

The Canadian-American

REVIEW

of Hungarian Studies

A Canadian Meets the Magyars

WATSON KIRKCONNELL

Franco-Rumanian Intervention in Russia and
the *Vix Ultimatum*: Background to Hungary's
Loss of Transylvania

PETER PASTOR

Nikolaus Lenau and Germanic Literary Interest
in Hungary during the First Half of the
Nineteenth Century

A. H. VARDY

Recent Publications in Hungarian
Art History

ALFONZ LENGYEL

Reviews

EDITOR

Professor Nandor Dreisziger

BUSINESS MANAGER

Dr. Ferenc Harcsar

CORRESPONDING EDITORS

Professor Geza Kuun,
Political Science,
University of New Brunswick.

Professor Alfonz Lengyel,
Art History and Archeology,
Northern Kentucky State College.

Professor Thomas Spira,
History of Nationalism,
University of Prince Edward Island.

Professor Charles Wojatsek,
History, Linguistics,
Bishop's University.

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Professor Paul Bódy
Professor Kalman Bogнар
Professor J.J. Csonka
Peter Gosztonyi
Rev. Charles H. Henkey, Ph.D.
Rev. Aladar Komjathy, Ph.D.
Dr. Zoltan Mate
Dr. Sandor Szilassy
Professor S.B. Vardy
Dr. Paul E. Vesenyi
Dr. Ferenc Wagner

Copyright © 1974 by the Hungarian
Readers' Service.

All rights reserved.

Printed by Brown & Martin Limited,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

The Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies is published by the Hungarian Readers' Service. University teachers and students may obtain personal subscriptions by joining the HRS or payment of \$8.00 per annum. Institutional and supporting subscriptions are \$12.00 for one year and \$20.00 for two years. Sustaining memberships in the HRS are \$50.00 for individuals and \$100.00 for organizations. Correspondence regarding memberships, subscriptions and sample copies should be addressed to Dr. Ferenc Harcsar, 908-1356 Meadowlands Drive East, Ottawa, Canada. Articles, book reviews and news items should be submitted to Dr. Nandor Dreisziger, Department of History, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada.

The Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies invites the submission of articles and book reviews dealing with Hungarian studies in North America and elsewhere. Manuscripts should be clearly typed on one side of 8½ x 11 inch paper, double spaced, with ample margins. Footnotes and bibliographies should follow the text on separate pages and should be double spaced. The articles should be original and should be offered exclusively to the *Review*. On style, authors should follow previous issues of the *Review* or consult the editor.

The HRS and the editors of the *Review* neither endorse nor always subscribe to the views expressed by the contributors of the *Review*.

The printing of the first issue of the *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies* has been made possible through the financial support of the following organizations: *In Canada*: the Canadian Hungarian Federation, the Hungarian-Canadian Engineers' Association, the Hungarian Helicon Society of Toronto, the Hungarian United Church of Montreal, the Hungarian Presbyterian Church of Ottawa, the Quebec Committee for Hungarian Relief, the Szechenyi Society Inc., and the United Hungarian Fund.

In the United States: the American Hungarian Literary Guild, the American Transylvanian Federation, the Arpad Academy, and the Hungarian Association.

A Canadian Meets the Magyars

Watson Kirkconnell

My acquaintance with things Hungarian dates from my acceptance in 1922 of a professorial post in Wesley College, Winnipeg. Born of largely Scottish ancestry in Port Hope, Ontario, and educated (Primarily in classics) at Queen's and Oxford, I had had no previous contact with any Magyars. This was not surprising, for by the 1911 census there were fewer than 10,000 Hungarians in the whole of Canada and most of these were pioneer farmers in Saskatchewan. Change soon came, however. The 1921 census figure of 13,181 rose to 40,582 in 1931 and to 54,598 in 1941. Some of the rise may have been due to natural increase, but more of it came from massive immigration brought in by such agencies as the C.P.R. and C.N.R. Colonization Departments and the British Land Settlement Corporation. Many of these migrants had to have passports from the Succession States but gladly affirmed their true national origin for the Canadian census-takers in 1931 and 1941.

In my 18 professional years in Winnipeg (1922-40), my contacts with the Hungarian community were chiefly through the *Kanadai Magyar Újság* [Canadian Hungarian News],* and the Royal Hungarian Consulate, opened in 1928 under Stephen J. Schebeck (Petényi), later followed by Dr. Louis Szelle in 1936.

In 1925-28, the entire margin of my time (beyond professorial duties) was being devoted to verse translation from a wide range of European languages. From this activity there issued my *Outline of European Poetry* (published serially in the *Western Home Monthly*, (June-November 1927), my *European Elegies* (Graphic Press, 1928), and in 1930 *The North American Book of Icelandic Verse* (Carrier & Isles, pp. 228), the first in a projected series of volumes planned for the whole spectrum of Europe's poetic literatures. Over two decades later, this volume was to make me a Knight Commander of the Order of the Icelandic Falcon, but that is another story.

Enter Béla Báchkai Payerle, the 24-year-old editor of the *Kanadai Magyar Újság*, who had encountered my translations from Magyar in *European Elegies* and the *Western Home Monthly* and now sought to encourage me to make *The North American Book of Magyar Verse* the next in my colossal series. He had been born in Újvidék (Neusatz, Novi Sad), and had studied Greek in Budapest under Professor Karl Kerényi (d. 1973) and engineering at the Budapest Polytechnic. Since the half-million Magyars in the southern districts where his father had

*Founded about 1920 in Kipling, Saskatchewan, by Miklós Istvánffy (editor) and Zoltán Istvánffy (printer) and moved to Winnipeg soon thereafter. It was taken over in December 1924 by the Immigrants' Aid Bureau.

been High Commissioner in 1918 were presently handed over to a new "Jugoslavia" in the peace treaties, the Payerle family all migrated to Canada. **

For the project that he urged, I had Arthur Yolland's excellent Hungarian-English dictionary and Kont's *Petite grammaire hongroise*. For originals I had a superb two-volume anthology of Hungarian poets (*Magyar költők*, 1928), edited by Aladár Zlinszky and László Vajthó. For background reading, I had Jenő Pintér's two-volume *History of Hungarian Literature*, also freshly published (in Magyar) in 1928. With Béla to help me in deciphering the fundamental meaning of the Magyar, and with my own flair and passion for recreating the lines in English, the Hungarian anthology in English took shape with exhilarating rapidity.

Actually, the completion of a large book manuscript was the least of our problems. The Great Depression had seen the financial sky fall down in November 1929. My publishers, Carrier & Isles, went bankrupt in the summer of 1930, leaving me to pay the printers and binders of my *Icelandic Verse* out of my own professorial pocket. Two of my other publishers, Graphic Press and Ariston Press, also went to the wall. Further book publication seemed as remote as Australia. As early as October 1929, the eminent Budapest novelist and academician, Ferencz Herczeg, had promised me an Introduction, but this solved no financial problems.

In the meantime, a number of my verse translations were published in the *Kanadai Magyar Újság*. Next, about Christmas 1930, I mailed a clutch of nine poems to Sir Bernard Pares, editor of the University of London's *Slavonic and East European Review*. Included were a number in the Greek classical metres that were long popular in Hungary, in this case, Ferenc Kazinczy's "Our Tongue" (epic hexameters), Benedek Virág's "Invocation" (alcaics), Dániel Berzsenyi's "My Lot" (sapphics) and "Invocation" (alcaics) and Károly Kisfaludy's "Mohács" (elegiac couplets). In more modern metres were poems by Endre Ady, Dezső Kosztolányi, "Miklós Bárd" and Géza Gyóni. Sir Bernard's 6-page answer of January 17, 1931, was full of enthusiasm: "Your sapphics are real sapphics, not the kind of jingle which passes for sapphics in England. It is of course, as you have made it, a

**Typical of our contacts with another phase of the Magyar tradition was a dinner-party for six at the home of the Schebeck-Petényis in the early 1930's, when I and my bride (a Canadian cousin of Earl Kitchener) were fellow-guests along with Béla and his bride, Lulu Putnik (a Winnipeg pianist, fresh from study in Paris and a Budapest recital), as well as Lulu's uncle Dezső Mahalek (soon to be 1st cellist in the Vancouver Symphony) and his wife, the golden soprano, "Carrie Henderson." Other Hungarian musicians, who were our house-guests during my presidency at Acadia University in 1948-64 were Joseph Szigeti (violinist), Béla Böszörményi-Nagy (pianist) and Géza de Kresz (founder of the Hart House String Quartet) with his wife, "Norah Drewett" (concert pianist).

five-foot line Also I think your alcaics and hexameters are good." There followed a good deal of prosodic counsel on how to avoid the overloading of unaccented syllables with clotted consonants. Publication followed promptly in March 1931 (Vol. IX, No. 27).

The *Slavonic and East European Review* had a considerable circulation in Hungary, and I presently awoke to find myself famous in academic circles there. A literary academy, the Petőfi Society, elected me to honorary membership on the Ides of March, 1932, along with Fredrik Böök of the Swedish Academy. My *székfoglaló*, or inaugural dissertation, entitled "The Significance of Petőfi from the Point of View of the New World", was duly read in the hall of the Royal Hungarian Academy of Sciences in November 1932.

Meanwhile, publication slowly became a possibility. When Lord Rothermere visited Winnipeg in May 1932, I had lunch with him and secured a promise of \$200 to buy book paper. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs voted 1,000 pengős (about \$500) to buy 500 copies of my volume for distribution to Hungarian schools. Mr. Schefbeck, the Hungarian consul, made a cash contribution. Béla Báchkai Payerle linotyped and printed the volume gratis with his own hands. Finally, entitled *The Magyar Muse*, the 228-page volume became available to the public in January 1933.

Then came a tidal wave of friendly letters and autographed books from poets and scholars in Hungary. Among names in my files from the first few months were those of Lajos Áprily, Mihály Babits, Eugen Balogh (Secretary of the Hungarian Academy), Aladár Bán, Aladár Bodor, George Buday, Minka Czóbel, Lajos Harsányi, István Havas, Ferencz Herczeg, Bálint Hóman (Minister of Education), Ödön Jakob, Dezső Kosztolányi, Ferenc Kozma, Géza Lampérth, "László Mécs", Gyula Pekár, George de Pilászy, Jenő Pintér, Miklós Radnóti, Sándor Reményik, Gyula Szekfű, Ernő Szép, Kálmán Szily (Secretary of State), István Traub and Gyula Wlassics.

With the *Magyar* volume in my European translation series duly achieved, I turned next to an anthology of my translations from Polish poetry. Here again there was the trial flight of a "Polish Miscellany" in the *Slavonic Review* and, after considerable delay, the publication of a *Golden Treasury of Polish Lyrics* (1936), made possible by heavy purchases of this work by the Polish Government. As a sequel came my decoration as a Knight Officer of the Order of Polonia Restituta and my receipt of the Silver Laurel of the Polish Academy of Literature.

But the Hungarian friends had other plans for me. Dr. Dominic Szent-Iványi, the young scion of an old Transylvanian family and a career diplomat in the U.S.A., helped to found in Cleveland, Ohio, a Benjamin Franklin Bibliographical Society, whose *raison d'être* was

the publication of a series of books by Magyar authors. The proposed first volume was an English verse translation of Hungary's greatest epic, *Buda halála* ("The Death of Buda", 1864), by János Arany (1817-82). I was to do the versifying and the Payerles were to supply me with a literal prose text. There was to be a Foreword by Géza Voinovich, Secretary General of the Hungarian Academy. Dr. Árpád Berczik, of the University of Budapest, would supply copious notes (the first in English). Dr. Joseph Szentkirályi, of the University of Budapest's Department of English, would check my translation with the original Magyar, line by line. I myself was to write an historical and critical introduction for this first translation of the epic into any language other than Czech and German. Complete sets (in Magyar, 16 volumes) of Arany, Vörösmarty and Petőfi now graced my shelves and widened my horizons. The Kirkconnell-Payerle version of *The Death of King Buda* came out on schedule in 1936. A grateful consul assured me that an Order of Merit would have been recommended had not the presence of a Regent (Horthy) instead of the legitimate Habsburg monarch rendered all decorations impossible. The king was the fount of honour and, thanks to the Succession States, who immediately mobilized their armies whenever any restoration of the throne was suggested, Hungary had no king.

The B.F.B.S.'s second volume was to have been an enlarged and revised edition of the *Magyar Muse*. The choice of poems, trebling the size of the volume, was to be made by Dr. Elemér Császár, professor of Hungarian literature in the University of Budapest, and by Dr. László Vajthó, professor of contemporary literature in the University of Debrecen. The Báchkai-Payerles and Joseph Szentkirályi were to play the same roles as for Arany's epic. We all set to work and the entire manuscript had been industriously completed by the summer of 1938.

In the meantime, however, the Cleveland firm had suddenly switched its priorities. Dr. Dominic Kosáry, a young professor of history in the Eötvös Kollegium, Budapest, was writing a *History of Hungary* in Magyar, and an English translation of this prose work (482 pages) was to precede the enlarged *Muse*. Here my own contribution was to be my final vetting of the English text in the summer of 1940. Kósary's volume was published in 1941, just before the firm went out of existence, a casualty of World War II.

But from 1936 on, interim use was found for the rapidly growing mass of *Muse II*. Béla, operating in Winnipeg, founded a literary monthly called *The Young Magyar-American*, with a considerable circulation in both Canada and the U.S.A. With pecuniary interruptions, it ran from March 1936 to May 1939, and every issue carried a newspaper-sized page of our translations. During that period, it published 140 of my English versions (including a whole instalment of

Toldi), 14 historical or critical articles from my pen and instalments of a *Primer of Hungarian* that I had written. Three further generous instalments of "A Magyar Miscellany" also appeared in the *Slavonic Review*

Still another outlet had come with the founding in Budapest of an English-language literary review, *The Hungarian Quarterly* (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1936). An opening article by Count Stephen Bethlen tells of its genesis: "Returning, two years ago, from a lecturing tour in England, I brought with me the sorrowful conviction that for all the sympathy and kindness which had met me at every turn, the great problems, past and present, of my own country were a sealed book to the majority of the English people . . . Led by these considerations, a few friends and myself resolved to found a periodical which, written in English throughout, would give British and American readers a faithful picture of Hungarian affairs past and present. With this aim in view a Society was formed which honoured me by offering me its chairmanship and intends a few weeks hence to issue the first issue of a review entitled "The Hungarian Quarterly."

