PREVAILING IDENTITY STRUCTURES AND COMPETING ETHNOPOLITICAL STRATEGIES IN TRANSYLVANIA

LEVENTE SALAT

Department of Political, Administrative and Communicational Sciences,
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania

In spite of the remarkable political mobilization and disciplined ethnic voting of the Hungarian minority in Romania, major political objectives, seen by the political elite of the community as critical for the cultural reproduction of Hungarians in Romania, have proven to be unreachable since 1989 through the instruments of participation in the country's political life. The paper explores the historical and contemporary reasons that contributed to this failure, and identifies conditions that could trigger a change. Various political projects of the Hungarians in Transylvania seeking integration on their own terms into the Romanian state since 1920, together with the circumstances that lead to their failure, are critically assessed. Based on considerable research conducted between 1995 and 2006, conflicting identity structures and competing ethnopolitical strategies are identified that divide the Romanian political community along ethnic fault-lines. The consequences of the divide are evaluated from the perspective of normative political philosophy and an answer is offered to the question which refers to the grounds on which Hungarians in Transylvania could (or could not) be considered part of the Romanian political community. The paper concludes by identifying alternative ways out of the current situation.

Keywords: Transylvania, Hungarians in Romania, strategies of integration, Transylvanianism, identity structures, ethnopolitical strategies, political community, nation-state

George W. White, an American political geographer who has extensively researched the relationship between identities and contested territories, asks himself the question, within a comparative study dedicated to Northern Ireland, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Transylvania, what is the true nature of the latter: "Hungarian, Romanian, or neither?"[1] Though none of the mainstream Hungarian and Romanian public discourses seem to have doubts in this matter, the question is justified and timely today, more than eighty years after the incorporation of the territory into modern Romania. Irina Culic, a young Romanian sociologist and author of several articles on the dominant identity patterns in Transylvania, asks a similar question in the title of one of her studies: Hungarians of Transylvania belong: ours (Romanians), theirs (Hungarians), or no one's?[2]

The questions posed by George W. White and Irina Culic do not refer, evidently, to the political status of the province. The converging inquiries of the two researchers address rather the issue of the prevailing identity structures and the competing ethnopolitical strategies of Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, trying to suggest foreseeable evolutions in the self-perception and the political projects of the two communities sharing the territory. While Irina Culic is more doubtful, as we shall see later, with respect to the chances, at least on the short run, of a positive, mutually acceptable outcome of the ongoing competition, George W. White is more optimistic. In his view,

> Transylvania will not simply become a territory where [the two ethnic groups] coincidentally live. Transylvania will be a territory where these people interact and create ... something Transylvanian.[3]

It is true, however, that White adds two necessary conditions: (1) the two ethnic groups become more tolerant to one another; (2) there is no interference from either the Romanian or Hungarian states or nations to thwart the creation of such an overarching regional identity.

Considering this statement as a working hypothesis, I will try to address in the subsequent article the following questions: Is White's hypothesis plausible? Are there signs of the two ethnic groups, Romanians and Hungarians, becoming more tolerant towards one another? Do the two states, Romania and Hungary behave according to White's recommendation? What would be the necessary changes in order to preserve diversity in Transylvania by fostering institutional solutions acceptable for both communities?

The above questions will be addressed from the perspective of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The declared interest of the paper is to explore, from the perspective of normative political theory, the conditions under which the shrinking of the Hungarian minority in Romania could be stopped and counterbalanced. The underlying assumption of the paper is that the continuous postponement of the community's "self-revision" claimed by Sándor Makkai in 1931 – which equals, in my view, the refusal to adopt alternative identity structures and more feasible strategies of accommodation within the Romanian state – is one of the important explanatory variables for what we are witnessing today in terms of the relatively unsuccessful integration of the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community.

Sándor Makkai was Bishop of the Calvinist Church, an emblematic personality of the Hungarian community in Transylvania which in 1920 unexpectedly found itself incorporated into the Romanian state in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. After a decade of heroic minority activism, Makkai concluded in 1931 that the long term survival of the Hungarian community in Transylvania required a thorough reconsideration of the way in which Hungarians in Transyl-

vania think of themselves and conceive of their future. In Makkai's views the "self-revision" of the community required that "ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania (…) take account of the facts that entered their life so decisively. Ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, in order to survive, need the truth of life and the obedient compliance with this truth…" According to the Bishop, the self-revision would imply the reconsideration of what Hungarians had regarded to be the causes of their new situation, abandoning prejudices that had loaded their relationships with the Romanian majority and designing a new collective identity that would be more compatible with the community's currents status: "The primary task of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania is to revise their conception of the past in a way so as to exclude prejudices hostile to life and establish a sound form of self-defense and self-assertion." Any resistance posed to the required self-revision, warns Makkai, would lead to emigration:

> We can hear the sad clattering of the railway carriages of expatriates and repatriates (…) those thousands who rejected the facts by avoided their orders (…) All these attempts at rejection of the facts entail the false paths of self-deception and delusion, mistake and confusion for us, Hungarians who stayed here, who are here, and who will have to remain here, observing the new legal order.[4]

It took not more than six years before Sándor Makkai himself was forced by the circumstances to leave Transylvania and to move to Hungary. In an attempt to justify his decision he published a pamphlet with a suggestive title – *It is impossible (Nem lehet)* –, denouncing his earlier views and declaring that "living as a minority is not only politically but also morally impossible". He emphatically explains:

> the parts of the Hungarian nation thrown into minority status are incapable of remaining alive, even if, driven by instinct, they encourage and deceive themselves with the illusion of survival (…); in serfdom, in the circumstances of degraded life it might be possible to remain alive for quite some time, but it is impossible to live the life of a nation capable of development, which means that in the new Europe [1937 – L. S.] it is impossible to remain human.[5]

Apparently Makkai's theses have been refuted by history. The "self-revision" of the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania has never happened according to what he considered necessary: the old conception of the past remains quite influential, both in public discourse and the collective memory of the Hungarian minority; the "hostile" prejudices are still there and are being uninterruptedly re-enforced, as the results of recent public opinion polls demonstrate; alternative forms of the minority's "self-assertion" more appropriate to the minority's current situation do not seem to emerge. In spite of that the community has survived. Though its institutional life has never been – and is far from being – full-fledged (a circumstance

which could be considered as substantiation of the "degraded life"), evidence of development in several concerns is undeniable, and the shrinking of the community is a relatively recent phenomenon.[6] How can this evolution, loaded with apparent contradictions, be explained? Is the reluctance of the Hungarian community of Transylvania to integrate more harmoniously into the Romanian political community an explanation for its endurance, as far as the past almost nine decades are concerned, or rather a threat to its continued existence in the future?

In order to explore the conundrum outlined above I will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly summarize the relevant conclusions of the available demographic data and forecast. I will continue by presenting competing views on the different strategies by which the Hungarian minority sought integration beginning in 1920 into the institutional system of the Romanian state. Based on the results of various surveys conducted in the past decade the prevailing identity structures, the competing ethnopolitical strategies and the evolution of some indicators of the mutual tolerance of Romanians and Hungarians (in Romania, in general, and in Transylvania, in particular) will be presented. Following a short digression on the issue of the political community, a brief assessment of the role of the Romanian and Hungarian states will follow, and I will conclude by formulating the answers that emerge from the arguments under discussion to the questions formulated at the outset.

The Evolution of the Ethno-demographic Situation in Transylvania

Calculating in absolute numbers, the size of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (in this context: the territory annexed from Hungary to Romania on the basis of the Treaty of Trianon) is fairly similar today to its population in 1920. The census conducted by the Romanian authorities in the year of the formal incorporation of the territory into Greater Romania registered 1,305,800 ethnic Hungarians, while the census of the year 2002 found 1,415,720 Romanian citizens residing in Transylvania who declared themselves to be Hungarian.[7] While this comparison could make us believe that the Hungarian minority in Romania provides a remarkable example of demographic stability in spite of its domination by the Romanian state, the situation is less spectacular if we compare the relative figures: while in 1920 the Hungarians represented 25.6% of the population in Transylvania, their proportion decreased to 19.6% in 2002. The following chart summarizes this evolution, including, for comparison, the evolution of the second and third largest minority groups in interwar Romania, the Germans and the Jews. The comparison includes the evolution of the Roma (Gypsy) population as well, except in the case of the 1920 and 1948 censuses, for which no data is available.

Chart 1

Source: Based on Kocsis, 2007.

The comparison proves that Romania has performed quite well as a nationaliz-
ing state. While the share of the Romanian population in Transylvania grew from
53.8%, in 1910 to 74.7%, in 2002, the percentage of the minorities decreased
steadily, two ethnic groups, the Germans and the Jews, shrinking almost to extinc-
tion. The impact of the homogenizing policies of the Romanian Communist re-
gimes between 1948 and 1990 is quite visible: while the Romanian component of
the region's population increased steadily, the Hungarian, German and Jewish
populations registered a trend in the other direction. The decrease of the German
population from 5.8% (in 1948) to 1.4% (in 1992), which meant a loss of almost
250,000 persons in absolute numbers, is spectacular. Between 1956 and 1992 the
Jewish community lost approximately 36,000 members.

As far as the Hungarians are concerned, their loss of position in terms of the rel-
ative shares was not always reflected in absolute numbers. Between 1948 and
1977 they registered a steady growth from 1,481,903 to 1,691,048, followed by a
sudden decrease of approximately 90,000 persons between 1977 and 1992. This
loss is attributed mainly to the migration of the ethnic Hungarians from
Transylvania, primarily to Hungary, during the harshest period of the Communist
dictatorship.[8]

The loss of almost 200,000 ethnic Hungarians registered between the 1992 and
2002 censuses (from 1,603,923 to 1,415,720, calculated for Transylvania only)
has been of somewhat more serious concern both for statisticians and politicians
of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Contrary to the widespread opinion that
this loss is due, as well, mainly to migration, recent investigations have proved
that at least half of the registered loss (approximately 100,000) was caused by the
negative natural increase, various forms of assimilation being included.[9] Between

55,000 and 67,500 ethnic Hungarians have emigrated,[10] the remaining part of the loss (around 30,000 to 40,000) being attributed to the changes in the methodology of the 2002 census as compared to the one in 1992.[11]

The concern for the unexpected loss of the Hungarian population during the 1992–2002 decade, in spite of the considerable improvement in the community's conditions, at least in comparison to the 1977–1990 interval, remains valid. Although it counts for not more than 30% of the total loss, the departure of 67,000 emigrants in ten years represents a considerable deficit for the Hungarians in Transylvania, particularly if we presume – no reliable data being available – that they represented the most mobile part of the community, the already negative potential of natural reproduction of the Hungarian minority being affected in addition by their departure.

