.1% moved five kilometers or less. Three moved a greater distance, but none more than 30 kilometers. 93.4% of the single men born in Féltorony remained in the village until marriage;

TABLE 14
EMIGRATION FROM FÉLTORONY
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920

<i>MALES</i>						
<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Totals</i>
16-20	0	0	0	0	0	0
21-25	6	1	0	0	0	7
26-30	13	0	1	2	0	16
31-35	6	0	1	1	2	10
36-40	2	0	0	0	0	2
41-50	2	0	0	1	0	3
50+	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	30	1	2	4	2	39

<i>FEMALES</i>						
<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Totals</i>
16-20	5	1	0	0	0	6
21-25	15	0	2	0	0	17
26-30	7	0	0	0	0	7
31-35	3	0	2	0	0	5
36-40	1	0	0	0	0	1
41-50	2	0	0	0	0	2
50+	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	35	1	4	0	0	40

5.0% settled within five kilometers. Only ten of 617 single, native-born grooms moved further. Of the previously married men born in Féltorony, 94.6% remained in the village and 4.5% moved five kilometers or less. Only one widower, native to Féltorony, moved more than five kilometers. (Table 15.)

Of the native-born Féltorony men who emigrated for whom occupations were listed, more than three-quarters (76.7%) remained within five kilometers of the village. Only six men moved more than 20 kilometers and returned to wed. The largest percentage (41.9%) of the emigrants were day-laborers or domestic servants. There was virtually no emigration of farmers from Féltorony. In fact, 95.9% of those engaged in agriculture, whether owners of land, tenants, or share-croppers, who were born in Féltorony never moved. Of those in agriculture who did move from the village, 81.3% remained within a radius of five kilometers. Artisans born in Féltorony were also highly stable. Only four of 71 left the village and in all cases established residence at least ten

TABLE 15
RESIDENCE AND OUT-MIGRATION OF FÉLTORONY
NATIVES ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS, 1827-1920

<i>FEMALE</i>							
	<i>Féltorony</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
Single	780	41	5	5	3	2	836
Previously Married	89	6	0	2	1	0	98

<i>MALE</i>							
	<i>Féltorony</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
Single	576	31	1	2	3	4	617
Previously Married	105	5	0	1	0	0	111

kilometers distant. Persons engaged in commercial activity displayed a different pattern. Few (14.5%) were born and resident in Féltorony. Instead, a majority (60.9%) resided within five kilometers and were not natives of the village, although choosing to be wed there. Those village natives classified in the service category were slightly more migratory. 10.1% moved from Féltorony, but only one person relocated his residence a distance greater than five kilometers. (Table 16.)

In contrast to those few natives who emigrated from Féltorony, the in-migrants traveled greater distances and constituted a larger per-

TABLE 16
EMIGRATION FROM FÉLTORONY
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Non-Migrants</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agriculture	375	13	1	1	1	0	391
Artisan	67	0	0	2	0	2	71
Commercial	10	2	0	0	1	0	13
Pastoral	6	1	0	0	0	1	8
Professional	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Service	160	17	0	0	0	1	178
Miscellaneous	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total	625	33	1	3	2	4	668

tage of the marriage partners. Of 832 men residing in Féltorony at the time of marriage, 144 (17.3%) had migrated into the village, as had 142 (13.9%) of the resident brides. The women who immigrated into Féltorony came from within a smaller radius than the men. Nearly one-third (31.0%) of the women and one-fifth (20.1%) of the men who were in-migrants came from within five kilometers; while three-quarters (76.8%) of the women and five of eight (62.5%) men had immigrated 20 kilometers or less. The cumulative figures reveal that 95.1% of the grooms and 97.7% of the brides residing in Féltorony between 1827 and 1920 were either indigenous to the village or had immigrated from within a radius of 30 kilometers; 89.5% of the men and 92.1% of the women were natives or immigrants of less than ten kilometers. (Table 17.)

According to age, men who moved into Féltorony revealed a pattern similar to those who emigrated. No groom under twenty years of age and only six men under 25 had moved into the village. Those who were

TABLE 17
IN-MIGRATION TO FÉLTORONY, 1827-1920

<i>MALES</i>						
<i>Years</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
1827-1838	2	2	7	4	4	19
1839-1849	6	2	3	0	6	17
1850-1860	2	3	8	1	11	25
1861-1871	3	10	7	1	3	24
1872-1882	5	3	1	2	4	15
1883-1895	2	7	2	4	7	22
1896-1908	7	1	5	1	6	20
1909-1920	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	29	28	33	13	41	144

<i>FEMALES</i>						
<i>Years</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
1827-1838	2	2	3	1	2	10
1839-1849	3	3	7	0	1	14
1850-1860	4	5	10	1	5	25
1861-1871	4	3	10	0	3	20
1872-1882	8	1	8	6	2	25
1883-1895	8	1	4	1	7	21
1896-1908	8	3	5	1	3	20
1909-1920	7	0	0	0	0	7
Total	44	18	47	10	23	142

immigrants, however, continued to change residence over a greater span of ages than did Féltorony's emigrants. The village's emigrants usually moved between 26 and 40 years of age. Immigration, though also declining after age 35, continued at a relatively significant rate beyond 50 years of age. Men over age 40 constituted one-fifth (21.6%) of the male in-migrants, but only 10.3% of the male emigrants. There was also a more equitable distribution of in-migrants among the age categories. Two-thirds of the males who emigrated from Féltorony did so between the ages of 26 and 35, whereas the same age groups accounted for 59.5% of the immigrants; 84.6% of the emigrants were between 21 and 35 years, but immigrants of similar ages totaled 64.9% of the grooms migrating into the village.

Women who moved into Féltorony changed residence at younger ages and over a shorter span of life than men. Eight brides had moved into the village prior to the age of 20, and more than one-third (34.4%) had settled in Féltorony prior to age 25. Most female immigration (80.3%) occurred between 21 and 35 years of age. By the age of 40, 92.6% of the women who were to move into Féltorony had done so. While the majority (75.4%) of the immigrant brides came from within 20 kilometers, there were some differences, depending upon age, in the distance of migration. (Table 18.)

Age, however, apparently had only a slight influence upon the distance of in-migration. When the average distance of each in-migrant is calculated, interesting patterns emerge. For both sexes the members of two consecutive age groups moved less distance than their respective percentages of in-migrants would appear to warrant. Men between the ages of 26 and 35, while 59.4% of the male immigrants, accounted for slightly less (53.1%) of the total cumulative distance of male in-migration. The women between 21 and 30 years of age totaled 57.4% of the female immigrants, but only 46.8% of the total distance moved. The youngest immigrant age group of each gender displayed a surprisingly lengthy distance of in-migration. Among the men, the 21-25 age group members, on the average, immigrated further than any other group prior to age 40; whereas the youngest group of female immigrants (16-20 years) migrated further than all other females. Migrating the least distance for their respective genders were men aged from 26 to 35 and women between 21 and 30 years; while persons over 50, for both groups, moved distances similar to those of the youngest. (Table 19.)

In consideration of their marital status, men who moved into Féltorony differed from the village's emigrants. First, a high proportion (17.7%) of the male immigrants had previously been married. Second,

TABLE 18
IN-MIGRATION TO FÉLTORONY
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920

MALES

<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
16-20	0	0	0	0	0	0
21-25	1	0	3	0	2	6
26-30	12	7	7	3	7	36
31-35	5	9	6	3	7	30
36-40	2	5	2	3	3	15
41-50	3	1	2	1	7	14
over 50	1	2	2	1	4	10
Total	24	24	22	11	30	111

FEMALES

<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
16-20	3	0	1	1	3	8
21-25	11	6	11	2	4	34
26-30	15	3	13	0	5	36
31-35	8	3	6	5	6	28
36-40	1	0	5	1	0	7
41-50	1	1	1	0	1	4
over 50	1	1	1	0	2	5
Total	40	14	38	9	21	122

men moving into Féltorony usually traveled greater distances. Over three-fourths (76.6%) of the male emigrants remained within five kilometers, but only one-fifth (19.8%) of immigrants came from within the same radius. Nearly three of five immigrants moved more than ten kilometers, with nearly one-third (31.2%) moving more than 30 kilometers. Generally, single men tended to move shorter distances than widowers, although the difference was minor.

As in the case of the men, previously wed women constituted a significant portion (16.2%) of the immigrants and migrated greater distances than those who moved from Féltorony. Nearly three-quarters (72.7%) of the brides who emigrated from Féltorony remained within five kilometers, while only 31.0% of the immigrants came from within an identical radius. For the female immigrants, marital status had virtually no influence upon the distance of immigration.

The largest (34.6%) group of male immigrants was made up of those in the service category, e.g., servants, day-laborers. Persons engaged in

TABLE 19
AVERAGE DISTANCE OF IN-MIGRATION
TO FÉLTORONY ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920

<i>MALES</i>				
<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>%(p) of Grooms</i>	<i>%(d) of Distance Moved</i>	<i>Difference (p - d)</i>	<i>Avg. Distance</i>
21-25	5.4	6.2	+0.8	17.9 km
26-30	32.4	27.2	-5.2	13.1
31-35	27.0	25.9	-1.1	15.0
36-40	13.5	13.6	+0.1	15.8
41-50	12.6	16.1	+3.5	20.0
Over 50	9.0	11.1	+2.1	19.3
<i>FEMALES</i>				
<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>%(p) of Brides</i>	<i>%(d) of Distance Moved</i>	<i>Difference (p - d)</i>	<i>Avg. Distance</i>
16-20	6.6	8.9	+2.3	17.2 km
21-25	27.9	20.5	-7.4	9.3
26-30	29.5	26.3	-3.2	11.3
31-35	23.0	28.5	+5.5	15.6
36-40	5.7	6.7	+1.0	14.6
41-50	3.3	3.6	+0.3	13.8
over 50	4.1	5.5	+1.4	17.0

agriculture constituted 29.2% and the artisans were one-sixth (16.9%) of those who moved to Féltorony. While these groups supplied 80.7% of the immigrants, significant differences existed among them. The practice of agriculture had little bearing upon the distance of immigration, as nearly equal numbers came from the various distance radii around Féltorony. From the artisan class, however, only two had moved into the village from within ten kilometers. Approximately 90% of the immigrant artisans moved more than 10 kilometers and nearly half (45.5%) had moved more than 30 kilometers. Persons employed in some form of service came from a widely dispersed area, but significant number migrated from within five kilometers, ten to 20 kilometers, and more than 30 kilometers. (Table 20.)