The same issue carried an article by myself entitled "Hungary's Linguistic Isolation"; and some paragraphs of mine, printed facing some from Count Bethlen's article, were used as a publicity leaflet in launching the periodical. My excerpt began: "With the establishment of *The Hungarian Quarterly*, the English-speaking world is at last given an open window through which to gaze into Hungary's lonely tower of linguistic isolation. It will see there, not an over-delicate Lady of Shalott, weaving a futile web of fictive fantasy, but the vital personality of a gifted people."

The editor, located in Budapest, was to be Joseph Balogh, a scholarly authority of Dante and Erasmus, and there were to be subscription offices in London and New York.

Subsequent contributions of mine, prior to the *Quarterly's* tragic demise in World War II, were "The Poetry of Ady" (Autumn 1937) and "Quintessence of Hungary" (Autumn 1938).

Another literary academy, the Kisfaludy Society, elected me to a corresponding membership in 1936 and the P.E.N. Club of Hungary (whose president was Antal Radó, a classical scholar and a poet) awarded me its "Medal of Honour", a distinction then first inaugurated for eminent work abroad in the field of Hungarian literature. But there was a confidential talk of an impending honorary doctorate at the University of Debrecen, which was to celebrate in 1938 the 400th anniversary of its earliest nucleus, "Debrecen College," founded in 1538 in this Protestant area of Hungary by Magyar graduates of Geneva and Leiden.

The ceremony was scheduled for September 1938, and as a prologue to that event I was invited to give a couple of lectures on

Hungarian literature at the summer sessions (*Nyári Egyetem*) of the University. Transportation was not provided, but the Polish "Gdynia-American Line" supplied free transatlantic tickets for my wife and myself, and I covered the remainder of the trip's expenses by sending back a series of travel articles to the Southam string of Canadian dailies. The Báchkai-Payerles (Béla, Lulu and small son Ferenc) were our fellow-travellers. For our six weeks stay in Hungary, a suite of rooms was placed at the Kirkconnells' disposal in the Eötvös Kollegium, "the Eton of Hungary," in Budapest.

Towards the end of our stay, we were urged to remain for the great Quadricentennial celebrations, but I had to decline, with a regretful "Nem lehet!" Being a full-time professor of Latin, I had classes to meet in Winnipeg in mid-September. As it turned out, in that month of the Munich crisis, the elaborate academic rites were called off. A personal letter from Count Paul Teleki, then Minister of Education, gave me the details (December 10, 1938): "We tried to keep the celebration on programme as long as we could. The great festivities were cancelled only a week before they should have taken place. It was in the first moment of great excitement and of possible war The anniversary was nevertheless celebrated in a simpler form by the University Your honorary doctorship was also announced."

That the promised diploma took twenty months to reach me was due to the pains taken by the University to make it a memorable document. The University Orator was commissioned to prepare an eloquent Latin panegyric on my achievements as an intercultural interpreter. A superb artist, Alexander Kiss, was hired to lavish his chromatic skill on a large parchment, 28 inches by 20. Across the top was the national blazon, along with the elaborate scarlet capitals of an exordium, backed by intricate scroll-work, worthy of the Alhambra. Across the foot of the diploma were the richly-hued emblems of the several faculties—the rooster for divinity, the owl for philosophy, enthroned justice for law and a serpent-cum-chalice for medicine. In between, in arresting, hand-painted black minuscules, with scarlet for all capitals, stood the body of the citation. The capital-S at its beginning (*Si laus eximia . . .*) was expanded, as in a mediaeval manuscript, into a vivid painting, 6 centimetres by 4, of a Hun warrior on horseback, turning back to shoot an arrow in Parthian style. This sketch, largely in scarlet, was a delicate reference to the subject-matter of my translation of *Buda halála*, especially the ancient legend in Canto VI.

As a major document in these annals, the text of the diploma is given hereunder in English translation:

WE, the Rector and the gracious and most famous Royal Stephen Tisza University of Debrecen, greet those who will read

this document! If exceptional praise is deservedly due to those who are devoted to the welfare of their own fatherland and people, then assuredly those men are worthy of the highest admiration and respect who, studying deeply the literatures of foreign nations, set as their goal the establishment and promotion of friendship and brotherhood between different peoples. In the noble circle of these men, by far the most eminent place is held by the most learned and famous gentleman, WATSON KIRKCONNELL, professor in Wesley College, Winnipeg, and a most illustrious member of many societies of letters among foreign peoples. For more than a decade now he has devoted himself to a study of the literature of our Hungarian nation and has published for his own nation an endless series of his translations and versions from the works of Hungarian poets and writers. His Hungarian anthology, rendered into English, and likewise his translation of "The Death of Buda," are monuments that will demonstrate to all ages, more enduringly than bronze, the genius and poetic ability of this Man, not only among us Hungarians but also truly in his own fatherland. Finally, who could help telling how much this Man, a true and sincere Friend of the Hungarian people, had made known in annals and periodicals the culture and learning, the character and virtues of our nation, and how much he has toiled on behalf of our just rights! We therefore, out of respect for his eminent deserts, and in accordance with a decree of the most eminent Regent of the kingdom of Hungary, dated December 20, 1939, and as a sign of our respect, of our own free will and accord, have created, pronounced and declared the said most illustrious, most distinguished and most erudite gentleman, Watson Kirkconnell, Doctor of Philosophy, *Honoris Causa*, conferring on him all the privileges and rights which Doctors of Philosophy *honoris causa* enjoy by right and custom. In proof of which, we have bestowed on him this Diploma, ratified by the great seal of our University and confirmed by the customary signatures. Issued in the free and royal city of Debrecen, May 3, 1940.

THEODORUS F. LINC
Doctor of Medicine,
Professor of Surgery,
Rector Magnificus.

STEPHANUS KISS DE RUGONFALVA
Doctor of Philosophy,
Professor of Hungarian History,
Dean.

In less than a year from the time that I received this document, an endless procession of German troops and planes was streaming through Budapest on its way to the Rumanian Banat, and Count Paul Teleki (premier since 1939) had put a bullet in his brain (April 3, 1941), leaving a note for the Regent that stated: "Perhaps by my voluntary death I may render a service to my nation." In the national descent to Avernus that finally hit hell-bottom in the German occupation of 1944, German S.S. brigades, aided by a few Right-Wing Hungarians, rounded up half a million Hungarian Jews and then deported them to Auschwitz for extermination. Antal Radó, who had called on me with the P.E.N. Club Medal of Honour, Miklós Radnóti, who had presented me with inscribed copies of two volumes of his

poetry, Joseph Balogh, in whose book-lined apartment my wife and I had dined—all these gracious and cultured friends were slaughtered, as Jews, by the Nazis. Stephen Bethlen, with whom I had helped to launch the *Hungarian Quarterly*, went underground when the Nazi police occupied Budapest in 1944, but was caught by the Russians in 1945 and seems to have died two years later in an NKVD dungeon in Moscow. In 1943-44, Béla Báchkai Payerle was involved in a crash program at the University of Indiana, training American officers in history and geography in preparation for occupation duty in Hungary; but Roosevelt suddenly sold Hungary out to Stalin, the Indiana program was cancelled, and Horthy was informed that he could place no hope in a separate deal with the Americans and the British, but must make his peace with the Soviets. In October 1944, Dominic Szent-Iványi was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in an unavailing delegation of three sent by Budapest to Moscow. Later, he was “framed” in a political trial by the Rákosi regime and endured several agonizing years in Communist prisons in Hungary.

Meanwhile, back in Canada, my academic employment had shifted from a professorship in Latin (Winnipeg, 1933-40) to a professorship in English (McMaster, Hamilton, 1940-48) and to the presidency of Acadia University (1948-64). I had also abandoned verse translation for active prose publication in support of the unity of wartime of Canadians of all origins. Books of mine with that purpose were *Canada, Europe and Hitler* (1939), *Canadians All* (1941), *Our Communists and the New Canadians* (1943), *Our Ukranian Loyalists* (1943), *Seven Pillars of Freedom* (1944), *The Quebec Tradition* (1946) and *Stalin's Red Empire* (1951). In December 1940, I was one of five founders of what is now the Citizenship Branch in the Secretary of State's Department, but declined the honour of becoming its first director, since, as a civil servant, I could then no longer speak out on public issues. One of my combative interchanges was in disposing of a claim, in *Saturday Night* (Jan. 9, 1943) by Steve Szőke, editor of the *Magyar Munkás*, Toronto, that his paper, founded by the Communists in 1925, had nothing to do with the Communist Party. Unfortunately for him, I had on file an official publication, *Resolutions of the Enlarged Plenum of the Communist Party of Canada* (1931), which specifically claimed (page 11) to have founded the *Munkás* as a revolutionary paper.

The stifled Budapest uprising in 1956 against the Communist dictatorship brought nearly 40,000 refugees to Canada and made our public at least briefly aware of the facts of life in Eastern Europe. A few fugitive remnants of the AVO, dislodged on October 23, 1956, may have arrived in Toronto one jump ahead of the real refugees, but the great bulk of the new influx consisted of long-suffering citizens who were neither Communist nor Fascist. Many were college

students, who made a vigorous contribution to life on our university campuses, as at Acadia, where Margaret von Fricke won straight A's in all her courses and Leslie Török ("Black Belt") began a judo club.

I found the newcomers very friendly. A Hungarian Literary Society in Winnipeg made me an honorary member and Sándor Domokos, its president, created for me a bronze wall-plaque relief portrait of myself, "from a son of a small nation to a great son of a great nation." The Helicon Society of Toronto presented me with a large bronze medal, "In gratitude to Canada for the welcome accorded to the exiles of the Hungarian revolution, 1956-61." Meanwhile the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' organization in New York conferred on me its Gold Medal of Freedom, in company with some eight other "international champions of human liberty"—Charles de Gaulle of France, Premier Segni of Italy, Defence Minister Strauss of West Germany, Chancellor Julius Raab of Austria, Cardinal Cushing of Boston, Mrs. Bang Jensen of Denmark, Richard M. Nixon and Senator Thomas J. Dodd. The medal had been designed by the Hungarian sculptor, Mihály de Kátay. The large parchment scroll (in Latin) accompanying the medal, had been deliberately burned around the edges so as to symbolize the martyrdom through which the Hungarian people had passed. Still another Magyar award was the George Washington medallion of the American Hungarian Studies Foundation, conferred on me, along with Hans Selye and Marcel Breuer, at a 1967 banquet at the Plaza Hotel, New York.

From 1938 to 1968, my work in translating Hungarian poetry had been left on the back burner. There had indeed been my *Little Treasury of Hungarian Verse* (1945), published in Washington by the American Hungarian Federation, from fragments of *Muse II*. For the Premonstratensian Fathers, of Saint Norbert Abbey, I prepared a volume of translations from László Mécs, a canon regular of their Order, and saw them published in 1964 and 1968. In 1957, I translated spontaneously a poem by "Tibor Tollas," had the man himself as my house-guest in Wolfville, and Englished most of the famous freedom-fighter anthology, *Füveskert*. But most of my literary energies had been poured into a massive trilogy of Milton studies, begun in 1933 and published as *The Celestial Cycle* (1952, pp. 728), *That Invincible Samson* (1964, pp. 229) and *Awake the Courteous Echo* (1973, pp. 360); into a verse translation of Adam Mickiewicz's Polish epic, *Pan Tadeusz* (1962, pp. 407); into two volumes of verse translation from Ukrainian, made in collaboration with Dr. C.H. Andrusyshen, namely, *The Ukrainian Poets, 1189-1962* (1963, pp. 530); and *The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko* (1964, pp. 614), into a volume of my own verse, *Centennial Tales and Other Selected Poems* (1965, pp. 550); and into a volume of my memoirs, *A Slice of Canada* (1967, pp.

403). All of these last eight volumes, totalling over 3,800 pages, were published by the University of Toronto Press.

From the same Press, through its *University of Toronto Quarterly*, there had been published for thirty-one years my annual survey of all books published in Canada in languages other than English and French, totalling perhaps 2,000 volumes in all. While the great majority of these were in Ukrainian, Icelandic and German, the Magyar record was not entirely blank. Before this, I had already become acquainted with the poetry of Gyula Izsák, Sarolta Petényi and Rózsa Páll Kovács. The 1930's also brought biographical narratives from Rev. Monsignor Pál Sántha and a short *History of Canada* by Gustáv Nemes. But an up-to-date literary community really materialized after the great migration of 1956, and the founding of *Kanadai Magyarság* and *Magyar Élet* in Toronto as vehicles for the outpourings of that community, presently gathered up in book form. Preeminent in this new wave in Toronto were Ferenc Fáy, with several volumes of distinguished verse; András Tamás, whose *Öröm a házat* [I guard the house], (1961), is masterly and mature, and Márton Kerecsendi Kiss, whose *Hetedhétország: Mesejáték* (1962) is alight with imagination. Contemporary with these began the political commentary of András Tamás, *Délkeleteuropa a diplomáciai törekvések sodrában 1939-44 között* [Southeast Europe in the Current of Diplomatic Endeavours, 1939-44] (Montreal 1961), which reminded me of *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool* (Notre Dame University, 1953), by Stephen Kertész, whom I had met in Budapest in August 1938. The laudable growth of a whole circle of Magyar poets came with the founding of a Canadian Hungarian Author's Association (*Kanadai Magyar Írók Köre*, 1969), with a striking series of annual volumes of original prose and verse, entitled *Antologia*, edited by János Miska, of Ottawa and Lethbridge, and presently printed with the financial help of the Szechenyi Society. All contributors deserve to be cited, but under pressure of space I shall mention only Ernő Németh, Sándor Domokos, Ferenc Fáy and György Vitéz. A celebrity in prose and verse who stayed briefly in Toronto before passing on was György Faludy.