Based on plausible hypotheses regarding the evolution of natural reproduction, life-expectancy, the rate of migration and the foreseeable loss through assimilation, Csata and Kiss realized a forecast according to which the Hungarian population in Romania will shrink to approximately 1 million in 2032.[12] The dynamic of the anticipated process is illustrated by the chart below.


Chart 2

Source: Based on Csata – Kiss, 2007.

53% of the forecasted loss (233,365 persons) is estimated to be caused by the negative natural increase, 42% (180,979) by emigration and 5% (20,822) by assimilation.[13]

The forecast estimates that in 2032 Hungarians will represent 5.6% of the country's population and 5.7% of the Romanian electorate. The high-school and

university population of the Hungarian minority will decrease to 37% in the interval between 2009 and 2018 and will subsequently enter a period of slow but steady decrease until 2032. The decrease will be more moderate in areas where the Hungarians live in compact communities (Harghita/Hargita, Covasna/Kovászna, Mureș/Maros, Satu-Mare/Szatmár counties) and more significant in the rest of the territory, where Hungarians live dispersed.[14]

In spite of the foreseeable spectacular shrinking of the Hungarian population in Transylvania, a community with 1 million members, characterized by strong self-identification and massive support for political projects seemingly incompatible with the will of the Romanian majority and assisted by an active neighboring kin-state, will remain a challenge for Romania. On the other hand the Hungarians of Transylvania, who, in spite of the evidence of the censuses, stick to the myth that they belong to a community of 2 million, will have to take into account the ethno-demographic realities when they think of possible forms of their integration or design the institutions of their future in Romania. It is important to note that the evolution of the ethnopolitical strategies and the terms of ethnocultural integration in Romania – both in what concerns the Romanian majority's reactions and the positions of the Hungarian minority – will be significantly influenced by the increasing share of the Roma community in the country's total population.

Strategies of Integration: 1918–1989

The context in which Sándor Makkai issued his two successive and contradictory warnings on the future of Transylvanian Hungarians was offered by the young Romanian state, which embarked after the "Great Unification" in 1918 on the ambitious project of forging a unitary nation-state out of the four regions that were unified within the borders of Greater Romania: Romania proper (the old Romanian Kingdom, "Vechiul Regat"), Transylvania (formerly part of Hungary), Bucovina (ruled by Austrians) and Bessarabia (taken over from the Russians).

The leading role in this bold project of national unification was taken by the political elite of the Old Romanian Kingdom, dominated by the National Liberal Party, which had earned undeniable merits in representing Old Romania in the peace negotiations following the First World War. A "nationalist consensus" emerged quickly, unifying most of the major political forces around the idea that a prompt national consolidation was necessary, pursued through policies of homogenization meant to render a "state of the Romanians" for the exclusive benefit of the ethnic Romanians.[15]

The task of the unifiers was complicated, however, by several circumstances. The three newly incorporated regions had quite different political cultures and were dominated by non-Romanian administrative elites which needed to be re-

placed as soon as possible. This objective was considerably hampered by the fact
that Romanians, though they were in majority in most of the newly incorporated
regions (except Bucovina), populated mainly rural areas, their presence in urban-
ized centers being less significant. While ethnic Romanians constituted 71.9% of
the country's population in 1930, their share in the urban areas was only 58.6%.[16]
In Transylvania, Romanians represented 17.6% of the urban population in 1910
and 35% in 1930.[17]

Another hindrance to the quick homogenization of the country was raised by
its ethnic composition. While in the Old Romanian Kingdom ethnic minorities
represented around 8% (mainly Jews), the non-Romanian component of Greater
Romania was close to 30%, represented by Hungarians (7.9%), Germans (4.1%),
Jews (4%), Ukrainians (3.3%), Russians (2.3%) and others.[18]

A third major element of the obstacles that the Romanian nation-building pro-
ject had to face was the existence of "regionalized" Romanian populations in the
new territories which erected, especially in Transylvania and Bucovina, unex-
pected resistance to the swift centralizing tendencies of Bucharest. It is important
to note however, that their opposition was due to the way in which reform was
conducted rather than their questioning of the need and scope of the process of
Romanization.[19]

As a response to these hindrances the over-bureaucratized Romanian state, in
close cooperation with a mobilized nationalist elite, engaged in a vast program of
nation-building, a genuine *Kulturkampf*, as Livezeanu puts it, meant to compen-
sate the Romanian populations for the disadvantages they had suffered in the past
under foreign rule, in parallel with marginalizing non-Romanian elites and insti-
tutions and taking over foreign-dominated urban areas. Within a fervent general
cultural mobilization, education was the main instrument by which national ho-
mogenization and consolidation of the state was pursued. The new elites that
emerged swiftly as a result of the nationalizing endeavors were dominated by mil-
itant nationalism, pan-Romanianism and strong anti-regionalism. Their major po-
litical objective, supported by all the influential political parties of the time was a
unitary, homogeneous national state that "includes all Romanians" and "belongs
only to the Romanians".[20]

As far as Transylvania was concerned, the major challenge the Romanian na-
tion-building project had to face in the region was the strong resistance – through
political mobilization and an extended network of cultural, educational and reli-
gious institutions[21] – of the Hungarian and, partly, the German minorities, which
sought integration on their own terms into the new Romanian state.

In a broader historical perspective, as Nándor Bárdi observes, with regard to
the political status of Transylvania and the management of the province's ethnic
relations three basic ethnopolitical strategies have been pursued subsequently by
the different actors or have coexisted temporarily within the territory: (1) the de-

sire for national supremacy, (2) projects of national autonomy (of the whole province or regions within it) and (3) universalistic ideologies (Marxism-Leninism, internationalism) or local, regional identity constructions (Transylvanianism and other forms of regionalism) that aimed to transcend ethnic fault-lines.[22]

The strategy of national supremacy was employed by Hungary until 1918 and between 1940–1944 in Northern-Transylvania and by the authorities of the Romanian state beginning in 1918.[23] Between 1944 and 1989 the principle of national supremacy remained the basic tenet of the Romanian Communist Regime, the socialist homogenization of the country adding important achievements to the nation-building project started in the interwar period.

Autonomy has regularly been the option of the non-dominant group: it represented a political objective for Romanians under Hungarian rule until 1905 and it was reiterated by the Hungarians several times after 1920. Between 1920–1928 the desire for autonomy has been embodied by the ideology of *Transylvanianism,* initiated by Károly Kós, first as genuine political autonomy of the province (until 1923), later as a political vision uniting the Romanians, Hungarians and Germans into a separate federal unit within Greater Romania. In the 1930s, when it became evident that neither the Romanians nor the Germans were interested in *Transylvanianism,* the quest for autonomy of the Hungarian minority shifted to a decentralizing movement claiming cultural and administrative autonomy for the minorities within the province.[24] Territorial autonomy was implemented for a short while between 1952–1968, under the Communist rule, following the authoritative intervention of Moscow, which imposed a change in the new Romanian Constitution, dealing with the issue of national minorities and enforcing the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous District according to the Stalinist model of territorial administration. The autonomous district, which had only a formal autonomy, the local leaders being appointed by Bucharest, was abolished in 1968 by a new administrative reform of the country carried out in a context in which the Romanian communist leadership was gaining more and more independence from Moscow.[25] Claims of different forms of autonomy have been on the political agenda of the Hungarian minority again since 1989.[26]

Internationalism was embraced by the representatives of the Hungarian minority between 1944–1948 (a period of sincere hope for the left-oriented Hungarian leaders to find a "genuine home" for the community within Romania's borders), and was deployed manipulatively by the Romanian authorities after 1959 when they started an extensive campaign of closing down Hungarian language schools (including the Bolyai University in Cluj, of great symbolical importance for the community) by unifying them with similar Romanian institutions on the grounds of the requirements of "internationalism."[27] Regionalism transcending ethnic fault-lines was manifest, as we have seen, in the ideology of early Transylvanianism, but it did not represent more than a generous offer of the Hungarians, of

little interest for the Germans and of practically no relevance at all for Romanians. As Zsolt K. Lengyel notes, during the 1920s there were several political projects targeting different versions of Transylvanian regionalism elaborated by Romanians, Hungarians and Germans separately, but those projects never managed to reach a common platform.[28] Some of the autonomy-claims made by the leaders of the Hungarian minority in the post-1989 period were gradually transformed into forms of non-ethnic regionalism after 1996, when it became evident that the desire for autonomy of the Transylvanian Hungarians met with tough resistance on the part of the Romanian majority.[29] An attempt to resuscitate *Transylvanianism* was recorded in 2000, when a group of Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals established the *Provincia* journal, edited in Romanian and Hungarian, hoping that a common space of discourse could be created gradually in which the differences so characteristic for Transylvania could be transformed from divisive to complementary within the frameworks of a consociational political system. The members of the group also hoped that through such a transformation Transylvania could be elevated from the status of a pre-modern province into a vibrant "center."[30] In 2002, when it became evident that the time was not ripe for the kind of change in Romanian-Hungarian relations that they had hoped to trigger, the group dispersed and the journal was no longer published.

The chances of the Hungarian minority of finding means of integration on its own terms into the nationalizing Romanian state were thus quite slim. The success of any attempt at an institutional solution was undermined on the one hand by the strong legacy of Hungarian statehood in Transylvania (powerful identity structures connected to "Hungariannes" by language and culture, as well as an extended network of institutions) and on the other by the manner in which the young Romanian state defined its own objectives, targeting the nationalization of all the economic, social and cultural positions of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Indeed, since the early 1920s the core of the integration conundrum has been to find institutional solutions based on the double loyalty of the Hungarian minority: to the Hungarian nation defined in *cultural* terms and to the Romanian state and nation defined in *political* terms.[31] The question has been and recurrently is the following: how must the concept of the political community be conceived in order to allow and integrate such dual loyalties, preventing conflicts and accusations of disloyalty on one side or the other?

Generally speaking, throughout the almost nine decades of Romanian rule in Transylvania the Hungarian community tried to answer the question along two principally different strategies: through attempts of institutionalized – or at least institutional – "separateness" within the Romanian state, on the one hand, and through direct participation in the Romanian state-building project on the other, trying to adapt the structure and institutions of the Romanian state to the needs and expectations of the Hungarian community.

