LECTORI SALUTEM!

This issue is comprised of a set of intriguing papers in the philosophy of technology.

Zsolt Ziegler investigates three versions of the famous Newcomb dilemma: the original, highly technical, and abstract, plus two more mundane cases. He also accounts for the dilemma possibly appearing in macroeconomic situations that central banks face and decisions about innovation projects. Since the Newcomb dilemma has no satisfactory solution, it may explain some pitfalls experienced in management.

Auli Viidalepp explains how recent science fiction has brought anthropomorphic robots from an imaginary far-future to new spacetime. Employing concepts of semiosis, unpredictability, and art as a modelling system, her study demonstrates how the artificial characters in four recent series have a greater analogy with human behaviour than that of machines. Through Ricoeur's notion of identity, this research frames the films' narratives as typical literary and thought experiments with human identity.

Daniel Paksi proposes that the concept of a living being as a kind of living machine is widespread and well-known. This poses a severe conceptual problem since the living part of the concept always indicates the notorious notion of vitalism. In Paksi's reconstruction of Samuel Alexander, the problem arises from the traditional usage of the concept of mechanical, which is confused both with the concept of something is determined and with the concept of material. Alexander's point is that the difference between lifeless machines and living beings lies not in a vital substance or a non-mechanical principle but in an emergent mechanical quality called life which simple machines lack.

When it comes to thinking about artificial intelligence (AI), the possibility of its disobedience is usually considered a threat to the human race. It is a common dystopian theme in most science fiction movies where machines' rebellion against humans has catastrophic consequences. But Hesam Hosseinpour elaborates on a counterintuitive and optimistic approach that looks at disobedient AI as a promise rather than a threat.

Mihály Héder investigates the current wave of Artificial Intelligence Ethics Guidelines (AIGUs). His goal is not to provide a broad survey of the details of such efforts; instead, the reasons for the proliferation of such guidelines is investigated. Two main research questions are pursued. First, what is the justification for the proliferation of AIGUs, and what are the reasonable goals and limitations of such projects? Second, what are the specific concerns of AI that are so unique that general technology regulation cannot cover them?

Agostino Cera aims to sketch a critical historicisation of the empirical turn in the philosophy of technology. After presenting Achterhuis's definition of

the empirical turn, he shows how its outcome is an ontophobic turn, i.e. a rejection of Heidegger's legacy. Such a rejection culminates in the Mr Wolfe Syndrome, i.e. the metamorphosis of the philosophy of technology into a positive science that depends on an engineerisation/problematisation of reality, i.e. the eclipse of the difference between 'problem' and 'question'.

The editorial board wishes you a splendid time while reading this issue.