I retired from Acadia University's presidency in 1964, following a bad coronary, and even from a subsequent professorship in 1968, following two cataract operations. As shades of the undertaker began to dog my septuagenarian steps, I turned back to a resumption of my old Hungarian studies. For this, the circumstances had changed since 1938. My shelves were now crammed with scores of new volumes of Magyar verse, and especially the 3-volume *Hét évszázad magyar versei* (Budapest 1966, pp. 1131, 931 and 1136). Pinter's *Irodalom-története* was now supplemented by the monumental 3-volume *Magyar irodalmi lexikon* (Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest, 1963), under

the general editorship of Marcell Benedek. I also purchased a complete microfilm of the Latin works of Janus Pannonius from the British Museum Library. But the first undertaking was my completion of Arany's *Toldi*, begun in 1936 in partnership with Tivadar Edl of the Hungarian Foreign Office. Next I added excerpts from a dozen other epics by Janus Pannonius, Zrínyi, Gyöngyösi, Csokonai, Vörösmarty, Arany and Petőfi. When I sent a copy of my projected table of contents to a score of knowledgeable Hungarians, many valuable suggestions flowed in. Dr. Asztrik Gábel, director of the Mediaeval Institute at Notre Dame University, proposed a much fuller representation of poetry from before A.D. 1800. Dr. Dominic Szent-Ivánvi, of Budapest, recommended a much more adequate array of poems from the Great Triad: Vörösmarty, Petőfi and Arany. Almost all advisers urged a fuller roster of the poets who had risen to prominence in the forty years since I had published my *Magyar Muse*, especially such men as Dezső Kosztolányi, Lajos Kassák, Milán Füst, József Erdélyi, Lőrinc Szabó, Gyula Illyés, Sándor Weores, Attila József, Zoltán Zelk, Miklós Radnóti, István Vas and Ferenc Juhász. My chief mentors for this recent period were three émigré scholars: Dr. George Gömöri, of Darwin College, Cambridge; Dr. Ádám Makkai, of the University of Illinois; and Dr. George Buday, of Coulsdon, Surrey.

The responsibility for the English versions was always my own throughout. Under the combined pressure of old age (pushing 78), coronary lesions and a work-desk suddenly swamped with several hundred pages of extra originals, I was deeply indebted in 1971-72 to the help on basic line-by-line meanings given me by my old friends, Lulu and Béla Báchkai Payerle, and by a new friend of the 1956 Emigration, Maxim Táborny, of Kinston, N.C. But for better or worse, the *summa manus* on the prosody was always my own. My aim in translation has been to pursue two conflicting ideals: (a) to come as close as possible to the meaning and metre of the original, and (b) to produce English verse that is acceptable as English in prosody and idiom. It is the tension between these ideals that creates whatever merit (or demerit) my translations may have.

In the spring of 1973, I sent a completed typescript of my *Hungarian Helicon* to the modern languages editor of the University of Toronto Press. His production staff reported that my 1180 typed pages would print as 848 large pages, at a cost of around \$28,000. The Helicon Society of Toronto, the Széchenyi Society of Calgary and the Hungarian Literary Society of Winnipeg have all recommended it to the Secretary of State, Ottawa, for a multicultural grant in aid of publication. The manuscript is still on the knees of the gods.

Franco-Rumanian Intervention in Russia and the *Vix Ultimatum*: Background to Hungary's Loss of Transylvania.

Peter Pastor

On March 21, 1919, the democratic Hungarian government of Mihály Károlyi collapsed and gave way to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. In that year of the "Red Scare" the rise of the Béla Kun regime strengthened the spectre of world revolution.

With the fall of the Károlyi regime, Hungary's first democratic experience met an untimely death. The direct cause of the government's collapse was the renowned *Vix Ultimatum*, a French-inspired memorandum from the Paris Peace Conference. The note, delivered to the Hungarians on March 20, 1919, by the head of the French Military Mission in Hungary, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Ferdinand Vix, seemed to legitimize Rumanian occupation of Transylvania. The crisis this development provoked in Hungary made some contemporary observers, among them the American General Tasker H. Bliss and the South African General Jan Smuts, believe that Rumanian occupation of Transylvania was a scheme of the Allied Supreme Commander, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, whose plan for an Allied attack on Russia required the placation of Rumania.¹ Historians of this period came to accept this view.²

Since the *Vix Ultimatum* was delivered almost one month after its issuance in Paris, the selection of the date of its presentation has remained a mystery.³ Recent publications have offered various explanations why the French chose March 20 as the date to hand over the fateful document. In Hungary, Professor Sándor Vadász has suggested that Colonel Vix was ordered by his superiors to transmit the memorandum on that date because French military preparations to enforce it had by then been completed.⁴ Tibor Hajdu, the best known authority on the Hungarian revolutions of 1918-1919, believes that the date was chosen because the Paris Peace Conference was ready then to reopen the discussion of the invasion of Russia. According to this thesis, the French military leaders were preparing the ground for such an invasion by handing the ultimatum to the Hungarians.⁵ In the United States, the present author has concluded that the date of transmittal was an arbitrary decision of Colonel Vix to reinforce his waning authority over the Hungarians.⁶

The opening of the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1918 to 1929 in the summer of 1972 shed new and startling light on the affair. It is now evident that the Allied forces in eastern Europe under the command of General Louis Franchet d'Esperey were not ready to transmit the memorandum to the Hungarians in the

middle of March. It was only on the urgent orders of the French Premier and Minister of War, Georges Clemenceau, that Franchet d'Esperey had it delivered then. Clemenceau's orders were prompted by a sudden crisis in southern Russia where Allied troops under French command were being defeated by the Red Army. To obtain quick reinforcements from neighbouring Rumania, Clemenceau had to pay off the Rumanians at once with the Transylvanian territory they coveted. Thus the Allied authorisation of the occupation of Transylvania by the Rumanians, and the fall of the Károlyi regime were precipitated not by French intentions of attacking Russia but by the need to protect Allied troops already in the Ukraine.

Direct French intervention in Rumania began in the aftermath of Rumania's defeat by Germany. In October, 1918, General Henri Berthelot was ordered to bring Rumania back into the war either by persuasion or by force.⁷ Berthelot's French troops were part of the Allied Army of the Orient under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey in the Balkans. Berthelot was responsible to Franchet d'Esperey for his orders. With the approach of the armistice with Germany, which came one day after Rumania's re-entry into the war, Berthelot's responsibility was broadened. On November 2, he was appointed to command the Allied interventionist forces in southern Russia. For his activities in Russia he was directly responsible to the Minister of War and to the General Staff, but his military mission in Rumania and his troops in occupied Rumania and Transylvania, now named the Army of the Danube, remained subordinate to General Franchet d'Esperey, who was in command of the whole Balkan theater, Hungary and Rumania included.

The division of Berthelot's responsibility indicates that for the French leaders the destruction of Bolshevism in Russia was more pressing than the political and military situation in the Balkans. Berthelot's task in Russia was the progressive invasion of Russian territory, including occupation of the ports of Odessa, Nikolaev and Sevastopol on the Black Sea and of Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. Inland his advance was expected to reach the Dnieper and Donets region where Allied detachments were to give advice and material support to the anti-Communist White forces.⁹

French intervention in Russia began on December 18 with the landing of 1,800 French troops at Odessa.¹⁰ In his zeal to find allies for intervention, Clemenceau even supported Rumania's participation in the Peace Conference as a minor ally. This was a *volte-face* for the French leader, who had earlier claimed that he could not accept Rumania as an ally because it had signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers on May 7, 1918.¹¹ On December 29 the French foreign minister, Stephen Pichon, announced in the Chamber of

Deputies in Paris that the Rumanian army was being reorganized and ready to intervene in Russia. That a territorial bounty had to be paid for the Rumanian support was implicit in Pichon's view that the organization of the states in central Europe could not be based on self-determination. France's aim was to create strong east European allies—a stance justified as the victor's right over the vanquished. Clemenceau supported Pichon by stating that he pinned his faith on a system of alliances to preserve the peace of Europe.¹²

Pichon's public statement was preceded by instructions to the French ambassador in Bucharest to express the French government's support for Rumania's presence at the Peace Conference as an ally. The Rumanians were being told that the Secret Treaty of Bucharest had been annulled by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918. Pichon, however, had promised the Rumanians that the French would ask the Allies to support Rumanian demands based on the Secret Treaty.¹³ Still, France's rejection of Rumanian claims rooted in the Secret Treaty of Bucharest was significant, for the Rumanians were in the process of advancing into western Transylvania, an area promised them in the Secret Treaty. The Belgrade Military Convention of November 13, 1918, between Franchet d'Esperey and the Hungarians, however, had clearly stated that it was for Hungary to administer the area unless the Peace Conference decided the fate of Transylvania otherwise.¹⁴ Rumania's advance was supported by General Berthelot, much to the despair of Colonel Vix in Budapest, whose role was to oversee Hungarian observance of the terms of the Belgrade convention. General Berthelot, who was in Budapest in January, informed Vix that he considered the Belgrade convention arbitrary and voiced his support for Rumanian expansion. To Vix and his superiors, Berthelot's behaviour seemed insubordinate.¹⁵ On January 13, 1919, Franchet d'Esperey lodged a complaint that Berthelot seemed to be disregarding Clemenceau's orders and acting on his own rather than under his (Franchet d'Esperey's) command.¹⁶ Franchet d'Esperey buttressed his complaint by claiming that Berthelot's actions were weakening central authority in Hungary and would facilitate the progress of Bolshevism there.¹⁷

General Berthelot, who was aware of the assailability of his attitude, tried to gain Clemenceau's support by arguing that Rumania must be treated generously because of her proximity to Russia. Berthelot called the Hungarians the enemies of France and asked for a Transylvanian boundary unfavorable to Hungary which would also make Rumania pro-French and a virtual French colony. He also reminded Clemenceau that the Rumanians had re-entered the war: by doing so they had fulfilled France's wishes and, as a result, deserved to be treated as old allies.¹⁸ What Berthelot was really seeking was Clemenceau's explicit support of the Secret Treaty of Bucharest.

The French leader's reply was not long in coming. He expressed the view that the Rumanian Peace Treaty with the Central Powers annulled original Allied commitments to Rumania. She had also co-operated with the enemy with her annexation of Russian Bessarabia. Thus, he concluded, Rumania was treated very fairly when it was invited to the Peace Conference as a minor ally. As for the boundaries drawn by the Belgrade convention, Clemenceau upheld them as a military demarcation line. In support of General Franchet d'Esperey he called on General Berthelot not to act as a broker for Rumania, and either to obey his orders or request his own recall.¹⁹ When Count August Saint-Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Bucharest, came to Berthelot's defense, the angry premier accused the general of sounding like a Rumanian statesman rather than an impartial judge of the Rumanian situation.²⁰

Clemenceau's heated messages indicate that in January, when French intervention in southern Russia was proceeding smoothly, even without Rumanian help, he took Franchet d'Esperey's warning seriously. The threat of Bolshevism and anarchy in Hungary forced Clemenceau to retreat from his previous stand on Rumania which was now seen as causing rather than stopping the spread of communism. Even Berthelot's strange reference to French colonial opportunities seemed to have little impact, but perhaps this was due to a general assumption that the Balkans would fall into the French sphere of influence anyhow.²¹

The complaint about Berthelot's behaviour forced Clemenceau to reinstate his earlier orders delineating the areas of responsibility of Franchet d'Esperey and Berthelot. The former was in charge of supervising all armistices in eastern Europe, and was also ordered to see to it that the territorial status quo was not disturbed in Transylvania or elsewhere in Hungary. This explicit order was necessary since, despite the Belgrade convention, frontier changes were being made in Slovakia on Czechoslovak government initiative.²²

Clemenceau confirmed that Berthelot was chief of the French Army of the Danube in Rumania, subordinate to Franchet d'Esperey, and in charge of troops in southern Russia, where he had three French, one Italian and three Greek divisions under him. The Rumanians were to contribute as many troops there as Berthelot deemed necessary. As before, Berthelot was directly responsible to Clemenceau and Foch for his activities in Russia, but his supplies in Russia were in the hands of Franchet d'Esperey, who therefore also had some influence over his activities there.²³

Clemenceau's critical attitude toward Rumanian expansion did not really jeopardize French influence in Rumania, for the other great powers regarded Rumania's aggrandizement by force of arms with far greater disapproval. On January 25, the Peace Conference adopted

President Wilson's resolution against the use of armed force "to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine."²⁴ Next, the Supreme Council referred Rumania's territorial claims to a "Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania." The eight-member panel of French, British, Italian and American experts was to examine Rumania's claims on its four neighbours—Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Hungary.

But the Rumanians disregarded both Wilson's call for peace and the new commission; they continued to advance into Hungarian territory. By February 14 they had pushed their front to the line of Máramarossziget (Sighet) through Zilah (Zălău), Csucsă (Cuca) and Nagysebes (Sebeş) to the Szamos (Someşul) river. According to Franchet d'Esperey, their ultimate aim was to occupy lands southeast of the Tisza accorded to them by the Secret Treaty of Bucharest. Thus he saw war between the Rumanians and Hungarians as being near. The Hungarians fielded 5,000 troops to repel any further advance in the area of Csucsă (Cuca). To prevent a bloody imbroglio, the general requested his superiors to draw a demarcation line that would separate the two belligerents by a zone occupied by French troops. This was necessary, he argued, as the Rumanians' past, uncontested advances had whetted their appetite and they were now regarded by the Hungarians as deliberately violating the Belgrade convention.²⁵

The Supreme Council's Rumanian commission, which began to work out a frontier between Hungary and Rumania on February 11,²⁶ received Franchet d'Esperey's urgent appeal the following day.²⁷ It realized that in order to avoid conflict a neutral zone would have to be set up. The experts of the commission proposed the establishment of a zone which would put the Hungarians behind a line running ten kilometers west of Vásárosnamény, the junction of the Kis Kőrös and Nagy Kőrös rivers, Algyő and north of Szeged. The Rumanians were to halt their troops ten kilometers east of Szatmárnémeti (Satu-Mare) Nagyvárad (Oradea) and Arad.