The ideologists of early Transylvanianism believed for instance that the Hungarians in Transylvania who accepted Romanian supremacy were entitled to enjoy autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the Romanian state.[32] Romanians, however, had good reasons to resist all claims of different forms of autonomy, remembering well the importance of autonomous institutions in supporting their national movement in Transylvania under Hungarian rule.[33] This strange equilibrium of opposing forces and tendencies rendered in interwar Transylvania an arrangement short of institutionalized separateness of the Hungarian community, but one characterized by an extensive network of separate Hungarian institutions that survived the Romanian *Kulturkampf.* Between the two world wars the dual loyalty of Hungarians in Transylvania inclined strongly towards "Hungarianness," and those members of the community who tried to integrate on their own into the various institutions of the Romanian society were considered traitors and were excommunicated.[34]

After the Second World War, in the fundamentally changed situation in which Romania was transformed from a constitutional monarchy into a soviet-style popular republic, the perspectives of integration were interpreted and molded by the left-oriented leaders of the Hungarian community.[35] After the disappointments of the interwar period and the failures of the territorial rearrangements between 1940 and 1944, there seemed to be good reasons to believe that on the grounds of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism a solution could finally be found to the Transylvanian issue. Indeed, as Bárdi notes, the 1944–1948 interval was the only period in the history of post-1918 Transylvania when members of the Hungarian minority's political elite had the conviction that they were building a country that belonged to the Hungarian community as well.[36] In this atmosphere of generalized mutual trust a group of delegates of the political organization of the Hungarian community (The Hungarian Popular Alliance) adopted a document in 1945 which declared that the issue of the Hungarians in Transylvania is not a matter of borders, but one of the internal democratization of the country. This declaration offered unexpected help to the Romanian delegates who represented the country at the 1947 Peace Treaty in Paris, which brought Northern-Transylvania back under the sovereignty of the Romanian state after a period of almost three years of uncertainty regarding the political future of the region. Once this mission was completed, the situation of the Hungarian minority began to change quickly for the worse.

During Communist rule, in spite of the fact that Hungary and Romania belonged to the same Soviet Block, the manifestation of any form of dual loyalty was impossible. In the given circumstances the political elite of the Hungarian minority recognized that loyalty to the Romanian state was a precondition for preserving the community's linguistic and cultural identity.[37] Based on that principle, the issue of integration was simplified and reduced gradually to sustaining and

protecting, from positions occupied within the state apparatus, an ever diminishing circle of separate institutions that played a role in the cultural reproduction of the Hungarians in Transylvania. In this process, following the different crisis-points,[38] the leaders of the Hungarian minority gradually had to give up the illusion that communism would facilitate national emancipation and would provide integration on fair terms. Later, the issue of loyalty towards the Romanian state came under question as well, as it became more and more evident, starting with the mid-1970s, that the two objectives, participating in Romanian state-building and representing the interests of Transylvanian Hungarians, could not be reconciled.[39] Beginning in 1984 the Communist Party officially denied the existence of the Hungarian community in Romania, the references to its members in the public discourse being replaced with the term "Hungarian-speaking Romanians". This was the period that, as we have seen, produced a massive wave of emigration of Hungarians from Transylvania.

The dynamic of the successive attempts of the Hungarian minority to integrate into the Romanian state, together with the repeatedly drawn conclusion that the way in which the leaders of the community think about the terms of integration is in conflict with the interests of the Romanian majority, generated an institutionalized mistrust of the authorities concerning the political objectives of the Hungarians. Between the two World Wars this mistrust became the central element of the state's minority policies, which suspected educational and cultural institutions and churches and youth associations of subversive activity.[40] Following the Second World War, especially after the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Communist authorities considered the separate institutions of the Hungarian minority as matters of state security.[41]

Both the failure of previous attempts towards integration of the Hungarian community and the tradition of institutionalized mistrust of the Romanian authorities represented a difficult legacy for the post-1989 political projects and ethnopolitical strategies.

Identity Structures and Ethnopolitical Strategies in the post-1989 Period

From the perspective of the present approach, the most important changes that occurred after 1989, as compared to the period of the communist rule, was the disappearance of any barrier to the assumption of "Hungarianness" in public and the acceptance of the idea that the Hungarian community, together with other minorities, needs political representation on a corporative basis. Thus, in the context of the fragile, young Romanian democracy and the emerging multi-party system, the role of representing Hungarians in the country's political life was assumed by a rapidly assembling organization, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Ro-

mania (DAHR), which found itself in the position to re-launch the attempts aiming to find ways of accommodating Hungarians within the structures of the Romanian state. Autonomy, as we have seen, came back to the agenda of the public debate, and a significant part of the mistrust of the Romanian authorities with regard to the political objectives of the Hungarians has been reactivated as well.

In spite of the fact that the situation of the Hungarians in Transylvania has improved significantly in many concerns – beyond political participation they gradually earned extensive language rights (in education, public administration, media and, to a more limited extent, in jurisprudence) and they are the beneficiaries of a considerable network of educational, cultural and media institutions operating in Hungarian, as well as dozens of private associations[42] – the conflicting interests of the Romanians and Hungarians could not be overcome. The new Romanian Constitution adopted in 1991 (over the opposition of the Hungarian community) and amended in 2003 continues to define the state as being based on the unity of the Romanian people (in an ethnic and cultural sense), and serving its interest only, the exclusive beneficiary of sovereignty being the ethnically defined Romanian people. According to special provisions, any future changes concerning the official language, forms of autonomy or federalism are excluded (art. 148). The national symbols, the day of the nation and the country's anthem reflect the Romanian nation's historical achievements, which have been accomplished against the Hungarian state and nation and thus embody an overtly anti-Hungarian message. Hungarians, for their part, consider themselves excluded by the Constitution and the national symbols from the integrative functions of the state, and continue to see no other guarantee for their cultural reproduction in the territories inhabited by them than cultural and territorial autonomy.

In November 1996 the unexpected outcome of the elections created a situation for which neither the Romanians nor the Hungarians were prepared: for pragmatic reasons the DAHR was invited to join the governing coalition. The Hungarian party has since been in power, and the Hungarians could consider again, for the first time since 1948, that by collaborating with the Romanian governing parties they are building their own country. In addition to the Educational Law adopted in 1995, which includes significant provisions concerning education in mother-tongue (retaining, however, important discriminatory features as well), the most important outcome of the cooperation was the Law on Local Public Administrations (2001), according to which a minority language can be used in those local communities in which the respective minority represents more than 20% of the population. In spite of these achievements, major objectives of the Hungarian community proved to be repeatedly unachievable, and as far as the issue of integration is concerned, the options of the Romanians and Hungarians remain irreconcilable.

As Irina Culic observes, in the post-1989 situation "neither the Romanian poli-
ticians, nor the representatives of the Hungarians in Romania succeeded in adopt-
ing a new approach in minority politics and, for that reason, they could not break
out of the old, integration/assimilation versus separatism/autonomy polarity of
the debate." As a possible explanation she adds: "The Hungarians failed to con-
vince the Romanian public that they consider the Romanian state as belonging to
them as well, and wish to represent their interests within its frameworks; they did
not succeed in elaborating a plausible form of the institutional arrangements they
would like to see either."[43]

Seventeen years after the re-launch of the political debate concerning the rela-
tionship between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority, though it is a
long time, it is still early, probably, to draw conclusions. I will try in what follows
to assess the foreseeable future evolution of the debate with the help of public
opinion polls and research conducted over the past years reflecting, among others
things, the evolution of the dominant identity structures, the competing ethno-
political strategies and the level of tolerance between Romanians and Hungarians
in Romania.

As far as the dominant identity structures of Romanians and Hungarians are
concerned, important similarities and differences were observed by Raluca
Soreanu, who investigated the databases of a series of surveys conducted between
2000 and 2002[44] concerning representative samples of the population of Roma-
nia. The polls used questionnaires that were fairly similar so as to allow for com-
parison and conclusions concerning the evolution of the indicators under investi-
gation.

Analyzing the distribution of answers recorded with regard to the question:
*"According to your opinion, which are the three most important circumstances on
the basis of which somebody can be considered Romanian/Hungarian?"* Soreanu
compiled a table (the percentages represent the sum of the first, second, and third
options – see Table 1).

It is interesting to note that while the way in which Romanians define both the
in-group and the *out-group* is quite similar to the Hungarians' views on the funda-
mentals of "Romanianness", the auto-identification of the Hungarians in Romania
is significantly different, laying emphasis on the mother-tongue and feelings in-
stead of place of birth and citizenship. The most important conclusion of So-
reanu's analysis, however, is the fact that according to the way in which
Romanians predominantly define "Hungarianness", Hungarians in Transylvania
do not qualify in this category, since they were not born in Hungary and are not
Hungarian citizens.

Table 1

	Autodefinition	Similarities/ Differences	Heterodefinition
ROMANIAN DEFINING: the Romanian (active) the Hungarian (passive)	To be born in Romania 63.7% To be a Romanian citizen 36.8% Romanian mother-tongue 41.9% To feel Romanian 31.5%	Significant similarity	To be born in Hungary 54.5% To be a Hungarian citizen 40.9% Hungarian mother-tongue 44.1% To feel Hungarian 30.5%
Similarities/ Differences	Significant similarity		Partial differences
HUNGARIAN DEFINING: the Romanian (passive) the Hungarian (active)	To be born in Romania 36.3% To be a Romanian citizen 32.2% Romanian mother-tongue 60% Romanian parents 34.2% To feel Romanian 34.5%	Partial differences	Hungarian mother-tongue 75.4% To feel Hungarian 51.9% Hungarian parents 43.3% Baptized in a Hungarian Church 35.5%
	Heterodefinition	Similarities/ Differences	Autodefinition

Based on these findings, Soreanu considers that the relationship between the three identities – Romanian, Hungarian and Hungarian in Romania – can be represented graphically in the following way:

Illustration 1

Romanian citizens = citizens' *in-group*

Civic identity

Ethnic Romanian Majority	Ethnic Hungarian Minority
Ethnic *out-group*	**Ethnic *in-group***

The culturally defined Hungarian nation

Ethnic identity = ethnic *in-group* in broad sense

Source: Soreanu, 2005.

Romanians accept Transylvanian Hungarians in the civic *in-group* provided that they do not consider themselves Hungarians (which means that they see them as Romanians). Since this is not the case – Transylvanian Hungarians consider themselves as belonging to the Hungarian nation, culturally defined –, the concept of the "Romanian civic nation" is void in the sense that it falls back to the ethnic concept of the nation according to the way in which the Romanian constitution defines it.

