

MIMESIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FICTION OF ZSIGMOND KEMÉNY

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This article examines the novels of mid-nineteenth-century Hungarian author Zsigmond Kemény. Falling roughly at the beginning of what is often referred to in critical literature as the century of psychological realism (1850-1950), Kemény's novels contain numerous examples of the various narrative techniques developed by authors throughout Europe as they called on language to serve both mimesis of action and mimesis of thought. His works can be cited as examples of a European wide shift in literature away from the narration of events towards the narration of thoughts and feelings. This corresponded to the emergence of the conception of the individual that accompanied the Romantic rejection of the Enlightenment faith in the universality of humankind. As texts drawn from one of the less familiar literary traditions of Europe, Kemény's novels constitute illustrations of the international nature of this trend. Moreover, they represent works that develop the distinctive potential of the novel as a genre the audience of which (the reader) has access not only to the actions and deeds, but also the thoughts and impressions of a subjective consciousness.

Keywords: Zsigmond Kemény, psychological novel, free indirect discourse, interior monologue, stream of consciousness

A. Introduction

"Between 1913 and 1915 was born the modern psychological novel."

This statement, made by Leon Edel in his book *The Psychological Novel*, constitutes, even according to Edel himself, something of an exaggeration. While the concept of the psychological novel may have emerged in the decades following the publication of the three works referred to by Edel as marking the inception of this genre (Proust's *Recherche du temps perdu*, Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and Dorothy Richardson's *Pilgrimage*), to claim, as Edel does, that it was these writers who, "for the first time... were seeking to find words that would convey elusive and evanescent thought"² is to ignore numerous critical studies written well before the publication of Edel's book. Despite his dramatic assertion, Edel does not make this mistake. He takes care to note, for example, the observa-

tions of such critics as Wyndham Lewis, who found a predecessor to the stream of consciousness technique in Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*, and Harry Levin, who compares passages from the diary of Fanny Burney to interior monologues in *Ulysses*? Edel himself revises his view. "It was in reality no coincidence that Marcel Proust, James, and Dorothy Richardson found themselves writing psychological novels at the century's turn," he explains. "They were children of the romantic century: rationalism and reason had long before yielded to introspection and feeling."⁴

Edel's contention concerning the importance of the works of these three authors in the creation of the psychological novel may seem valid, however, if one examines not the history of this genre, but rather the history of the criticism that sought to define it. It was in the decades following the publication of these works that historians of literature, in their search for a sort of genesis of this seemingly new fascination with psychology, developed new interpretations of novels by authors like Flaubert, Austin, or Henry James. Works such as *Madame Bovary*, which had previously been characterized as archetypal examples of Realism, came to be regarded as early manifestations of a shift of interest away from the narration of events towards the narration of thoughts and impressions.⁵ A flurry of articles published mostly in the 1950s and 1960s developed new critical concepts to facilitate these readings by supposedly enabling readers to discern passages in third person fiction that expressed the viewpoint of a particular character. This was accompanied by attempts to develop analytical procedures that would allow a reader to detect moments in a text in which the voice of the narrator yielded to the voice of a character.⁶ Edel's assertion concerning the birth of a unique genre gave way to a new understanding of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth as a period of transition in the history of the novel from social to psychological realism, a transition of which the works of Joyce, Proust, and Dorothy Richardson represented not the inception, but the culmination.

A persuasive argument in favor of this interpretation came in 1978 with the publication of Dorrit Cohn's book length study *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction*. Adopting a typological approach to the study of the narration of consciousness, Cohn outlines three distinct techniques that allow for varying degrees of mediation by the narrator in the narration of the thoughts of a character. Drawing examples from a range of novels written in the period beginning in the late eighteenth century and ending roughly in the mid twentieth, Cohn offers paradigmatic illustrations of these techniques. She contends, and her examples suggest, that over the course of this period novels in which an authorial narrator recounts the thoughts and impressions of characters gave way to novels in which characters themselves give voice to their thoughts. This shift in narrative techniques, she argues, corresponds to a growing interest in personal and subjective experience.

A reader searching for examples from one of the less familiar literary traditions of Europe with which to support this interpretation would find a useful resource in the novels of Zsigmond Kemény. These novels, characterized by numerous critics as the first psychological novels in Hungarian, contain examples of each of the three techniques identified by Colin. Falling at the beginning of the period Cohn describes as the "century of psychological realism, - roughly 1850 to 1950," they seem to corroborate her thesis concerning the evolution of the psychological novel. They can be said to occupy an early moment in the development of new approaches to the narration of consciousness, after the novel had begun to include the voices of characters giving expression to their thoughts, yet before narrators deferred to these voices entirely.

Kemény's novels serve as more, however, than examples that might be cited to affirm Colin's interpretation of the history of the novel. As works in which a variety of approaches to the narration of consciousness are adopted, they represent illustrations of the distinctive potential of the novel as a genre. Like the drama the novel can create a fictional world in which fictional characters act. Unlike the drama, however, the novel is not restricted to the presentation of surface alone (action, spoken word, or event). It can explore from a variety of perspectives the consciousnesses of its characters, narrating both those levels of thought of which a character may be aware and those of which he/she is unaware. In the words of Käte Hamburger, the novel "is the sole epistemological instance where the I-orinigarity (or subjectivity) of a third-person qua third-person can be portrayed."⁷ Kemény's novels epitomize this aspect of the genre.

B. Context

The student of Hungarian literature cannot help but notice, when he/she confronts the secondary literature on Zsigmond Kemény, the variety of labels that have been ascribed to his novels. They have been referred to alternately as 'historical novels,' 'social novels,' 'psychological novels,' 'saloon novels,' and 'novels of purpose.' Often critics draw comparisons between Kemény's novels and works by authors such as Heinrich von Kleist, Walter Scott, Victor Hugo, Balzac, Dostoevsky, and others, but these function merely as substitutes for the generic labels, with 'Walter Scott' acting as a stand in for 'historical novel' or 'Balzac' for 'social novel.'⁸ The diversity of these comparisons seems puzzling in light of the fact that Kemény, unlike his two prolific contemporaries, Miklós Jósika and Mór Jókai, wrote very few novels, four that would fall under the category of historical novel (*Pál Gyulai* - 1847, *Widow and Daughter* - 1855-57, *The Fanatics* - 1858-59, *Forbidding Times* - 1862), two that could be considered social novels (*Husband and Wife* - 1852, *Phantom Visions on the Soul's Horizon* - 1853),

and a few shorter novellas (including *Maelstroms of the Heart*- 1851, *Love and Vanity*- 1853, *Alhikmet*, and *the Aged Dwarf* - 1853). The use of such a variety of labels to refer to this small handful of narratives can give one the impression, looking into the critical literature on Kemény, of reading the proverbial description of an elephant written by a group of blind men.