Most of the persons married in Féltorony apparently spent their lives within a small geographical area. Two-thirds (66.8%) of the men and three-fourths (78.0%) of the women were born and resident in Féltorony or within five kilometers, while a radius of ten kilometers included

TABLE 20
MALE MIGRATION INTO FÉLTORONY
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>5-10 km</i>	<i>10-20 km</i>	<i>20-30 km</i>	<i>over 30 km</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agriculture	8	11	8	3	8	38
Artisan	1	1	7	3	10	22
Commercial	1	1	1	2	1	6
Pastoral	1	2	0	0	2	5
Professional	3	0	1	1	2	7
Service	12	7	14	2	10	45
Miscellaneous	0	2	0	0	5	7
Total	26	24	31	11	38	130

74.1% of the men and 81.2% of the women. In addition, seven of eight grooms (87.8%) and 97.4% of the brides were born or resident in Féltorony or within five kilometers. (Table 21.)

There was a slight correlation between age at marriage and the area of birth and residence for both men and women. Surprisingly, grooms under the age of 20 years were born and resident within a narrower radius than were brides of identical ages. For the increasingly older age groups there was a gradual broadening of the radius of existence, so that only slightly more than half of the men between 36 and 50 years of age and women over 40 years were confined to Féltorony or a five-kilometer radius. For each gender there was little difference in the radius of birth and residence for those between the ages of 21 and 35 (in the case of men) and 16 and 40 (in the case of women). Between 21 and 35 years of age, 70.0% of the grooms; and, between the ages of 16 and 40, 78.7% were born in Féltorony or within five kilometers. For men over 35, however, only 56.8% resided within an identical area, and only 57.9% of the women who were over 40 years spent their lives within five kilometers. The age groups with the smallest percentages to spend their lives in Féltorony or within five kilometers were men between 36 and 40 (53.7%) and women between 41 and 50 (51.9%). High percentages of brides and grooms were either born or resident in Féltorony or nearby, which is a result to be expected when the amount of immigration into the village is considered. Of the women, 97.2% were either born or resident in Féltorony or within five kilometers; while 88.6% of the men did the same. Except for the grooms under 20 years of age, there was relatively little difference among male age groups. The same situation applied to the women, except that all of the women between 36 and 50 years of age

TABLE 21
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES

<i>Years</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	67.7	82.5	73.3	86.0
1839-1849	67.7	77.8	74.5	83.4
1850-1860	56.9	71.4	62.2	75.8
1861-1871	67.1	77.7	78.1	80.6
1872-1882	64.2	74.1	72.3	77.0
1883-1895	63.0	75.6	72.2	76.6
1896-1908	65.7	75.4	71.4	78.6
1909-1920	87.7	92.5	93.5	98.8
Average	66.8	78.0	74.1	81.2

AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES

<i>Years</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
1828-1838	83.7	98.1	88.5	98.1
1839-1849	84.7	98.1	88.1	98.1
1850-1860	88.7	97.7	91.4	97.7
1861-1871	90.2	99.4	95.5	99.4
1872-1882	86.7	97.7	92.5	99.6
1883-1895	87.3	99.1	93.3	99.1
1896-1908	86.3	94.0	88.0	95.2
1909-1920	96.4	95.4	99.3	100
Average	87.8	97.4	92.3	98.4

were born or resident in Féltony or within five kilometers. Only 34 (2.8%) of the brides, whose ages are known, were either born or resident at a distance greater than five kilometers. (Table 22.)

The marital status of those who wed in Féltony also influenced their residential mobility and the area in which they were born and resident. For both sexes those who had never been married came from within a smaller radius than those who were re-marrying. Higher percentages of women than men, however, spent their lives closer to the village. The marital status of men made less difference upon their area of existence than was the case with females. Approximately two-thirds (68.4%) of the single men and three of five widowers (61.1%) were either born or resident in Féltony or within five kilometers, a difference of 7.3%;

TABLE 22
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE
ACCORDING TO AGE
PERCENTAGE OF SPOUSES

<i>Ages</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
16-20	100.0	74.4	100.0	79.7
21-25	69.8	82.4	77.0	84.5
26-30	70.5	74.9	76.8	78.8
31-35	66.9	77.0	75.3	78.2
36-40	53.7	75.7	64.2	78.4
41-50	58.4	51.9	70.1	59.3
over 50	61.1	54.5	61.1	63.6
Average	68.2	78.0	75.6	81.1

AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE
ACCORDING TO AGE
PERCENTAGE OF SPOUSES

<i>Ages</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
16-20	100.0	94.3	100.0	98.0
21-25	87.8	98.3	91.8	98.8
26-30	90.2	97.4	93.2	98.3
31-35	89.2	96.6	92.8	97.7
36-40	83.6	100.0	91.0	100.0
41-50	84.4	100.0	93.5	100.0
over 50	88.9	90.9	88.9	90.9
Average	88.6		92.6	98.4

while four of five single brides (79.3%) but only two-thirds (68.3%) of the widows, a difference of 11.0%, spent their lives within the same area. When a radius of ten kilometers from Féltorony is considered, there is an expected increase in the number who were born and resident within the enlarged area, but the increase is rather small, which indicates that most persons who wed in the village were residents of Féltorony and nearby communities, while the remainder were born and resident within a widely dispersed area. The smallest percentage of any group which had neither been born nor resident in Féltorony or within five kilometers was comprised of males who were widowers. Even so, five of six widowers were born or resident in Féltorony or within five kilometers, while it was the same for nine of every ten single men (89.1%). For the women,

marital status made virtually no difference and only one bride in forty had neither been born nor resident in the village or nearby. (Table 23.)

TABLE 23
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES

<i>Status</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Single	68.4	79.3	75.5	82.5
Previously Married	61.1	68.3	68.8	71.9

AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES

<i>Status</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>		<i>0-10 km</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Single	89.1	97.5	93.0	98.6
Previously Married	83.3	97.6	89.6	98.2

Among the men wed in Féltorony who engaged in agriculture, nearly two-thirds (63.5%) were native-born residents and three-fourths (78.7%) had always lived in the village or within five kilometers. The artisans, day-laborers and servants, and the commercial element, however, displayed different characteristics. Less than half (45.6%) of the artisans who married in Féltorony were natives and only 57.1% had been born or resident within five kilometers, with only three of five (59.9%) coming from within a radius of ten kilometers. Still fewer of those engaged in commerce or business (14.5%) were natives of Féltorony, while less than half (49.3%) had always lived in the village or within five kilometers. Of the laborers and servants, slightly less than half (45.8%) were natives, but nearly two-thirds (64.8%) had always lived within five kilometers of Féltorony. When the average distances are calculated for those who moved and settled in Féltorony, it becomes expectedly evident that the servants, laborers and agrarians were drawn predominantly from the nearby population, while the commercial and business elements and the

artisans, who had fewer restraints and could travel more easily, migrated to Féltorony from greater distances. (Table 24.)

TABLE 24
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE OF GROOMS
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>0-10 km</i>
Agriculture	78.7	86.0
Artisan	57.1	59.9
Commercial	49.3	52.2
Service	64.8	70.2
Professional	12.5	25.0
Pastoral	38.7	45.2
Miscellaneous	37.5	37.5

AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE OF GROOMS
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>0-5 km</i>	<i>0-10 km</i>
Agriculture	90.5	94.2
Artisan	81.6	83.0
Commercial	89.9	91.3
Service	94.8	97.4
Professional	37.5	75.0
Pastoral	83.9	87.1
Miscellaneous	79.2	83.3

There was a significant amount of migration within western Hungary during the period from 1827 to 1920. Except for those who permanently emigrated, however, there was little long-distance internal migration, regardless of age, sex, marital status or occupation. Also, the mobility and marriage patterns of the inhabitants of Féltorony were scarcely influenced by the general improvement of transportation during the nineteenth century. For most rural inhabitants of Moson life continued to be contained within a small area and social contact was narrowly circumscribed. The local populace was not likely to travel far from home or marry someone who had formerly been unknown to friends and family, or was of a dissimilar background. Clearly, the traditional patterns of spouse selection were largely unaffected and continued well into the modern age.

NOTES

1. Notable exceptions are the geographers Peter Perry and R. F. Peel whose studies of internal migration, rural isolation and marriage-distance relationships on New Zealand and England stimulated some of the ideas contained in this paper.

2. Microfilm copies of the parish registers employed in this study are contained in the Genealogical Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints in Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S.A. The following rolls of film were used:

- No. 0700861. Births, Marriages, Deaths, 1827-1864; Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0700862. Births, Marriages, Deaths, 1865-1895; Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0700273. Marriages, 1895-1920; Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0623508. 1828 Census of Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0719825. Census of Moson County, Hungary, 1848.
- No. 0623058. Census of Moson County, Hungary, 1828.
- No. 0700271. Births, 1895-1904; Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0700272. Births, 1905-1920; Féltorony, Hungary.
- No. 0700274. Deaths, 1895-1920; Féltorony, Hungary.

3. In 1934 the portion of the Austrian Burgenland east of the Neusiedler See was estimated to have a population which was 84.46% German. The village of Halbturn's (Féltorony) population was 96.9% German, while the immediately surrounding area was 94.4% German. Cf. Lendl, Hubert. "Das gesellschaftliche Gefüge des Landvolks im deutsch-madjarischen Grenzraum östlich des Neusiedler Sees." *Deutsches Archiv für Landes- und Volksforschung*, Jahrgang 2 (1938), pp. 800-835.

4. Féltorony's population throughout the century was the following:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>
1821	1150
1833	1218
1842	1282
1851	1262
1863	1961
1869	2093
1880	2473
1890	2263
1900	2429
1910	2460
1920	2449

Féltorony's population increased 112.9% between 1821 and 1920, while the villages within a 5 km. radius, whose population change is known, increased an average of 62.1%; villages from 5 to 10 km. increased an average of 59.1%; and villages from 10 to 20 km. increased an average of 55.3%.