When the Supreme Military Council took up the recommendation, the military leaders in Versailles suggested certain changes. On February 19, 1919, General Alby, Chief of the French General Staff, spoke of the military aspects of the zone. He said that in the light of the need to re-establish order, it would be wise to renounce the military convention of Belgrade and to draw a new demarcation line between Rumania and Hungary. He argued that the lines proposed by the Rumanian commission left in the neutral zone such important rail centers as Nagyvárad (Oradea), Nagykároly (Carei) and Szatmárnémeti (Satu-Mare)—cities that controlled Transylvania's lifeline. If the Rumanians were to fight against Bolshevism in Transylvania, it was illogical to deny them these communication centers. He also claimed

that, since French troops were to occupy Arad, they could not occupy the other cities because Berthelot would have to send his troops to southern Russia. Rumanian occupation of the rail centers would therefore be necessary.²⁸

It has been argued that the French military view of the shape of the neutral zone was an organic part of the military plans of the Allied Supreme Commander, Marshal Foch, who was intent on destroying Bolshevism in Russia. Indeed, by February 17, the French General Staff had circulated a seven-page "Plan of Action in Russia." The first step in this project was to encircle Russia. In the north, this was to be done by organizing a Polish army strengthened by the return of Polish troops from France. In the south, an allied force made up of three French, three Greek, one English, one Italian and two Rumanian divisions would occupy the Ukraine and reconquer the Donets basin from the Bolsheviks. The second step included the organization of a Russian army from the prisoners of war in Germany and from Russian troops in France, Algeria and Macedonia. The last step was to be a general offensive that would enable the White Russian troops to destroy the Red Army before the winter of 1919-1920. The plan concluded with the observation that it was necessary to know how much support the Allied states were willing to give to the venture.²⁹ It seems that concessions to Rumania were motivated by Foch's wish to transfer the Danubian Army to the offensive against the Bolsheviks and to encourage the Rumanians to follow suite by catering to their designs on Transylvania.

The question of the neutral zone was put on the agenda of the Council of Ten on February 21, 1919. In the absence of the leaders of the Big Four, the Allied representatives accepted the arguments of the military specialists in Versailles and requested them to work out the final details of the military plan.³⁰

According to the Supreme Military Council in Versailles, the neutral zone was to be policed by troops of two-battalion strength with some cavalry regiments to maintain order. The limits of the Hungarian withdrawal were a line "leaving the Tisza five kilometers northwest of Vásárosnamény, passing five kilometers to the west of Debrecen to three kilometers west of Dévaványa and continuing west of Gyoma, five kilometers west of Hódmezővásárhely and Szeged, rejoining the old frontier south of Szeged." In this area the cities of Szeged and Arad were to be under French occupation.³¹

The Rumanians were to have an eastern demarcation line that followed the main road from Arad to Nagyszalonta (Salonta) and the Nagyvárad (Oradea)—Nagykároly (Carei)—Szatmárnémeti (Satu-Mare) railway line. The three rail centers were excluded from Rumanian occupation but "were available for the use of Rumanian troops and Rumanians living in the areas controlled by the Allies, for

economic purposes." The northern limits of the demarcation line followed the river Szamos (Someşul). The Peace Conference adopted the final version of the plan on February 26.³²

Since the establishment of the neutral zone was a military matter, the decision of the Peace Conference was transmitted by Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey on March 1, 1919, for execution.³³ On March 5, the Allied Commander in the Orient informed Berthelot of the decision. Berthelot was to pass it on to the Rumanians but it was to be kept from the Hungarians. Franchet d'Esperey also requested Berthelot to ask the Rumanians not to act prematurely and to wait for Franchet d'Esperey to give them the date to move forward. Berthelot was to supply Franchet d'Esperey with information on the disposition of the Rumanian troops that would move into Transylvania so that he (Franchet d'Esperey) could plan a date for the Hungarian withdrawals to begin. Franchet d'Esperey also saw the need to inform Paris of the date of execution of the Allied plan.

Franchet d'Esperey, who was weary of Berthelot's tendency to disregard his orders, told him that immediate responsibility for the French troops in Hungary was with General de Lobit in Belgrade, the commander of the French Army of Hungary. It was he who was empowered to handle the final details of executing the plan, which was to be supervised by an officer appointed by Franchet d'Esperey. With this in mind, Franchet d'Esperey warned Berthelot not to send to Hungary any missions that would duplicate the tasks of General de Lobit.³⁴

Franchet d'Esperey seemed to have been disappointed by the generous temporary demarcation line accorded the Rumanians. It appears that he had expected the approval of his proposed neutral zone, pushing the Rumanians back to their old line between Nagybánya (Baia-Mare) and Kolozsvár (Cluj). After all, he did not believe in the Rumanian bogey of Bolshevism in Transylvania and had been opposed to French intervention in Russia from the start.³⁵

Having seen Rumania's unauthorized advances legitimized in Paris, Franchet d'Esperey began to assume that the memorandum of February 26 would lead to the permanent award of Transylvania to the Rumanian ally. He also believed that such a development would lead to war between Rumania and Hungary, therefore Rumania had to continue to mobilize to war. He felt that the Rumanians should organize eight divisions to face the six divisions that were allowed to Hungary under the armistice arrangements. Franchet d'Esperey warned Berthelot to make sure that the Rumanians did not withdraw troops from Bessarabia and Dobruja, leaving those areas vulnerable to attack.³⁶

General Franchet d'Esperey's concern about Rumania's preparedness in Bessarabia was occasioned by a sudden turn in the fortunes of

the antibolshevik coalition in southern Russia. On March 1, Franchet D'Esperey had informed Clemenceau and Foch that contingents of the Ninth Red Army under Colonel A.I. Yegorov were advancing on a front stretching from Troiskaya to Pekatchevo. According to intelligence reports, they were to be reinforced by the 20,000 men of the First Army supported by artillery.³⁷ Thus at a time when Marshal Foch was looking to Rumanian intervention in southern Russia, the Red Army was threatening to carry the war into Rumania and recapture Bessarabia.

The change of circumstances in Russia also brought a change in Clemenceau's attitude. When on March 1 General Berthelot formally requested his recall from Rumania, Clemenceau's reply lacked the acerbity of his communications in January. He told Berthelot that the situation in the east had become more delicate and for this reason he could not terminate Berthelot's mission. Rather, he suggested that Berthelot should come to Paris at a convenient time for an interview.³⁸

Clemenceau's temperate response to Berthelot must have upset Franchet d'Esperey, for he went out of his way to discredit Berthelot by blaming the crisis in Russia on him. He reported that, at a time when no reinforcements were arriving from France and the power of the Allied forces was being reduced by attrition, Berthelot encouraged Rumania's expansion in Transylvania. As a result, there was a shortage of troops in Bessarabia at this critical juncture.³⁹

By the time Franchet d'Esperey had filed his new attack on Berthelot, the situation in southern Russia had deteriorated further. In February the Allied troops had occupied Tiraspol, Kherson and Nikolaev. On March 10 the pro-Bolshevik forces of Ataman Grigoriev retook Kherson, and by March 14 Nikolaev had fallen. Soon the Reds were advancing on Odessa.⁴⁰

General Franchet d'Esperey proposed to his superiors in Paris a new line of Bessarabian defense along the Dniester river. He saw the need to put the Rumanian army and the Allied forces under a unified command and proposed General Berthelot for the job so that Berthelot himself might try to undo the errors he had committed. If Berthelot still failed, Franchet d'Esperey nominated General Degoutte to head a single general staff that would include the Rumanian army under its command.⁴¹

On March 12, Franchet d'Esperey sped another telegram to Clemenceau about the Russian situation. He said he was aware that Berthelot was directly responsible to Clemenceau for Russia but, according to his orders of January 28, he was in charge of operations in the east and they were being threatened by the developments in Russia. The Allied commander stated that it was no longer a question of marauding bands of Bolsheviks but of well-organized and well-

disciplined troops under strong command who were imposing order on the chaotic situation in southern Russia. He added that local xenophobia was eroding the morale of the Allied troops. The indigenous population was hostile to them and had shot many in the back in Kherson as the Red Army was approaching. He warned that repetition of such incidents in Odessa, a city of 900,000, could have dangerous consequences.⁴²

Clemenceau's reply came the following day. He ordered Berthelot to deploy Rumanian troops in defense of the Tiraspol-Razdelnaya-Odessa railway line, which was considered a vital link in Odessa's defense, and promised to send several battalions of French infantry to reinforce the city.⁴³ On March 14, new directives cancelled Berthelot's visit to Paris. Apparently Clemenceau also became convinced that Berthelot's powers should be limited. Thus using the excuse of Berthelot's complaint that direct communications between Bucharest and Paris were poor, Clemenceau relieved him of his Russian command. Provisionally, Clemenceau appointed Franchet d'Esperey to command the Allied forces in southern Russia.⁴⁴ The contest between Berthelot and Franchet d'Esperey thus ended in victory for the latter. For the first time, all the Allied forces in eastern Europe were truly under the command of one man.

The new emergency in Russia gave the Rumanians a fresh opportunity to pressure the French for concessions over Hungary. The same day Berthelot lost his Russian command a member of the Rumanian delegation to the Peace Conference, Victor Antonescu, sent a memorandum to Clemenceau stressing the obvious—the possibility of an attack on the Rumanians by the Bolsheviks. He asserted that, according to Rumanian intelligence reports, the Hungarians had reached an accord with the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine and were about to launch their own offensive against Rumania. This claim was completely baseless, but it provided the grounds to argue that Rumania was now encircled and had become the last bastion against Bolshevism. Antonescu therefore requested stronger Allied support for Rumania.

Having identified the Hungarians as allies of the Reds, Antonescu's memorandum went on to complain of Franchet d'Esperey's slow handling of the Peace Conference's decision of February 26. He claimed that, while Franchet d'Esperey was looking for a suitable French officer to supervise the Peace Conference's order, the Hungarians were stripping Transylvania and spreading Bolshevik agitation. These charges were also baseless, but they bolstered his request for immediate action to stop the Hungarians. Antonescu said that, since the Reds in the Ukraine and Hungarians were allies, a commander was needed to take charge of the Ukraine, Transylvania and Hungary. He suggested Bucharest for headquarters.⁴⁵

There is little doubt that Antonescu's candidate for the job was General Berthelot whose headquarters were in Bucharest and whose Hungarophobia was well known. What Antonescu had not anticipated, however, was that Berthelot would be relieved of his duties in the Ukraine on the self-same day he delivered his memorandum to Clemenceau. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of antibolshevik hysteria in Paris, Antonescu's unfounded accusations had their effect. That very day Clemenceau sent new orders to Franchet d'Esperey about the Peace Conference's February 26 decision. Using almost exactly the same words as Antonescu's memorandum, Clemenceau's new orders referred to the Hungarian's scorched-earth policy in Transylvania and urged Franchet d'Esperey to put the Peace Conference's decision into effect without further delay. Clemenceau also proposed to organize a mixed commission of French, Hungarian and Rumanian members to see that his orders were executed.⁴⁶

The reason for Clemenceau's sudden support for Rumania's appeal for the swift implementation of the February 26 decision is clear. In the light of Franchet d'Esperey's reports, it is unlikely that Clemenceau was taken in by the invention of a Hungarian-Bolshevik alliance. Rather, the French leader wanted to make sure that the Rumanians were rewarded for their intended support of the troubled Allies in southern Russia. The price for Rumania's loyalty was the speedy occupation of areas accorded to them by the Peace Conference.

Franchet d'Esperey's first act as the new commander of the Allied forces in Russia was to ask Clemenceau to recall General Berthelot from Rumania. He claimed that Berthelot was fatigued and discouraged and should be replaced by General Degoutte. He again requested that the Rumanian army be put under his own command. He argued that only the Commander in Chief of the Allied Army of the Orient was able to oversee the whole eastern theater and could deploy the Rumanian troops in such way that the Transylvanian operation would not hurt the situation in Russia.⁴⁷

While Franchet d'Esperey was awaiting a reply from Clemenceau that would remove his nemesis from Bucharest, he went about fulfilling the order regarding Hungary. On March 19 Franchet d'Esperey ordered General de Lobit in Belgrade to transmit the February 26 decision to the Hungarians. At the same time, he appointed General de Gondrecourt to deliver the Allied *démarche* to President Mihály Károlyi.

The boundaries of the neutral zone troubled Franchet d'Esperey as they troubled de Lobit, who as early as March 7 had proposed extending the zone to the Hungarian frontier in the Carpathians. Their reason was to prevent a Rumanian-Hungarian clash in Ruthenia, above the neutral zone designated by the Peace Conference. Franchet

d'Esperey therefore ordered de Lobit to expand the neutral zone all the way to Galicia,⁴⁸ including the city of Munkács (Mukachevo), an area claimed by Edvard Beneš for the Czechoslovaks.

Franchet d'Esperey's order enlarging the neutral zone should have been cleared by the Peace Conference first, but there was no time for that. Clemenceau's order brooked no delay. So Franchet d'Esperey asked Clemenceau to have the change in the neutral zone approved by the Peace Conference *ex post facto*, and make it appear to the Hungarians that it was part of the original Allied demand.⁴⁹ In his eagerness to execute Clemenceau's wishes and to ensure that Rumanian troops would be available to fight the Russians and not the Hungarians, he wanted Clemenceau to present the Allies with a *fait accompli*. This way it would be the task of the Allies, rather than French troops, to coerce Hungary into accepting the ultimatum.⁵⁰

Once the order had been issued for General de Lobit to begin putting the provisions of the memorandum into effect, General Franchet d'Esperey embarked on an inspection tour of Odessa on March 19.⁵¹ But the order hit a snag, for General de Gondrecourt was not in Budapest to hand the memorandum to the Hungarians. For General de Lobit, time was pressing, especially since new complications had been reported by Colonel Vix: the head of the French military mission in Budapest had sent news of the visit to the Hungarian capital by the American military attache to Bucharest, Colonel Yates, and had warned de Lobit that this visit could have serious complications for the French.

The American officer had met Károlyi on March 15 and the Hungarian President had complained to him about the unilateral French orders changing the Belgrade demarcation lines in Slovakia in favour of the Czechoslovaks. He also described the Rumanian advances in Transylvania. Yates had told Károlyi that the Peace Conference had granted Slovakia to the Czechoslovaks and that it might also take a decision in favour of the Rumanians. The Hungarians, who had heard only rumors of the February 26 decision, thus had in effect been forewarned by an Allied representative what they could expect next.

In conversation with Colonel Vix, Yates said that the embittered Hungarians would rather fight the Rumanians than accept the terms of the February 26 decision. He believed that in a conflict the Hungarians would defeat the Rumanians. He told Vix that for this reason he intended to ask Paris to suspend the Peace Conference's resolution until the Rumanians were strong enough to enforce it. Vix was rather upset at what he considered to be the American's meddling in affairs that were a French responsibility.

When General de Lobit received his orders on March 19 to transmit the memorandum to the Hungarians, he told Franchet

d'Esperey that Yates' talks with the Hungarians could inspire them to military resistance.⁵²

It is likely that it was de Lobit's fear of losing precious time that made him order Vix to deliver the memorandum rather than await de Gondrecourt's return to Budapest. Subsequently, Franchet d'Esperey approved de Lobit's change in the procedure as he (Franchet d'Esperey) reported to Clemenceau that the American might have given the Hungarians advance notice.⁵³ It was undesirable to postpone the delivery of the February 26 decision when Clemenceau had ordered Franchet d'Esperey to transmit it as soon as possible. Swift execution of the memorandum was to protect French interests in Russia; the American's proposal could have had the opposite effect.