Of these labels, however, there is one that recurs with notable consistency. Without exception every critic to have written on Kemény before the year 2000 has at some point referred to the emphasis given in his novels to the narration of the thoughts and emotions of characters. In fact, even in his own lifetime Kemény had the reputation of a writer whose works showed an unprecedented (in Hungarian literature) interest in psychology. In an article written in 1854 fellow novelist and poet Pál Gyulai (not to be confused with the title character of Kemény's novel *Pál Gyulai*) comments that Kemény's "faithful depiction of passions (...) places emphasis on psychological developments."⁹ Ágost Greguss, author of the first systematic treatment in Hungarian of Schlegel's concept of romantic irony (*A szépiészet alapvonalai* [An Outline of Aesthetics], 1849), claims in an article from 1856 that, "each of Kemény's works is a psychological study in the strictest sense of the term."¹⁰ After Kemény's death these interpretations of his oeuvre were canonized in histories of Hungarian literature. Ferencz Szinyei, author of a monumental history of prose fiction in Hungarian, calls Kemény "the creator (...) in our literature of the modern psychological novella and novel."¹¹ Dániel Veress, writing almost a century later, concurs, citing Kemény's *Love and Vanity* as "the first psychological novel, in the whole sense of the term, in Hungarian literature."¹² Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, a contemporary critic thoroughly familiar with international trends in European literary history, writes that, "Kemény initiated a development in Realism which lead to the formation of the psychological novel."¹³ He goes on to add that with the exception of Stendhal no European author before Flaubert, James, and Dostoevsky was as preoccupied with psychology as Kemény.¹⁴ Numerous similar citations could be added. One final example is sufficient to demonstrate that Kemény's reputation as the author of the first profound psychological novels in Hungarian has endured. Dezső Kozma, writing in the last year of the twentieth century, asserts, "among our writers few knew as much about the most subtle tremors of man's inner life as he."¹⁵

This broad consensus offers a critical angle from which one can impose some unity on the oeuvre of an author whose works otherwise display striking dissimilarities. Novels set in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Transylvania can be set alongside novels set in mid-twentieth-century Hungary as examples of narratives that deploy numerous strategies in order to give expression to the thoughts of characters. Drawing comparisons with other works of European literature, one can see Kemény's novels as part of a process, beginning with Richardson's *Pamela* or Goethe's *Werther* and culminating in the stream of consciousness experiments

of Dujardin or Joyce, in which narrative fiction came to focus less on the narration of events and more on the narration of thoughts and emotions. His novels can be analyzed as the manifestation in a less widely known literary tradition of a broadly European shift in conceptions of the proper subject matter of narrative fiction.

Much of the critical literature on Kemény operates on the premise that interpretations of his novels must be based on observations concerning his life. Nowhere is this better epitomized than in the contention of Ferencz Szemlér that,

it is impossible to separate the literary work and the man from one another. From the creator emerges the work, but in the work the creator himself can be discerned in his entirety. The historian of literature strives to find explanations for the work on the basis of biography!]¹⁶

The pervasiveness of this assumption is made clear by the fact that very few critics writing on Kemény fail to include biographical sketches in their books and articles, though Ferencz Papp's two volume biography of Kemény, based partly on documents that have, in the turbulent decades following its publication in 1922, been lost or destroyed, remains the most thorough account of the author's life. However, since there is no comparable material available on Kemény in English, it is necessary, as a preface to a discussion of the philosophical context of his novels, to give a brief summary of his life.

Zsigmond Kemény was born in 1814 in the small town of Alvinc, Transylvania (today Vințu de Jos in Romania), at the time a territory of the Habsburg Empire. By the time of his twentieth birthday he had already begun to take an active part in the political life of Transylvania, participating in the local assembly as an advocate of the liberal opposition. In 1835, following the forceful dissolution of the assembly, Kemény composed a brief study entitled "Historical Fragment" (*Históriai töredék*) of a period in Hungary's history beginning with the reign of King Mátyás in 1458 and concluding with the assassination of the Cardinal Martinuzzi of Transylvania in 1551. This period saw what many consider the worst disaster of Hungarian history, the defeat of the Hungarian army at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1526. This defeat led to the occupation of most of Hungary by Ottoman forces for the following 150 years. The mountainous region of Transylvania, which had been the eastern part of the Hungarian kingdom, became a principedom that maintained its precarious independence by paying tributes to the Sultan. "Historical Fragment" is important as the first of many essays Kemény wrote on Hungary's history. It is an early indication of the interest he took in the turbulent past of his native land, an interest that was later reflected in his decision to write several novels set in the conspiracy ridden courts of sixteenth and seventeenth century Transylvania.

Towards the end of the 1830s Kemény spent two years in Vienna studying medicine. Here he was exposed to the writings of German authors such as Goethe, Schiller, and Friedrich Schlegel. As the liberal reform movement in Hungary gained strength Kemény returned to Transylvania to take an active role in politics as a member of the liberal opposition. The 1840s were a time of tumultuous transitions in Hungary, as charismatic statesmen like Lajos Kossuth and fervently populist poets such as Sándor Petőfi fueled the growing desire among the Hungarian population of the Habsburg Empire for independence. Kemény took a skeptical attitude towards this movement. As a native of Transylvania, one of the more ethnically diverse regions of Hungary, he recognized that Hungary did not form a linguistically homogenous whole. Kemény feared that the diversity of its population would imperil the country if it were to attempt secession. When revolution did break out in 1848 Kemény welcomed the measures adopted by the new government, including the abolition of serfdom and emancipation of the Jewish population of Hungary, while at the same time remaining apprehensive about the outcome of the struggle for independence. His fears were realized when, in 1849, with the help of the Russian army, Austria defeated Hungary's forces and a new era of authoritarian repression began.

In the years following the defeat of the revolution Kemény wrote two essays ("After the Revolution" - *Forradalom után* - and "One More Word After the Revolution" - *Még egy szó a forradalom után*) condemning the leaders (most particularly Kossuth) who had led Hungary into what Kemény had correctly predicted would be a hopeless, bloody struggle. Fearing that the upheavals of the era would sever his generation from its traditions. Kemény contributed to the preservation of Hungarian national identity by supporting cultural organizations such as the *Újabbkori Ismeretek Tára*. In 1853 he himself published the text of the Grievous Hungarian Chronicle (*Síralmas magyar krónika*), a manuscript of seventeenth century Transylvanian scribe János Szalárdi, from which Kemény took the story of his novel *Widow and Daughter* (*Özvegy és leánya*). In 1855 he became the chief editor of Hungary's most important political periodical, the Pest Diary (*Pesti Napló*), for which he authored several articles criticizing Vienna for its expansionist foreign policy. By 1860 he had begun to play an active role as a spokesman, through his articles in the Pest Diary, for the political party led by Ferenc Deák, who sought to win more autonomy for Hungary within the Habsburg Empire through compromise. These efforts came to fruition in 1866-67, when the imperial government in Vienna, threatened by the ever-stronger German state under Bismarck, negotiated the so-called Compromise of 1867, recognizing Hungary as a kingdom within the Empire, autonomous in all aspects of public life except for foreign policy, military, and banking. By this time, however, Kemény's health had declined. He no longer ran as a representative of the political party in

which he had played a formative role. By 1870 he had ceased to write for the Pest Diary. In 1873 he returned to Transylvania, where he died in 1875.

Kemény's literary career spanned what could be characterized as the two most tumultuous decades of Hungary's history in the nineteenth century. Casting off its feudal institutions, Hungary began, through the liberal reforms initiated in the 1840s and realized, partly, in the Compromise of 1867, its development into a modern democratic state. In the rapidity of these changes Kemény perceived a danger. He feared that as a result of the many upheavals of its history, from the Ottoman occupation to the liberation of the country in the late seventeenth century by the Habsburg armies to the failed struggle for independence in the mid-nineteenth, Hungary would lose touch with the culture of its past. In the two novels that have usually been characterized as social novels (*Husband and Wife* and *Phantoms Visions on the Soul's Horizon*) Kemény offered a critique of the era's faith in progress by depicting what he perceived as the inevitable failure of rapid change imposed on a culture from without. In his four historical novels, based in part on Transylvanian manuscripts, Kemény hoped to reestablish some continuity between the literary culture of his generation and the literature of Hungary's past.