Interpreting the findings of the same research, Irina Culic observes that while the self-definition of Romanians is a "mixed territorial-cultural construct", the self-definition of Hungarians in Transylvania is *par excellence cultural*.[46] This difference in self-perception leads in her view to the following patterns of exclusion:

> The Romanians 'enjoy' their nation, while the Hungarians are excluded from it. Or, to concieve the situation from another point of view, the Hungarians exclude themselves from it, by entering the 'club' of the Hungarian nation, and enjoying its goods and services.[47]

Similar results were recorded by a survey conducted in 1997 as part of broader comparative research focusing on the Carpathian Basin and initiated by the Eötvös Lóránd University of Budapest under a UNESCO program on national minorities. The component of the research focusing on Romania identified significant differences in the dominant identity structures of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. While 75% of the Romanian respondents' opinions reflected total or partial agreement with the statement that for somebody to be considered Romanian it is necessary to be born in Romania, in the case of the Hungarians only 9% of the respondents agreed totally or partially with the corresponding statement: for somebody to be considered Hungarian it is necessary to be born in Hungary. If the question referred to the relationship between citizenship and identity, 78% of the Romanian respondents agreed totally or partially with the statement according to which for somebody to be considered Romanian it is necessary to have Romanian citizenship, while only 18% of the Hungarian respondents took a similar stand with regard to the corresponding question referring to the relationship between Hungarian identity and Hungarian citizenship.[48]

Based on the data of the research on the Carpathian Basin, Irina Culic observes the following:

> The dilemma of the member of a minority is an important source of tension. First, for the member of the minority community who has to choose often between the two identities, civic and national (ethnic). In many cases, without regard to the alternative which defines, in a given circumstance, the person's actions, attitudes and options, the result seems to be that of a zero, or even negative sum game. In most

> of the cases in which ethnicity (identity) matters, the two alternatives
> cannot be reconciled. Second, the duality of the identity of the mem-
> ber of a minority is a source of tension for the members of the major-
> ity nation as well. The ambivalence of the member of the minority
> generates mistrust, uncertainty, suspicion. The majority expects a
> kind of loyalty which is unattainable for the minority.[49]

Culic believes that the situation could perhaps be changed by providing more sub-
stantive rights to the Hungarian minority. She is aware, however, that even if the
loyalty of the Hungarian minority towards the Romanian state could probably be
enhanced in this way, the reactions of the Romanian majority are more difficult to
foresee:

> A different type political and civic formalization of the minority's
> situation (maximal educational rights in the language of the minority,
> cultural and territorial self-government, or other forms of civic and
> political organization) might probably change the substance of the
> minority's identity construction, though it is debatable how such a
> change could come about or how the majority would relate to the mi-
> nority in this situation.[50]

Other variables of the previously mentioned surveys conducted in 2000–2002
seem to offer several responses to the question posed by Culic. As far as the domi-
nant views regarding the most important ethopolitical options of Transylvanian
Hungarians – autonomy, education in mother-tongue, Hungarian language state
university, state subsidies for the Hungarian culture, double citizenship, assis-
tance offered by the Hungarian state – are concerned, the situation, as reflected in
the surveys, is as follows.

To what extent do you agree that...

- the Hungarian state should provide ethnic Hungarians in Romania with certain rights — 88% / 41%
- the Hungarians in Romania should have double, Romanian and Hungarian citizenship — 82% / 39%
- the countries in which Hungarians are in majority should have more autonomy — 85% / 13%
- the Romanian state should support cultural organizations of Hungarians in Romania — 94% / 50%
- the Romanian state should provide Hungarian children in Romania with education in Hungarian — 95% / 46%

Legend: Hungarians / Romanians

Chart 3

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

It is evident from the data that while the enlisted objectives are supported by the large majority of the Hungarian respondents, the resistance of the Romanian population is considerable, especially as far as the issue of autonomy is concerned.

Regarding the way in which the topic of Hungary's involvement is concerned, the opinions are distributed according to the diagram below.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning Hungary?

- The Hungarian investments in Transylvania have political objectives — 17%, 41%
- The EU integration of Hungary is a good thing for Romania — 76%, 41%
- Hungary will never give up its claims over Transylvania — 49%, 47%
- It is normal that the Hungarian Government is interested in the situation of Transylvanian Hungarians — 90%, 62%

Legend: ■ Hungarians ▨ Romanians

Chart 4

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

Using the databases of the polls conducted in 2001 and 2002, Ioana Paul, Mirela Tudoran and Luiza Chilariu[51] calculated the percentages of respondents characterized by ethnocentric tendencies (more positive attributes for the *in-group*), both in the case of Romanians and Hungarians. They obtained the following stratification of the identity structures:

The findings confirm the contact theory, since the more ethnocentric Romanians are non-Transylvanian, while the most ethnocentric Hungarians live in the Székely land.

Using the concepts of "Romanians with balanced ethnic views" and "ethnocentric Romanians" (ETNOr) as defined above, the opinions with regard to two major objectives of the Hungarians are distributed according to the following two charts.

If the question refers to the extent to which the spoken Hungarian language is being tolerated in public, the options of "balanced" and "ethnocentric" Romanians are distributed as follows:

Table 2

	Romanians total (%) (%)	Non-Transylvanian Romanians	Transylvanian Romanians (%)	Hungarians total (%)	Hungarians in Székely land (%) (%)	Hungarians outside Székely land
ë (equal number of positive attributes for in-group and out-group)	35.9	31.7	43.3	46.9	42.0	51.1
ETNOr (at least with two more positive **ë** attributes for Romanians)	30.4	33.7	21.7	2.2	2.1	2.3
ETNOm (at least with two more positive attributes for Hungarians)	4.2	4.9	2.6	21.0	24.0	18.5
Other	29.5	29.7	32.4	29.9	32.0	28.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

Chart 5

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

To what extent do you agree that the Romanian state should provide Hungarian children in Romania education in Hungarian language?

Chart 6

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

To what extent do you agree with the statement: "I resent when Hungarian language is spoken in my presence"?


Chart 7

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

The tendencies reflected above are confirmed by subsequent polls as well. A survey conducted in 2003[52] recorded, for instance, the following opinions of Hungarians in Romania (the distribution does not include the opinions of those respondents who declared themselves Hungarians):

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

The countries where Hungarians are in majority should have more autonomy
5 5 | 23 | 55 | 12
24 | 21 | 21 | 25 | 9

Hungarians should rather move to Hungary
14 | 12 | 30 | 33 | 11
24 | 33 | 14 | 8 | 21

Hungarians will never give up their claims over Transylvania
37 | 20 | 9 | 7 | 27
53 | 23 | 5 3 | 16

Hungarians should use only Romanian language in public administration
59 | 22 | 6 4 | 9

■ total agreement ■ partial agreement ▧ partial disagreement ▨ total disagreement ▦ DK/NA

Chart 8

Source: IPP – Gallup, 2003.

In December 2006 a new nationally representative survey was completed and a research report compiled which compares the results recorded with the ones registered in the previously mentioned 2002 poll.[53] As far as the opinions regarding the role and involvement of the Hungarian state are concerned, the situation evolved as illustrated in the table below.

Table 3. "In your opinion is it acceptable that the Hungarian state…"

|	Agreement (%)		Disagreement (%)	
	2002	2006	2002	2006
encourages Hungarian language education in Romania?	37.8	26	59	55
provides Hungarians in Romania with Hungarian language textbooks?	42.9	34	54	30
supports Hungarian companies that invest in Romania?	64.1	57.3	31	45
strengthens its relations with political organizations of the Hungarians in Romania?	42.4	39	51	52
offers Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians in Romania?	46	34	48	55

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.

Concerning the relationships between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority, measured with the level of acceptance by Romanian public opinion of the Hungarians' ethnopolitical options, the evolution was the following.

Table 4

	Agreement (%)		Disagreement (%)	
	2002	2006	2002	2006
The Romanian state should provide education in Hungarian for Hungarian children.	47.2	46.2	50.2	47.4
The Romanian state should support cultural organizations of Hungarians in Romania.	55.6	51.1	41.5	39.4
The counties in which Hungarians are in the majority should have more autonomy.	18.6	13.8	77.8	75.5
It is good if Hungarians in Romania have double, Romanian and Hungarian citizenship.	44.1	40.1	50.6	49.2

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.

The report compares the evolution of opinions regarding the quality of Romanian-Hungarian relations as well. In this respect the situation evolved as follows.

From the alternatives given below which one describes best, according to your opinion, the Romanian-Hungarian relations?

Conflictual relations: 26.2 / 18.6
Relations of cooperation: 30.8 / 39
Indifference: 25.4 / 17.5
I cannot say other: 17 / 24.1

2002 2006

Chart 9

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.

The slightly diminished level of acceptance of the involvement of the Hungarian state and the decrease of support for the ethnopolitical objectives of the Hungarian minority, together with the quite significant increase in the share of the respondents who see the Romanian–Hungarian relations more loaded with conflict, is explained in the report by the reinforcement of ethnocentrism due to the increased visibility of the Hungarian language in public spaces (in accordance with the provisions of the public administration law adopted in 2001) and the renewed public debate centered around the autonomy claims of the Hungarian political elite in Transylvania.[54] It is interesting to note that those respondents who appreciate the relations as being based on collaboration (30.8%) see as one of the major advantages of Romania's EU accession the legal framework of the EU which will curb the autonomy claims of the Hungarians' political organization (DAHR). The same respondents consider that the idea of autonomy is subversive and constitutes a political attack against the etnopolitical status-quo.[55]

The Hungarian analysis of the data recorded in Transylvania during the research conducted in 1997 on the Carpathian Basin identified different types of cleavages in the Hungarian and the Romanian population in Transylvania.[56] According to Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi, Hungarians in Transylvania can be categorized in four clusters by the fear-hope and the nationalist-assimilationist axes. Close to 60% of the Hungarian population belong to the category of the "worried", which includes persons who do not situate themselves at large distance from Romanians but who have networks that do not include members of the majority, and perceive a high level of conflict generated by all actors involved. A second category, the "moderate optimists", comprising 20% of the Hungarian population in Transylvania, includes persons who situate themselves at a larger distance from the majority but believe that all actors are interested in reducing the tensions. Another 10% of the Hungarians are labeled as "nationalists" by the analysis: the persons included in this cluster situate themselves at a large distance from the Romanians. Their social networks do not include members of the majority and they consider that the tensions are intensified by the Romanians and mitigated by Hungarians and the international organizations. The remaining 10% constitute the cluster of the "integrated". The persons belonging to this category have an extended network of relations with Romanians, do not feel any social distance from the majority, and consider that the tensions are generated by Hungarians and the international organizations.

