

## Polanyi and the Treason of the Intellectuals\*

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In the years since the Second World War, Michael Polanyi has emerged as a philosopher of the first rank. His major work, *Personal Knowledge* (1958), is a brilliant tour de force that manages to steer a course between the Scylla of a critical philosophy that insists upon completely objective epistemological criteria and the Charybdis of a subjectivism that denies the possibility of surmounting caprice. By demonstrating the viability of a personal knowledge that is neither wholly objective nor arbitrary, Polanyi has helped to open paths of thought and existence previously obstructed.<sup>1</sup> Although this philosophical achievement still awaits comprehensive examination, my present intention is more modest; I should like to call attention to Polanyi's lifelong concern with the question of moral and intellectual responsibility and to his thoughtful and devastating indictment of the treason of the intellectuals.

Unlike Julien Benda, whose *La Trahison des clercs* (1927) is generally regarded as the classic statement on the subject, Polanyi recognizes that by far the greatest number of traitorous intellectuals have abandoned the independent search for truth in order to further the revolutionary goals of Marxism. They have offered not only their intellectual freedom but also their moral principles as ransom for a world made perfect; paradoxically, they have sacrificed morality for moral reasons.

Although Polanyi has dated the beginning of his attempts to expose the treason of the intellectuals to the 1930's,<sup>2</sup> he had, in fact, become initially concerned with the question before 1920 in his native Hungary. Indeed, as his friend and fellow countryman Paul Ignatus has written, "the intellectual environment of his youth has profoundly influenced his development."<sup>3</sup> Before turning to his mature critique of Marxism, therefore, it would be well to consider his years in Hungary.

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Polanyi was born in 1891 in Budapest, the scion of an extraordinary Hungarian-Jewish family.<sup>4</sup> His father Mihály Pollacsek, a building contractor for Budapest's suburban railways, watched his fortunes soar in the last years of the nineteenth century only to plummet to the earth in the early years of the twentieth.<sup>5</sup> More important, however, Pollacsek was a man of exemplary character whose life bore eloquent witness to his commitment to the highest moral standards. When, for example, a business venture of his failed, he insisted that every share-holder be paid to the last penny, even though to do so spelled his own financial ruin.<sup>6</sup> For Michael Polanyi, as well as for his brothers and sisters, the example of Pollacsek's life provided the moral ballast necessary for navigating the stormy seas of twentieth-century existence.<sup>7</sup>

Polanyi's Russian mother, Cecile Wohl, was a high-spirited, energetic woman with a great interest in Hungary's intellectual life. In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, her salon attracted men and women, old and young, who were anxious to discuss new ideas from Western Europe. "Mama Cecile," as she was called, reveled in the intellectually-charged atmosphere of fin de siècle Budapest, where, as one contemporary observer put it: "Everyone is talking about Marx or Herbert Spencer; the class struggle, historical materialism, evolution, the organic and inorganic view of the world are on everyone's lips."<sup>8</sup>

This intellectual ferment was generated by the members of Hungary's emerging "counter-culture," a heterogeneous and uncoordinated movement that sought to reawaken the country from the cultural slumber that had begun about the time of the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867. With a few notable exceptions,<sup>9</sup> late nineteenth-century Hungarian cultural leaders were less concerned with creativity and profundity than with giving expression to an increasingly rigid official ideology that was a blend of clericalism and Hungarian nationalism.<sup>10</sup>

The counter-culture centered around two forums: *Huszadik Század* ("Twentieth Century"), a sociological journal edited by Oszkár Jászi, and *Nyugat* ("West"), a literary journal edited by Ignotus.<sup>11</sup> These journals accepted contributions from young writers and scholars intoxicated with Western ideas and Western creative experiments and eager to break loose from the fetters that bound Hungarian cultural life. The young writers' confidence was all the greater because of the existence of parallel rebellions in other cultural fields. Two young composers, Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály, had begun the work that would soon bring them world renown; groups such as the "Circle of Hungarian Impressionists and Naturalists" and

"The Eight" provided new opportunities for Hungarian artists and suggested new artistic possibilities to the educated public.<sup>12</sup> And Sándor Ferenczi, one of Freud's closest associates, defended brilliantly the epoch-making claims of psychoanalysis.