Yet to characterize these works as historical or social novels is perhaps to overlook their importance as examinations of the complexity of the human psyche. In a letter to Jósika, Kemény himself described his novel *Pál Gyulai* as "less the sketch of an era as the sketch of a psyche."³ The story of Gyulai's fate, Kemény commented, was uninteresting. The faithful historian "could hardly create something interesting [out of it]."^b In his essay "Life and Literature" Kemény contends that the author of fiction must not content himself with faithful depictions of historical characters. "We all know the motives of our actions rarely come to light," Kemény comments.

Furthermore the stated reasons are more often ostensible, or are cleverly reasoned out of conjectures after the fact.

It is certain that, concerning human virtue and sins, there are a few rubrics, and it is into these categories that public opinion groups our actions about which people speak on the streets, in the salons, and in coteries.

But in nine out of ten cases a secret instinct whispers to us that the world is in error, because our actions, praised or condemned, grew out of different sources. Sometimes for example out of a fact that we were careful not to disclose, an exasperation that is a secret, or a

^a Gyulai Pál kevésbé kor- mint lélekrajz. (Szádeczky Béla. "Magyar írók levelei b. Jósika Miklóshoz. I. B. K. Zs. levelei." *ItK* 1909. 439-47, 443.)

^b Belőle a történéshöz hűn, alig lehet valami érdekest gyártani. (*Ibid.*, 444.)

disposition of the blood or the spirit which is inexplicable even before us.^c

We are faced with the same riddles, Kemény comments, when dealing with the figures of history. Our knowledge of the motives behind their acts rests equally on "ostensibilities." The historian is compelled to admit only those explanations that can be documented or demonstrated. The author of fiction, Kemény comments, cannot content himself with these explanations. An author seeking to recreate the characters of history must recognize that, "as soon as [these characters] act simply according to historical motivations, they will be regarded as lacking motive altogether."¹

Kemény's comments are echoed in the writings of twentieth century novelist E.M. Forster. In his *Aspects of the Novel* Forster remarks that a novelist writing about Queen Victoria cannot limit his tale to the retelling of actions and events. He must "reveal the hidden life at its source (...) tell us more about Queen Victoria than could be known, and thus (...) produce a character who is not the Queen Victoria of history."¹⁷ What Forster and Kemény touch on in these remarks is the fundamental difference between dramatization and narration to which Thomas Mann referred when he dismissively characterized drama as an art of silhouette:

The novel is more exact, more complete, more knowing, more conscientious, and deeper than the drama in all things that concern cognition of men as body and character, and, in contradiction to the view that the Drama is the truly three dimensional form of literature, I admit that I perceive [drama] more as an art of silhouette and only narrated man as round, whole, true, and three dimensional. One is a viewer at a theater performance; one is much more than this in a narrated world.¹⁸

If the novel, unlike the drama, is limited to mere words on a page, it is at the same time less constrained by the illusion of mimesis. There is no restriction, for example, on time, and the novel can depict the events of centuries in a matter of

^c Mindnyájan tudhatjuk, hogy tetteink rugói ritkán kerülnek nyilvánosság elé. Sőt az elmondott okok többnyire ostensibilisek, vagy a viszonyok találgatásából utólagosan vannak kiokoskodva. Bizonyos, hogy az emberi erényre és bűnökre nézve néhány nagy rubrika létezik, s azok alá sorolja a közvélemény oly tetteinket, melyekről az utcán, a szalonokban, és a koteriáknál beszéd foly.

De tíz esetből kilencben egy titkos ösztön súgni fogja nekünk, hogy a világ tévedésben van, mert vádlott vagy dicsért tetteink más forrásokból eredtek. Néha p.o. egy tényből, melyet gondosan eltakartunk, egy ingerültségből, mely titok, vagy a vér és szellem oly diszpozíciójából, mely előttünk is kimagyarázhatlan. (*Élet és irodalom.* 166.)

^d [M]ihelyt csak a történelmi motívumok szerint cselekednek, minden ember motiválatlan jellemnek fogná [őket] tartani. (*Ibid.*, 167.)

seconds or devote hundreds of pages to the events of an hour. More importantly for this discussion, the novel is not limited to appearances, and can explore in depth the subtle, mysterious, sometimes contradictory relationship between spoken language and unspoken thought.

In his writings on form and function in literature Kemény draws precisely this contrast between the novel and the drama. "If the novelist has the right," he contends, "to offer little story and can make do without (...) the interest aroused by plot complication - which the author of drama cannot do - then we can at least ask of him that in place of plot we see true life, which can draw us in with its calm progression, in place of deliberate complexity always changing and developing feelings, impulses, passions[.]"^c This statement represents a striking antithesis to a European doctrine of literary aesthetics inherited from Aristotle's *Poetics*. For Aristotle "plot is the first principle and, as it were, soul of tragedy."¹⁹ Of the components of a drama (spectacle, character, plot, diction, lyric poetry, and thought), "the most important (...) is the structure of events."²⁰ This view, though it underwent a number of revisions and substitutions over the centuries, nevertheless continued to exert a powerful force on attitudes towards literature up until the beginning of the nineteenth century. As late as 1858 it surfaced in an essay by Hungarian novelist Miklós Jósika, who maintained that, "the interesting story [is] one of the crucial components of the novel."²¹

Yet Kemény's comment, however radical a departure from Aristotle's dictum, hardly constituted an idea novel at the time he wrote his essay. It was rather an echo of views that had already found expression in works by authors from all over Europe. Decades before Kemény was born Rousseau had claimed, as the chief virtue of his novel *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, "the simplicity of the subject and the continuous chain of interest, which (...) is sustained over six volumes, without episodes, without fantastic adventures[.]"²² "It is easy to rouse the reader's attention," Rousseau contended, "by ceaselessly presenting him with extraordinary events (...) But to keep it always focused on the same objects, without the aid of marvelous adventures, that truly is more difficult[.]"²³ Friedrich von Blanckenburg, one of the first to attempt a systematic theory of the novel, expressed similar disdain for narrative that relies on intrigue. Distinguishing between the writer (*Dichter*) and "the mere story-teller" (*bloß Erzähler*), Blanckenburg insisted that the true writer must acquaint his readers with "the inner existence [*das ganze innere Sein*] of the character in its entirety."²⁴ Wordsworth, in his "Preface to the

^c [H]a a regényírónak joga van egy hosszas munkában igen kevés mesét adni és a bonyolítás általi érdeket (...) mellőzheti mit a drámaíró nem tehet -, akkor viszont legalább annyit kívánhatunk tőle, hogy a mese helyett valódi életet, mely csendes menetével is tud vonzani, a bonyolítás helyett pedig mindig mozgó és fejlődő érzéseket, indulatokat, szenvedélyeket (...) láthassunk. (*Élet és irodalom*. 154.)