As far as the dominant patterns of thinking about the Romanian-Hungarian relationships in the case of Romanians in Transylvania are concerned, Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi identified three clusters. The first category is labeled as the "distance-keepers", comprising 47% of the Romanian population. The persons belonging to this cluster do not define a large social distance from Hungarians, but they have no Hungarian networks at all, and they blame mainly the Romanians

and the international organizations for keeping the tensions high. The second cluster includes the "nationalists", who sense a large social distance from Hungarians. Their networks do not include members of the minority and they consider that the tensions are generated by Hungarians, while Romanians and the international organizations try to alleviate the conflict. This cluster comprises 46% of the Romanian population in Transylvania. The last category, consisting of 7% of the Romanians, is labeled as the "accommodators", who do not feel large social distance, their networks include many Hungarians and they believe that Hungarians mitigate, Romanians intensify, and international organizations mediate the conflict.

The research report of the polling institute that conducted the 2006 survey contains further interesting data about the level of acceptance of the Hungarian language in public spaces and the ways in which the role and activity of the Hungarians' ethnic party (DAHR) is appreciated.[57]

As far as the opinions regarding the implemented language rights are concerned, the situation registered by the 2006 poll is reflected in the chart below.


In localities where many Hungarians live, public inscriptions should be also in Hungarian in/on...

	supportive	indifferent	opposing	DK/NA
street-signs and road indicators	35.4	24.3	32.1	8.3
Hungarian language schools	40	26.4	28.8	4.8
post offices	32.7	27.3	35.2	4.8
the police	32.3	25.4	37.3	4.6
the cultural buildings	32.6	38.6	46.9	4.7
shops	30	26.9	37.2	5.9

Chart 10

Source: Horváth, 2006.

The report includes an interesting comparison of the way in which the opinions concerning the role and impact of the DAHR were reflected in the 2000, 2002, and 2006 polls. The percentages in the following table reflect the opinion of the Romanian respondents only.

Table 5

From the statements below which is the one you agree with?	2000 (%)	2002 (%)	2006 (%)
Regardless of which party wins the elections, DAHR should be invited in the government.	11.7	10.8	3.5
DAHR can participate in the government like any other party.	34.9	30.7	39.8
DAHR can be represented in the Parliament but should not be invited in the government.	20.1	20	15.2
DAHR should leave politics and be transformed into a cultural organization.	21	20.6	13.4
DAHR should be banned.	9.5	11	15.4
DK/NA	2.8	6.9	12.7

Source: Horváth, 2006

The predominance, in 2006, of the Romanian respondent's negative opinion with regard to the impact of the DAHR's activity is reflected in the following set of data, too.

Table 6

To what extend do you agree...?	Rather agree (%)	Rather disagree (%)
DAHR serves the interests of the Hungarian minority only, not the whole population.	78.5	11.4
DAHR's participation in the government does not make any difference.	51.5	37.2
DAHR's participation in the government resulted in more rights of the Hungarian minority than the rest of the population.	55.5	30.2
DAHR's participation in the government resulted in the deterioration of the Romanian–Hungarian relationships.	46.7	36.1
Through its activity, DAHR promotes the rights of all minorities in Romania.	31.4	51.9

Further interesting aspects are offered by two undertakings that focus on younger generations. Research conducted in 2004 which included quantitative and qualitative components revealed that the intolerance identifiable at the level of younger generations (aged between 15–35) is due mainly to difficulties in communication with Hungarians, who prefer to speak in their language even in the presence of Romanians. Younger generations of Romanians consider that the Hungarian minority has too many rights (representation in Parliament, and they "aspire even to leading positions within the Romanian state") and that the objective of the Hungarian community is "to impose a system in their own language, and they want to govern themselves".[58]

Qualitative research conducted in 2006 on the dominant values of Romanians aged between 15–25 confirms these findings. The participants in the focus-groups generally consider that the Hungarians in Romania have too many rights (in some instances, more than the Romanians). They are disturbed by the fact that the Hungarian language is spoken in public and they firmly reject the idea of autonomy. Some feel that the Hungarians are "aggressive" and "they do not like the Romanians". More than half of the participants would not accept a Hungarian in the family and one third refuse to have Hungarian friends. The report mentions minor regional differences and considers that the members of the 20–25 year age group are slightly more intolerant.[59] In both cases the research proves that the dominant way of judging Hungarians and their relationships with the Romanian state have been reproduced during the last 17 years.

Though its perspective is significantly different, the overall image emerging from the above is reinforced also by comprehensive research coordinated by Rogers Brubaker focusing on the interethnic relations of Cluj, conducted between 1995 and 2001.[60] Though the patterns of "everyday ethnicity" investigated by the fieldwork are predominantly peaceful and only occasionally loaded with tensions, the price paid for the peace seems to be avoiding systematically any substantive debate concerning the unsettled issues of Romanian–Hungarian coexistence in Transylvania: various "everyday coping strategies" are deployed both by Romanians and Hungarians to avoid confrontation over sensitive issues or to downplay the importance of controversial aspects.

The findings of the research mentioned here entitle us to raise the question: in what sense can we consider the Romanian political community to include Hungarians in Transylvania? In order to identify possible answers to this question we need to explore the concept of political community.

The Idea of Political Community

The concept of political community is surprisingly under-theorized in political science. Seemingly, there aren't any comprehensive research projects targeting the different historical, theoretical and empirical aspects of the issue. The Handbook of Political Science edited by Goodin and Klingeman[61] does not provide any definition of the term, and more systematic works dedicated to the concept are generally lacking, in spite of the fact that the issue of "bounded communities" has been a concern for authors like Kant, Hegel, Marx, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt and many others.[62] A more analytical account of the concept has been offered recently by Elizabeth Frazer, from the perspective of communitarian political theory.[63]

Though the concept is widely used, its significance is considered in most cases to be self-referential. However, if we have a closer look at the broad area of its significance we can easily see that the concept is loaded with several internal tensions and contradictions. Some use the term as if it were synonymous with polity, and most authors see a strong relationship between the state, the society and the political community. There are, however, opinions according to which well organized, self-governing sub-state actors also can be considered political communities.[64] Newly, the concept of the "European political community" has also been in use.

On a different level of analysis, Frazer observes that the term and its use embody at least four different types of ambiguities. The most common interpretation refers to a particular type of community, along other kinds of "partial" communities, such as ethnic, local or business communities, in which what is shared is political: institutions, values, etc. A second widespread account of the concept considers political community to be a community that is organized politically. According to this view, the political tie is added to other, prior commonalities like culture, economy and shared territory. A third sense of the term refers to the belief that a community can be considered to be a political community if it acts politically and behaves as a political actor, by defending the community's continued existence, protecting the members' needs and benefits, norms, institutions and traditions. The fourth interpretation holds that the distinctive feature of the political community is that it is constituted politically; this view reflects the recognition that the reasons for the disintegration of communities are usually political.[65] Frazer observes that political theory is highly ambiguous particularly as far as the first two connotations are concerned: while many authors consider that political ties are thinner and overlook other types of allegiances, the belief that a genuine political community needs deep forms of commitment, reciprocity, shared culture and meanings is at least as widespread.

Two further aspects of the issue are of interest for Frazer: the way in which a political community comes into being and the level of internal conflict and diversity that prevents a community from disintegrating.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, Frazer notes that political communities can be constituted both exogenously and endogenously. The endogenous version implies cases in which a "social contract" transforms an aggregate of individuals into a "duly constituted political association (or society, or polity – or community) with agreed procedures for legislation, adjudication, and administration and an agreed locus and distribution of sovereign power."[66] However, a more "realistic" account of "bringing into being a political community" seems to be the following:

> ...a political settlement is forged – by violent conquest, by the gradual centralization of power and the accrual of legitimacy, by the dispossession of kings in the favour of the commons – a political com-

> munity, in the present sense, might be said to be the upshot at the
> point when individuals share allegiance to a particular set of institu-
> tions and procedures.[67]

Frazer observes that the accrual of legitimacy presupposes "stories, actions and orientations which tend to confirm its [the community's] existence",[68] as well as a group which undertakes to provide the rules and their justification. It is quite common that the group which assumes this role acts in its own interest:

> The institution of politics, as has been observed, is quite consistent
> with a politically dominant class or group promulgating and promot-
> ing mythical justification of the social order, or arguments in favour
> of traditional patterns of government (...) – in their own interest.[69]

The existence of a group that defines the political community according to its own interests has further consequences in Frazer's view: the exclusion of those who cannot accept the prevailing trend of justification for the community's existence. For the sake of stability and efficiency, the discursive space of the political community has to be defined in such a way that the voices of the excluded cannot be heard.

> The rules of the political game and the rules of conduct that govern
> participation in it, has been constructed so as to benefit those who
> constructed the political sphere and continue to participate in it, and
> so as to exclude persons whose disadvantage and subordination is
> necessary (...) At the same time, the claims of the disadvantaged can-
> not be pressed or heard in the normal political process which is orga-
> nized so as to exclude certain kinds of voices, certain kinds of claims,
> and certain agenda items.[70]

Though Frazer seeks to maintain the balance between the empathy required by proper comprehension and the unengaged critique of the communitarian views, she seems to reach the conclusion that the essence of the political community can only be grasped from the perspective of the communitarian political philosophy. Acknowledging the merits of what we might call the "thin" interpretation of the term, according to which one can speak of a political community whenever a group of people is politically constituted through a common subjection to the same governing institutions, she firmly opts for a "thicker" version of the concept, according to which members of the political community are "related by sharing not only institutions, territory, state or national symbols, a legal system, etc., but also values, political culture, national and political identity, a sense of allegiance, and so on." Echoing Rawls, author of *Political Liberalism* (1993), rather than that of *A Theory of Justice* (1971), she stresses at one point that "anything less than a reasoned agreement – grudging acceptance, for instance, indifference or the ab-sence of conviction – will mean that the polity is nothing more than a *modus vi-*

vendi, and that cannot meet the needs for commitment and participation that generate genuine political stability".[72]

Frazer is aware, of course, that a community also involves arguments, even conflicts over the meaning of the shared values and goals, or the way those values need to keep pace with time. However she believes that in a full-fledged political community "what is shared will be privileged for practical purposes over disagreement and differences".[73]

Privileging agreement on values and purposes is relatively easy in communities that are not divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious lines and do not belong to incompatible legal traditions. In deeply divided societies however, the practical reasons are often less than sufficient. With respect to this challenge, Frazer admits, building on Benedict Anderson and David Miller, that in the circumstances of diversity "political relations and state unity can only be achieved by the use of symbols, and rituals as symbols, which relate each to each and to the whole on the imaginary level". More concretely, "state institutions must deploy myths and associated symbols of 'nationhood' in such a way that all citizens orient to these in such a way as to understand themselves as related to their fellow citizens and to the whole".[74]

However, as Frazer herself emphasized, the mythical justification of the prevailing political order is usually provided by self-interested political elites, who prefer to deploy the instruments of exclusion, rather than more integrative ways of defining the state and the political community, definitions in which the different segments of society relate to one another and to the whole on the imaginary level. In addition to this internal contradiction, Frazer's account bears a second one: when anchoring her interpretation of the ideal political community in the sphere of communitarian political theory, she is obliged to assume the consequences of what she sees to be one of the distinctive features of political communitarianism:

> ...communitarians argue that the conduct of political life must be congruent with the conduct of community life. That is, the culture inhering in political institutions of the state and the locality must fit with the cultural life people live in their communities – their local area of residence, their schools and workplaces and churches.[75]

Two consequences follow from this: (1) the political community is justified in seeking homogeneity in order to secure the congruence between politics and culture; (2) when the conduct of community life at the level of the state differs from that of certain local areas of residence then the latter are entitled to seek congruence between politics and culture by claiming the status of separate political community.