5. Peter Laslett's observation that "before the coming of the bicycle and paved highway, there was a fixed distance from the labourer's cottage beyond which a full day's work was out of the question—it took too long to get there and back," applies also to the courtship process. *The World We Have Lost*, 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 1971, p. 80.

6. The 1828 census of Féltorony, which had a population of approximately 1190, contained 331 horses. In 1852 the parish registers began to list the occupation of carter, which was the occupation of 1.8% of the grooms between 1852 and 1920.

7. Fel, Edit and Tamas Hofer, *Proper Peasants: Traditional Life in a Hungarian Village*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, pp. 138-143.

8. Because nearly every person who was wed in Féltorony was resident within 20 km., this distance will serve as the outer limit of the study.

9. The years of the censuses and the sources of information are as follows:

1821 Csaplovics, Johann v. *Topographisch-statistisches Archiv des Königreiches Ungarn*. 2 Bde. Wien, 1821.

1833 Thiele, J. C. v. *Das Königreich Ungarn*. Kaschau, 1833.

1836 Hungary. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. *A népmozgalom főbb adatai közésként 1828-1900*. Vol. I. Budapest, 1972.

1842 *Universalis Schematisus Eccl.* Budae, 1842.

1851 Fényes, Elek. *Magyarország geographiai szótára*. 4 Bde. Pest, 1851.

1863 *Ortslexikon des Königreiches Ungarn*. 1863.

1869 *Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen*.

1870 same source as 1836.

1880 *Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen*.

1890 Ibid.

1900 Ibid.

1910 Ibid.

1920 Ibid.

10. Wittmannshof (population in 1934 - 265) and Albert Casimir (population in 1851 was 338) were so small that they had no church. As a result, all of the births, deaths and marriages involving residents of these villages were recorded in Féltorony and are included in this study.

11. For the years following 1907 slightly more than one-fourth of the places of birth for males are unrecorded. The male and female places of residence and the female places of birth are nearly all recorded, but reveal a tendency to list few villages other than Féltorony, Wittmannshof and Albert Casimir. As a result, the figures for the post-1907 period are questionable.

12. For the purposes of this study the terms mobile and migratory are applied to persons who change their village of residence prior to marriage. Those at the time of their marriage who were residing in the village of their birth are designated as non-migratory or stable. Persons born in Féltorony who married elsewhere are not included in this study. Because of the possibility of an unusually large migration out of the village, it is conceivable that the trends described will not be totally accurate. However, the fact that the population of Féltorony increased at a much faster rate than other villages within a 20-kilometer radius indicates that Féltorony did not experience a significant loss of its native population. This conclusion is further corroborated by a perusal of the family groups which this author has compiled from the village's parish registers. When a projected study of the villages near Féltorony is completed, it will be more nearly possible to determine accurately the number of migrants in the region and the distances and directions of their moves.

The reason for the apparent discrepancies in some of the figures quoted in this study results from the fact that the places of birth and/or residence of some spouses was not recorded, hence rendering their inclusion in certain analyses impossible.

Of the men who were non-migratory natives of villages other than Féltorony, 37.3% were born and resident in Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof. Of the non-migratory women outside of Féltorony, 84.1% were natives of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof.

13. The linear regression calculated for men from 1827 to 1920 is: $y = 33.7 - 0.48x$; and for women is: $y = 32.3 - 0.65x$. When the data from 1907 to 1920 is omitted, the mobility trends for both sexes change from negative to positive, i.e., mobility, on the average, increased from 1827 to 1906, with the men revealing a faster rate of increase. For the shorter period (1827-1906) the linear equations are: men: $y = 28.5 + 1.26x$; women: $y = 28.7 + 0.56x$.

14. Indications from data not included in this study are that of a large majority of those who remarried did so within one to three months of the death of their previous spouse. The immediate need for a spouse might have contributed to a higher percentage of mobility. Only those in the upper age levels who remarried did so after an extended period of time.

15. These figures appear to disagree with those given in note 16. The difference results from the fact that in some cases the ages of those who remarried are unknown.

16. MARITAL STATUS ACCORDING TO AGE

Ages	Men		Women	
	Single	Previously Married	Single	Previously Married
16-20	20 (1.5%)	1 (0.08%)	282* (21.4%)	1 (0.08%)
21-25	425 (31.9%)	6 (0.5%)	604 (45.9%)	8 (0.5%)
26-30	469 (35.2%)	39 (2.9%)	222 (16.9%)	21 (1.6%)
31-35	160 (12.0%)	30 (2.3%)	62 (4.7%)	33 (2.5%)
36-40	39 (2.9%)	37 (2.8%)	8 (0.6%)	31 (2.4%)
41-50	24 (1.8%)	61 (4.6%)	4 (0.3%)	29 (2.2%)
50+	4 (0.4%)	17 (1.3%)	2 (0.2%)	10 (0.8%)
Total	1141 (85.7%)	191 (14.3%)	1184 (89.9%)	133 (10.1%)

* Three brides were married before the age of 16.

17. For single men the linear regression trend was $y = 64.8\% + 0.93x$; for widowers the trend was $y = 77.6\% - 3.15x$.

18. For single women the linear regression was $y = 68.8\% + 0.70x$; for widows the trend was $y = 59.4\% - 0.06x$.

19. Because those classified in the professional, pastoral and miscellaneous groups comprised less than four per cent of all grooms and only 10.3% of those who changed residence, an analysis of the frequency and distance of their migration would be unjustified.

20. Percentages of Grooms according to Occupation and Stability

Occupation	% of Occupations	% of Stable Grooms
Agriculture	47.6	57.3
Artisan	12.3	12.0
Service	29.0	24.1
Commercial	5.8	3.6
Pastoral	2.5	1.2
Professional	0.7	0.4
Miscellaneous	2.1	1.3

21. The regression trends for the major occupations were as follows:

Agriculture $y = 86.4 - 0.97x$

Artisan $y = 55.7 + 2.26x$

Service $y = 31.6 + 5.18x$

A possible, partial explanation for the increasing stability of the artisan and service categories is that the increased population of the village rendered a change of residence for employment or economic improvement less necessary, whereas the population growth would have been disadvantageous to those needing land to cultivate.

Auteurism in the Modern Hungarian Cinema¹

George Bisztray

After half a decade spent mostly in Rome, Miklós Jancsó, now a director of international reputation, returned to Hungary in the mid-seventies and became more accessible to cultural journalists who were eager to interview him about his artistic outlook and future plans. And Jancsó was eager to answer their questions. True enough, these recent interviews were at least ten years behind the main current of European cinema, since the auteurist director Jancsó was talking about issues which had been discussed already in the fifties and sixties, especially in André Bazin's periodical *Cahiers du Cinéma*. But again, Jancsó himself willingly admitted that his style was no longer in accord with his time. And it is also true that what he said in these belated interviews was the first extensive conceptualization of auteurist aesthetics by a Hungarian director. A review of his more significant statements will hopefully demonstrate that a distinct and valid definition of these aesthetics unfolds from these interviews.²

As most fashionable jargon terms, "auteurism," too, has a hollow ring.³ From the theoretical debates of the past, it appears that we should first look for the essence of auteurism in the role which the movie director plays in the creative process. Jancsó's comments on his own artistic method grew out of this basic view of auteurism and he defines the concept accordingly.

As Jancsó spells it out, the director may be a link in a production chain, materializing a script to which he is indifferent by manipulating actors and actresses whom he does not care for but must nevertheless feature because of the contracts binding the producer. This is the American model of filmmaking, a perfect prototype of the division of labour and of alienation. Leadership is with the producer and the distributor; their criteria have nothing to do with art but with production expenses, contracts, and expected returns on the investment. If anything marks a movie and attracts people to the theatre is least likely the director's name; most likely the name of stars featured. The director has nothing to do with the thousands of feet of film shot, since he is hardly allowed to edit his own movie, unless as a very exceptional privilege. The identifying characteristic of these films is not the style but the story.

On the other hand, there is another example which Jancsó, relying on his Roman experience, calls the Italian model. This is a biased term but the way Jancsó describes it clearly indicates the contrast with Hollywood. "Film as an art form does not permit the director to degrade his fellow-artists to second-rate figures," states Jancsó, asserting also that he can make movies only with artist-friends.⁴ Writers help the director develop a script which most adequately expresses his artistic vision. Similarly, stage and costume designers work closely together with the director. Unlike in the division of labour, a co-operation of artists unfolds before our eyes to characterize this form of filmmaking whose result is not a rootless product but, rather, a collective piece of art, comparable to the performance of a theatre or musical ensemble.

The term "auteurism" suggests a creative action analogous with "authorship." Indeed, it is the co-operation or even full identity of writer and director which forms the basis of this filmmaking practice. On the one hand, in the auteur movies it is the director claiming the one-person responsibility for the ultimate realization of a collective vision, and for giving shape to figures which appear, as Jancsó states, in an abstract, formless way in literature. On the other hand, as the Hungarian film critic István Nemeskürty emphasizes, the dialogues of the film are inalienable properties of the writer.⁵

On this point, we are confronted with an interesting phenomenon. Whereas virtually all great Western auteurist directors have themselves written the scripts for their movies, Jancsó is unique with his obsession of working with the same scriptwriter in a row of movies. Beginning with "My Way Home" (Így jöttem, 1964), this writer-associate has become Gyula Hernádi. Based on his scripts, Jancsó shot thirteen movies, including three produced in Italy, two of these with the literary cooperation of the Italian Giovanna Gagliardo. No other auteurist director is known for such "duplication of one function in two persons" (as Domokos called the Jancsó-Hernádi phenomenon in his interview). As Jancsó describes this process, an idea is slowly shaped to a script, then to a visual image, in a dialogue between two akin artistic minds.