Lyrical Ballads," wrote that in his poetry "the feeling (...) gives importance to the action and situation, and not the action and situation to the feeling."²⁵ In 1833, in an essay entitled "What is Poetry," John Stuart Mill stated his view that it matters little that "the incidents of a dramatic poem (...) be scanty and ineffective," as long as "the delineation of passion and character (...) be of the highest order."²⁶ Whereas according to Aristotle, "without action there could be no tragedy, but without character there could be,"²⁷ for these authors this contention was clearly not valid.

A reader searching for some explanation for this apparent shift of interest away from plot towards character might be tempted to interpret this change as a corollary to what has been described as a fundamental opposition between Enlightenment and Romantic thought. Critical literature has tended to characterize the Enlightenment as a period dominated by an assumption of the uniformity of humankind. Romanticism, on the other hand, has been considered a movement that regarded differences between cultures and individuals as significant. These conclusions, presented in elaborate detail by such authors as Arthur Lovejoy (not one to ascribe carelessly to period concepts) and M. H. Abrams, rest on copious excerpts from the writings of authors defined as representative of the two movements.²⁸ Rather than reproduce these arguments, it is sufficient to refer to two citations that illustrate this contrast. The first, from David Hume's *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* written in 1748, expresses the belief referred to by Lovejoy as the "Uniformitarianism" of the Enlightenment. The second, from Johann Gottfried Herder's *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele* written in 1778, articulates a contrary view claimed to be typical of Romanticism.

It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the acts of men, in all nations and all ages, and that human nature remains the same in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes. (...) Mankind are [sic] so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior.²⁹

The deepest ground of our being is individual, in feelings as well as thoughts (...) All the species of animals are perhaps not so distinct from one another as man is from men.³⁰

Such a shift in conceptions of humankind provides a context in which the interest in character expressed by Kemény and others seems a natural part of a larger

philosophical trend. Aristotle's definition of drama as mimesis of action, it could be argued, harmonized well with a view of human nature as uniform. If the passions underlying a particular deed are common to all then the writer merely has to depict the deed in order to imply the passion. Kemény himself offered this characterization of the poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In an essay entitled "Classicism and Romanticism" he contended that Renaissance poetry "painted not the man, with his impulses and passions, but rather the impulses and passions themselves, unbound from circumstance and mediating elements[.]"^f For a movement that rejects the principle of uniformity, if Romanticism can be referred to as such, the writer cannot rely on characterizations that derive exclusively from descriptions of actions and events. Blankenburg touches on this, contending that, "When we, in the real world, cannot understand and observe in each instance the causes that depict an occurrence this way rather than that, this is because the sum of the causes is too large and various, the whole too entangled in itself- more so than we would like."³¹ Poets and authors of narrative fiction must find other techniques, apart from the description of actions, through which to create unique characters by exploring a range of possible interpretations of a specific deed or occurrence.

This notion of humankind as "individual, in feelings as well as thoughts" can be seen as the impetus behind numerous changes of form in narrative fiction throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth as authors sought new means of expressing the emotions and perceptions of characters. As several works on Romanticism demonstrate, following Young's *Night Thoughts* and Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*, first published in 1742 and 1751 respectively, the use of the first person in verse accompanied the ascent of the lyric as a form propitious to the exploration of personal experience over the epic as a form more suited to the retelling of events. The latter half of the eighteenth century could be said to have witnessed an analogous development in prose fiction. Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) and Goethe's *Werther* (1774) exemplify a shift away from a retelling of events, typified by such novels as Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), towards an examination of the thoughts of characters freed from the mediation of a narrator. In Hungarian literature József Kármán's *Fanni's Legacy* (*Fanni hagyományai*- 1794), also an epistolary novel, evidenced a similar desire for a narrative form that focused on character over plot. This tendency continued in the nineteenth century in narratives that, though written in the third person, nevertheless devoted as much attention to a character's reflections as they did to plot. Stendhal's *Le Rouge et le noir* (1830) or Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (1856)

^f A renaissance költészete (...) nem az embert feste indulataival és szenvedélyeivel, hanem magokat az idulatokat és szenvedélyeket, feloldva az esetlegestől és a közvetítő elemektől[.] ("Classicismus és romantikus." In: *Koszorú*. 1964, Jan. 10. 25-26.)

could be mentioned as examples of novels that use such techniques as interior monologue or free indirect speech to narrate the thoughts of a character. Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866) could be cited as a work that focuses on the ambiguous relationship between act and motive. So-called stream-of-consciousness fiction can be seen as a logical conclusion of a trend towards the removal of the mediating presence of the narrator.

In this light Kemény's works, published between 1847 and 1862, seem to fall roughly in the middle of a shift that began in the last decades of the eighteenth century and ended, if indeed it ended at all, with the Structuralists' challenge to the notion of the individual. Robert Humphrey, in his book *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel*, argues for such a historical turn from novels of action to novels of thought. "There is a difference," he contends,

and it is a tremendous difference, between Zola and Dreiser, say, two novelists who attempted a kind of laboratory method in fiction, and the stream of consciousness writers. It is indicated chiefly in the difference in subject matter - which is, for the earlier novelists, motive and action (external man) and for the latter ones, psychic existence and functioning (internal man). The difference is also revealed in the psychological and philosophical thinking in back of this. Psychologically it is the distinction between behavioristic concepts and psychoanalytical ones; philosophically, it is that between a broad materialism and a generalized existentialism. Combined it is the difference between being concerned about what one does and being concerned about what one is.³²

Although the distinction that Humphrey draws between the fiction of Dreiser and Joyce is certainly plausible, his contention could be said to be equally true of Balzac and Flaubert or, for that matter, Jósika and Kemény. The shift he identifies from behavioristic concepts to psychoanalytic ones could be said to have appeared in literature long before William James coined the term stream-of-consciousness in 1890.³³ Kemény works could be cited as texts that support Dorrit Cohn's conclusion that "the 'inward turning' of the stream-of-consciousness novel is not nearly so singular a phenomenon, nor so radical a break with tradition as has been assumed[.]"³⁴

C. Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness: Dorrit Colin

Should she go up to the curtain? After all, she had a right to see the body to which she had given life... and death. She was the mother and the murderer, she had baptized and cursed, nursed and devoured her child... the female Saturnus. Oh Sára! Had the window glazed

over or was it Tamóczy's eye that she barely saw in. But now from inside came the sound of weeping... the voice of a woman sobbing. Judit grieved instead of the mother, she tore her shawl, wiped her tears with her disheveled hair. Away, away from here!¹⁸

This passage, from Kemény's novel *Widow and Daughter*, describes the thoughts of widow Tamóczy as she stands outside the room in which the body of her daughter lies draped in a shroud. Mrs. Tamóczy is slowly coming to understand that she herself is to blame for her daughter's suicide. Not only did she force her daughter to marry against her will, she plotted to bring about the execution of the man Sára loved. Her obsessive loathing of Mihály Mikes and his family left her blind to the fact that her daughter had fallen in love with Mihály's son János. Not realizing that Sára had willingly fled her mother's home with János, widow Tamóczy had insisted that János be apprehended for kidnapping. Under the (mistaken) impression that János had been sentenced to death, she had told her daughter with glee of the impending execution. Sára, upon hearing this, had taken leave of her mother and gone to her room, where she had stabbed herself in the heart.