The gathering counter-cultural forces became self-conscious when, in 1906, Endre Ady published his *New Verses*, a book that boldly challenged the official ideology and spoke in a powerful Magyar idiom of a new Hungary. Not only did Ady place himself at the head of the counter-cultural movement, he also summoned his countrymen to national regeneration, by which he meant the creation of a society governed by moral principles rather than by class privilege. Himself a member of the gentry (though, the impoverished gentry), Ady, like István Széchenyi in the nineteenth century, believed that the Magyar ruling classes, the magnates and the gentry, had become morally derelict and had therefore forfeited their right to speak for Hungary.<sup>13</sup> Proclaiming himself to be the embodiment of his country's most noble traditions, the proud poet declared that he, not they, possessed the right to command Hungarians and in the exercise of that right, he would recall them to their authentic selves.<sup>14</sup>

It was in this turbulent, stimulating atmosphere that Polanyi came of age. From the first, his sympathies lay with the counter-culture and the more encompassing movement for national regeneration.<sup>15</sup> Yet, unlike his elder brother Karl and many of his friends, he was never attracted to radical politics. "His reputation," according to Paul Ignotus, "was that of the man who had the courage to dissent from the dissenters; in a flock of black sheep he shocked many by seeming almost white."<sup>16</sup>

As a medical student at the University of Budapest in 1908, Polanyi joined the newly-founded Galileo Circle, a counter-cultural organization of students interested in the sciences—natural and social. Under the leadership of its first president, Karl Polanyi, the Circle announced that its aim was the "defense and propagation of unprejudiced science. Teaching and studying are the means employed in the struggle against religious, racial, and class prejudices."<sup>17</sup> To that end, the Circle organized a series of lectures that was an education in itself. Leading Hungarian thinkers such as Oszkár Jászi and Sándor Ferenczi, as well as foreign scholars such as Max Adler, Robert Michels, Werner Sombart, Eduard Bernstein, and Wilhelm Ostwald, addressed the Galileoists.<sup>18</sup> In addition to sponsoring these lectures, the Galileo Circle opened reading rooms, published a series of scholarly studies, and established the journal *Szabadgondolat* ("Free Thought"), primarily as a vehicle for younger scholars.<sup>19</sup>

Polanyi played an active role in the Circle's life, serving for a time as a member of the "Committee on Natural Science."<sup>20</sup> Yet,

while he was enthusiastic about the pursuit of scientific truth and certainly possessed the moral sensibility that was the animating force behind the Circle's scientific activity,<sup>21</sup> he objected to the ever-increasing tendency on the part of his comrades to view scientific (especially social scientific) research as a weapon in the battle for social and political reform. Hence, while continuing to support the Circle's stated purposes, Polanyi seems to have drifted further and further away from its leaders, including his own brother.

Having completed his M.D. in 1913, Polanyi entered the Austro-Hungarian army as a medical officer on the outbreak of world war. Soon, however, he contracted diphtheria and, returning to the University, earned a Ph.D. in physical chemistry in 1917. By that time the cataclysmic character of the war was apparent to all Europeans and efforts to provide an explanation for its outbreak reflected a profound need to make sense of three years of unprecedented devastation—material and spiritual. In the summer of 1917, Polanyi contributed an article to *Huszadik Szazad* in which he discussed the causes of the war and the prospects for peace. The article was entitled: "To the Peacemakers: Views Concerning the Conditions of European War and Peace."<sup>22</sup>

In this rare non-scientific essay, Polanyi argued that the war was not the result of a clash of economic interests, but rather of the almost religious idea of the sovereign state abiding in the hearts of the European peoples. "The war is bad business," he wrote. "The state, however, becomes engaged in war not as an association of interests, but as an idea; what is bad business for an association of interests, is health-giving nourishment for an idea. Business demands rational investments; an idea clamors for bloody sacrifices."