In the last analysis, however, a genetic criterion (that is, authorship) alone is not sufficient to define the artistic method of auteurism. The question arises: How is it possible to tell an auteurist movie from a non-auteurist one? Jancsó describes his movies as "special films" in which the actors "express ideas and standpoints in songs, dances, and mimics." Nemeskürty emphasizes that an auteurist film is a personal statement. The result is a certain mood, an individual visual style which permeates the movies of auteurists. This mood may result from a stylized reality or

even from a venture into the surrealist, but never from an attempt to create the illusion of a reified world. It is mostly from the basis of György Lukács's aesthetic principles, and especially his view of naturalism, that Jancsó consistently attacks what he calls the mini-psychology and mini-realism (that is, the small-scale and meticulous psychological and realistic tendencies) of the nineteen-seventies. *Cinema vérité*, documentary techniques, the illusion that reality is as faithfully projected on the screen as possible are, in Jancsó's eye, manipulative ways of making people accept conditions as they are. "Realism" in its most plausible meaning appears as an enemy of socialist art, because it does not let one see beyond the surface of social phenomena, and therefore it negates both human freedom and the possibility of change, excludes alternatives, and does not open any vistas of a better future. Showing a ritual act, on the other hand, breaks the superficial illusion that things are as they are and they cannot be changed.

Creative sincerity, not to a reified world but to human essence, to artistic consciousness, is a basic principle for Jancsó. One charge this credo can easily call upon is didacticism. Incidentally, Jancsó is willing to face this charge, although with some reservations. He claims that his didacticism is never direct and obvious. He quotes the examples of András Kovács, his Hungarian fellow-director, in whose movies (as Jancsó puts it) two people tend to discuss politics at length; and Jean-Luc Godard, who makes one or another of his characters read Marx. Jancsó believes that he would be unable to cultivate this kind of didacticism (making a movie of Sacco and Vanzetti would not suit him); but that nevertheless his films are political and manifest the French concept of *cinéma engagé*. He calls his style, located between the seemingly apolitical and the blatantly, militantly political cinema, a "middle way." Yet in 1976, he also believed that he had ventured too far into the field of cinematic surrealism with "Agnus Dei" (Égi bárány, 1970), "Red Psalm" (Még kér a nép, 1971), "Elektreia" (Szerelmem, Elektra, 1974), and the films he shot in Italy. He saw a mixture of reality and an extreme rejection of reality in these movies of his own; admitted that it would be hard for him to invent anything novel after the notorious red helicopter in "Elektreia"; and implicitly expressed his intention to switch back to middle-of-the-road engagement before his surrealist style becomes manneristic and boring.⁶

It might be due to his didactic intention that Jancsó never considered his movies compatible with psychology. He believes that the psychological style means a certain way of maneuvering persons and things so that unbelievable phenomena should appear believable. Jancsó's fascination

with the improbable is not intended to make the improbable look possible. Actually, he states that his spectators are expected to be aware of a distance between themselves and what they experience. As he says: "While I am directing, I create a distance between reality and its reflection in the film. . . . It is precisely this distance which enchants the public."⁷ As it appears from this statement, the intellectual understanding of the distance between artistic illusion and experienced reality is a central guiding principle of Jancsó's art.

One may ask: by what technique does Jancsó express his principles in his movies? As an artist rooted in a fairly unique culture, Jancsó is more than aware of the cleavage between the universal semantic code of the film and the cultural limitations imposed on it. He wants to express universal truths and situations in visual images, but constantly finds himself bound by the specific cultural connotations of these images. Referring to a frequently recurring motive of his films, we may ask: Since international moviegoers have been conditioned to react negatively to only one kind of uniform: the black or brown Nazi outfit, how can the director evoke similar dislike by showing much less familiar uniforms? Jancsó actually uses an auditory motive as an example in one of his interviews and asks: How many moviegoers around the world share the cultural connotations which some of the religious and ultra-nationalist Hungarian songs and melodies heard in his movies raise in his own generation of Hungarians?⁸ To expand this argument, we may refer to the International, the Horst Wessel *Lied*, Rule Britannia, or God Bless America—these four songs alone trigger strong connotations, no matter whether positive or negative, in hundreds of millions of spectators. As such examples prove, even the most internationally appreciated artists of unique cultures feel the tension of an open and a closed cultural system quite acutely.

Jancsó is notorious for his long tracking shots. Some of his critics counted not more than a dozen or two shots in films like "Red Psalm" and "Elektreia." Jancsó admits his aversion to the montage which, according to such classics of film theory as Eisenstein and Béla Balázs, is the essence of the cinema. Not without affectation, Jancsó claims that his movies are "small-scale," "low-budget" films, which is especially hard to believe now when rumours are spreading about the disastrous draining of the Hungarian national film budget by the two most recent Jancsó-Hernádi movies: "Hungarian Rhapsody" and "Allegro Barbaro," parts of the planned trilogy "Vitam et Sanguinem" which may never be finished.

Repetition of basic themes as well as visual motifs is another charac-

teristic of Jancsó's art. "I hate all forms of oppression,"⁹ he said in one of his interviews. Indeed, his whole intricate visual semiotic system is based on the leitmotifs of freedom and oppression. At the same time, Jancsó also stated that there was a range of variations in the meaning of identical visual stereotypes. For instance, "men in uniform" do not always symbolize one and the same idea. Graham Petrie pointed out how nudity in Jancsó's films initially expressed humiliation and vulnerability but later tended to become a symbol of power and defiance.¹⁰ Also, with reference to Antonioni and Wajda, Jancsó says that repeated motifs quite often may express the same idea with greater sophistication. In other words, the same visual motifs may express qualitatively different ideas, or may express the same idea in a qualitatively different form.

Improvisation is a method which has a great impact on the artistic effect of the final, edited film. As it is widely known, Jancsó lets his actors formulate their own text. Nor does he go to the shooting of the film with preconceived plans concerning camera angles, duration of the shots, and other directing techniques. As a result, one can compare Jancsó's and Hernádi's scripts with the finished film in the same way as one compares the first drafts and the published texts in the study of literary creation.

This tendency to improvise, alongside with the obsessive utilization of the same philosophical ideas and visual leitmotifs, characterizes virtually all auteurs of the modern cinema. This brings us to the question of Jancsó's admitted and latent affinities with different contemporary auteurist directors. He admires mostly Antonioni, also Pasolini, Glauber Rocha, and Wajda, but dislikes Ingmar Bergman. No matter what his personal views are, his works are organic parts of the international auteurist production of the past two decades. Improvisations, repetitions, universal existential themes, shooting series of films with a limited group of actors, are methods generally shared by auteurist directors. Notwithstanding Jancsó's dislike of Bergman, both meddled with the theatre, and both expressed the wish that they could make film comedies (Bergman repeatedly tried—the results were pathetic).

Improvisation, repetition, the use of irony are not simply technical matters. They make it possible to perceive an underlying relationship between auteurism and an existential outlook of life. The sincerity of a subjectively rationalized truth, the penetration of layers of superficial "realities" covering the existential essence, infatuation with role-playing and improvisation, repetition and motifs, and a Kierkegaardian use of the irony, are all shared characteristics of existential thought, art, and

auteurism. Even the cult of the director, the idea of one-person responsibility, is familiar from the German aesthetic concept *Gesamtkunstwerk* which appeared in Schlegel's, Nietzsche's, and Wagner's philosophy of art; at least the latter two were clearly identifiable figureheads of an existentialist aesthetics. The same holds true for scriptwriters: Hernádi, Mándy, Mészöly, and other Hungarian writers who collaborated with, or provided literary material for, more or less auteurist directors, have themselves at least a few recognizable existentialist trends.

Because of the sincerity and, as any perceptive critic would assert, the general high quality of auteur movies, the more painful it is for an artist to realize that he is not being understood by the public. Jancsó has complained repeatedly about his lack of contact with the larger masses. He spoke bitterly about the conservative, unsophisticated taste of Hollywood-fed moviegoers—a characterization which is now pertinent of the Hungarian public as well. Film criticism was not exempt of his attack either: he believed that too many of his movies were misinterpreted by press reviewers. He found escape in this attitude: "I always read as much as I can about my movies, but accept neither favourable nor unfavourable criticism. I read criticism as if it were a story, a fiction."¹¹

Yet there is something fundamentally wrong about Jancsó's complaints against the Hungarian public. In the nineteen-seventies, a new national awareness dawned on Hungary, accompanied by the widely shared desire for an objective reinterpretation of Hungarian history. Jancsó's masochistic view of the past derives from the two post-war decades when the first lines of the Hungarian Republican Anthem read: "Oppression, slavery: This was the order for a thousand years"; and when Hungary was assumed to be the first "Fascist" country and Hitler's "last ally." Hungarians of the nineteen-seventies find such views unjust and repulsive. Jancsó may insist that his films are allegorical and show Universal Oppression and Universal Liberation—however, they also show just too many Hungarian uniforms, just too many very Hungarian-looking peasants massacred. This aspect may be irrelevant for moviegoers abroad, but in the Hungarian context it raises the question: Who should draw the ultimate consequence? The auteurist Jancsó, who is undoubtedly a great artist, or fifteen million Hungarians? The same question also holds true of Gyula Hernádi and his scripts as well as "historical" dramas.

While Jancsó is the internationally best known and most celebrated Hungarian auteurist director, some of his younger colleagues, who had less opportunity to express their ideas in interviews, were equally consistent and congenial in pursuing this creative principle. István Gaál and

István Szabó, both in their forties (while Jancsó just turned sixty), are held in even greater esteem by certain connoisseurs of the cinema than Jancsó.

Of the six movies Gaál has shot since his debut with "Current" (Sodrásban, 1963), three are prototypical one-person auteur productions, whereas the script of the other three was written in consultation with other writers. However, Gaál emphasizes as much as Jancsó does that the authorship of the script does not make a director's film an auteurist work. "An auteurist movie can be the product of the fortunate cooperation between an author and a director. But if the director does not have an original artistic vision, you cannot call his film auteurist even if he wrote the script. Until now, films . . . resembled of prose; nowadays, they tend to resemble of poetry," Gaál explained in an interview with the reporter of a Hungarian magazine.¹²

As Jancsó and the great Western auteurs like Antonioni and Bergman, Fassbinder, Truffaut, and others, so Gaál, too, has developed his own symbols which, elusively enough, look unusually "realistic" and devoid of symbolic references. His country landscapes are hardly stylized, his shots of action free of ritual symbolism. Yet, the reoccurring symbols (the falcons in at least two movies, morning awakening as a starting shot of the film) and the existential preoccupation (with *Angst*, loneliness, and the metaphysical aspects of human relations) are recognizable auteurist traces. It seems that of all Hungarian auteurist directors, Gaál is closest to Antonioni whom, by the way, all equally admired. Also, Gaál has taken the one-person responsibility for his films one step farther than Jancsó: he always edits his own movies.