Widow and Daughter, originally published in three volumes in 1855-56, is, as previously noted, a historical novel based on an account found in the *Grievous Hungarian Chronicles* (Siralmas Magyar Krónika) of seventeenth century scribe János Szalárdi. At the time Kemény composed his novel several other authors were writing similar narratives based on this tale, among them Albert Pálffy (*The House in Szeben -A szebeni ház*, 1853) and Sándor Halmágyi (*Battle of Hearts - Szívek harca*, 1855). Unlike the works of these authors, which tend to focus on retelling the events of the story, Kemény's novel gives great importance to the narration of the emotional struggles of the characters. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák characterizes it as "a psychological tragedy... superimposed on a story borrowed from a seventeenth-century historian."³⁵

András Martinkó refers to Kemény as "one of the great masters of the complex use of perspective in Hungarian literature."³⁶ The description of widow Tamóczy's troubled deliberations certainly seems an example of this. It could be said to shift several times between the viewpoint of the third person narrator and that of Tamóczy. The fact that the passage begins with a question rather than an assertion suggests that it constitutes an echo of the thoughts mulling through Mrs. Tamóczy's mind rather than merely descriptive statements given from a third person per-

¹⁸ Fölmenjen-e a téritőhöz? Hisz neki joga van látni a tetemet, melynek életet adott... és halált. Ő az anya és a magzatgyilkos, ő kereszteltető és átkozta meg, szoptatta és falta föl gyermekét... a nő Satumus. Ó Sára! Az ablak homályosult-e el, vagy Tarnóczyné szeme, hogy alig lát odáig? De a teremből most lehallott a zokogás... egy síró asszony hangja. Judit kesereg az anya helyett, ő tépi köntösét, szárítja leomló hajával könnyeit. El, el innen! *(Özveggy és leánya*. 423.)

spective. The exclamation "Oh Sára!" could be construed as a direct quote of Mrs. Tarnóczy's unspoken thoughts. The explicit reference to Tarnóczy in the fifth sentence, however, implies the perspective of the narrator, while the exclamation with which the passage concludes suggests a return to the thoughts of the widow.

How might a reader approaching a passage such as this one address these ambiguities? If, as Edel contends, point of view "must be at the center"³⁷ of any study of the psychological novel, this question is crucial to developing interpretations of Kemény's works as early examples of this genre. What critical procedures might a reader adopt in order to make distinctions between a statement that expresses the view of a narrator and a statement that expresses the view of a character? To what extent can these statements be said to depict the mental state of a character? Can a reader distinguish discrete techniques that allow for shifts in perspective? Does there seem to be any pattern in the use of these techniques over time?

It is to these questions that Dorit Cohn's *Transparent Minds* offers possible answers. In her discussion of narrative modes for the presentation of consciousness Cohn identifies three techniques each of which imply a radically different relationship between the narrator and a statement depicting the inner life of a character. In order to distinguish these concepts from similar ideas discussed in the works of her contemporaries Cohn coins three terms: psycho-narration, quoted monologue, and narrated monologue. Psycho-narration refers to commentary by a narrator on the thoughts or the emotional state of a character. Quoted monologue refers to passages that can be read as if they were direct quotations of a character's thoughts as those thoughts are articulated by the character. Narrated monologue refers to a passage that present the character's thoughts in the guise of third person narration. These techniques can be distinguished from each other, Cohn argues, based primarily on grammatical but also on stylistic criteria. Psycho-narration is third-person narration reported in past tense. Quoted monologue is rendered in first-person present tense. Narrated monologue, though it preserves the third-person pronoun and the past tense, is cast in the idiom of a particular character, which is distinct from the idiom of the narrator. Examples of these categories may prove more helpful than explanations of the linguistic grounds on which they are based. I use the same sentence to introduce each of the following three examples:

Psycho-narration: The little boy looked up and saw someone coming. He realized that it was his mother. She seemed tired to him.

Quoted monologue: The little boy looked up and saw someone coming. "It's mommy!" he thought. "She looks kinda sleepy."

Narrated monologue: The little boy looked up and saw someone coming. It was mommy. She looked kinda sleepy.³⁸

These examples make clear the basic features of the three techniques defined by Cohn. While a reader, it would seem, can generally recognize psycho-narration and quoted monologue by the grammatical form in which they are cast or, for that matter, by the inquit formulae ('he thought') with which a character's thoughts are often introduced, this can be more complex with narrated monologue. In this example the colloquial speech indicative of a child's vocabulary ('mommy' and 'kinda sleepy') suggests that these sentences represent the thoughts of the child as he would have put them into words.

Cohn was not, as she acknowledges, the first critic to coin terms for these concepts. Her terms, however, have a degree of exactitude that others lack. Derek Bickerton, for example, used the term 'omniscient description' to refer to a narrator's commentary on the mental state of a character.³⁹ This is imprecise, Cohn points out, since omniscient description could refer, for example, to the narrator's description of events of which a character is unaware. Psycho-narration, she explains, has the advantage of referring both to the subject matter described (psychological processes) and the activity it denotes (narration). Quoted monologue could be seen as a synonym either for interior monologue or soliloquy. Cohn argues that these two terms refer to the same phenomenon. The quotation of a character's thoughts, she argues, is always distinguished from the narrative around it by "the reference to the thinking self in the first person and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense."⁴⁰ Narrated monologue resembles free indirect discourse with the important difference, Cohn insists, that it refers only to the narration of a character's thoughts, not his speech.

Although Cohn's study is, in principle, a discussion of these three forms and the potential of each as a tool for the mimesis of consciousness, it nevertheless traces the outlines of a historical process. "I have not altogether disregarded the historical dimension," Cohn writes in the preface.

The direction in which I sweep across the principle techniques generally corresponds to evolutionary changes of fictional form: from vocal to hushed authorial voices, from dissonant to consonant relations between narrators and protagonists, from maximal to minimal removes between the language of the text and the language of consciousness (...) [t]he fact that I begin with narrators who exclude inside views and end with interior monologue texts that exclude narrators also suggests that my typological lines are not entirely disengaged from the historical axis.⁴¹

In formal terms (those provided by Cohn), the changes to which she refers can be summarized as a move away from narratives in which psycho-narration is the dominant technique towards narratives in which quoted monologue prevails. Whereas psycho-narration tends to create the illusion of an author speaking to the

reader about the thoughts and feelings of characters, quoted monologue allows for the silencing of this authorial voice as characters give voice to their thoughts themselves. Cohn argues that over the course of the nineteenth century, as authors such as Flaubert and Henry James advocated the removal of conspicuous narrators from fiction, quoted monologue came to play an ever more prominent role in narrative, culminating in the almost complete disappearance of psycho-narration in some of the stream of consciousness novels of the early twentieth century.

Cohn's concepts furnish the reader with tools with which to evaluate the merits of the now cliché (in Hungarian literary history) characterization of Kemény's works as psychological novels. Analyses of these texts reveal that the author availed himself of each of the three modes for presenting consciousness defined by Cohn. Moreover, one finds in Kemény novels examples of the many forms these different modes may take. This suggests a new perspective from which to consider Kemény's place in European literary history. His works offer illustrations of the narrative techniques developed by writers throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth as they called on language to serve not only mimesis of action, but mimesis of consciousness.