When de Lobit ordered Vix to hand the memorandum to the Hungarians, another order of General Franchet d'Esperey was overlooked. Franchet d'Esperey had told de Lobit to extend the neutral zone into Ruthenia, but de Lobit told Vix to deliver a memorandum that defined the neutral zone as it had originally been decided upon in Paris.⁵⁴ Vix was told to present the memorandum on March 20, giving the Hungarians forty-eight hours to reply.⁵⁵ He was also informed that if the Hungarians refused to accept the decision of the Peace Conference, no immediate measures would be taken against them.⁵⁶

Upon receipt of his orders, Vix contacted the representatives of the other Allied great powers and called them together for the morning of the twentieth. To keep the operation secret, he did not inform them of the purpose of the meeting. When they arrived at the French mission they were told that they were going to the Hungarian president's office to present the memorandum. When Károlyi read the document, he asked if he could call in his minister of defense, Vilmos Böhm, as the order seemed to be of a military nature. Vix suggested that the Prime Minister, Dénes Berinkey, should also be called in.⁵⁷

Vix's suggestion to call in Berinkey apparently reinforced the Hungarian's suspicion that the memorandum was imposing new political boundaries on Hungary in the guise of military expedience.⁵⁸ Hungarian fears about the political character of the new demarcation lines were reinforced by the omission of Franchet d'Esperey's proposal to extend the neutral zone to the Galician border. Károlyi therefore accused the peace conference in Paris of allowing the Rumanians and the Czechoslovaks to expand across Ruthenia to establish a common frontier. Berinkey added that the lack of a buffer zone in northern Hungary between the Rumanians and Hungarians gave the Rumanians the green light to do just that.⁵⁹

Apparently Vix was unaware that it was precisely Berinkey's argument that Franchet d'Esperey had used in his request to Clemenceau to extend the neutral zone to the Carpathians. Had

Franchet d'Esperey had more time to work out detailed military plans for the neutral zone, the likelihood of the Czechs and the Rumanians permanently linking forces in northeastern Hungary would have been reduced, the fears of the Hungarians allayed and the collapse of Károlyi's regime prevented. It is ironic that Clemenceau's desire to prevent a Bolshevik victory in the Ukraine led to the triumph of Bolshevism in Hungary.

Whether Colonel Vix had deliberately encouraged the Hungarians to believe that the new demarcation lines were political, thereby creating a crisis that led to the rise to power of the Bolsheviks in Hungary is an open question in Hungarian history. Károlyi and Bohm claimed that he did. Nicholas Roosevelt, the American present at the encounter, saw it differently. Captain Roosevelt, whose task in Hungary was to gather information for the American plenipotentiaries in Paris, claimed that Vix gave no such indication.⁶⁰ Soon after the collapse of the Károlyi government, Vix denied the Hungarians' assertion in a letter published in a Budapest paper. In response, Károlyi refuted Vix.⁶¹ In a recent article Dr. Hajdu claims that Vix implied that the Hungarians were right in assuming that the new military frontiers were in fact political in nature.⁶²

Vix's report of the encounter with Károlyi and the Hungarians, which he submitted right after the meeting, belies the Hungarian claim. He considered the Hungarians' view of the political nature of the new demarcation line a Hungarian attempt to debate the issue and to stall implementation of the memorandum.⁶³ He suspected the Hungarians of trying to force a delay while Vix sought new instructions. But Vix was against any delay. Rather than giving the Hungarians more time, he demanded their response within thirty, instead of forty-eight hours.⁶⁴ The memorandum came to be known as the *Vix Ultimatum*.

From Captain Roosevelt's report it is evident that Vix assumed that the Hungarian government would yield to French pressure as it had in the case of the Slovak borders. According to Vix's instructions from his superiors, rejection of the ultimatum would not have occasioned immediate reprisal. Yet Vix went on to threaten the Hungarians that in case of rejection he would be packing his bags.⁶⁵ This warning from the supervisor of the armistice was taken as tantamount to a resumption of warfare. Unbeknown to the Hungarians, Franchet d'Esperey's orders had made Vix's threat a bluff.

The Hungarian statement that no responsible government could accept an ultimatum that truncated the country simply seemed to Vix another ploy. In the months before the delivery of the ultimatum, when the Czechoslovak frontiers seemed to be the burning issue, Prime Minister Károlyi resigned only to be made President. The new prime minister, Berinkey, followed a policy no different from his pre-

decessor's. Following the cabinet crisis of mid-January, Berinkey often threatened to resign in protest against compromises of Hungarian interests. When on March 21 the Hungarian government rejected the ultimatum and resigned,⁶⁶ Vix merely assumed that the new crisis would be solved by the formation of a new cabinet. The former minister of war, Vilmos Böhm, encouraged Vix's assumption.⁶⁷

Böhm, however, failed to inform Vix that the Hungarian leaders had a different solution for this crisis. Now they were working for a social-communist fusion government that was to seek an alliance with Trotsky's powerful Red Army. This coalition was expected to defend Hungary's integrity by force if necessary.⁶⁸ In the evening of March 21 a new "Revolutionary Governing Council" was created with Sándor Garbai as its chairman. Real power, however, was in the hands of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Béla Kun, who as a communist leader was expected to attract Bolshevik support for the newly proclaimed Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Hungary therefore sought to retain Transylvania with the help of that army which Clemenceau wanted to defeat with Rumanian support. The *Vix Ultimatum* was to deliver Transylvania to the Rumanians as the prize for their promised support of the threatened French forces in southern Russia. In this imbroglio neither Hungarian nor French hopes were fulfilled. The Red Army was strong enough to defend Bolshevism in Russia but not strong enough to aid and save the Communist revolution in Hungary. The sole victor was Rumania, which was allowed to keep Transylvania under the Trianon Treaty.

NOTES

1. Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (New York, 1922), II; 29-30; W.K. Hancock and Jean van de Poel, *Selections from the Smuts Papers* (Cambridge, 1966), IV; 86.
2. Arno Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (New York, 1967), p. 545; Tibor Hajdu, *Az 1918-as magyarországi párti demokratikus forradalom* [The 1918 Hungarian Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution] (Budapest, 1968), p. 353; Sherman D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C. Bratianu* (New York, 1962), p. 105; Alfred D. Low, *The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference* (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 46, n. 177; Marcel Berger et Paul Allard, *Les dessous de Traité de Versailles* (Paris, 1933), pp. 117-118.
3. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*, p. 545.
4. Sándor Vadasz, "Vix és Károlyi" [Vix and Károlyi], *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* [Military History Reports], XVI, No. 2 (1969), 259.
5. Tibor Hajdu, "Adatok a Tanácsköztársaság kikiáltásának történetéhez" [Contributions to the History of the Proclamation of the Soviet Republic], *Párttörténeti Közlemények* [Party History Reports], XVIII, No. 3 (1972), 140-141.
6. Peter Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary, 1918-1919: A Re-examination," *Slavic Review*, XXIX, No. 3 (1970), 496.

7. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance des Affaires Politiques, Roumanie, fasc. 11, "Ordre de Mission pour M. Gn'l de Division Berthelot," October 7, 1918 (hereafter cited as CAP).
8. Ministère de la Guerre, Etat-Major de l'Armée, Archives historiques, Campagne Contre Allemagne (1914-1918), Clemenceau to Berthelot, Dec. 31, 1918, 20 N 731 (hereafter cited as CCA).
9. *Ibid.*; "Instructions pour les Generaux Franchet d'Esperey et Berthelot," Jan. 21, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc 19; John M. Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 58-59; John Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia* (New York, 1968), p. 137.
10. Bradley, *Intervention in Russia*, p. 142.
11. Comte de Saint-Aulaire, *Confessions d'un vieux diplomate* (Paris, 1953), p. 484; Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré* (Paris, 1957), p. 73; Raymond Poincaré, *Au service de la France*, Vol. X, *Victoire et Armistice 1918* (Paris, 1933), p. 457.
12. *Le Temps*, Dec. 31, 1918.
13. Pichon to Saint-Aulaire, Dec. 30, 1918, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 32.
14. Bogdan Krizman, "The Belgrade Armistic of November 1918," *Slavonic and East European Review*, LXVIII, No. 110 (1970), 86.
15. Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary," p. 490.
16. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, Jan. 13, 1919, CAP, Hongrie, fasc. 44.
17. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, Jan. 15, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
18. General Berthelot to Clemenceau, Jan. 9, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 32.
19. Clemenceau to Berthelot, Jan. 15, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 32.
20. Clemenceau to Berthelot, Jan 24, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 32; also in Roumanie, fasc. 42.
21. "Raport fait au ministre. Analyse," March 23, 1919, CAP, Serbie, fasc. 25.
22. Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary," pp. 486-489.
23. Instructions pour les Generaux Franchet d'Esperey et Berthelot," Jan. 21, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 19.
24. As quoted in Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 80.
25. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, February 13, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
26. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 103.
27. Rumanian Commission to Allied Supreme Council, Feb. 15, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
28. "Note lue par le General Alby devant le Commission des Affaires Roumanies," Feb. 19, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
29. "Plan d'action en Russie," Feb. 17, 1919, *The Sonnino Papers*, on microfilm at Harvard University Library, Reel 50.
30. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 106.
31. "Rapport sur la creation d'une zone neutre entre Hongrois et Roumains on Transylvanie," Feb. 26, 1919, CCA, 20 N 729, Carton 42; United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, 13 vols. (Washington, 1942-1947), IV, 157-158 (hereinafter cited as *FRUS-PPC*).
32. *Ibid.*
33. Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey, March 1, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
34. Franchet d'Esperey to Berthelot, March 5, 1919, CCA, 20 N 732.
35. Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia*, p. 137; Paul Azan, *Franchet d'Esperey* (Paris, 1949), p. 240; Jean Charbonneau, ed., *Franchet d'Esperey maréchal de France* (Paris, 1956), p. 150.
36. Franchet d'Esperey to Berthelot, March 6, 1919, CCA, 20 N 732.
37. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, March 1, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 33.

38. Clemenceau to Berthelot, March 7, 1919, CCA, 20 N 732.
39. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, March 11, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 227.
40. William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1965), II, p. 166.
41. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, March 12, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 227.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey and Berthelot, March 13, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 227.
44. Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey and Berthelot, March 14, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 227.
45. "Note remanee par M. Antonescu a M. Clemenceau," March 14, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47; for a discussion on Rumania's exploitation of the "Red scare," see Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 107.
46. Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey, March 14, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47; Gondrecourt to Ambassador G. Barrere, March 26, 1919, CAP, Hongrie fasc. 27.
47. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau, March 16, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 228.
48. Franchet d'Esperey to Berthelot, March 19, 1919, CCA, 20 N 731; Franchet d'Esperey to de Lobit, March 20, 1919, CCA, 27 N 89.
49. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, March 20, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau and Foch, March 19, 1919, CAP, Russie, fasc. 228; Azan, *Franchet d'Esperey*, p. 247.
52. Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary," pp. 495-496.
53. Franchet d'Esperey to Clemenceau, March 23, 1919, CAP, Roumanie, fasc. 47.
54. De Lobit to Károlyi, March 19, 1919, CCA, 20 N 732; lacking the documents now available, the author previously assumed that Vix had an open choice when to hand the memorandum to the Hungarians. Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary," n. 45 and p. 496.
55. De Lobit de Gondrecourt, March 19, 1919, CCA, 26 N 89.
56. "Rectification a l'instruction 129 relative a l'organisation zone neutre en Hongrie," March 19, 1919, CCA, 20 N 732; for the original order no. 129 sent to Vix on March 15, see CCA, 26 N 89.
57. *FRUS-PPC*, XII, 414-416.
58. Vilmos Böhm, *Két forradalom tűzében* [In the Fire of Two Revolutions] (Budapest, 1946), pp. 189-191; Michael Károlyi, *Memoirs: Faith Without Illusion* (New York, 1957), p. 152.
59. *FRUS-PPC*, XII, 415-416.
60. *FRUS-PPC*, XII, 415; Nicholas Roosevelt, *A Front Row Seat* (Norman, 1953), p. 109.
61. "Károlyi Vix leveléről" [Károlyi about the Letter of Vix], *Vörös Újság* [Red News], No. 40, March 27, 1919; also in Mihály Károlyi, *Az Új Magyarországról* [For the New Hungary] (Budapest, 1968), pp. 304-305.
62. Hajdu, "Adatok," p. 142; a similar claim was made by Vadász, "Vix és Károlyi," pp. 260-261.
63. Vix to de Lobit, March 20, 1919, CCA, 26 N 89.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *FRUS-PPC*, XII, p. 416.
66. For the text of Károlyi's note see, Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York, 1942), pp. 409-410; Reference to Károlyi note is made in CAP, Hongrie, fasc. 27. It was filed in Serie A Carton 1055, Dossier 8, which according to the archive's catalogue, was destroyed during World War II.
67. Vix to de Lobit, March 21, 1919, CCA, 26 N 89.
68. Károlyi, *Memoirs*, pp. 154-155; Böhm, *Két forradalom tűzében*, pp. 195-205.

Nikolaus Lenau and Germanic Literary Interest in Hungary during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*

Ágnes Huszár Várdy

The importance and utilization of exotic themes in the works of German and Austrian poets and writers became quite fashionable and widespread during the first half of the nineteenth century. This phenomenon was part of a broad intellectual and cultural movement in the Western (especially German-speaking) world, which was manifested in a growing interest in the culture and folklore of the East Central European nations and other foreign countries. This movement had its roots in the eighteenth century in the "noble savage" concept of Rousseau and more specifically in the philosophy of the many-sided Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder's philosophy was a mixture of romantic and nationalist ideas, at the heart of which stood the glorified people, the *Volk*, which in his view were the sole possessors and carriers of the national genius. Herder believed that the national genius manifested itself in indigenous native cultures, especially as expressed through the medium of the mother tongue. He was therefore attracted by the folk songs, ballads and artistic expressions of all nations, especially those which had remained unspoiled by the new cosmopolitan culture and enlightened values of the West—the so-called *Naturvölker*.¹

The majority of the East Central European nations, including the Hungarians, could accordingly be said to fall into this category. The vicissitudes of their history had prevented them from reaching the level of material plenty and political peace necessary for the development and wider diffusion of cosmopolitan sophistication save among their upper classes. At the same time, however, their unspoiled indigenous cultural and ethical values stimulated a nostalgic longing among the peoples of the West, who lived amidst greater material and intellectual abundance. This interest was further enhanced by the Romantic Movement of the early nineteenth century which, besides drawing inspiration from the past, was also intrigued by the uncommon, the exotic and the unusual. One of the results of this search for the exotic was the renewed orientation toward America, where many a culturally and politically disillusioned European hoped to find Utopia; another was the famed "ex oriente lux" movement, resulting in the importation of Oriental themes. These movements directed the attention of Austrian and German poets to the East

* This study is part of a larger monograph on Lenau which is to appear in the near future.