More urban and more middle-class than Jancsó and Gaál is István Szabó, the youngest of the three (born in 1939). Among this group, he has manifested the greatest interest in the human psyché, deriving existentialist themes and situations from individual experience past and present. Like in Bergman's "Persona," Alma Vogler's loss of speech is partially explained by her obsession with the picture of a Buddhist monk burning himself alive in protest against the war in Vietnam, so does the equally famous photo of Hitler talking to teenage "soldiers" occur in at least two of Szabó's movies, occupying a peculiar and identical denotation in both. Bergman's and Godard's "variations to a theme," that is, reviewing the same events in different ways in the mental cinema of the mind, appears most notably in Szabó's second (and as some critics claim, best) film, "Father" (Apa, 1966). Memory, a crucial leitmotive of "Father," becomes exclusive in "25, Fireman's Street" (Tűzoltó utca 25, 1973). A quasi-Freudian technique, the distorted perspective, achieved

chiefly by wide-angle lenses and also by extreme positioning of the camera, never appears in Jancsó and Gaál, but the more often in Szabó's films.

It is perhaps because of his psychological preoccupation that Szabó approaches the concept of auteurism by attempting a psychological definition. "If the cinema is to become an art equivalent with other arts, those who make films shall visually record their own world outlook and their own concrete experiences, but the truly significant directors are those who develop their own artistic world."¹³ As it appears from this statement, Szabó regards auteurism as a projection of the mind—an outlook not entirely remote from expressionism.

At the end of the interview in which the above quotation appeared, Szabó voiced his hope that such artistic subjectivism would serve as basis of the future method of filmmaking. Although auteurism has left its permanent mark on Hungarian (and world) cinema, the method as it was typically practiced in the nineteen-sixties is now passé everywhere. What we experience instead is "mini-realism," to use Jancsó's critical term.¹⁴ Also, this trend of the seventies could not be farther from Szabó's wish to make the film a projection of mental states or processes.

One may, naturally, find superficial similarities between auteurism and the documentary style of the Hungarian film during the 1970s. Several of the younger directors also write their scripts or co-operate with the same writers; and they let actors and actresses improvise their roles. Should we accept the fashionable cliché that the director's "personal style" is a central criterion of the auteurist cinema, we could call almost the entire new Hungarian film production auteurist. Yet it is impossible to ignore that the cinema of Péter Bacsó, István Dárday, Imre Gyöngyössi, Zsolt Kézdi Kovács, and Rezső Szörényi, also represent styles, techniques, and world outlooks different from those of auteurism. The ideology underlying *cinéma vérité* (namely, social criticism disguised as detachment but evident in the selective perception of the director) is definitely dominating the Hungarian cinema of the nineteen-seventies. This ideology entirely differs from the auteurist philosophy that filmmaking is visualized consciousness.

In addition, a recognizable, although not homogeneous aesthetic principle and stylistic sign system identify the auteurist directors and distinguish them from the documentarists of the 1970s. The existentialist allegories and absurd, seemingly incongruent symbols which characterize the proto-auteurist style of the sixties, are absent from the production of the newer generation of filmmakers. Utilizing aesthetic terms borrowed from Charles S. Peirce, we can call improvisation in auteurist

movie acting symbolic (the actor becomes a "persona" for a certain situation and verbalizes the role); in documentary moviemaking, indexical (there is no role: actor and character are identical).

In short, Jancsó was right when he called the technique of the new generation entirely different from his own. From the perspective of four years, however, he was wrong when he thought that moviegoers appreciated the new style more than his. Recent Hungarian statistics indicate that 312,728 people watched "Hungarian Rhapsody," and 298,634 "Allegro Barbaro," as of November 1, 1980. No feature film representing the documentary technique came close to these numbers.

On the other hand, the two Jancsó films together did not attract as many visitors as did "Kojak in Budapest," the Hungarian box office success of 1980, within just a few months (652,357).¹⁵ Jancsó's scepticism of the changing taste of Hungarian moviegoers was warranted.

NOTES

1. This paper is a considerably enlarged and revised version of one presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Hungarian Educators' Association in Silver Spring, 1979. The author is indebted to István Karcsai Kulcsár (Hungarian Film Institute and Archive, Budapest) for supporting his research with advice and relevant books; and to Lia Somogyi and Vera Surányi (Hungarofilm, Budapest) for printed information and the opportunity to view eighteen Hungarian films pertinent to the subject.

2. Jancsó's views on auteurism are most explicitly stated in his interviews with Marianne Gách ("27 kérdés Jancsó Miklóshoz," *Film, Színház, Muzsika*, August 14, 1976, pp. 6-7); with Mátyás Domokos ("A pályatárs szemével," *Kortárs*, 10, 1978, pp. 1647-1654); and in Italian with Giovanni Buttafava, printed in this latter's monograph *Miklós Jancsó* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1975, pp. 2-14). Since these three interviews are quite condensed and frequently referred to in this paper, page references will be provided only for quotations but not for paraphrased theses.

3. Perhaps the most noted controversy in international film criticism – a controversy which revealed the shallowness of the fashionably broad use of the term – took place between the American film critics Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael. In his essays "Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962" and "Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1970" (pp. 38-61 in *The Primal Screen*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1973), Sarris simply reduced auteurism to a director's individual style and, no longer surprisingly, found its gems precisely in the film production of Hollywood. In her essay "Circles and Squares" (*I Lost It in the Movies*, Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1965, pp. 292-319, esp. 303-4), Pauline Kael refuted Sarris's utterly amorphous "definition" and used several factors to define auteurism. I have utilized Kael's interpretation in this paper.

4. Interview with Domokos, p. 1651.

5. Mátyás Domokos, "A pályatárs szemével. Válaszol: Nemeskürty István." *Kortárs*, 1, 1978, pp. 138-42; ref. to p. 139.

6. Jancsó in interview with Gách; Nemeskürty in loc. cit., p. 141.

7. Interview with Gách.

8. Jancsó's characterization of these songs as "fascist" is most inappropriate and irresponsible (in Buttafava, p. 3).
9. Interview with Gách.
10. G. Petrie, *History Must Answer to Man* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1979), pp. 77-79.
11. Buttafava, p. 5.
12. *Tükör*, 44, 1965.
13. In an interview from 1965, quoted by István Karcsei Kulcsár, *Szabó István* (Budapest: Magyar Filmtudományi Intézet és Filmarchivum/ Népművelési Propaganda Iroda, n.d.), p. 21; originally published in *Filmkultúra*, 1, 1965.
14. Interview with Domokos, p. 1652.
15. *Filmvilág*, 1, 1981, p. 7.

Document: Budapest—Washington, 1956

Andor C. Klay
editor

Editor's Note:

The purpose of this article is to provide some insight into American official actions during a crisis abroad by placing on public record two reports which previously could not be published because of their security classification. One, dated October 25, 1956 was sent to the Department of State by the Legation in Budapest at the start of the Hungarian uprising, and the other, dated November 4, 1956 on the day of its collapse under the onslaught of Russian armed forces. They have been exempted by the Department at the request of the author who was chief of the Hungarian section in the Division of Intelligence and Research on the USSR and Eastern Europe at the time of the events reported. The documents reflect a crisis situation in which an American diplomatic mission abroad and its governing agency at home were in direct and continuous communication about unexpected developments which posed a possible physical threat to the officials and other Americans present at the foreign capital, and created major policy challenges and security problems for the home office.

Twenty-five years ago, through the most violent defiance of Communist authority to erupt in Eastern Europe, the Hungarian people secured within one week the formation of a government headed by a man of their choice. The Communist party of nearly a million members in a population of ten million disappeared overnight; its principal leaders fled to Moscow. The new leader declared that the previous

regime "brought the socialist reorganization of agriculture to a dead end, destroyed the worker-peasant alliance, undermined the power of the People's Democracy, trampled upon the rule of law, debased the people's living standards, established a rift between the masses of the party and the government; in other words, the country was swept toward catastrophe."¹ A lifelong Communist himself, Imre Nagy pledged domestic policies of a socialist nature within a democratic framework, pursuance of a neutral foreign policy, a free press, and a multi-party system based on free and secret elections. He demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops which were attacking throughout the city as the teletype conversations between the American Legation and the Department of State went underway. The country became the scene of a Hungarian civil war and a simultaneous Hungarian-Russian war in overlapping theatres of operations.

[A few weeks before the date of the first document, Minister Christian M. Rayndal had completed his tour of duty at the head of the Legation and returned to Washington for reassignment. A successor, Edward T. Wailles, arrived shortly before the date of the second document; in the interim, Counselor N. Spencer Barnes acted as chargé d'affaires.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Control: 14766

Rec'd: Oct. 25, 1956

FROM: Budapest
TO : Secretary of State
NO. : Unnumbered, Oct. 25

Following is running overseas Teletype conversation between American Legation and Department starting at 6:30 a.m., October 25, 1956.

Quote

Legation: This is clear. Communications open temporarily. Am typing on floor. A big battle has just taken place in front of Legation seems to have gone towards Parliament seems all Americans still OK and safe. Street fighting again flaring up with tanks fighting it out at present. Stand by please, chief coming down into Telex room.

Department: Roger, will do.

Legation: Here he is. Do you have any questions at present? Here some news. Parliament Square 10:45 crowded with people afternoon October 24 continued street fighting many Soviet tanks and troops. Legation skeleton staff returned to homes without incident. Two officers and two Marines remained in Legation. Intermittent shots heard through night.