The salience of communitarianism in political thought on the nature and functions of political community and the exclusionary consequences of the dominant

interpretations of the term have been acknowledged by Andrew Linklater, too.[76] Building on Hegel, he emphasizes the importance of the communities' fundamental right to protect "their different ways of life", a right that stems from the "importance which human beings attach to their membership in specific bounded communities". By exercising this right through self-determination and the principle of sovereignty, communities create the appropriate frameworks of freedom in accordance "with the unique experience and distinctive tradition of different forms of life".[77]

Self-determination and the principle of sovereignty, however, often generate various forms of exclusion. Sovereignty, warns Linklater, "is exclusionary because it frustrates the political aspirations of subordinate cultures".[78] It also involves the right to closure: communal self-determination, the right of a community to determine its own affairs, cannot be considered complete if it does not include the right to decide who can and who cannot enter the community. In order to preserve its autonomy and distinctiveness, the political community is forced to harden boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders. The hegemonic political discourses, which "set the rules of the game" in Frazer's terms, are important instruments of the closure since they are meant to

> ...channel human loyalties away from potentially competing sites of power to centralizing and monopolizing sovereign states which endeavoured to make national boundaries as morally unproblematic as possible."[79]

What resulted from the practical need of political communities to protect their distinctiveness and particular way of organizing social life was a process through which "more inclusive and less expansive forms of political association failed in the struggle for survival".[80] The form of political community that prevailed as the result of this evolution is one that is "too puffed up and too compressed" at the same time:

> ...too puffed up, or universalistic, because the needs of those who do not exhibit the dominant cultural characteristics have frequently been disregarded; too compressed, or particularistic because the interests of the outsiders have typically been ignored.[81]

It is not difficult to discover in Linklater's account the same tension that has been identified by Frazer between the "thin" and "thick" versions of the idea of political community. As Linklater observes, a major dilemma for communitarian political thought originates from this tension: the challenge to think of the sovereign state as the only alternative to the cosmopolitan argument for enlarging the moral frontiers to include the whole of humankind, on the one hand, and to take issue with the sovereign state that deprives local communities of the right to self-determination, on the other.

Linklater believes that political communities accepted by the international legal order are far less "finished and complete" than neo-realism has depicted them to be. Many states are "incomplete", political communities are often "precarious", and what is needed in the current phase is an exploration of new forms of political community together with a "more comprehensive understanding of what it means to be a full member of a political community".[82]

The shortcomings of the dominant conception of modern political community – in which sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and one dominant ethnocultural community are wedded together, impoverishing, as Linklater puts it, Western political imagination – can be overcome in his view through a triple transformation of the idea of political community: (1) by greater respect secured for cultural differences; (2) stronger commitment to the reduction of internal inequalities; (3) significant advancements in universality. Progress in these three directions would have, according to Linklater, the impact of "deepening and widening" the sense of the concept, as well as gradually

> ...replacing unitary sovereign states with new forms of political community which are more hospitable to cultural difference, and there are equally strong arguments for granting the members of minority groups the right of appeal beyond sovereign states to global legal institutions which give expression to the normative idea of an international society of peoples.[83]

In addition to the solution thus offered to the problem of those groups which "do not feel at home in the political community",[84] the suggested triple transformation has also the potential to bridge the gap between communitarian and cosmopolitan political thought on the nature of political community:

> Far from being antithetical, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism provide complementary insights into the possibility of new forms of community and citizenship in the post-Westphalian era. They reveal that more complex associations of universality and difference can be developed by breaking the nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship and by promoting wider communities of discourse.[85]

If we return now to our questions concerning the Romanian political community, Frazer's and Linklater's account entitle us to draw the following conclusions. If we bare in mind the "thin" interpretation of the concept, the Romanian political community qualifies without doubts. However, if we consider the "thick" version of its significance, the entirety of the Romanian citizenry falls short of the criteria of the ideal political community. Though territory and political institutions are common, values, political culture, national and political identity, the sense of allegiance, are, as the evidence of a wide variety of polls and the

results of much research demonstrate, far from shared by the large majority of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. Instead of a definition of the state in which the Romanian and Hungarian segments of the society relate to each other and to the whole, we see, both in the Romanian Constitutions and public discourse, those patterns and agents of exclusion – providing justification for the political order according to their own interest – which Frazer and Linklater talk about. As we have seen, any renegotiation of the way in which the different segments of the population relate to one another and to the whole is excluded by the Constitution. The myths and symbols associated with Romanian "nationhood" do not help Hungarians in Transylvania feel related to their fellow citizens or to the whole of the political community either: on the contrary, they are permanently warned by those symbols that they are historical enemies of the Romanian people. What is shared seems not to be privileged for practical purposes over disagreement and differences, and, as a result, the Hungarians in Romania evidently do not feel at home in the Romanian political community. They participate in the country's political life with grudging acceptance, indifference and the absence of conviction, which means that the Romanian political community is not more, indeed, than a modus vivendi between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority. The accentuated interest in autonomy, which is equal to the desire to belong to a separate political community within which the disadvantages can be compensated, seems to be a logical reaction on the part of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

The case of the Romanian political community is evidently not singular. While the great majority of political communities today can be considered as such according to the "thin" interpretation of the word, they often fall short of the "thick" interpretation provides the criteria. Moreover, the dominant elites of the political communities are guided usually by the "thick" version of the concept when they think of themselves, while they regularly recommend to the minority nations to relate to the prevailing political order according to the "thin" interpretation of the term.

The Role of the Romanian and Hungarian States

The process described by Linklater as the social evolution along which "more inclusive and less expansive forms of political association failed in the struggle for survival" and the dominant conception of political community prevailed is in fact the historical route leading to the triumph of the nation-state. The amalgamation of state building practices with principles of nation building seemed to confer to political communities an unprecedented efficiency, as compared to previously known state structures. In addition to internal efficiency, the practical advantages of pursuing the congruence between *states* and *nations* proved to be eas-

ily capitalized in international politics, too. The conviction that international politics is nothing but the process of state interactions and that states are concomitantly actors and ultimate goals of this these exchanges, ensured a common starting point and solid grounds for all competing theories and paradigms aiming to explain the nature of international politics. The assumptions that the actors in international politics are theoretically equal and sovereign in relation to one another, they are not subordinated to one another or any other higher authority, and they have clearly marked territories and are easily identifiable as homogeneous units of organizing social and political life all represent further dimensions of the international consensus that offered a solid basis for the prevalence of the nation-state logic.

Romania, as we have seen, performed quite well as a nationalizing state. In addition to the *Kulturkampf* carried out during the two world wars and the homogenizing achievements of the communist regimes, the post-1989 political system of the country managed to strike the appropriate balance between minority protection and resistance to any claims submitted by minorities which could undermine, at least in the long run, the unitary character of the Romanian nation-state as enshrined in the Constitution. While the language-rights that were provided (in education, local public administration and to a limited extent in courts), the parliamentary representation of 19 "small" minorities,[86] and the presence of the DAHR in the government and other subordinated state institutions made the situation of Romania fairly comfortable in cases of international scrutiny targeting the country's minority regime, the tough resistance posed by the Romanian authorities to all claims for autonomy, the acceptance of Hungarian as an official language of state, the (re)establishment of the Hungarian language state university, and the amendment of the Constitution to acknowledge Romania as a multinational state did not lead to any serious concern, at least so far, on behalf of any influential international organization – in spite of considerable efforts of representatives of the Hungarian minority. State institutions, together with various political actors, are efficient as well in keeping the necessary level of mobilization within Romanian public opinion against political targets of the Hungarian minority which could pose a threat to the Romanian nation-state.

The treatment that Hungarians in Transylvania get from the mother country is heavily loaded, as well, with the logic of the nation-state. The authorities of the Hungarian state maintain a high level of involvement in the life of the Hungarian minority, seeking ways of legalizing its relationship with members of the Hungarian community in Romania, considered, as we have seen, members of the Hungarian nation defined in cultural and linguistic terms. This involvement contributes with no doubt to the enhancement of the cultural and linguistic reproduction of the Hungarian minority in Romania, but significantly impairs the chances of finding

effective ways of integrating the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community.

According to Article 6.3 of the Constitution, the Hungarian state "feels responsible" for its co-nationals who live outside the borders as citizens of neighboring countries, and this sense of responsibility has generated during the post-1989 era a number of initiatives, both on behalf of state agencies and various political or civic actors. The most spectacular elements of these initiatives were the extended system of financial aid provided by the Hungarian state from public funds to members of the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries; the establishment, in 2000, of the Sapientia University in Transylvania, funded exclusively by the Hungarian state (meant to provide a substitute for the Hungarian language state university, the reestablishment of which is strongly resisted by the Romanian authorities); the adoption, in 2001, of the Status Law by the Hungarian Parliament (on the basis of which "identity cards" were issued by Hungarian state authorities to members of the Hungarian communities in neighboring countries, the carriers of the IDs being entitled to certain state subsidies);[87] and the initiative to grant Hungarian citizenship to members of the Hungarian communities abroad, which was finally abandoned after the unfavorable outcome of a referendum organized in 2004.