Polanyi acknowledged that his view could not be reconciled with the popular materialism of the day and would therefore call forth strenuous opposition. In an effort to anticipate objections, he faced the central issue squarely and assumed the offensive. The widespread disavowal of every preconception (to which, as we have seen, the Galileo Circle was committed) had not been wholly successful, "because these [preconceptions] are rooted in those tacit assumptions which govern our thinking without our being aware of it. This is why it is impossible to disavow them."<sup>23</sup> It was possible then, Polanyi continued, that twentieth-century thought was prisoner to materialistic preconceptions. The frequent assertion of such unexamined shibboleths as "the interest of the ruling classes," "war profiteers," "bureaucratic and military ambitions," and "economic expansion" constituted clear evidence that an unprejudiced social science did not exist.

In order to bring the war to an end and to prevent a renewal of hostilities, citizens of every state would have to become Europeans in the fullest sense of the word; they would have to abandon the idea of the sovereign state in favour of that of a unified Europe. Indeed, Polanyi insisted that civilization itself depended for its survival on the realization of the idea of a united Europe in which sovereignty was set above the individual nations. Unless that was accomplished, revolution would be inevitable, a revolution so terrible that it would soon reduce to insignificance the horror of the war. "Workers for peace! Only the creation of a European legal order can deliver us from revolution, because in its essence, the revolution of which everyone speaks is *the stirring of the peoples' conscience in an effort to free it from the idea of the state.*"

Anticipating Benda, who wrote in 1927 that "the progress of political passions in depth during the past century seems to me most remarkable in the case of national passions,"<sup>24</sup> Polanyi criticized the intellectuals for failing to take the lead in moderating nationalistic fervor. "Europe's intellectuals . . .," he wrote, "who speak equally well Europe's languages and whose spirit was nourished equally on every culture . . . one after another repudiated the internationalist ideal that was an animating force in the composition of their personalities."

Polanyi's counsel to the peacemakers was inspired by a concern for the precariousness of civilization and a conviction that the national passions that produced one war must not be allowed to call another into being; his essay did not betoken any taste for politics or political action. On the contrary, he regarded the blind national partisanship of the European intellectuals as a betrayal of their responsibility to defend civilization against internecine strife. And, precisely because the Galileo Circle had been captured by political radicals during the war, he apparently severed all ties with the organization, having found his way, in 1915, to a remarkable Sunday-afternoon discussion circle presided over by György (Georg) Lukács and Béla Balázs.<sup>25</sup> The subject for discussion at these gatherings was always chosen by Lukács and it invariably centered on some ethical problem or question suggested by the writings of Dostoevski and Kierkegaard. Politics and social problems were never discussed.<sup>26</sup> In a memoir concerning the "free school" organized by the circle in 1917, Balázs wrote: "There were eight or ten of us who never thought about politics even in our dreams."<sup>27</sup>

The political aloofness cultivated by the Lukács-Balázs circle became increasingly difficult to maintain as time wore on, for in the closing months of 1918, Hungary entered one of the most critical periods in its thousand-year history. By conceding defeat in the Great

War, the military leaders of the Central Powers had sounded the death knell for the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies and created an atmosphere of political uncertainty in *Mitteleuropa*. In Hungary, that uncertainty was not removed when, in late October, the liberal aristocrat Michael Károlyi led a bloodless revolution against the helpless old regime.<sup>28</sup> The Károlyi government sought to remake Hungary in the image of the Western democracies, but the enormous difficulties it faced made constructive action all but impossible. Locked in a vice by the victorious Allies and political enemies on the Right and the Left, Károlyi's democratic republic sank ever deeper in the quicksand of the post-war chaos while the Hungarian Communist Party, organized on November 24, 1918,<sup>29</sup> waited impatiently for its disappearance.