Quieter towards morning October 25. Crowds moving in streets, center town especially [Buda-]Pest Danube river bank area full of Soviet tanks and troops. US staff with no difficulty. About 10 heavy movement of tanks reported on Stalin Street. 10:30 large crowd marched north past Legation proceeded farther towards Parliament. Heavy gun fire from Parliament area. Some Legation reports that of some Soviet tanks going over to the crowd flying Hungarian flags from tanks with crowds. Budapest radio broadcasts statement that isolated groups firing in town. Advised people stay off streets. Large crowd dispersed before Parliament now mainly dispersed by Soviet tanks firing over crowds heads. Some tanks in control of crowd withdrew from Parliament area. Heavy firing continues hearing distance of Legation apparently tank guns. Any questions?

Department: Chief Warrant Officer is contacting Budapest officer here for questions. Do you people believe this fighting is going to spread further?

Legation: Have no way of knowing but seems very possible that it will spread. We all are in Telex room huddling on floor to avoid gunfire. Believe non-Hungary-stationed Soviet troops pulled into Budapest overnight. Prefix on truck numbers is Soviet 'F'. Have report that no airplane service to or from Budapest. Train service probably interrupted and no information on conditions Vienna Budapest highway except some reports of disturbances in Győr. Also heard reports of disturbances Debrecen and Szeged and Miskolc. Any questions?

Department: Have none at present.

Legation: Strength of Soviet troops which arrived in Budapest initially at 0400 hours local time 24 October estimated to be one mechanized infantry division. Hungarian troops held in background. Soviet doing bulk of fighting. Some Hungarian troops known to have joined the crowd. Situation in front of Legation building now quiet, fighting seems to have left this immediate area.

American apartment house on Szechenyi sprayed with Russian machine gun fire due to presence of insurgents firing from roof. All Americans and domestic help safe in basement, however windows broken from shell fire and front of building sprayed with machine gun fire from Russian troops dug in, in and around the building.

Some members in crowd before Legation have been shouting for United States assistance.

Army and Legation officers have personally observed several instances of Soviet tanks going over to crowds just prior to firing. These were seen flying Hungarian flags.

Still on floor, reason for bad typing.

All this information given by Legation officers.

Legation wife observed at 10:45 local time 76 Soviet trucks fully loaded with troops field kitchens towing howitzers proceeding from east in the direction of Parliament. All trucks bearing numbers beginning with Cyrillic letter 'F'. Agriculture attache has observed trucks bearing this letter by chance in Rumania.

Situation around Legation quiet. Any questions?

Department: None.

Legation: Is anyone from military there?

Department: Military will be informed.

Legation: Have set the printer back on table. State Department are you still there? This is American Legation Budapest.

Department: Yes, still with you.

Legation: Appears to be rather quiet around the Legation area again. Still there, State Department?

Department: Yes, will stay with you until you advise.

Legation: Just so long we don't get cut off is what I'm worried about. Budapest radio has just announced Gerő has been relieved of the party and has been replaced by Kádár who is to speak over radio shortly. Things seem a little quieter at moment and one city bus on normal run just passed by. In meantime John MacCormac of New York Times reported today to us on the basis of eye witness as follows.

What began Tuesday as demonstration in Budapest turned late the same night into revolution. Yesterday it became something like a small war after Russian troops had been called in to 'restore order'. At noon today the square before Hungarian Parliament was strewn with dead and dying Hungarian men and women shot down by Russian tanks. But the revolution did not seem to be over. New crowds of youthful demonstrators continued to form in Szabadság Square near the American Legation and only a few blocks from the Parliament. They carried Hungarian flags and shouted, 'Down with Gerő!' An hour later Gerő was relieved as boss of Hungarian Communist party and was succeeded by János Kádár. The massacre in front of Parliament occurred after some hundreds of demonstrators had come to it in trucks, armored cars and even riding on top of Russian tanks. They shouted to this correspondent, 'The Russians are with us! They say they don't want to shoot down Hungarian workers.' The Russian tank crews seemed to corroborate this statement when they smiled and waved. But this love feast became first a disappointment and then a tragedy. Some ten minutes later another Russian tank roared up and opened fire on the crowd. This correspondent saw some dozens of prone bodies and saw a number of

wounded men and women being carried away by rescuers who had to run the gauntlet of Russian fire. The tanks fired not only their machine guns but their big guns. Armored cars roared past but directed their fire mostly in the air apparently with the intention of terrorizing the fleeing crowd. The situation at 1:00 was completely confused. Some Hungarian soldiers seemed to have thrown in their lot with the insurgents. Others like the Russians were obeying orders to quell the insurrection. Today's insurgents were unarmed. All they had to oppose the mechanized might of the Russians and the Hungarian secret police was the Hungarian flag and their own bodies. When a truck full of Hungarian soldiers appeared in Szabadság Square and warned the demonstrating crowd that 'we are armed', one of the demonstrators held up the Hungarian flag he carried and replied, 'all we are armed with is this flag'. Hold on, will have more later. Please hang on. While we will have the circuit can inform you that large crowd still in front of Legation shouting for help, etc. Have you any questions?

Department: None right now. Hope you can hold circuit.

Legation: Hope so too. Appears we have friends in telegraph office. Very unusual.

Department: If you speaking of us, sure you have. Any more running comments?

Legation: Seems that crowd has left from in front of Legation and things again seem rather quiet. However, numerous times we thought this whole mess was over but it starts up very suddenly without any warning as you can well imagine. Earlier this morning I had the printer on floor typing from prone position with many more typing errors than appearing on this later transmission. Was rather afraid of bullets coming in the window since this Telex room is facing the crowd and would have more protection on floor. Fortunately no shells or the like came in this direction. I have man in back of me who was in Bogota in 1948 so situation we are facing is familiar. Have been informed that my own apartment all shot up, windows broken and a fire broken out in empty apartment adjacent to mine. Have not had opportunity to go see extent of damage but sure that some of my things are damaged from the numerous rifle and machine gun fire which occurred in that area when the Russians discovered some of the crowd on the roof of the American apartment. Am having bits to eat at my side and do not want to leave this machine while we still have contact. Any questions?

Department: No questions. Want to hold you on, don't jeopardize connection.

Legation: Believe Legation has reported situation in immediate vicinity

as fully as possible. Barnes in snack bar, will be here momentarily. Here now.

Department: What is your estimate of Imre Nagy's position now? Is there anything we can do to facilitate your task? We all appreciate magnificent job you all are doing. Sure you will be glad to know Wailes has applied for visas and should be departing within week or ten days.

Legation: Thanks. Good to hear that news. Here is answer to question one. This is a battle situation and we have no idea what is going to happen. Our impression yesterday was that in view of he being blamed for calling in Soviet troops, he lost a great deal of popularity. Where he stands today and how the people would view a further retreat from Kádár to Nagy we do not, repeat not, know. We presume Nagy is to all intents and purposes premier. Should the blame for the calling in of Soviet troops now be placed on Gerő and he made a scapegoat for all that is going on now, and if he made further concessions, he might have a chance. But we do not know enough to say anything very certainly.

As you undoubtedly know, Foreign Minister Horváth, and Sik, requested visa for attending General Assembly UN. Foreign Minister inquired today about them, after being incommunicado yesterday. Unless you see objection, we will issue them this afternoon or tomorrow, assuming contact with Foreign Office. What can you tell us about Secretary's statement last night?

Department: No objection to issuance of visas to Horváth and Sik. Cases of other officials will be subject of later communication.

Legation: We assume you will report to press and close relatives soonest that all Americans on Legation staff are in no imminent danger. Couriers OK, please inform Frankfurt. So far as we know there have been no American casualties, but our information is very meagre. We have been asked by the following American citizens to inform relatives that they are safe (LIST). Another group of seven Americans arrived by train this morning and we now are attempting to remove them from station to hotel and will give names later if possible.

Crowd has put up a ladder on Russian monument in front of Legation and is attempting to knock down red star. Otherwise rather quiet in front of Legation at present. In response to crowd which continued to grow before the Legation, demanding assistance, and as what apparently was the only way to prevent this crowd from growing into unmanageable proportions, we have just made the following statement and asked them to move away peacefully, they appeared satisfied. 'We understand the situation and it has been reported to our Government as fully as we were able. You will understand that we ourselves can take no decision,

this is a matter for our Government and the United Nations. We have been in Hungary for many years and we think we understand the situation.'

Department: Answer to previous question. Statement expected probably today. Secretary has asked us to pass on word to you that he is pleased and gratified by Legation's performance under these trying circumstances.

Legation: In speech just delivered on radio, Imre Nagy has promised inter alia that as soon as arms laid down, Soviet troops now, repeat now, fighting will be withdrawn to former position in Hungary and that negotiations will be started to have all Soviet troops withdrawn. Deadline of 18:00 yesterday for laying down arms canceled. Americans referred to earlier who were to be taken from station to hotel turned out to be Canadians, deposited safely. All except duty officers and those who cannot get to apartment are rapidly pulling out as it is getting dark. We will have only one further brief coded message unless something very dramatic takes place.

Thousands of Hungarians gathering in front of Legation again, shouting for Russians to leave. They are still gathering.

In notifying families please don't forget newlywed wife of Jerry Bolick, Marine Guard.

Mass demonstration carrying Hungarian flags and black flags running over two thousand have sung Hungarian anthem and appealed for help in front of Legation. In efforts to disperse crowd we have repeated in essence message given earlier. Some of crowd has dispersed but others are attempting to enter Legation, nothing really violent. Crowd presently singing, demonstrating. Time here 16:30 local time. We have just remade statement to crowd quoted earlier. If you have suggestions as to what we can say in future, we would like to have it.

Crowd slowly dispersing, 16:40 local time. We would like to have suggestions for statement, however, for future use.

Department: No suggestions for future statements except you may wish to reiterate our sympathy and assure crowds you are keeping your Government as fully informed as possible. Reluctant to keep this circuit tied up much longer, and unless you want to send further message we had better terminate.