Though some of those initiatives seem bold post-Westphalian political projects meant to challenge the prevailing concept of political community and trying to surmount the unity of territory, sovereignty and citizenship, their impact was in fact seriously marked by the logic of the nation state: they delivered the message to members of the Hungarian communities abroad that the improvement in their situation rests in the hands of Hungary exclusively through unilateral initiatives, implemented in spite of the opposition of the neighboring state. The tacit assumption according to which the interest of all Hungarians lies in seeking peaceful reunification of the cultural nation across borders, without changing the status-quo, became openly assumed after Hungary's and Slovakia's accession to the European Union in 2004, when the frameworks of the European political community seemed to offer a perspective within reach for Hungarians in Transylvania, too. In addition to the above, Hungary openly supports the claims for autonomy and the project of a Hungarian language state university in Romania, without having any leverage in pushing those objectives closer to fulfillment.

As far as the role of the two states are concerned, we can conclude that they keep the Hungarian community in Transylvania in the cross-fire of two competing nation-states, rendering the integration-conundrum even more complicated: the higher the involvement of the Hungarian state, the more accentuated the resistance of its Romanian counterpart.

Conclusion

Based on the above, we can return now to the questions formulated at the out-set. We have seen in the previous chapters that the various political projects of the Hungarians in Transylvania seeking integration on their own terms into the Ro-manian state have all failed since 1920. We have seen considerable evidence of conflicting identity structures and competing ethnopolitical strategies that divide the Romanian political community along ethnic fault-lines, and we have taken note of survey results that show a negative trend of the indicators of mutual toler-ance. Guided by normative considerations, we explored the relationship of Hun-garians in Transylvania to the Romanian political community and reached the conclusion that this relationship is precarious. Finally, a brief assessment of the role of the two states was presented, revealing that the level of interference of the two states is quite high and that this thwarts the chances of more pervasive patterns of mutual acceptance.

Drawing the line, we can conclude that George W. White's hypothesis con-cerning the construction of something particularly Transylvanian, with the joint efforts of Romanians and Hungarians in the region, seems quite unlikely. Romanians do not seem ready to accept that the definition of the Romanian politi-cal community could include anything related to Hungarians, and the Hungarians in Transylvania are evidently unwilling to cooperate at the cost of giving up their Hungarianness. *Transylvanianism,* the ideology which could lay the ground for the type of cooperation and political innovation White considers plausible, re-mained, as we have seen, isolated in time and in the minds of a few visionary thinkers of the Hungarian elite in interwar Transylvania. The promising attempt to reinvent Transylvanianism in more appropriate terms and conditions, launched in 2000 by the *Provincia*-group, remained, as we have seen, a short-lived endeavor with no impact at all on the region's dominant identity structures.

What would be necessary to trigger change that could make White's vision concerning the potential of the region more plausible?

An initial theoretical option would be the "self-revision" advocated by Makkai in 1931, which would translate in contemporary terms into a thorough reconsider-ation of the identity structures and etnopolitical options prevailing today in Hun-garian public opinion in Transylvania. Such a reconsideration, should it prove possible, could allow perhaps a gradual demobilization of the Romanian majority with regard to the "dangers" posed by the Hungarian minority to the Romanian nation-state, and the salient differences between the Hungarian and Romanian components of public opinion in Transylvania could gradually disappear. Once the mental structures of mutual mistrust are deconstructed, the Romanian state could accept some of the main ethnopolitical targets of the Hungarian minority, which could enhance the loyalty of the members of the Hungarian community to-

wards the Romanian state. A more harmonious integration of the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community could be the grounds on which "something Transylvanian", as White puts it, could emerge in the territory.

The second theoretical option would be the triple transformation of the Romanian political community, according to Linklater's recommendations. If the Romanian political community could become "more hospitable to cultural difference" and could accept "wider communities of discourse", the Hungarians in Transylvania could have a say in defining the Romanian political community, could see themselves reflected in the symbols of the state and gradually would start to "feel at home" within the Romanian political community.

The first option would require the Hungarians to take the initiative, the second would depend on the stance taken by the Romanian political elite. Since neither of the two parties seems convinced of the advantages that might follow, these two options seem equally implausible.

A third possibility could be that if everything remains as it is, history could offer the solution on the medium and long run. The demographical forecasts, as we have seen, foretell a rapid shrinking of the Hungarian population in Transylvania. The population loss can be further amplified by the push-and-pull effect exercised by the behavior of the two states. Romania, being firmly reluctant to accept the main ethnopolitical objectives of the Hungarian community, generates a sense of community failure in the younger generations of Hungarians in Transylvania, who could decide to leave and seek new forms of belonging in Hungary or elsewhere. This trend could be amplified by the policies of the Hungarian state, facing itself a serious demographic deficit. It has been quite common in past years that increasing numbers of Hungarian institutions recruited members of a properly educated, Hungarian speaking work force from neighboring countries, especially in fields left behind by Hungarian citizens who moved to western countries seeking better paying jobs. It has also been observed that educational institutions, middle and high schools in Hungary, risking closure due to the decrease in the number of children, recruit Hungarian students from outside Hungary. The graduates of several university departments in Transylvania in which education is provided in Hungarian enter the Hungarian labor market, their return to Transylvania often being improbable. Judging from the mere statist perspective, it can be observed that the interests of Romania and Hungary seem to coincide for the first time since 1920: the massive, though gradual transfer of the Hungarian population in Transylvania to Hungary seems to be in the interests of both states anchored in the logic of the nation-state, in spite of contradictory public statements on one side or the other.

Finally, an alternative solution could be offered by the European Union. The dynamics unleashed by the various aspects of European integration, though the success cannot yet be taken for granted, may easily foster the reconsideration of

identity structures and ethnopolitical strategies which, for the time being, does not seem to be in the interest of either Romanians, or Hungarians, both in Hungary and in Transylvania. The evaluation of the chances for such a development would require a separate investigation.

Notes

[1] George W. White: "Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian, or Neither?" In: G. Herb – D. Kaplan (eds.): *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.

[2] Irina Culic: "Magyarság Erdélyben: a mienk, az övék, senkié? Avagy hogyan értelmezzük a kettős állampolgárságról szóló népszavazást és a hozzá kapcsolódó reakciókat?" [Hungarians of Transylvania: ours, theirs, or no one's? Comments on the Referendum Concerning Double Citizenship and the Reactions to It]. *Erdélyi Társadalom*, 3 (2005), no. 1, 127–148.

[3] G. W. White, 1998, 286.

[4] "Magunk revíziója" [Our Self-Revision]. In: Sándor Makkai: *Egyedül* [Alone]. Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh, 1931, 215–217.

[5] "Nem lehet" [It is impossible]. In: Péter Cseke – Gusztáv Molnár (eds): *Nem lehet. A kisebbségi sors vitája* [It is impossible. A Debate on the Minority Condition]. Budapest: Héttorony Kiadó, 1989, 107–111.

[6] Makkai's thesis referring to the "political and moral impossibility" of the minority condition is refuted as well by the abundance of data referring to the diverse ethnic composition of most contemporary states. According to Ch. Pan – B. S. Pfeil (*National Minorities in Europe. Handbook*. Wien: Braumüller, 2003) the 46 states of Europe include 87 different ethnicities which form 337 minority communities officially recognized by the states of the territory in which they live. It is interesting to note that while the population of 10 of the European states count less the 1 million people, among the 337 ethnic groups 5 minority communities number between 5 and 10 million, 4 communities have 2-5 million members, 12 minorities number between 1 and 2 million and 23 communities number between 500,000 and one million. According to J. D. Fearon the 160 most diverse states of the world include 819 sizeable minority groups. In addition, Fearon calculates the mean value for the major regions of the world of the ethnic fractionalization index (the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups): it is 0.48 for the 160 countries researched; 0.24 for the 21 states of the West; 0.45 for the 19 countries of North-America and the Middle East; 0.41 for the 23 states in Latin America and the Caribbean; 0.44 for the 22 states of Asia; 0.41 for the 31 states in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union; 0.71 for 43 states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cf.: J. D. Fearon: *Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups*. Presentation at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29 – September 1. 2002.

[7] It is important to note though that the 1920 census registered a loss of the Hungarian population close to 350,000 in comparison with the census conducted in 1910, which registered 1,653,943 Hungarians living in Transylvania. Cf.: Károly Kocsis (ed.): *South Eastern Europe in Maps*. Budapest: Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2007. The same source will be used for further references to the 1910, 1941 Hungarian and 1920-2002 Romanian census data.

[8] The number of ethnic Hungarian citizens of Romania who emigrated in the period between 1985-1991 is estimated at between 93,000 and 97,500. Cf.: István Horváth: "Az erdélyi

magyarság vándormozgalmi vesztesége 1987–2001 között" [The Emigrational Loss of the Hungarians in Transylvania Between 1987–2001]. In: Tamás Kiss (ed.): *Népesedési folyamatok az ezredforduló Erdélyében* [Demographic Developments in Transylvania at the Turn of the Millennium]. Kolozsvár: RMDSZ Ügyvezető Elnökség – Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 2004, 85.

9   Cf.: Valér Veres: "A romániai magyarság természetes népmozgalma európai kontextusban, 1992–2002 között" [The Natural Ethnodemographic Evolution of the Hungarians in Romania in the European Context Between 1992–2002]. In: Kiss, 2004, pp. 50–51. As far as the issue of assimilation is concerned, see Szilágyi N. Sándor: "Az asszimiláció és hatása a népesedési folyamatokra" [Assimilation and its Impact on the Ethnodemographic Developments]. In: Kiss, 2004, 157–234.

10 Cf.: Horváth, 2004, 90.

11 Cf.: Veres, 2004, 51 and Horváth, 2004, 87.

12 István Csata – Tamás Kiss: *Népesedési perspektívák* [Ethnodemographic Perspectives]. Kolozsvár: RMDSZ Ügyvezető Elnökség – Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 2007. The hypothesis concerning the evolution of the migration rate presumes that it will moderately decrease from 0.055% in 2002 to 0.04% in 2032. Cf.: *Ibid.*, 21–24.

13 *Ibid.*, 45.

14 *Ibid.*, 53–59.