In the midst of this political maelstrom, most Hungarian intellectuals hastened to volunteer for political combat. Even Lukács and Balázs, to the dismay of their friends, joined the Communist Party.<sup>30</sup> Polanyi was a major exception. On February 1, 1919, less than two months before the fall of Károlyi's democratic regime and the establishment of Béla Kun's Soviet Republic, he published an article in *Szabadgondolat* entitled "New Skepticism."<sup>31</sup> The essay was a searing indictment of the intellectuals' prostration before the altar of politics; it was the initial engagement in Polanyi's lifelong war on the politicized intelligentsia. So anomalous was the article in a journal whose pages rang with political debate, that its publication can only be explained by the fact that Karl Polanyi was then *Szabadgondolat's* editor-in-chief.

Polanyi began his essay by pointing out that before the world war, intellectuals had largely disdained politicians and political engagement. In the wake of the collapse of the old order, however, they had abandoned their position above the strife and descended into the political arena; they had begun to seek salvation through political faith. Such faith, according to Polanyi, was misguided and dangerous; modern society was so complex that not even the most talented social scientists, much less politicians, were able to calculate the future effects of any political innovation. Politics was the blind eruption of terror and hope; political struggles did not ensure historical progress, but only aimless destruction. Faith in politics was, therefore, faith in an illusion.

The authentic task of intellectuals living in a politicized world was to preserve culture and to shatter faith in politics. In place of the illusions engendered by that faith, the ancient tradition of the skeptics had to be revived. To be sure, illusions would never die, because their death, like that of kings, enthroned their successors. That is so because the causes of illusions, hope and fear, could never be laid to

rest. Yet, by fostering a spirit of political skepticism among the European peoples, intellectuals could contribute to the establishment of less dangerous illusions.

"Our work," Polanyi continued, "is the exploration of the truth." Intellectuals had to discover the origin of political illusions in order to dispel them. Once that task was accomplished, perhaps a real community could be built, grounded in political as well as personal self-restraint.<sup>32</sup> Until then, intellectuals would have to regard politics as their enemy.

Polanyi's warning and counsel could not be heard above the shrill cries of political prophets and shortly after the formation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in March 1919, he left Hungary for a life in exile.

## II

I have dwelt at some length on Polanyi's years in Hungary because his early experience exerted a profound influence on his mature work; certainly they helped inspire him to discover the origin of political faith in man's moral nature. In contrast to most critics of the modern world, Polanyi does not think that ours is an age of moral weakness. On the contrary, "never in the history of mankind has the hunger for brotherhood and righteousness exercised such power over the minds of men as today."<sup>33</sup> The humanitarian reforms of the past two centuries embody in concrete form our moral sensibilities. And yet, something has gone wrong; the nineteenth century's dreams of continuous progress have turned into the twentieth century's nightmares. The political nihilism of Hitler and Stalin has shaken the edifice of civilization and ushered in an ice age of the human spirit.

Polanyi explains this paradox by analyzing what he has called "moral inversion." By that he means the process by which modern men have converted their moral passions into acts of manifest immorality in the search for perfection in society. They have done this because, while longing for an earthly paradise, their moral skepticism, engendered by "critical" thought since Descartes, forces them to conclude that all moral imperatives are mere epiphenomena without any legitimate claim to ontic status.

It is from this paradox that moral inversion springs. Man's moral impulse, Polanyi believes, is primal and cannot be successfully suppressed.<sup>34</sup> The more powerful that impulse and the less able it is to express itself through traditional channels, the more it will seek clandestine outlets. Embarrassed to be seen publicly, it disguises itself behind a mask of science or history; castigating the self-serving hypocrisy of "bourgeois" morality, it asserts its preeminence on grounds of its complete lack of self-deception and public duplicity.