Legation: Following this last message we have nothing more, many thanks for support. Following tactical estimate 17:03 local time. Budapest proper very unclear, outline seems as follows. Soviet, State security forces and other government units have set up downtown defense based on east end Margit Bridge and covering Defense Ministry and security

headquarters and north end Parliament Square. South of Parliament, but unknown to what degree east, anti-government crowds freely moving. Gellért area and bridge appears under the control of anti-government forces but tanks on Chain Bridge unknown as to allegiance. Soviet setting up heavy guns back in Városliget Park. If this outline is correct, heavy trouble may break out. Please note that as far as Legation concerned we desire to break contact and will route through Vienna if possible, or if very important, attempt to contact Secretary of State office direct.

Department: OK, we will sign off, thanks for everything, all you guys doing wonderful job, take care.

Moscow issued a momentous declaration on October 30. As carried by the official news agency TASS, the main points were:

The Hungarians "are justified in raising the question of eliminating serious mistakes"; the USSR "deeply regrets" that events in Hungary led to bloodshed, and "has agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Budapest"; it "is prepared to start negotiations with the Hungarian government and other signatories of the Warsaw Pact about the question of stationing Soviet troops in Hungary"; and "it is ready to withdraw all Soviet economic, cultural, technical and military advisers from Hungary."

Order was being rapidly restored in the heavily damaged streets of the capital as well as in the provinces. A free press was already functioning, and free political parties, newly formed or resuscitated, took over the arena formerly occupied by a Soviet-imposed single party.

On November 1, Nagy summoned the Soviet ambassador and told him that he had received authoritative information of the entry of new Soviet army units into Hungary; he demanded their immediate withdrawal. At the same time he informed the ambassador of his decision to proclaim Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and to appeal to the United Nations to safeguard the country's neutrality. On the next day, additional Soviet troops were reported entering. On November 3, Budapest was encircled and provincial areas saturated with troops and tanks, and at dawn on November 4, a general assault was begun.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Control: 2536
Rec'd: Nov. 4, 1956

FROM: Budapest
TO : Secretary of State
NO. : Unnumbered, Nov. 4

Following represents exchange of comments with the American Legation in Budapest by direct Telex connection commencing 11:45 pm November 3 and terminating 5:15 am November 4.

Legation: The Minister is out at present. Have someone looking for him but in meantime, in case this circuit goes out, would like to inform you that it appears at 5:00 am local time Russian artillery and mortar has begun falling on outskirts of Budapest. Earlier note from Minister follows. Interesting to note firing in suburbs began exactly 05:00 local time. Guns are heavy caliber and to date firing appears to be going out from city rather than in. Garbled local broadcasts are reporting either Nagy or Tildy have advised people to take to cellars as the city is being occupied. That's all for now, but we would like to hold the circuit for a while yet. Please get this to watch officer immediately. Now Minister here.

Department: Watch officer is here.

Legation: Unconfirmed reports state convoy across border. Have you any information?

Department: Did US dependents get out to Vienna today on second try? Hope you are aware of our immediate protest to Russian ambassador here on word that they had been turned back.

Legation: We do not know if they are out. But someone has reported that the Voice of America has reported that they were out. We are checking now to see if any last dope on that. Tildy's secretary has just phoned to say Russians attacking in all Hungary. He requested us to report that the Hungarian Government is asking the United States for aid. Broadcast at 05:45 reported Nagy stated Russians advancing on city and presently engaged with Hungarian army. We think there is enough in these reports that we have started priority material destruction . . .

Department: Here Washington, is this Legation Budapest?

Legation: Yes, we were cut off.

Department: Do you have any further word on American dependents that tried to enter Austria yesterday?

Legation: The answer is no, but we are trying to find out.

Department: Suggest you present your credentials. You may act on this immediately if feasible, and if desirable in your view.

Legation: Things have been quiet for about ten minutes, do not yet know what this means. Streets patrolled and Parliament Square filled with Hungarian troops. As for presenting credentials, doubt that at the moment could find the gentleman on whom I should call even if I could navigate streets. Will therefore wait temporarily to see what present lull means. Minister of State has just rung our doorbell, will sign off for a minute to see what he has on his mind.

Department: OK, we stand by here. Think you would like to know we are getting in touch with Lodge who is asking for a Council meeting immediately. No other news for moment, except good luck we still stand by. We will pass on to you immediately any news that comes in from New York.

Legation: That would be highly appreciated here.

Department: We also have call in to Vienna and will give you any news we can develop on convoy.

Legation: That also would be highly appreciated as some of the husbands are quite worried about safety of wives and children. The sooner you can supply information the better in order that they will know one way or other.

Department: Please assure all concerned that we are highly sympathetic and doing all possible.

Legation: Have examined credentials of Minister of State and find he is one of those appointed yesterday, will give you his name in a few minutes. He tells me Nagy has gone to Soviet Embassy and has not returned, he is thus one of two cabinet members now acting, he has a message he wishes to have transmitted to President. We are now translating it, he says it is most urgent. Translation proceeding as rapidly as possible. Meanwhile he says Soviet tanks at second bridge, in fact report is that they have two main bridges each about half mile from Legation, and we also hear that Defense Ministry completely surrounded.

Translation coming along. Note was delivered by Bibó, Minister of State, member of Peasant Party, now Petőfi Party. Tildy is the other Minister of State on the job. Here is the message.

Hungary in its present exceptionally difficult situation turns with particular confidence to President whose love of peace, wisdom and bravery so often firmly shown till now. Although people of Hungary are determined to resist with desperation the attack upon them, there is no doubt that in this unequal struggle they will be defeated if help not received. In this moment the most necessary kind of help is political, not military. It is clear that the new phase of the intentions of USSR are related to the

British intervention in Egypt. The subjugation of Hungary, however, would not only mean renewal of oppression in this country but it would also stop the liberation trends which have started so hopefully in the other East European countries. It would also bankrupt the ten year old American liberation policy which was pursued with so much firmness and wisdom. It would create a crisis of confidence for all the Eastern European peoples in the USA and on the other hand in view of the adverse effects of the Egyptian intervention it would bring to the fore isolationist currents which as shown by experience to date would be the most certain road to the inception of a world war. This is the historical moment to which both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles referred in earlier speeches when they said that only by risking a world war can a sure way be found to avert the outbreak of one. Without attempting in any way to give advice, we cannot forego bringing to the attention of the President the possibility that taking into account the most difficult consequences he can on the one hand bring the Western powers to end the Egyptian intervention by acting as intermediary in an armistice, and on the other hand he can call on the USSR to quickly withdraw its troops from Hungary. We know that the moral significance of the simultaneous execution of the two measures is as great as the practical difficulty in carrying them out.'

That is all that has been translated up to now.

Department: Believe Lodge will speak very shortly at the General Assembly, and meeting of the Security Council will probably be held early today, Sunday.

Legation: A few jets overhead but no immediate street fighting. Still no news from convoy, and Soviet Embassy says they do not know what is going on here in town.

Rest of message from Minister of State says in brief fate of the world now depends on President. Just made phone contact with convoy, I will tell you in a minute which side of border they are on. Wait. Sorry, it was not convoy. Lots of action here but nothing new to give you for the moment. May have something in a moment. Just having coffee at present, sure is good. We hope soon we will have information on dependents, all husbands standing by for any news, when you get it please relay soonest.

Department: We will certainly forward to you immediately anything we can develop. In meantime can you give us the rest of the text of the message to President?

Legation: Here is rest except for an eight line sentence which we cannot make out.

'We are not in position to further pursue these suggestions, but we

strongly emphasize that in this moment the fate of Eastern Europe and the entire world depends on the action of the President. The next few critical days will determine whether we enter on a path of peace and liberation, or whether we shall increase the appetite of aggressors and proceed to an inevitable world catastrophe.'

Department: The Security Council is meeting within a few minutes.

Legation: Delighted, and hope to get to you today for Lodge as accurate information on Soviet buildup as possible. We have actually seen numbers of tanks bearing markings, stop, Cardinal is now at the door and we are now taking him in, I'll speak to him and be right back.

Department: OK, standing by.

Legation: Minister has gone downstairs, will return shortly.

Continuing, Cardinal accompanied by his secretary, can we also take him in?

Department: Will have answer in a moment.

Legation: Waiting.

Department: Here is reply. Let the secretary in.

Legation: Henceforth will admit only Americans unless instructions from you.

Department: Can you get statement from Cardinal Mindszenty?

Legation: Am now asking him. In the meantime so far as we know there are only about eight Americans other than Legation here in city. They are journalists and we will take them in if they come.

Department: Who are they, please?

Legation: One moment, we'll see if we can get the list.

Department: Is Garst party still there?²

Legation: They left their hotel last Thursday and we have checked but we assume they are safely out of Hungary.

Department: Any progress on Mindszenty statement?

Legation: Please hold on. Minister has just gone down to ground floor to see what has developed along those lines, should be back shortly.

Department: Have you names of journalists?

Legation: There is a list in the Legation someplace, someone has gone up to third floor to see if it is still around. Anything else we can do?

Department: What is situation outside of Legation now?

Legation: Am here alone now, have blinds down and some safes against the window, cannot see a thing from here but it appears to me rather quiet, this room rather sealed off for over a week, we put the safes by window to stop any bullets from entering this room and reduce possibility of damage the Telex equipment and personnel working in this section of Legation. Here is translation of Cardinal's statement.

'Under the pretense of serious negotiations the assembled Soviet troops at dawn occupied the Hungarian capital and the entire country. I protest against this aggression and ask for forceful and speedy defense of my country by the United States and other powers.'

Did you get that OK?

Department: Yes, OK.

Legation: Several American newspapermen in group, believed to be all that are here have phoned from Duna Hotel they have tentatively decided not to take refuge in Legation unless permitted to bring a few German and other non-Hungarian assistants with them. What about it? Just heard that Russians have taken over Parliament building, about two blocks from Legation.

Department: Do you have any contact with British and other Western diplomatic missions?

Legation: No, not at moment, however am now trying to get British. In meantime here are the names of American correspondents. (LIST.)

Department: That's fine. We are still trying to reach Vienna regarding convoy. Stand by, something coming up. OK, we are still awaiting a reply and feel quite sure husbands are very anxious to hear of their whereabouts as soon as possible.

Legation: Have contacted British Legation and they know nothing more than we, they are sitting tight as we.