D. Psycho-narration

Returning to Edel's assertion concerning the origins of the psychological novel, one finds in his work another suggestion regarding the progenitor of this genre. Having conceded that his original claim is an oversimplification, Edel contends that, "the psychological novel [was] accidentally founded by Samuel Richardson."⁴² If one traces the psychological novel back to the epistolary novels of the late eighteenth century (notable examples include Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) in English, Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) in French, Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774) in German, József Kármán's *Fanny's Legacy* (1794) in Hungarian), then the technique described by Cohn as psycho-narration was long in coming. Up until well into the nineteenth century many authors of narrative fiction seemed hesitant to suggest that they had unlimited access to the thoughts of their characters. The injunction of Friedrich von Blankenburg notwithstanding ("the writer [Dichter] (...) cannot hold to the pretense that he does not know the inner world of his characters"⁴³), characterization in third person fiction tended to rely on the narrator's mention of telling gestures such as "she blushed" or "he sobbed." As Cohn points out, the narrator of Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), though he does enter into the mind of the title character, is more reluctant when dealing with Sofia, describing her reactions but denying any knowledge of her thoughts:

A gentle sigh stole from Sofia at these words, which perhaps contributed to form a dream of no very pleasant kind; but as she never revealed this dream to anyone, so the reader cannot expect to see it related here.⁴⁴

A fascinating example of similar reticence is found in the novel *Abaß* (1836) by Kemény's contemporary Miklós Jósika. Although in the preface Jósika claims, "it is a psychological sketch that I give to the reader,"⁴⁵ his narrator rarely touches on the thoughts or feelings of the characters, relying instead on descriptions of the observable:

The old man's face suddenly whitened, he screwed up his eyes, and it seemed as if he wanted to flee.¹¹

Alongside such passages, however, run others in which the narrator appears to have some knowledge of his characters' emotions:

The rough man felt something, he himself knew not what, but the feeling was pleasant to his heart. It seemed from his face that he was almost surprised.¹

Jósika, writing almost a century after Fielding, is willing to wander into his character's mind, but then quick to retreat and fall back on the technique of mentioning an observable detail from which the character's emotional state can be inferred. This tendency, which, according to Colin, "dominates the third person novel well into the nineteenth century,"⁴⁶ explains the characterization of Jósika as an author whose characters "are often distinguished from one another only by their appearances, sometimes only by their names."⁴⁷ Some critics, noting the interest Kemény's works evince in the inner lives of their characters, draw contrasts between the two authors. Szinyei contends that in his historical novels, "Kemény does not bother sketching the external details of the era as much as Jósika."⁴⁸ Papp maintains that Kemény's characters, "in who we feel at every moment the movement of an endless inner life, are in total opposition to the heroes of Jósika's novels."⁴⁹

These observations concerning differences between Kemény and Jósika notwithstanding, Kemény's narrators are occasionally as hesitant as Jósika's to describe a character's mental state. In the following example from an early, unfinished novel by Kemény entitled *Queen Izabella and the Hermit* (*Izabella királyné*

^h Az öreg arcát hirtelen sápadtság ömlé el, szemeit összeszorítá, s úgy látszék, szökni akar. (*Abaß*. 13-14.)

¹ A durva férfiú érzett valamit, maga sem tudta mit, de szívének elfogódása kellemes volt. Úgy látszék arcából, hogy szinte megdöbbsent. (*Abaß*. 19.)

és a remete) the queen of Transylvania listens to the sound of a canon being fired in the distance to mark the admission of her son into the ranks of the Ottoman armies that have occupied her homeland and robbed her of her child:

She heard the blast of the canon that signaled her son's entry into the Sultan's tent. At that sound, both anticipated and feared, she fell back into her seat, her pale face resembled that of a corpse, but her lips moved. Probably she prayed, only half conscious, as if she were dreaming that she stood before an altar and spoke to God about her child.^j

Not only do Kemény's narrators occasionally seem unwilling or unable to describe a character's thoughts, they too, like the narrators in Jósika's novels, sometimes offer only descriptions of observable details that suggest a character's emotional state. The following passage from *Pál Gyulai* describes the facial expressions of Gergely, a ruthless, power-hungry man, as he torments Pierro, an innocent entertainer who has become embroiled in political schemes:

He twisted the muscles of his face in such contortions that one artist could have assembled an entire album of the most fascinating caricatures, while another - who had chosen to do a study on grief and woe - could have traced every mark of tormented sorrow and mocking resignation.^k

Hungarian literary critic and novelist László Németh argues that passages like this one reveal the influence of Kemény's experiences as a student at a medical school in Vienna. As a young man Kemény studied, among other things, the musculature of the face. He was also exposed to the theories of Ignaz Paul Vitális Troxler (founder of "Anthroposophie," supposedly a mix of philosophy and anthropology), according to which the muscles of the face contract in specific ways in response to changes in a person's emotional state. "It was here," Németh contends, "that Kemény's realism learned the language of facial expressions and gesticulations that both serves and betrays the soul."⁵⁰ While there may be some truth that the occasional descriptions of facial expressions in Kemény's novels were influenced by his exposure to the theories of Troxler, as an approach to characterization this technique was so widespread in European literature that it hardly calls

^j Hallá az agyüdörgést, mely fiának a szultán sátorába lépését adta jelül. A várt s rettegett jelre karszékebe hanyatlék, sápadt arca a halottéhoz hasonlított, de ajkai mozogtak. Hihetőleg imádkozott féleszmélettel, mintha álmodna, hogy oltár előtt áll, s az Istennek beszél gyermekéről. (*Izabella királyné és a remete*. Cited in Péterfy, 61.)

^k Arcizmait annyi felé vonta, hogy azokról egy művész egész albumot készíthetett volna a legérdekesebb torzképekkel, s viszont egy másik - ki a szomorút és meghatót választá tanulmányul - lemásolhatná a mardosó bú és szende mélázat minden bélyegeit. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I. 228.)

for explanation. It is a feature that Kemény's novels have in common with the works of virtually all of his contemporaries.

The difference between Kemény's novels and those of Jósika lies in the fact that in Kemény's this technique plays only a minor role. Alongside mention of telling gestures the reader finds passages in which the narrator describes the thoughts or feelings of characters. These descriptions go well beyond the mention of a fleeting sensation, exemplified by the statement of Jósika's narrator that "The rough man felt something... pleasant to his heart." In Kemény's novels the narrator rarely hesitates to enter into protracted explanations of emotional processes that may have taken as little as a few seconds or as much as several years. Moreover, the narrator often shows himself to have more knowledge of a character's psyche than the character himself. These descriptions by the narrator of a character's inner life are examples of the mode for presenting consciousness referred to by Cohn as psycho-narration. The frequency with which they occur in Kemény's fiction goes a long way towards explaining his reputation as the author of the first psychological novels in Hungarian.

For examples of psycho-narration the reader need go no further than Kemény's first published novel, *Pál Gyulai*. Set in late sixteenth-century Transylvania, it is a historical novel that tells the tale of an advisor to Zsigmond Báthory, prince of the region perched precariously between the Ottoman Empire to the south and the Holy Roman Empire to the north. The stability of the principedom is threatened by the ambitions of the callow Zsigmond's powerful and influential cousin Boldizsár. Eager to maintain public order, the secret council, comprised of members of the nobility, has voted to have Boldizsár murdered if he takes any action that might spark an open conflict. Out of a sense of loyalty to the prince's family, Gyulai (the title character) resolves to take action to ensure Zsigmond's safety. Hoping to provoke Boldizsár, he orders the execution of Senno, the leader of a group of traveling entertainers whose only crime is having defied Gyulai's interdiction on the performance of music on the occasion of Boldizsár's arrival in the capital. Gyulai's plan goes awry. The public is outraged at the news of Senno's execution. Boldizsár learns of the council's decision to exile or murder him. Eager to calm public opinion and pacify Boldizsár, Prince Zsigmond, whose life Gyulai had sought to protect, delivers the hapless advisor to Boldizsár's troops, who execute him.