Polanyi distinguishes between personal and political inversion,<sup>35</sup> the symbol of the former being the bohemian immoralist. Because of the totality of his contempt for all moral standards, the immoralist demands our respect and admiration. "I shall show you," he says, "an honesty as terrifying as it is pure. Like Smerdyakov, I shall follow to its logical conclusion Ivan Karamazov's 'everything is permitted' and shall taste those forbidden fruits before which you tremble with lust and fear of exposure. Your petty addiction to empty forms pales in moral significance beside my open decadence." It is on terms such as these that Simone de Beauvoir asks us to recognize in the Marquis de Sade our moral superior.<sup>36</sup>

Obscene as this personal inversion is, Polanyi has reserved his most scathing attack for those intellectuals whose treason consists of being seduced by the "magic of Marxism," for they have helped to create and sustain a leviathan that has devoured millions of human beings and, what is perhaps worse, deprived millions of others of the last shred of human dignity.

What, precisely, is the magic that Marxism possesses? "The answer is," Polanyi writes, "that it enables the modern mind, tortured by moral self-doubt, to indulge its moral passions in terms which also satisfy its passion for ruthless objectivity."<sup>37</sup> While mocking the acknowledged moral concern of liberal reformers, Marx channeled his far more demanding moral passion into a scientific theory of historical inevitability. There is, in short, more morality to be found in Marx's monumental works than in all the works of liberals put together. So demanding and uncompromising is that morality that only a resort to violence can effect the realization of its imperatives. Thus, Marx the moralist becomes Marx the apologist for violence.

It is impossible, I think, to read much of Marx without becoming aware of his Old Testament moral fervor; indeed, many writers have called attention to the moral ground of Marx's doctrines. Polanyi's great contribution is to have shown precisely *how* the descent from lofty, if disguised, ideals to the abyss of nihilism logically proceeds. Because of his work, we now have a much clearer understanding of the treason of the intellectuals and a fuller appreciation for the agonizing efforts made by some of them to stand morality back on its feet.

That such efforts have been made by those intellectuals most sunk in the slough of political nihilism—the Stalinists—is the ground for Polanyi's conviction that twentieth-century man has now advanced "beyond nihilism." The turning point, he argues, came in 1956, the year in which the Poles and the Hungarians revolted against a system that proclaimed that truth was party truth and common decency the fossilized remains of bourgeois cynicism.



It is not by chance that Polanyi has singled out the Hungarian Revolution for especial analysis, for despite his many years in Germany and England, he has never severed spiritual ties with his native land. The dark years of the Rákosi dictatorship (1948-56) must have been a source of great pain to him and the Revolution of 1956 a proud moment. Again and again he has written of its crucial significance in the moral history of mankind.<sup>38</sup>

The Revolution, Polanyi maintains, cannot be comprehended by social scientists committed to value-free descriptions, because it was generated by an analytically simple but existentially profound moral awakening among Hungarian communists. Any attempt to link the tumultuous events of October-November 1956 to some imagined social or economic change will end in a scholarly cul-de-sac; no such change induced the Hungarians to revolt. Rather, the rebel intellectuals finally recognized that they had betrayed systematically every moral principle for which they had originally alienated themselves from polite society. As two participants in the Revolution, Tamás Aczél and Tibor Méray, have written of their comrades: "The decisive impulse which flings the adventurers out of their usual course with such force into the opposite direction (sometimes with such force that they themselves hardly know where they have landed) is usually a moral impulse."<sup>39</sup>

To be sure, many communists and fellow travelers, such as Koestler, Silone, and Gide, had recanted prior to 1956, but now the recantations came in the very heart of darkness—the Stalinist state; and from those whom that state had honored and rewarded.<sup>40</sup> Morally, the Hungarian communists are back on their feet and because in 1956 they were, metaphorically speaking, the embodiment of the world spirit, mankind can be said to have emerged from the dark cave of nihilism into the refracted sunlight of an imperfect but potentially decent world.