Legation: Regret, cannot authorize further refuge for other than American nationals. If you are still able to communicate you may recommend exceptions, otherwise, must leave to your judgment.

Legation: I think we must stick to Americans for the reason that food in the city is getting short and we must keep those at Legation at minimum from standpoint of our supplies which are sufficient for us, as well as possibly water shortage.

Just heard from Cardinal that some time ago he saw white flag raised on Parliament building. Unable to confirm.

We at Legation are grateful for this machine being installed when it was and is of great help and assistance to the cause, it is a fine bit of equipment and we shall protect it. We have managed to keep almost twenty-four hour coverage on this equipment by putting beds near the machine and bells would awaken operator to receipt of any and all urgent night-action telegrams, priorities, et cetera. By the way, what is the correct time there?

Department: It is now 2:45 November 4.

Legation: It is 8:45 am here, have just reset my watch to conform to yours.

Department: We are now in touch with Vienna on a weak circuit somewhat garbled version follows. Convoy was waiting at border last night. Vienna has an officer waiting at the Austrian side and attempting to get word to them. No report from the officer so far this morning. We are trying to get a clarification of the garbles.

Legation: OK, we will pass this to interested parties.

Department: Vienna is trying to reach Vienna officer by radio and phone.

Legation: Fine, hope you have success and then we will probably get more information on latest developments on Austrian border. When you get the information you will I am sure pass it along to us.

Department: You may be interested to know that Lodge broke news on Soviet occupation Budapest at General Assembly meeting tonight.

Legation: When Russians surrounded Parliament building, no firing took place as far as we know.

When next budget is presented we hope plenty of money put in for Telex expenses as this is certainly a great help at the moment.

Assume in due course you will let out Missions in neighboring countries know what is going on as we do not have time to communicate with them.

Department: We have United Press report from Vienna that Nagy Government captured and that Budapest radio now on air in Russian language. Associated Press reports from Vienna that Russians are bombarding and strafing city. It says Budapest radio went off the air moments ago. Hungarian news agency reports to Vienna that new Soviet controlled government has been formed outside city of Budapest headed by six Hungarian Communists. Any confirmation?

Legation: We have no confirmation. We can hear no bombing or strafing at this moment, if it is going on it must be well in suburbs.

Department: We have Vienna on line, anything you wish to ask?

Legation: We have reached American journalist group and told them if they wanted to come in here they may, and bring with them the German and other non-Hungarian assistants who definitely work for American press if there are not more than five. I said we could not take in Hungarian associates, which they seem to appreciate.

Department: Security Council in session, Lodge speaking, he says Soviet has ring of tanks around city. While this going on, Soviet press says Nagy has turned out to be enemy of people. Also, Budapest radio heard playing national anthem, voice saying 'You are Hungarians, here you live and here you must die'.

Legation: British military attache called and stated that he had heard

officially that Soviets had given the Hungarian government an ultimatum at 8:00 to the effect that if the government did not capitulate within four hours, Budapest would be bombarded. He states he was told that the government would technically capitulate under those terms but that the insurgents would not. Do you have any information on this?

Legation: No, we do not.

Department: We have word from Vienna through Defense Department that convoy was again turned back at Austrian border by Soviets, convoy is staying overnight at Red Cross Hospital at Magyaróvár but will try again to cross the border this morning.

Legation: Thanks, we knew that but were hoping for something later. New subject. Béla Kovács, Smallholder Party leader, with two associates, now at front door. Seeking asylum. We will have to turn them away, unless you instruct to contrary.

Department: Lodge concluded statement before Security Council by asking for adoption of resolution he introduced last night. Cuban now speaking.

Department: You are authorized to grant shelter tentatively to Kovács and his associates. We wish to consider disposition later.

Legation: Action being taken now to permit them to enter. Just made contact with head of International Red Cross to inquire what supplies have been coming in, as it was our opinion that road blocs had cut off transportation. In fact we have seen many Red Cross vehicles stopped from entering city. Red Cross said they have enough medical supplies for about ten days under present circumstances. We imagine a good bombing would use them up very rapidly. Food is probably a more critical problem as we gather that with city ringed by Soviets there is not more than two or three days supply. This does not apply to Legation.

Department: Cuban reviewed events in Hungary which he described as 'world shame' and laid it at feet of USSR. Britain's Dixon now speaking, he condemned 'brutal slaughter' of women and children and male civilians by Soviet troops in Hungary. Australian now speaking.

Legation: Just had a good flight of jets overhead. They kept right on going, did not stop.

Kovács has apparently left but may come back and we will let him into vestibule with his associates with firm understanding that this is tentative and no asylum granted.³ If they do come back and we have bombing at noon as threatened in ultimatum, we will take them in for a few minutes as the vestibule is largely glass. We plan to send staff to basement just before twelve and if it gets really hot we will all go there for a few minutes but will tell you beforehand in case you can keep machine

running. It is now ten o'clock here so there is still two hours to go. If you have nothing urgent, I will now give you list of Americans here. (LIST.)

Department: Australian in UN said delegates who went to negotiate with Soviets for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary have not returned and have apparently been taken prisoner. Said 'no need to multiply recitation of tragic events, we have before us American resolution and we can do nothing less than adopt it.'

Legation: We understand that as late as 10:00 the Hungarians were negotiating with the Soviets, and have also heard this morning that Hungarian delegation has not returned, so it looks like Australian is correct although we have no positive proof.

Legation: We have telephoned Soviet ambassador, got him out of bed and told him we expected action on convoy as promised previously. Ambassador said he would send another telegram on the matter.

Some sort of press conference has been called at Parliament and we will let you know results when available. We do not know who called conference, believe all local radios now being jammed.

Department: We are on the phone to New York and will have something for you in a moment on Security Council meeting.

Legation: We now have Foreign Office on phone and will send their view of things in few minutes.

Department: Peruvian said yesterday we had hopes that Hungarian-Soviet negotiations might produce favorable results. Soviets had tried to force conditions which Hungary forced to reject. As result, Soviets understood to restore regime of 1948. A regime of force, he added, with all objections it produces, collides with moral forces of the world which will ultimately defeat it. The Soviet government has not only committed a 'great crime' but also a mistake in trying to restore 'Stalin tyranny'. It is impossible for any state to fight successfully against moral forces of the world which in the end prevail for all time. Soviets, he concluded, are guilty of slaughtering youth, women and children, and one of the beautiful cities of Europe, 'the pride of our culture, is now being wrecked in vengeance'. Further in UN, Chinese proposed change in US resolution. Proposed first point be changed to read: 'To call upon the government of USSR to desist forthwith from making war on government and people of Hungary and from any form of intervention in internal affairs of Hungary'. Belgium accepted the Chinese amendment.

We are on the line to New York again and will give you the gist as soon as we get it. We have all been with you in spirit on this thing and sure admire the way you have all held up.

Legation: Thank you very much. We are now translating what we

received from Foreign Office and local employee is taking down the substance of long talk with Minister of State.

Military attache reports two explosions a few minutes ago, more on the order of dynamite than bombing, target might have been Margit Bridge and Chain Bridge.

Department: Further on Security Council meeting, Soviets are speaking, will give you summary of remarks shortly. Have spoken to Bohlen in Moscow, asking him to take up the matter with the Foreign Office here.

Department: New York has just come in again on phone and may have summary of Soviet remarks.

Vienna: *This is Vienna telex operator, we were cut off again, one moment, we will try to get them on the other line.*

(No further contact established with American Legation Budapest.)

* * *

[One final message came through Radio Budapest, the last words to be heard from the head of the revolutionary government:

“This is Imre Nagy, president of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, speaking. Today at dawn Soviet forces launched an attack against the capital with the obvious purpose of overthrowing the legal Hungarian government. Our troops are fighting. The government is at its post. I hereby report this to the people of our country and of the entire world.”]

NOTES

1. Imre Nagy, “On Communism: In Defense of the New Course” [New York, 1957].

2. A group of Iowa farmers led by agronomist Garst had toured Soviet agricultural areas in connection with a type of hybrid corn developed by them, in which Russian specialists had expressed an interest. The farmers planned to return home through Hungary and Austria; the outbreak of the uprising found them in Budapest.

3. “. . . the right is that of the State voluntarily to offer asylum, not that of the refugee to insist upon it.” [Chandler v. US, Court of Appeals 1st Ct, 171 F.2d 921935.] In American practice, each request must be dealt with on an individual basis, taking into account humanitarian principles, applicable laws, and other factors. In cases of such requests occurring within foreign jurisdiction, the ability of the US Government to give assistance will vary with location and circumstance of the request. It is the policy of the US not to grant asylum at its units or installations within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. However, immediate temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons may be granted [except to board aircraft because of their vulnerability to hijacking] in extreme or exceptional circumstances wherein the life or safety of a person is put in danger, such as pursuit by a mob. Protection shall be

terminated when the period of active danger is ended, except that authority to do so shall be obtained from the Department of State.

PHILIP UREN
1923-1979

Our journal lost still another of its editorial staff when Professor Philip Uren died suddenly in December of 1979. In the field of Hungarian studies he is best remembered for his work on Hungarian agriculture (including a book co-authored with Louis A. Fischer), and the establishment of an exchange of academics between Canada and Hungary, which he negotiated while he headed Carleton University's Institute of Soviet and Eastern European Studies. Two other positions which he filled during his years at Carleton were the chairmanship of the Department of Geography and the directorship of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

Professor Uren was a man of wide-ranging scholarly interests and a devoted promoter of international cooperation through a keener understanding of conflicting political aspirations in the world. His publications on subjects ranging from East-West trade to South African affairs and his exchange arrangements with East European, Asian, African and Caribbean universities stand as testimonials to his life-work and ambition.

ERRATA

A few errors appeared in Maxim Táborny's review of the work *Kövület* (Petrification) by the late Ferenc Fáy (*CARHS*, Vol. VI, No. 2). The editors apologize for these mistakes.

page 119, line 28: for *does seem* read *does not seem*

page 120, line 5: for *Kutasi* read *Kutasi Kovács*

page 121, line 16: for *sterile* read *fertile*