Central European nations, as the nearest eastern countries with exotic and romantic peculiarities and connections.

Specific interest in Hungary was first stimulated by the Austrian Josef von Hormayr (1781-1848) who was intent on furthering a common "Austrian" patriotism within the component nationalities of the Habsburg Empire.² Hormayr was convinced that the history and cultural traditions of these nations, in addition to belonging to the individual nationalities, were also part of the common heritage of the Monarchy as a whole. He thus proposed that these traditions be treated as part of the whole spectrum, incorporated into a new form of *Kaisertreue*, (loyalty to the Emperor) and regarded as a kind of "Habsburg nationalism". Furthermore, in harmony with the ideas of the age, he proposed a shift in emphasis from the Emperor and dynasty to the peoples of the Monarchy. He hoped to accomplish this by encouraging the literary treatment of each nationality's cultural past within the context of the common Habsburg tradition.

While in retrospect Hormayr's ideas seem utopian and unattainable under the aegis of nationalism, he soon found an eager supporter in the person of the Hungarian Baron Alajos Mednyánszky (1784-1844)³. Similarly devoted to the unity and common traditions of the Habsburg realm, Mednyánszky pointed out (in Hormayr's literary journal *Archiv Für Geschichte, Statistik, Literatur und Kunst*, (Archives for History, Statistics, Literature and Art) Vol. XVIII) that the cultural traditions of the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire are so diversified and rich that they are inferior neither to antiquity nor to the German Middle Ages. This was evident to him from the abundance of available material for dramas, ballads and novels which, stemming from the individual traditions of the varied peoples of the Monarchy, could be molded into a unique literature. Being a Hungarian, Baron Mednyánszky naturally based his argumentation mainly on Hungarian historical traditions, wherein he pointed to a wealth of material that easily could be utilized for literary adaptation.

Hormayr's and Mednyánszky's initiatives soon produced a growing trend within the German-speaking literary world of Austria, which led to the adoption of various non-Germanic materials. Among these, Czech, and Hungarian themes predominated and gave rise to such historical dramas as Theodor Körner's *Zrinyi* (1812) and Franz Grillparzer's *König Ottokars Glück und Ende* (King Ottokar's Fortune and Demise, 1825), *Ein Treuer Diener Seines Herrn* (A Faithful Servant of His Master, 1826) (about the Hungarian Bánk Bán), and *Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg* (A Fraternal Struggle within the House of Habsburg, 1848). Some of the lesser manifestations of this movement were Caroline Pichler's drama *Ferdinand der Zweite König von Ungarn und Böhmen* (Ferdinand the Second King of Hungary and Bohemia, 1816), her novel *Die Wiedereroberung von Ofen*. (The

Reconquest of Buda, 1829) and Carl Herlossohn's *Der Ungar*. (The Hungarian, 1836).⁴

A great number of the German-speaking poets and writers who turned to Hungarian themes like Karl Beck, Johann Nepomuk Vogl and Ludwig Foglar were born in the Carpathian Basin,⁵ while others had various connections with Hungary, such as Adalbert Stifter and Josef Zedlitz. But there were some who had no such connections and were drawn to the country only because they were attracted by its exotic qualities. For the most of these Austrian writers, among them Heinrich Lewitschnigg, Moriz Hartmann and Ludwig August Frankl, it was the Hungarian landscape and its peculiarities which served as the "extraordinary" and acted as the necessary magnet.⁶ These writers and poets regarded the wandering gypsies, the forbidding *betyárs* (peasant highwaymen) and the dashing hussars of Hungary as part of the exotic East, and the literary treatment of these figures afforded ready-made possibilities for them. It is to be remembered, however, that while the literary creations of those writers relied upon Hungarian scenes and themes, the results of their efforts were not Hungarian in spirit. This was almost universally true, even though some of these well-meaning writers—like Vogl, who dedicated a whole volume entitled *Klänge und Bilder aus Ungarn* (Sounds and Images from Hungary) to the favorable treatment of Hungarian themes—travelled extensively in Hungary to gain first-hand knowledge about the land and its people.⁷ Yet, notwithstanding these commendable aims and strenuous efforts, their works were essentially unsuccessful. Vogl's literary accomplishments, for example, hardly ever surpassed the bounds of mediocrity. Neither his love of the Magyars and his affectionate treatment of Hungarian genre pictures, nor his somewhat strange custom of mixing Hungarian words with his German-language poetry, could compensate for his lack of poetic strength and for his inability to grasp and to give expression to the genuine Magyar spirit. His efforts were not sufficient to dispel the air of artificiality in his poems dealing with Hungarian themes.

At this time German-speaking writers outside of Austria also began to show interest in Hungary. Many came to the country and wrote about their impressions and experiences.⁸ Thus, similar to the epoch of the Turkish occupation of Hungary (16th and 17th century) when the country was known as the land of fierce battles and exotic adventures, the land of the Magyars once more became fashionable in the German-speaking world and its literature.

The most talented Austrian poet who at this time turned to Hungarian subject matter was Nikolaus Lenau (1802-1850). Born in Hungary of German parentage, he spent his childhood and youth on Hungarian soil, completing his secondary education at the Piarist Gymnasium in Pest. The two years spent in the wine-growing region

of Tokay, and the frequent trips to Mosonmagyaróvár (Deutschaltenburg) subsequent to his settlement in Austria, afforded him the opportunity to get a close and intimate look at what can be termed as the "exotic" in Hungary. Hungarian peasant life, the lives of the *betyárs* (peasant highwaymen) and the wandering gypsies greatly impressed him and he was fascinated by Hungarian folk songs and gypsy music. Since with his background he fitted perfectly into the Austrian intellectual climate of the late 1820's, it was quite natural for him to try his hand at gaining popularity through poems with Hungarian themes. His treatment of Hungarian subject matter, however, differed from the customary adaptations of this kind. Critics generally agree that his poems dealing with Hungarian themes are free of the affected and forced elements prevalent in the works of fellow German and Austrian poets. But after all, Lenau had a great advantage over them, for the impressionable years of his youth were spent in Hungary, leaving their mark on his emotional and intellectual world. Furthermore, not even the passage of time could obliterate these youthful impressions from his mind. He personally witnessed and experienced many of those aspects of Hungarian life which remained a closed book to most of his fellow German-speaking writers, who knew about these either from the romantic and largely misleading travelogues of their adventurous predecessors or from their own brief and superficial glimpses of the country. Thus, since these poets wrote about something known to them only through the accounts of others, they tried in vain to capture the spirit of a strange and alien world. Lenau, on the other hand, simply relived his past and drew freely upon the spiritual heritage which had become an inextricable part of his own intellectual and emotional world.

Consequently, as a result of his background and past experience with certain aspects of Hungarian life that caught his fancy, Lenau's poems are generally correct in detail, and the sum of his poems dealing with Hungarian subject matter presents a less distorted picture of the country and of Magyar national life than the poetry of his predecessors and contemporaries. Yet, even Lenau was unsuccessful in portraying a balanced and representative image of contemporary Hungary. Like his fellow Austrian and German poets, he too utilized the same Hungarian images and figures and it is true that the gypsies, the talented carriers of both Magyar folk melodies and the so-called "gypsy music", the *betyárs*, the peasant Robin Hoods of the forests and *pusztas* and the *csikóses*, the tough herdsmen of the plains, are all Hungarian types. But they represent only a minute part of Hungary and the Hungarian world of Lenau's time. Like his fellow German-language poets and writers, Lenau seldom, if ever, treated the other, larger part of contemporary Hungary. To him the peasants, burghers, the commercial classes and the various types of lesser and higher

nobility (95% of Hungarian society) might as well not have existed. Naturally, Lenau and his fellow Austrian and German poets had the right to select those elements of Hungarian life and society which appealed to them. But in doing this, they presented an image which was not representative of Hungary as a whole, and thus did an unintentional disservice to the country. In their search for the exotic, they portrayed a relatively unimportant part of Hungarian life and overlooked the much more important elements of basic human values, beliefs and moral and political ideals which soon shook the very foundations of not only Hungary but the Habsburg Empire as well.

The stereotype view of Hungary which was propagated by Lenau and the contemporary German-language poets was further strengthened by the great influx of Western tourists and travelers in search of the unusual. It is clear, that despite certain differences in their approach, the foreign writers, poets and travelers recognized and wanted to recognize only those aspects of Magyar culture which were foreign to them and therefore could be classified as "exotic". They over-emphasized these traits, projected them over the whole country, and treated them as if these were the dominant characteristics of the entire Hungarian nation.⁹ As a result of these activities, the view presented by these writers and travelers about early and mid-nineteenth century Hungary became the conventional Western image of the country well into the twentieth century. To them Hungary appeared as the romantic land of the vast *puszta*s, wandering gypsies, gypsy virtuosos, ungainly *betyárs*, intriguing music and intoxicating Tokay wines. That this view remained prevalent even in the nearby German world had been recognized by many critics. "What do the German people know about Hungary?" asked Professor d'Ester of the University of Munich in the 1920's. And he answered: "If a newspaper confronted its readers with this intriguing question, the answers would fail pitifully. Hungary—'O yes, of course, Hungarian dances, Hungarian gypsy music'—the man who appreciates music would say; 'paprika, *puszta*—would be the reply of one who has a more realistic frame of mind."¹⁰

A similar view was expressed by the Hungarian János Koszó. "Every Hungarian who spends a considerable period of time in Germany," he said, "makes the rather unpleasant discovery that his homeland is still viewed in the romantic light of the early nineteenth century, which image has no relationship whatsoever to today's reality".¹¹ One might add that it never did reflect Hungarian reality in its entirety.

That the stereotyped image of Hungary, epitomized above, is the product of the past century is beyond doubt. And it may be true, as some critics claim, that Lenau's role in the development of this image, though unintentional, is immense. Several of them hold him expressly

responsible for these distortions and at least one, Zsigmond Szántó, even believes that it would have been much better had Lenau not written anything about Hungary.¹² Szántó contends that if a poet who was born and educated in Hungary retained such an erroneous and one-sided picture of the country of his birth, then one can at least question his genuine interest and knowledge of the country. This is all the more so—claims Szántó—as the years of Lenau’s poetic activity coincided with the great years of Hungary’s national revival, when the resurgent Hungarian culture produced some of the country’s greatest poets (Sándor Petőfi, Mihály Vörösmarty, Sándor and Károly Kisfaludy, Ferenc Kölcsey, János Arany, etc.), novelists (Miklós Jósika, Mór Jókai, József Eötvös, etc.), and political thinkers (István Széchenyi, Lajos Kossuth, Ferenc Deák, József Eötvös, etc.), most of whom apparently remained unknown or at least unimportant to Lenau. Through his treatment of Hungarian subject matter, he merely strengthened the already prevalent and grossly misleading view of Hungary as a land of primitive if appealing barbarism and a cultural and intellectual vacuum. Lenau, of course, was completely unaware of this, and he was rather proud of his part in again making Hungary familiar abroad. “What did people abroad know about Hungary before us?” he boastfully asked Karl Beck at their first meeting, clearly claiming credit for allegedly having placed Hungary once more on the map of Europe. But is this claim valid? Did Lenau, or Beck for that matter, add anything worthwhile to what was already known about the country from the well-meaning but naive writings of Vogl and others? Szántó does not seem to think so, and one must, in general, agree with him. Hungary had already been known in the German-speaking world prior to Lenau’s time as a productive but forsaken land of untamed Magyars who—so it appears—were either hussárs, *betyárs* or primitive swineherds. According to these beliefs, the sum total of the activity of these Magyars consisted of drinking, dancing, singing and drinking again; they were wholly untouched by the progress of time and civilization. In general, they had to be intoxicated to be enthusiastic about anything. But once they became enthusiastic, not even the spilling of human blood could be a matter of grave concern to them. All in all, from the point of view of a civilized Western man, the most worthwhile things in Hungary were the good Tokay wines and the melancholic and fiery gypsy music.¹³

While they are not in the least malicious or consciously critical, many of the important elements in Lenau’s poems dealing with Hungarian subject matter seem to agree with this assessment, and therefore they unintentionally strengthened this faulty and far-from-correct picture. This is the reason why one of his most recent critics, Ede Szabó, questioned the validity and even relevance of Lenau’s

poetry to Hungary. Szabó contends that they are

already somewhat covered by the dust of time. Their external romanticism, the *puszta*, the *betyár*, (peasant highwaymen) the *csárda*, (wayside inn) the gypsy and others fail to present a lasting genuine image of Hungary. Moreover, not even in their own time did they depict anything but a partial portrait.

Their value and authenticity is slight and too greatly bound to an age, and although some are marked by literary brilliance, for the present-day readers, they are mere curiosities.¹⁴

What these critics failed to consider was that Lenau was a poet, and as such, he was more interested in writing highly-personalized impressions of his youth than in giving a more prosaic but balanced account of contemporary Hungarian society and culture. One must also keep in mind that, notwithstanding his one-sided presentation, Lenau's basic sympathies for the land and culture of his birth are evident in his imagery and the sincerity and immediacy in his treatment of Hungary and the Magyars. It was not his intention (at least he never claimed so) to present an all-inclusive portrait of the whole spectrum of Hungarian society. Like any other lyric poet, Lenau only wished to preserve some fond memories of his childhood, and at the same time use the imagery of these memories to portray completely unrelated emotions which filled his sensitive soul. Later in his life some of these images became associated with his fervour for the Hungarian national movement—a movement which he apparently never knew very well. To Lenau, therefore, Hungarian genre pictures served the purpose of imagery and they were not intended to portray his native land in all its meaningful reality. Thus his poetic works should be evaluated in the context of their artistic imagery. This is precisely the point that the above critics failed to take into consideration.