Polanyi insists, however, that a return to the moral status quo ante is not sufficient surety for a world ravaged by the effects of nihilistic politics. It is not enough, he argues, to restore rationalist enlightenment, since the logic of its demands for critical objectivity has been exposed as the fertile ground of nihilism. Rather, intellectuals must recognize that men are not machines whose task it is to reject all truth claims and moral postulates because they are incapable of objective verification, but moral agents who cannot set aside the burden and responsibility of personal commitment.

In one of the most challenging chapters of *Personal Knowledge*, "The Logic of Affirmation," Polanyi identifies his "post-critical philosophy" with that of St. Augustine.

We must now go back to St. Augustine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers. In the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy. He taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief: *nisi credideritis, non intelligitis*.<sup>41</sup>

The similarities between the two thinkers are indeed striking. In common with St. Augustine, Polanyi has forged his philosophy in the crucible of a broken world, and like the great Church Father, he has offered an alternative to nihilistic despair rooted in a recognition of the fiduciary source of all knowledge. If twentieth-century intellectuals are to remain beyond nihilism, they must, in Polanyi's judgment, submit to intellectual and moral requirements which, while not scientifically demonstrable, are not for that reason merely the products of passing fancies, but the independent and universal determinants of authentic human existence.<sup>42</sup>

#### NOTES

1. As a philosophic pathfinder, Polanyi has surprisingly much in common with Martin Heidegger. In at least one place, he has made explicit his accord with the great German thinker. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), p. x.
2. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
3. Paul Ignotus, "The Hungary of Michael Polanyi," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday, 11th March 1961* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 12.
4. On the Polányi family, see Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930-41* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 113-15. Even more valuable, but in Hungarian, is Ilona Duczynska, "Polányi Károly (1886-1964)," *Századok*, 105, No. 1 (1971), 89-95. Ilona Duczynska is Mrs. Karl Polanyi.
5. Duczynska, "Polányi Károly," 89. Like many Hungarian Jews during the era of Dualism (1867-1918), Pollacsek chose to Magyarize his children's name (though not his own) to "Polányi," in the hope that their social and economic opportunities would thereby be greater.
6. *Ibid.*, 89-90.
7. The lifework of Karl Polanyi also bears the mark of Mihály Pollacsek's moral earnestness.
8. Pál Wolfner cited in Gyula Merei, *Polgári radikalizmus Magyarországon, 1900-1919* (Budapest, 1947), p. 10.
9. Exceptions include the poet János Arany (1817-82) and the painter Mihály Munkácsy (1844-1900).
10. Because Hungary's lyricists had traditionally been the pride of the nation, the sterility of Hungarian poetry at this time was particularly conspicuous. According to the perceptive critic and literary historian Aladár Schopflin (1872-1950), "The manner of our great classical poets became conventional in [fin de siècle] patriotic poetry. Generally, there was more patriotism . . . than poetry in this work." *A magyar irodalom története a XX. században* (Budapest: Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata Kiadása, 1937), p. 57. In art, paintings of the Holy Family and portrayals of glorious historical events proliferated.