15 Cf.: Irina Livezeanu: *Cultural politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, nation building and ethnic struggle, 1918–1930.* Cornell University Press, 1995. The following references to the book will be on the basis of the Romanian version: *Cultură și naționalism în România Mare, 1918–1930.* București: Editura Humanitas, 1998. As far as the "nationalist consensus" is concerned, Livezeanu notes that the Communist and Socialist parties did not adhere to it, but their disagreement with the nationalizing project had a strong counter-effect: due to their compliance with the Comintern's anti-Romanian stand in the issue of Bessarabia and Bucovina, supporting the Russian expansionism, their position enforced the exclusionary nature of the Romanian nationalism in the interwar period. Livezeanu, 1998, p. 24. As far as the exclusionary, nationalist targets of unification are concerned see: *Ibid.*, 355.

16 Dumitru Șandru: *Populația rurală a României între cele două războaie mondiale* [The Rural Population of Romania between the two World Wars]. Iași: Editura Academiei RSR, 1980, 51. Quoted by Livezeanu, 1998, 19.

17 Sabin Manuilă: "Aspects démographiques de la Transylvanie". In: *La Transylvanie*, 1938, 70–73. Quoted by Livezeanu, 1998, 164.

18 S. Manuilă, *Studiu etnografic asupra populației României* [Ethnographic Study on Romania's Population]. București: Editura Institutului Central de Statistică, 1940, 97.

19 Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 57–63.

20 *Ibid.*, 349–353. See also: Sorin Alexandrescu: *Paradoxul Român* [The Romanian Paradox]. București: Editura Univers, 1998, 67–69.

21 "The Romanization of Transylvania – Livezeanu notes – had to face, after 1918, the challenge of nationalizing three major categories of important foreign enclaves: geographical regions, cultural institutions and cities." Cf.: *Ibid.*, 168.

22 Nándor Bárdi: "Romanian-Hungarian Relations between Past and Present". In: Levente Salat – Samaranda Enache (eds): *The Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the French-German Reconciliation.* Cluj: EDRC, 2004, 79–96.

23 Károly Kós, another important personality (in addition to the previously mentioned Sándor Makkai) of the political and cultural life of the Hungarian minority between the two world wars, was one of the initiators of the first program of political activism calling, in 1920, for the involvement of the Hungarian minority in Greater Romania's political life after two years of

apathy and passive resistance. In 1934 he drew attention to an interesting parallel. In 1848, when a national assembly in Cluj adopted the unconditional unification of Transylvania with Hungary, neither the Germans (Saxons) nor the Romanians assented. In 1918, when a Romanian national assembly in Alba Iulia declared the unconditioned unification of Transylvania with the Romanian Kingdom, the will of the Hungarian community was ignored, while the representatives of the German community assented to the decision much later, only after long negotiations with the representatives of the Romanian community. Cf.: Károly Kós: *Erdély* [Transylvania]. Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1988 (1934), 85–86.

24 Cf.: Zsolt K. Lengyel: *Auf der Suche nach dem Kompromiß. Ursprünge und Gestalten des frühen Transsilvanismus 1918–1928*. München, 1993, 193–238.

25 Stefano Bottoni: "A sztálini 'kis Magyarország' megalakítása (1952)" [The Establishment of the Stalinist 'Small Hungary']. *Regio*, 2003 (3), 89–125. The fact that the territorial autonomy of the Hungarians was imposed from the outside against the will of the country's authorities represents a heavy legacy for any future plans of autonomy in Transylvania.

26 See in this respect Zoltán Bogdán: "Romániai magyar autonómiakoncepciók. Az 1989 és 2006 között kidolgozott törvénytervezetek" [Hungarian Autonomy Projects in Romania. The Draft-Laws Elaborated Between 1989 and 2006.], in: Ferenc Fejtő – Levente Salat – Mária Ludassy – Gábor Egry – Zoltán Bognár: *Autonómia, liberalizmus, szociáldemokrácia* [Autonomy, Liberalism, Social Democracy]. Budapest: EÖKIK, 2006, 85–117.

27 See in this respect L. Nastasă (coord.): *Minorități etnoculturale. Mărturii documentare: Maghiarii din România (1956–1968)* [Ethnocultural Minorities. Witness of the Documents: Hungarians in Romania (1956–1968)]. Cluj: CRDE, 2003, 482–503 and 867.

28 Zsolt K. Lengyel: "Politisches System und Minderheiten in Rumänien 1918-1989. Abriß über die innere Integrationsprobleme des zentralistischen Einheitstaates am Beispiel der Deutschen und der Magyaren". *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, 24 (2001), Heft 2, 12–14. It is important to note in this context that on the side of the Romanians the political projects suggesting the regionalization of Transylvania were modest forms of resistance against the centralizing tendencies of Bucharest. In the context of the general mobilization for cultural unification of the country, described by Livezeanu, the promoters of such projects again and again had to defend themselves against the charges of "separatism". Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 195. It is not difficult to see that any compromise in this concern with the non-Romanians, especially with the Hungarians, would have implied serious political risks.

29 With regard to further details concerning the three strategies, see Nándor Bárdi: "A szupremácia és az önrendelkezés igénye. Javaslatok, tervek az erdélyi kérdés rendezésére (1918–1940)" [The Desire of Supremacy and Self-Determination. Proposals and Projects Aiming to Resolve the Transylvanian Issue (1918–1940)]. In: Nándor Bárdi (ed.): *Források és stratégiák* [Sources and Strategies]. Csíkszereda: Pro-Print, 1999, 29–133.

30 See in this respect the invocation of the journal's editorial: "Mit akarunk [What we want]", in: E. Szokoly (ed.): *Provincia – 2000*. Marosvásárhely: Pro Európa Kiadó, 2001, 5.

31 Concerning the issue of the loyalty of the minority communities in the interwar period see: Ferenc Eiler: "Nemzeti kisebbségek és az állammal szembeni lojalitás a két világháború között" [National Minorities and Loyalty with Respect to the State between the two World Wars]. In: Nóra Kovács – Anna Osváth – László Szarka (eds.): *Etnikai identitás, politikai lojalitás. Nemzeti és állampolgári kötődések.* [Ethnic Identity, Political Loyalty. Ties of Nationality and Citizenship]. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2005, 204–219.

32 Károly Kós: "Kiáltó szó Erdély, Bánság, Körösvidék, Máramaros magyarságához!"[Call to the Hungarians in Transylvania, Banat, the Cris Region and Maramures!] In: Károly Kós – Árpád Paál – István Zágoni: *Kiáltó szó. A magyarság útja. A politikai aktivitás rendszere* [The

Calling Word. The Road of the Hungarians. The System of Political Activism]. Kolozsvár, 1921, 5.

[33] Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 213.

[34] Stefano Bottoni: "Integrálódó kisebbség?" [Minority on the Way to Integration?] In: Nándor Bárdi – Attila Simon (eds.): *Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében* [Strategies of Integration in the History of Hungarian Minorities]. Somorja: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2006, 398.

[35] The orientation towards the political left of the Hungarian minority was due mainly, in addition to the Soviet influence in the region, to the fact that the right-wing Romanian parties blamed the Transylvanian Hungarians for the 1940–1944 occupation of Northern-Transylvania by Hungary, which made any coalition on the right impossible. Cf.: Nándor Bárdi: "A romániai magyar elit generációs csoportjainak integrációs viszonyrendszere" [The System of Relations of the Different Generation-Groups of the Hungarian Elite in Romania]. In: Bárdi – Simon, 2006, 56.

[36] *Ibid.*, 58.

[37] Bottoni, 2006, 398.

[38] 1948: the start of expropriating communal properties; 1953: disbanding the Hungarian Popular Alliance; 1956–57: imprisonment and cruel penalties for sympathizers in Transylvania with the Hungarian revolution; 1959: the unification of Hungarian language educational institutions with institutions where education is provided in Romanian. For details see: *Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale pentru Studierea Dictaturii Comuniste din România* [Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania]: www.presidency.ro, 523–541 (updated in January 8, 2007).

[39] Bárdi, 2006, 58.

[40] Livezeanu, 1998, 217.

[41] Bárdi, 2006, 56.

[42] For details see István Horváth: *Facilitating Conflict Transformation. Implementing the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993–2001.* Hamburg: INCORE Working Paper no. 8, 2002.

[43] Culic, 2005, 144.

[44] Research Center for Interethnic Relations: *Ethnobarometer – Interethnic Relations in Romania,* May – June 2000; Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center: *Barometer of Ethnic Relations,* November 2001; Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center: *Barometer of Ethnic Relations,* October 2002.

[45] Raluca Soreanu: "Autodefinire şi heterodefinire a românilor şi maghiarilor din România. O analiză empirică a stereotipurilor etnice şi a fundamentelor diferite de definire a identităţii etnice" [Autodefinition and Heterodefinition of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. An Empirical Analysis of the Ethnic Stereotypes and the Criteria According to which Ethnic Identity is Defined]. In: G. Bădescu – M. Kivu – M. Robotin (eds.): *Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994–2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnice din România* [Ethnic Barometer 1994–2002. A Perspective on Romania's Interethnic Climate]. Cluj: CRDE, 2005, 65–88.

[46] I. Culic: "Nationhood and Identity: Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania". In: Balázs Trancsényi – Dragoş Petrescu et al (eds): *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies.* Budapest-Iaşi: Regio Books-Polirom, 2001, 237.

[47] *Ibid.*, 241.

[48] I. Culic: "Dilema minoritarului: între identitate civilă şi identitate naţională" [The Dilemma of the Minoritarian: Between Civic and National Identity]. In: Irina Culic – István Horváth – Cristian Stan (eds): *Reflecţii asupra diferenţei* [Reflections on Difference]. Cluj: Editura Limes, 1999, 43.

[49]   *Ibid.,* 46.

[50]   *Idem.*

[51]   Ioana Paul – Mirela Tudoran – Luiza Chilariu: "Români și maghiari. Reprezentări in-grup, out-grup în cazul grupurilor etnice din România" [Romanians and Hungarians. In-group and Out-group Representations in the Case of Ethnic Groups in Romania]. In: Bădescu – Kivu – Robotin (eds), 2005, 89–117.

[52]   Institutul pentru Politici Publice – Gallup: *Intoleranță, discriminare și autoritarism în opinia publică* [Intolerance, Discrimination and Autoritarism in the Public Opinion]. Septembrie, 2003.

[53]   Guvernul României. Departamentul pentru Relații Interetnice [The Romanian Government. Department of Interethnic Relations]: *Climat interetnic în România în pragul integrării europene* [Interethnic Climate in Romania before EU Integration]. Material pentru presă [Information for the press], 4 decembrie 2006.

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