As intricate as this plot summary may appear, the novel itself is slow paced, or at least it may seem so compared with those of Kemény's contemporaries. The focus is less on the retelling of the actions taken by the characters than on descriptions of the emotional torments they undergo before reaching their decisions. "Even the most superficial reader," writes Péterfy, "notices the orientation of the imagination towards the inner world in Kemény's first work."⁵¹ For example, while the narrator devotes twenty-six pages to a description of Gyulai's deliberations over

whether or not to have Senno killed, Gyulai's execution itself is not narrated (in the traditional sense) at all. The narrator skips this part of the story entirely, informing the reader of the execution only through brief mention of gossip on the street in the days after it has taken place. Szegedy-Maszák explains, "Kemény needed the slow paced narration because he intended to give a greater role to interior action than exterior."⁵² Kemény himself made an interesting remark concerning his choice of protagonist that indicates the lack of importance he attributed to plot. In a letter to Jósika he wrote, "there is not a page in the histories on which I could not have come across a more interesting man than my hero, who really did nothing more than write two dissertations, serve as an advisor, and die the victim of ill fate (...) If my works should have a large public, this is not due to the raw material, but rather to its adaptation."¹

The following sentence is an example of a passage in which the narrator avails himself of more than just description of the observable in depicting a character's emotions. It refers to Senno's reaction upon realizing that in the time he has spent in prison he has begun to fall seriously ill:

His mood we could say had improved, since, into his wild despair, of which the one extreme was delirious rage, the other resigned numbness, a gentler emotion had mingled, the thought of his own decay.^m

Unlike the description of Gergely from the same novel, this sentence gives no mention whatsoever of Senno's appearance or, for that matter, his gestures. It focuses solely on inner happenings. There is not a single noun that refers to an object. In fact of the eight nouns five refer to emotions. The narrator describes Senno's mental state in precise terms. In Cohn's terminology, this is psycho-narration: "the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness."⁵³

Cohn distinguishes two types of psycho-narration: consonant and dissonant. In dissonant psycho-narration the narrator remains distant from the character, describing his emotional state in terms that the character never would have used. As an example of dissonant psycho-narration Cohn cites a passage from Balzac's *Père Goriot*:

The next day Rastignac dressed himself very elegantly, and at about three o'clock in the afternoon went to call on Mine de Restaud, in-

¹ Nincs a históriában lap, mellyen sokkal érdekesebb férfira ne akadhattam volna, mint az én hőszöm, ki tulajdonkép egyebet nem csinált, mint két dissertációt [sic] írt, tanácsnokoskodott, és szerencsétlenül meghalt. (...) Ha tehát munkámnak nagy publicurna leend, ez nem a nyers anyag érdeme; de a földolgozásé. ("Magyar írók levelei b. Jósika Miklóshoz. I. B. K. Zs. levelei." 444.)

^m Kedélyét valamennyire j avultnak mondhatnók, miután a vad kétségbeesés közé, melynek egyik véglete őzjögő düh, a másik hideg dermedt volt, enyhébb érzés, mélézat a hervadásról vegyült. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 462-463.)

dulging on the way in those dizzily foolish dreams which fill the lives of young men with so much excitement: they then take no account of obstacles nor of dangers, they see success in everything, poeticize their existence simply by the play of their imagination and render themselves unhappy or sad by the collapse of projects that had as yet no existence save in their heated fancy; if they were not ignorant and timid the social world would not be possible. Eugene walked with extreme caution in order not to get muddy]⁵⁴

As Cohn points out, "no sooner does the narrator mention an inner happening ('indulging... in... dreams') than he imposes a value judgment ('dizzily foolish')[.]"⁵⁵ There is a disparity in this passage between the narrator's view of the character and the character's view of himself. "Even as the narrator draws the reader's attention away from the individual fictional character," Cohn observes, "he fixes it on his own articulate self: a discursive intelligence who communicates with the reader about his character - behind the character's back."⁵⁶

The description of Senno's reaction is an example of dissonant psycho-narration. The explicit self-reference ('we could say') and the complexity of the sentence, with its abstract vocabulary and convoluted structure, foreground the narrating presence, drawing the reader's attention to the production of the discourse through which Senno's emotions are depicted. The ironic assertion that Senno's mood has 'improved somewhat' emphasizes the distance between this narrating presence and the character. There is no indication of any attempt by the narrator to espouse the character's vocabulary or to construct the sentence in a way that would reflect the form that a person in despair might give it. Although this passage refers to Senno's state of mind, it cannot be said to represent his thoughts. He does not speak, rather he is spoken about.

This sentence illustrates several of the advantages psycho-narration offers in the presentation of consciousness over descriptions of observable details that suggest a character's mood. What may be most readily apparent is that psycho-narration allows for a summary of a mental process that may have extended over a long period of time. Senno's oscillations back and forth between the different poles of despair took place over the course of days, yet the narrator is able to encapsulate this in one sentence before launching into a ten-page description of a brief conversation between Senno and a prison guard. Thus psycho-narration allows for vast differences between what Cohn refers to as "time of narration" and "narrated time." A passage from Kemény's novella *Maelstroms of the Heart* offers another illustration of this. The protagonist of the story, Anselm, learns that a woman whose favor he once courted has taken another lover. Though he cherishes no feelings of affection for this woman whatsoever, his vanity is wounded. He himself is surprised by the extent to which this news upsets him:

Anselm paced back and forth in his room restlessly.

First vengefulness flashed through his soul, then indifference, with a touch of its cold hand, calmed his racing blood, then he felt disgust trample across his nerves, then spite arose, ruling like a tyrant over his other feelings, then finally memory lit its lights one by one so he could look with somber eyes of discontent onto the empty memories of past times."

As in the passage describing Senno's despair, here too psycho-narration allows for a quick summary of the range of emotions that Anselm experienced. Unlike the other two techniques identified by Cohn (quoted and narrated monologue), in which the character himself plays a role in the narration of his thoughts, psycho-narration can be used to describe psychological processes that take place over the course of years or that are over within a matter of seconds.

Another significant feature of dissonant psycho-narration is that because it represents the narrator's description of a character's inner life, it need not be restricted to the character's knowledge of his own feelings. There is no reason to infer from the sentence describing Senno's despair that Senno himself has arrived at the precisely this understanding of his emotions. As Szegedy-Maszák observes, "the narrator, drawing attention to his own presence, can communicate more faithfully even than his protagonists what is going on in their psyches."⁵⁷ Cohn refers to this as the "cognitive privilege" of the narrator. "[T]his cognitive privilege," she writes, "enables [the narrator] to manifest dimensions of a fictional character that the latter is unwilling or unable to betray."⁵⁸ A curious example of this is found in *Widow and Daughter*. The narrator raises a question concerning Tarnóczy's reaction to her daughter's suicide:

To what extent did the sin of [her daughter's] suicide curb her zeal-ousness? It would be hard to say, since in our lonely widow piety and hypocrisy had mingled to such an extent that she herself couldn't draw the line between pretense and truth anymore.⁰

Here the narrator's cognitive privilege is qualified. While he sees into Tarnóczy's psyche sufficiently to perceive her hypocrisy (of which she presumably is unaware), he is unable, or at least claims to be unable, to distinguish the point where

" Anselm álmatlanul jár szobájában.