NOTES

1. See Herder, "Über die neuere Deutsche Literatur," [Regarding the more recent German Literature] *Samtliche Werke* [Complete Works] (Hildesheim, 1967), I, 131-357. Cf. Friedrich Heer, *Europäische Geistesgeschichte* [European Intellectual History] (Stuttgart, 1953), pp. 565-570, and Ernest Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Boston, 1955), pp. 230-233.
2. Gusztáv Heinrich, *Magyar elemek a német irodalomban* [Hungarian Elements in German Literature] (Budapest, 1909), pp. 38-39.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
5. For a full treatment of Karl Beck's life, literary accomplishments and relationship to Hungary, see Ágnes Huszár Várdy, *Life and Works of Karl Beck: A Poet without a Country*. Dissertation. University of Budapest, 1970.
6. Béla Pukánszky, *A magyarországi német irodalom története* [History of German Literature in Hungary] (Budapest, 1926), pp. 488-489.

7. Heinrich, p. 40.
8. Some of the most important travel narratives are: Graf von Hofmannsegg, *Reise in einigen Gegenden von Ungarn, bis an die türkische Grenze*. [Travels in various Regions of Hungary, up to the Turkish Border] (Gorlitz, 1800), Ernst Arndt, *Reisen durch einen Teil Deutschlands, Ungarns, Italiens, Frankreichs, in den Jahren 1789-99*. [Travelling across Parts of German, Hungary, Italy, France, in the Years 1789-99] (Leipzig, 1804), August Ellrich, *Die Ungarn wie sie sind* [The Hungarians as they are] (Berlin, 1831), and Hans Norman, *Ungarn, das Reich, das Land und Volk wie es ist*. [Hungary, the Kingdom, the Land and the People as it is] (Leipzig, 1833).
9. The awakening of Hungarian nationalism and its effect on the outcome of events during the first half of the nineteenth century is discussed by Gyula Farkas, "Der ungarische Vormärz, Petőfi's Zeitalter," [The Hungarian Vormärz. The Age of Petőfi] *Ungarische Jahrbücher* [Hungarian Yearbooks] XXIII (1943), 5-186, and by Hugo Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Österreichs*. [The History of Austria] (Graz, 1953), II, 318-340.
10. As quoted by Mária Dukony, *Az Alföld a német irodalomban* [The Hungarian Plain in German Literature] (Budapest, 1937), p. 14.
11. János Koszó, "Das romantische Ungarn in der neueren deutschen Dichtung," [Romantic Hungary in the more recent German Literature] *Deutsch-Ungarisch Heimatsblätter* [German Hungarian Fatherland Review] I (1929), 21.
12. Zsigmond Szántó, *Lenau viszonya a magyarsághoz* [Lenau's relationship to the Hungarians] (Lugos, 1899), pp. 22-23.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Ede Szabó, "Lenau in Ungarn," [Lenau in Hungary] *Lenau Almanach*, 1965-1966, p. 90.

Recent Publications in Hungarian Art History

Reviews by Alfonz Lengyel

Christian Art in Hungary, Collections from the Esztergom Christian Museum. By Miklós Boskovits, Miklós Mojzer and András Mocsi. (Budapest: Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1965. \$14.50)

Miklós Mojzer presents a short but excellent analysis of the collection at the Christian Museum in Esztergom, András Mocsi wrote the notes for the Trecento and Miklós Boskovits those for the Quattrocento periods respectively. The importance of the book lies in the fact that it introduces the Hungarian medieval masters to the English speaking public: specifically, it evaluates the works of Master Bat I., Tamás Kolozsvári, Master of Janosrét, Master B.E. and Master M.S.

The painting *The Legend of Sta. Catherina* by Master of Bat I. is a most unusual pictorial representation in that Sta. Catherina, a princess of Alexandria, appears on either side of the canvas which is divided by the image of a romanesque column. However, Master of Bat I. followed the Italian Quattrocento practice of including a Trecento icon within the composition. This typical Quattrocento representation is well documented in the book.

Tamás Kolozsvári, the most celebrated painter in Hungary during the reign of Sigismund, followed the practice of the Italian early Quattrocento by placing the figure of King Sigismund, portrayed as a Roman captain, into the scene of the *Crucifixion*.

The development of an Italian Renaissance in Hungary was not accompanied by the immediate demise of the Gothic influence and a dualism of styles prevailed for a time. This phenomenon is clearly apparent in Kolozsvári's altarpiece. Despite the strong Renaissance influence apparent in the picture, the miniature kneeling figure of the donor is presented in typical Gothic style, complete with medieval inscription. Such an inscription also appears above the head of King Sigismund; it is written in Latin, utilizing Gothic style letters and reads: "*Vere filius die erat iste.*"

Other artists such as Master of Janosret and Master B.E. followed the Flemish school, while Master M.S. echoed the great German Renaissance masters and Schongauer and Durer belonged to the Danube school.

The *Crucifixion* by Master M.S. was painted in 1506 in a flamboyant Gothic style. The portrayal of a Turkish figure as the executioner is remarkable. This type of anti-Turk propaganda appeared

often in art works after the Turkish massacre at Otranto in 1480. (See: A. Lengyel: "Turken" in *Lexicon der Christlichen Ikonographie*, Vol. 4. pp. 391-392, Herder Verlag, Freiburg, 1972).

It is notable that the authors present a well balanced cross section of the foreign masters. Starting with the Ducento through Taddeo Gaddi and Lorenzo di Credi several Florentine and Sieneese Trecento and Quattrocento painters are also reviewed. Among others, Giam-pietrino, Scarsellino and Carlo Crivelli are chosen to represent the late phase of the Italian Renaissance. Northern Italian and Umbriañ painters and the painters from the Marche region and Romagna are also reviewed.

In addition to the Italian Masters, the book introduces German, Austrian and Flemish painters. Thus the works of the unknown masters of Salzburg, Lubeck, Witzendorf and Brussels as well as those of several known masters (Crispin van den Broeck, Hendrick van Balen, Jacob van Amsterdam Cornelis, Johan Zick, Christian Ernest Dietrich) are discussed and the studio of Lucas Cranach the Elder receives mention.

Due to limitations on the size of the publication, important Italian, German, Flemish and Dutch 19th Century masterpieces could not be included. In order to make the entire collection known a second and third volume would need to be published.

Unfortunately, the analogies do not make reference to findings of western art historians. In order to supply the western scholars with sufficient data the notes on the page opposite to the colour plates would need more detailed iconographical, technical and analogical analysis. For the half tone plates the same kind of analytical notation would also be desirable.

A művészet Mátyás Király udvarában [Art at the Court of King Mathias]. By Jolán Balogh. (Budapest: Akadémiai Könyvkiadó, 1966. 2 Vols.)

This basic reference book, published in two volumes, has been long overdue. Dr. Balogh, inspired by Professor Antal Hekler, started this work in 1925. Through decades she carried out her untiring, zealous research which finally resulted in this extremely important compilation. The first attempt at publication was defeated by World War II. Dr. Balogh resumed her work in 1952, when her project became part of the research program of the Hungarian Academy of Science. Thus, the findings of the excavations in Buda and Visegrad after World War II were incorporated into the work. Her ultimate goal was to write a monograph similar to Francesco Malaguzzi Valeri's *La*

Corte di Ludovico il Moro, but she also added a thematic catalogue of descriptive data.

The first volume is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the documentation of the artistic and architectural remains of Mathias' epoch. The second part contains all documented data on the artists and artisans who worked for Mathias. In the third part Dr. Balogh introduces Mathias as a man of science and letters. I would have preferred a different arrangement in which part three and part one were interchanged, followed by those parts dealing with the documentation related to the artistic and architectural remains and their creator artists and architects. In the third part Dr. Balogh documents the education, personal development and ambitions of Mathias. She gives a clear picture of the culture of Mathias, his attitude towards religion, and his political connections. At the end of the volume she provides documentation on the activities of the members of the court of this great humanist king of the Hungarian Renaissance.

The second volume is a collection of photographs of the most important archeological remains. The fragmentary documentation is grouped in the form of an archival catalogue, while the results of Dr. Balogh's specific research appears in the footnotes. In addition, she often makes comments and explanatory notes. For example, when she presents a catalogue type description of some architectural decorative remains, she footnotes the related Italian analogies.

With this analysis Dr. Balogh provides a great number of questions for the future generation of Quattrocento scholars, not only in respect of Hungary but of Italy as well.

The work should be translated into English.

A Budai Vár feltárása [The Excavation of the Royal Palace in Buda]. By László Gerevich. (Budapest: Akadémiai Könyvkiadó, 1966. Pp. 352. Illus.)

This is the first comprehensive book ever written regarding the excavation of an important Central European royal palace, which was almost totally destroyed by artillery fire and bombardment in Budapest toward the end of the Second World War. Two other important ancient Central European royal palaces, the Hradczin in Prague and the Palace of Pozsony (Bratislava) are not yet entirely excavated and their archeological analysis is long overdue.

During the late 19th century, when Hausmann was preparing the urban plan of Budapest, some remains of the old palace of King Zsigmond and King Mathias were discovered by accident. The excavated walls were recovered and the findings were removed to the National Museum. This important research work was not resumed until 1946 when preparations were made for a systematic excavation of the site. László Gerevich was placed in charge of the project. He

used a technique of such precision as is known only to prehistoric archeology. The scrambled nature of the remains, due to several violent assaults on and destructions of the palace through the centuries, made this technique necessary.

In recent years Gerevich published the most significant and important findings from particular layers. This gave rise to a dispute on the exact chronology and other pertinent data of the findings, mobilizing historians of Hungarian art, culture and architecture. With their aid Gerevich was able to come up with a definitive analysis covering all facets of the Royal Palace in Buda.

In the course of the excavations certain parts of the palace were reconstructed and a "museum in situ" was erected. Over eighteen thousand artifacts and study material, consisting of architectural decorations and carved work, as well as doors, windows, and small statues, were placed within the museum part of the Palace.

An important feature of Gerevich's book is the publication of the entire building plan. First he describes the results of work done in a particular excavated unit, then he correlates the results with the Medieval and Renaissance archives and new bibliographic material. His conclusions are compared with material covering the whole of the European Medieval and Renaissance periods.

Gerevich's book will serve as a very important source for any further study of Central and Northeastern European fortified castles. One of Gerevich's conclusions is that, though similarities of construction methods were shared by Toscana in Italy and Buda, the latter is closer to the "Vorburgstadt" idea which was likely imported to Hungary by twelve and thirteenth century German settlers.

Recent Hungarian research on Medieval church architecture proved that the Benedictine and Cistercian styles originated from Italy. This fact indicates a very strong architectural contact between Hungary and that country which was accelerated during the reigns of King Zsigmond and King Mathias. The reviewer is at present excavating a small Augustinian church; the Santa Lucia near Rosia (Siena), and has found one meter and a half above the floor, triple Gothic starting ribs at the corner of the apse, similar to those discovered among the ruins of the Chapel of the Palace in Buda. It would be useful to extend research into this direction before we can fully accept Gerevich's theory of the Germanic origin of the architecture of Buda.

Gerevich, with an excellent pedagogical instinct presents the photographs, diagrams and architectural drawings within the text itself, and brings together at the end of the book a series of selected illustrations related to the art and architecture of the Palace.

The new methods of archeological excavation applied and the technique employed in utilizing related research, serves as a useful model and example for similar excavations. I strongly recommend the translation of the book into English, perhaps by UNESCO.

Reviews

The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453. By Dimitri Obolensky. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Illus. \$15.00.)

A good number of excellent monographs have been published on the peoples who one way or another came into the sphere of influence of the Byzantine Empire in the Balkan or Danube area. Such are, for instance, Runciman's *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire*, Jireček's *Geschichte der Bulgaren* and *Geschichte der Serben*, Dvornik's *The Slavs in European History and Civilization* and *The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization*, Macartney's *The Magyars in the Ninth Century*, and others. As their titles indicate, these works are mostly concerned with the development of these peoples as racial and national units; their points of contact with Byzantium are viewed only as one of its chapters.

There are several works, on the other hand, whose main focus is the relationship of any one of these nations to the Empire. Among them we have Lipsic's *Byzanz und die Slaven: Beiträge zur byzantinischen Geschichte des 6.-9. Jahrhunderts*, Dvornik's *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle*, Darko's *Byzantinisch-ungarische Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII Jahrhunderts* and Heisenberg's *Ungarn und Byzanz*.

The uniqueness of the work under review is that in a compact volume it brings together the interaction of all the peoples who, as foes or allies, affected the life of Byzantium in Eastern Europe, and were affected by it, from the sixth century till the end. Professor Obolensky seems to have been aware of the need for a book like this from the time he wrote the lively chapter for Vol. IV of the new edition of the *Cambridge Medieval History*. This book is a welcome and vast amplification of that chapter.

The title itself of the work, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, would be misleading if one does not read the introduction of the author in which he justifies it as an ambiguous translation of the ambiguity contained in the Byzantine terms used to express the unique relationship to the Empire of the nations which invaded its eastern European territory. Actually, the book embraces more than that area; it goes further: to the Caucasus and the Russian southern steppe belt whose inhabitants held the access to the Balkans and whose friendship

the Byzantines assiduously cultivated. Later on, the Russians also entered the Byzantine sphere of influence, as Professor Obolensky competently discusses the point, and thus had a place in the Byzantine Commonwealth.

The author offers a detailed but readable account of the changing character of that relationship and of the enduring culture influence which the Empire exercised over those nations, from the reign of Justinian to 1453. The Avars, Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbians and Croats came first as marauders or allies, and some of them decided to make their home in the lands of Byzantium. As unwilling hosts, the Byzantines tried all the repertoire of their diplomacy to minimize their danger: military and marriage alliances, sowing of discord, appeals to friendship, empty but resounding titles, conversion to Christianity, duplicity, force bribes, trade, pomp and culture. The success of these devices was varied. They all converted to Christianity but that only insured their allegiance to the Byzantine Church, not to the Emperor. They were dazzled by the splendor and the mystique of the Empire, but that also whetted the ambitions of Krum and Symeon, John I and John II Asen and Stephen Dusan to place the imperial crown on their own heads and even though they failed, their attempt cost the Empire dearly. Nevertheless, on the whole, the long life of Byzantium proves that its diplomatic efforts were not in vain.