11. On Jászi and *Huszadik Század*, see Merai, *Polgári radikalizmus Magyarországon* and my article, "The Moralist as Social Thinker: Oszkar Jaszi in Hungary, 1900-1919," in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse (eds.), *Historians in Politics* (London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1974), pp. 273-313. On Ignotus and *Nyugat*, see Miksa Fenyő, "The *Nyugat* Literary Magazine and the Modern Hungarian Literature," *The Hungarian Quarterly*, III, No. 3-4 (1962), 7-28, and Andre Karatson, *Le Symbolisme en Hongrie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969).
12. On Bartók, see the excellent study by Halsey Stevens, *The Life and Music of Béla Bartók* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Krisztina Passuth, *A Nyolcak festészete* (Budapest: Athenaeum Nyomda, 1967) is an important study of the new art.
13. For an outstanding study of Széchenyi, see George Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism, 1791-1841* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968).
14. See my article, "Endre Ady's Summons to National Regeneration in Hungary, 1900-1919," *Slavic Review*, 33, No. 2 (1974), 302-22.
15. Polanyi has testified to his youthful identification with Hungarian liberalism in *The Tacit Dimension* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 86.
16. Ignotus, "The Hungary of Michael Polanyi," p. 12.
17. Márta Tömöry, *Új vizeken járok: A Galilei Kör története* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1960), photographic plate between pp. 48 and 49. On the formation of the Galileo Circle, see also Zsigmond Kendé's posthumous memoir, *A Galilei Kör megalakulása*, ed. by Péter Hanák and György Litván (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974).
18. For a complete list of these lectures, see Tömöry, *Új vizeken járok*, pp. 278-79.
19. The Galileo Circle received most of its financial support from the Hungarian Freemasons.
20. Tömöry, *Új vizeken járok*, p. 274. The mathematician George Polya served on the same committee.
21. Like Ady, with whom they established a close relationship, the Galileoists sought the moral regeneration of Hungarian society. See Károly Polányi, "A Galilei Körre vonatkozó ismeretlen dokumentumok," ed. by Zoltán Horváth, *Századok*, 105, No. 1 (1971), 99-100.
22. Mihály Polányi, "A békeszerzőkhöz. (Nézetek az európai háború és béke-fételeiről)," *Huszadik Század*, 2 (1917), 165-76.
23. Polanyi's later theory of tacit knowledge is here prefigured.
24. Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. by Richard Aldington (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 13-14.
25. Balázs Béla naplója: 1899-1922. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára: Keziratár, Ms 5023/19, p. 47. December 22, 1915. On the Lukács-Balázs circle, see my article, "The Making of a Hungarian Revolutionary: The Unpublished Diary of Béla Balázs," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 8, No. 3 (1973), 57-74.
26. Interview with Professor Arnold Hauser in London, August 28, 1971. Hauser was a member of the circle.
27. Béla Balázs, *Válogatott cikkek és tanulmányok*, ed. by Magda K. Nagy (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1968), p. 91.
28. The best study of the October Revolution and the Károlyi government is still Sándor Juhász-Nagy, *A magyar októberi forradalom története (1918 okt. 31-1919 márc. 21)* (Budapest: Cserepfalvi, 1945). See also Oscar Jaszi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (Howard Fertig, Inc. ed.; New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) and Gábor Vermes, "The October Revolution in Hungary: From Károlyi to Kun," in Ivan Volgyes (ed.), *Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), pp. 31-60.
29. György Milei, "Mikor alakult a KMP?," *Párttörténeti Közlemények*, XI, No. 3 (1965), 140-41.

30. On Balázs, see my "The Making of a Hungarian Revolutionary"; on Lukács, see my article, "The Unexpected Revolutionary: Lukács's Road to Marx," *Survey*, 20, No. 2/3 (91/92) (1974), 176-205.
31. Mihály Polányi, "Új szkepticismus," *Szabadgondolat*, February 1, 1919, pp. 53-56.
32. The theme of political skepticism and restraint is a recurring one in Polanyi's writings. He admires greatly the "suspended logic" of English political theory. For example, see Michael Polanyi, *Knowing and Being: Essays*, ed. by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 22-23.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
34. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 234.
35. Polanyi, *Knowing and Being*, pp. 16-17; Michael Polanyi, "On the Modern Mind," *Encounter*, XXIV, No. 5 (1965), 19.
36. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Marquis de Sade: An Essay* (New York: Grove Press, 1953).
37. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 228.
38. See especially, Polanyi, "The Message of the Hungarian Revolution," in *Knowing and Being*, pp. 24-39.
39. Tamás Aczél and Tibor Méray, *The Revolt of the Mind* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1959), p. 325.
40. Tamás Aczél was a celebrated communist novelist and winner of both the Stalin and Kossuth Prizes; Tibor Méray was a highly-praised journalist-novelist and recipient of the Kossuth Prize.
41. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 266.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 300.