The author also discusses two other peoples whose medieval history is likewise linked to Byzantium even though they settled on the northern banks of the Danube. They are Hungarians and the Rumanian Vlachs and Moldavians. Professor Obolensky holds as "almost certain" that the Byzantines were acquainted with the Hungarians since the early sixth century when the latter were settled between the Don and Caucasus; the Byzantines had then an outpost in the Crimea. Moravcsik thinks that the Hungarians must have been one of those Turkish tribes among whom the Byzantine missionaries in that area achieved great success. Obolensky doubts that that was the case because when the Hungarians first appear in history in the ninth century their behaviour is entirely pagan, but he implies that their settlement in the Pannonian Plain late in that century had serious repercussions in Eastern European history because it drove a wedge between Byzantium and the Slavs of Central Europe whom Cyril and Methodius had recently introduced to Byzantine Christianity. This view, however, has to be revised if one accepted Professor Imre Boba's very recent theory that the Moravia of Cyril and Methodius was not situated by Bohemia but around Sirmium, south of the Danube. Be it as it may, the Hungarians' role in Byzantine history is somewhat different from that of the other unwelcomed guests to the realm. Called as allies in 859 against the dangerous designs of Symeon the Bulgarian, they at the same time discovered in the Balkans one

more theater for their depredations but, unlike the Slavs and Bulgars, they never gave signs of intending to stay there. To this fact the author attributes the rather cool reaction of the Byzantines to their raids. Their final place of dwelling, in the Pannonian Plain, put them in the very frontier of Roman and Byzantine Christianity. In spite of the fact that they had been first exposed to the latter, they, nevertheless, chose the former. However, Byzantine Christianity remained a powerful factor in the Hungarian life, and when the conquest of Bulgaria by the Byzantines gave common boundaries to the two nations in question, the religious, cultural and political ties between them became even stronger. The Hungarians were particularly regarded as valuable allies after the dark days of Manzikert and their kings, at least until the end of Manuel I Comnenus' reign, viewed themselves as subordinates to the universal Emperor of Byzantium. The same Manuel, son of a Hungarian princess, and who used the title of *Oungrikos*, frequently intervened in the internal affairs of Hungary and after his last campaign there in 1166 had his suzerainty officially recognized by the Hungarians. The association of the two countries continued and in the fifteenth century, when the Ottomans were readying the death blow for the Empire, the great hope of deliverance was placed on the redoubtable Transylvanian, John Hunyadi.

The Vlachs and the Moldavians do not appear in the Byzantine orbit until the fourteenth century when they attain their independence from Hungary. The author mentions three reasons why they were of importance to the Empire: trade, religious designs on the part of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and military. The second sounds a bit overstated. It was the Vlachs and the Moldavians who first sought adherence to Byzantine Christianity as reaction to the Hungarian attempt to impose on them the Roman type, and the liturgy that they adopted was not the Greek orthodox but the Slavonic. Perhaps this latter decision was due to the influence of Bulgaria from where Professor Obolensky thinks the two Rumanian principalities probably obtained their acquaintance with Byzantine Christianity.

The author adequately documents his facts without excessive use of footnotes. His geographical description of the Balkan area and the maps which he inserts at different intervals of the chapters make more lucid the historical narrative. His judgment of Justinian and the Slav peril, however, may be a little too harsh. Memories of Marathon and Salamis may have been in Justinian's mind when he waged war on Persia, but they do not seem to have been the determining cause of his attention to it to the detriment of the Balkan danger. It must be remembered that the first Persian war during his reign was started by the Persians who broke off the peace negotiations which his ambassadors were conducting in Persia. It is true that he ordered Belisarius, at the same time, to construct a new fortress on the border with Persia,

but that was not necessarily an offensive measure. Likewise, the second Persian war in 540 was started by Chosroes who wanted to get access to the Black Sea and used the Byzantine campaign against Mundhir as a pretext to start the hostilities. Mundhir, to be sure, was a client of Persia, but he had first raided the Empire's lands. All this does not mean that Justinian is entirely free of blame for the eventual Slavic occupation of the Balkan area. The Ostrogothic war was the unrealistic and wasteful realization of a dream which may have prevented him from paying more attention to the Danube frontier. But still, Justinian was willing to make a negotiated peace in 540 with the Ostrogoths, dividing Italy in two; it was Belisarius who frustrated his intentions.

One chronological slip found frequently in chapter 3 is the reference to Louis the Pious as the reigning ruler of Germany in the 860's; the author probably meant Louis the German, since the former had died in 840. But these slips do not detract from the outstanding merits of the work which is an exhaustive treatment of the intricate Byzantine diplomacy with its neighbours in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus region.

California State University
Fresno, California.

Carlos A. Contreras

A Budai Vár és a debreceni csata [The Budai Vár* and the Battle of Debrecen]. By Ignáz Ölvedi. (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1970. Pp. 225. Illus.)

The literature of Hungarian military history has again been enriched. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ending of the Second World War the Zrínyi Military Publishing Co. released *A Budai Vár és a Debreceni Csata* by I. Ölvedi. This book deals with the events of the fall of 1944 in Hungary and is based on material gathered from German, Hungarian and Russian archives.

The book is written against the following background: at the end of August, 1944 Regent Horthy of Hungary dismissed the government led by Sztójay, which was completely under Hitler's influence, and asked Géza Lakatos, the loyal, former general of the First Hungarian Army, to form a new government. General Lakatos took over the direction of the country at a most difficult time. Hungary was under occupation by the German *Wehrmacht*, and on the other side of the Carpathian mountains her army lay bleeding. The Red Army which,

*The Budai Vár was the seat of the Hungarian government in 1944.

after Roumania's declaration of neutrality, was pushing toward Transylvania through the southern Carpathians, had arrived at the country's borders. Inside the walls of the Budai Vár the decision was reached: the war must be ended. But how? Ölvedi devotes the first part of his book to pondering this serious question. With this book on Horthy's and Lakatos' military strategy, the Hungarians have their first glimpse of the enormous difficulties which beset the government during that critical time. It was almost impossible for the government, during September 1944, to see through the complexities of the internal and external military and political situation, and to select the least hazardous path along which Horthy's delegates could head for Moscow in order to negotiate with Stalin regarding the possibility of a Hungarian-Russian ceasefire. Ölvedi discusses the Regent's myriads of problems, and writes of the 1944 August-September secret talks in Bern. As a result of these consultations, the British advised Hungary to approach Moscow. The author discusses the many facts of domestic politics; documents the intentions and moves of the German and Hungarian military and, finally, he devotes space to describing the feelings of the population. There is no doubt that the Hungarian people, as a whole, dreaded the arrival of the Red Army. Ölvedi accurately reports the fact that not only the supporters of the government and the civil service, but also the military, the intellectuals, the moneyed middle class and the "petit bourgeoisie" all supported Horthy's moves towards an agreement or alliance with Britain. Thus, it was against this socio-economic backdrop that the Lakatos government had to make its decisions.

The second part of the book deals predominantly with the military operations taking place on the other side of the Tisza river; detailed knowledge of these events was until now limited.

Of note is the fact that Ölvedi devotes equal space to a discussion of the Russian, German and Hungarian military hopes and strategies. By doing so he manages to bring in a degree of objectivity and avoid the traditional one-sidedness prevailing in Hungarian communist military chronicles, a one-sidedness which in the past has often bordered on servility toward the Russians.

Ölvedi devotes a full chapter to the events of October 15, 1944 and their military and political consequences.

Schweizerische-Osteuropa-Bibliothek.
Bern.

Peter Gosztonyi

The Wind and Beyond: Theodore Karman, Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space. By Theodore von Karman with Lee Edson. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 376.)

The first part of the book was written as an auto-biography by von Karman—the outstanding aeronautical scientist—in collaboration with Lee Edson, a journalist. After von Karman's death in 1963, at the age of 81, the work was completed by Edson.

Von Karman was born in Budapest, Hungary, where his father was a university professor and leading figure in the reorganization of the Hungarian secondary school system. At an early age, he exhibited the traits of a mathematical genius and, upon graduating from Budapest Technical University, became an assistant professor there. Later he resumed his studies at various German and French Universities and this led to his appointment as professor of aeronautics at Aachen University. From 1933 on von Karman was on staff at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and in this capacity was instrumental in the development of modern aviation in the United States. He took part in the scientific development of supersonic aviation, rocketry and space technology and acted as adviser to the U.S. Air Force and NATO during and after the war, respectively. Consequently his name has become inexorably linked with a number of important aeronautical discoveries. In addition to being a theoretician, von Karman was also a founder of Aerojet General Corporation, the world's largest rocket manufacturing company.

World wide recognition of von Karman is documented in the Appendix of the book which lists 29 honorary doctorates, 10 decorations and orders and 35 awards in testimony to his extraordinary contribution to twentieth century science.

In his private life he was a colourful personality who led an active social life. He counted Einstein, Bohr, Fermi and many other greats among his friends. He never married and his beloved sister ran his household for decades.

The Wind and Beyond is written in a vivid journalistic style and the story vies for interest and suspense with the best science-fiction novels. The only regret one feels in reading it is that the author does not dwell in more detail on von Karman the man as opposed to von Karman the scientist.

Mississauga, Ontario

G. Bethlendy

Habsburg Otto - egy különös sors története [Otto Habsburg: the Story of an Extraordinary Life]. By Emil Csonka. (Munich: Új Európa Kiadó, 1972. Pp. 580.)

What happened to the Habsburg dynasty after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? What has been the life of the first Habsburg heir who could not occupy the throne of his ancestors? Emil Csonka, a Munich historian, undertook to answer these questions and thus to relate the life-history of Otto, King Charles' eldest son, from the time he was the heir-apparent, to his recognition as a European statesman.

This well-organized, scholarly work, written in excellent Hungarian, will be welcomed by those interested in modern political literature. Its topic is not only Otto Habsburg's life, but rather the era in which the eldest son of the last Hungarian King was born and brought up.

Otto was forced to leave Vienna with his parents at the age of six losing, at ten, his father the Emperor-King while in exile in Madeira. He was twenty when, at the request of his mother, Queen Zita, he launched a political campaign to regain the thrones of Austria and Hungary. According to Csonka, Queen Zita never gave up hope that political developments both in Vienna and Budapest would be such as to require return of Otto as Emperor-King. The extremely energetic widowed Queen worked hard on the restoration of the Monarchy. She obtained the cooperation of several outstanding politicians of the twenties and thirties and was successful in building up contacts with the royalist groups of the Austrian Republic and the Hungarian Kingdom. (After 1918, constitutionally, Hungary remained a Kingdom and the prerogatives of the King were exercised by a Regent).

The course mapped out for Otto by his mother was not an easy one. Neither socialist Vienna nor the majority of patriotic Hungarians wanted another Habsburg in the Viennese 'Hofburg' or the royal castle in Buda. Csonka gives a detailed account of Otto's political career in the Europe of the thirties. A royalist restoration is not an easy cause at best and is rarely successful. The exceptions were the Stuarts in England and the Bourbon King who returned to his throne after Napoleon's defeat. Once, very briefly, Otto also came close to success: immediately before the annexation of Austria his return was a distinct possibility, but Schuschnigg hesitated at the last moment and instead of Otto, Hitler marched to Vienna.

The anti-nazi attitude of the Habsburgs is well-known. Otto himself is a humanist, a democrat, and an enemy of dictationships. Accordingly, he and his family tried to promote the Austrian cause in France, England and the United States during the year of 1939 to 1945, but to little avail. The book describes the amazing political ignorance

of several statesman of the day in European affairs. President Roosevelt's naiveté and obscure views on Stalin and the Bolshevik system are astounding. Otto Habsburg had to fight not only misguided Western politicians, but also the intrigues of various emigre groups, and particularly those of the Czechs. Benes gave the impression that he considered Otto as a greater foe than Hitler, the 'Moravian corporal'. An account is given on the tragic fate of the Austrian Legion which was dissolved because of disagreements among emigre circles.

Certain historical facts about Hungary are also reviewed by the author. During the war the Kallay government with the consent of the Regent, contacted the United States concerning the possibility of a separate peace treaty on several occasions. The Hungarian diplomats and other public figures living in Washington persuaded Crownprince Otto, among others, to support this Hungarian line with Roosevelt. Otto undertook the task despite the maltreatment to which he had been exposed on the part of Budapest during the previous decade. The subsequent exchange of secret messages and letters begun in the summer of 1943 did not produce tangible results, although a number of somewhat naive promises were made. The book is incorrect in implying that Kallay and Regent Horthy promised Otto that in the event of a separate peace treaty Hungary would offer him her throne. The writer, while working on a Horthy biography, recently discussed this question with the late Tibor Eckhardt who stated categorically that such a promise was never made to the Crownprince during the negotiations of 1943 and 1944.

Being convinced that Churchill's plan for the setting up of a political union between Bavaria, Austria and Hungary fell through as a consequence of Stalin's violent opposition, Otto returned to Austria in June 1945. But the man who represented Austrian interests so ably during the war was not allowed to remain in his country. The Renner government requested him to leave the French sector of Austria, where he lived. Although the occupying French authorities suggested that he stay despite Vienna's order, the 33 year old Otto rejected this offer with the words: "During my whole life I have been fighting against foreign interference and infringement of Austria's sovereignty. Therefore, I will not accept the help of the French occupying powers to remain here". Thus, Otto once more left Austria, this time as an adult.

Emil Csonka gives a detailed account of Otto's life after 1945, dealing with his political struggles, journeys, lectures, his marriage and financial situation. The emerging picture is one of a highly-cultured European, a humanist and a democrat. There is no doubt that Csonka is biased both towards Otto as a person and towards his political aspirations. However, he still manages to chronicle the events

of an era and the life of Otto Habsburg with accuracy and relative objectivity.

The last chapter of the book, entitled "The Battle for Return" deals with the changes in Austrian domestic politics which led to Otto's ultimate return to his country. Numerous pictures and photographs of historical importance as well as an extensive list of sources present the author as an excellent scholar with a wide horizon. A detailed index is also attached.

Schweizerische-Osteuropa-Bibliothek
Bern.

Peter Gosztonyi

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Watson Kirkconnell is President Emeritus of Acadia University.

Agnes Huszar Vardy is Assistant Professor in the Humanities Department at Robert Morris College.

Peter Pastor is Assistant Professor of History at Montclair State College.

Alfonz Lengyel is the Director of Northern Kentucky State College's Classical Art History and Archeology Programme.