Majd a bosszú villant meg lelkén, majd a közöny híves szárnylegyintése csillapítja vérereit, majd undort érte szilajul átnyargalni idegein, majd a dac ébredt föl zsarnokkényt úzve a többi benyomások felett, majd pedig az emlékezet gyújtá meg egyenkint lámpavilágait, hogy az elégtelenség komor szemeivel a múlt idők üres emlékeire nézhessen. (*A szív örvényei*. 27.)

⁰ Mennyire lázítá fel vallásosságát az öngyilkosági bűn? Nem könnyű kipuhatolni; mert árva özvegyünkben a hit a képmutatással úgy összevegyült, hogy maga se tudná a szerep és a való határait kijelölni. (*Özvegy és leánya*. 422.)

this hypocrisy might give way to genuine faith. The implication is that whatever religious sentiments Tarnóczy's might once have held, these have become totally submerged beneath her grotesque pretense of piety.

This passage demonstrates yet another function of dissonant psycho narration. The narrator, superior to the character in his knowledge of the character's inner life, can cast his description of that inner life in a form that implies or for that matter makes explicit an ethical judgment. Another example from *Widow and Daughter* provides an illustration of this. The following passage focuses on the reaction of Tarnóczy to the discovery that her plan to ruin the loathed Mikes family has hit a snag:

Tarnóczy's pride, as soon as she withdrew beyond the gaze of the public eye, turned into torturous anguish.

Something whispered to her that fortune had turned her face on her and, at the prompting of a brazen whim, cast her smile on the house of the Mikes family. All her plans, a marvelous tapestry woven of religious fanaticism, hypocrisy, and an implacable thirst for vengeance, were beginning to fray before her very eyes.^p

Mrs. Tarnóczy would never refer to her schemes as an interweaving of fanaticism, hypocrisy, and thirst for vengeance. The disparity between the narrator's viewpoint and that of the character suggests to the reader that the character cannot be trusted to describe her own reactions. It is not simply a question of the narrator's cognitive privilege, but also of the character's sincerity, both with the reader and with herself.

Finally, the sentence describing Senno's emotions demonstrates the tendency of dissonant psycho-narration towards generalization illustrated in the example cited by Cohn from Balzac. As previously noted, there is no evidence of an attempt on the part of the narrator to phrase the sentence in a way that might echo Senno's thoughts. The feelings described (despair, rage) are referred to as abstractions. The sentence takes on the air of a generalization about human emotions that the narrator finds an apt description of what is taking place in Senno's mind. This interpretation is supported by the passage that immediately follows this sentence. The narrator raises a question and offers a response to it:

What aroused this stolid temper?

Physical disease, which is the most powerful consolation for sickness of the soul.

^p Tarnóczyiné büszkesége, mihelyt a közönség szeme előtt visszavonult, kínzó szorongássá változott.

Valami súgta neki, hogy arcát elfordítá tőle a szerencse, s ledér szeszélyével a Mikes-ház felé mosolyog. A vallásos vakbuzgóság, a sikerült képmutatás és engesztelhetetlen bosszú csodás vegyületéből szőtt tervek szálanként kezdtek szemei előtt foszlani. (*Özveggy és leánya*. 394.)

Because there are few men, who, having finished counting up delights in life, having been led by their emotions either to resigned despondency or vain hope, seeing no other prospect than to be plunged into the whirlpool of a horrifying disaster by the mailed fist of fate, there are few men who will not welcome as a merciful spirit an ailment that reassures them of natural death.⁹

This is an example of what Cohn refers to as an "ex cathedra statement," a feature "typical of psycho-narration with maximal distance."⁵⁹ Such a statement is set apart, Cohn argues, by the switch to present tense verbs, a tense Cohn describes as the "gnomic present - the tense used for timeless generalizations."⁶⁰ An ex cathedra statement indicates the move from specific to general, as the narrator shifts from describing the emotions of a particular character to explaining those emotions with reference to an abstraction applicable to all humankind. "[T]he inner life of an individual character," Cohn explains, "becomes a sounding-board for general truths about human nature."⁶¹

Kemény's novels have often been compared with those of Balzac, and this use of dissonant psycho-narration as segue to a generalization could be said to be a feature common to the works of both novelists. Numerous critics have noted Balzac's fondness for generalizations. Jonathan Culler points out how frequently Balzac's characterizations rest on stereotypes. Eugene de Rastignac is described as "one of those young men moulded for work by misfortune." Baron Hulot is referred to as "one of those men whose eyes light up at the sight of a pretty woman."⁶² Cohn maintains that the tendency towards generalization that frequently accompanies dissonant psycho-narration is typical of Balzac's works. She observes that in the preface to the *Comédie Humaine* Balzac characterizes his project as "the description of social species[.]"⁶³ In reference to the example cited, Cohn notes that as soon as the narrator begins to describe Eugene's thoughts he immediately switches to a description of a general type. "When the text at length returns to Rastignac," she points out, "we have learned much about his peer group, but little about his own thoughts."⁶⁴ This is not an isolated example. As Cohn observes, "it is hard to find in the *Comédie humaine* a single instance of psycho-narration that is not followed and dwarfed by authorial glosses[.]"⁶⁵

To liken Kemény to Balzac on the grounds that both authors use characters as "sounding-boards for general truths," however, would be misleading. Examples

⁹ Mi költé fel e szelíd lendületet?

A testi kór, mely a lélekbetegségekben a sors legerősebb vizsgálatása.

Mert kevés ember van, ki azon nyavalyát, mely természetes halállal biztat, egy könyörülő nemtőként ne fogadja akkor, ha az életörömmel számadását berekesztette, ha szenvedélyei végsűggedésre vagy túlzó inerényekre ragadták volt, s más kilátást nem ismert, mint a végzet vasöklétől mélységbe lökötven, egy rémítő katasztrófa örvénye közé sodortatni. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 462-463.)

of dissonant psycho-narration in Kemény's works are remarkably rare, and it is even more unusual for these passages to incorporate a movement from specific to general. To claim, as János Dengi does, that Kemény's approach to the depiction of the inner lives of his characters "is nothing other than Balzac's analytical technique"⁶⁶ is to overlook the extremely important difference between an author who prefers generalizations and an author who avoids them. Dengi contends that Balzac's novella *La Maison du chat qui pelote*, the story of an unhappy marriage between an artistically gifted man and a kind-hearted but unimaginative woman, was the source for Kemény's novel *Husband and Wife*. While the two works share a similar plot, the techniques through which the characters' consciousnesses are presented are quite different. Two examples (many more could be given) from Balzac's novella illustrate how quickly the narrative moves from specific to general when describing the emotions of the characters:

Theodore répandait sur chaque journée d'incroyables fioritures de plaisir, il se plaisait à varier les emportements de la passion par la molle langueur de ces repos où les âmes sont lancées si haut dans l'extase qu'elles semblent y oublier l'union corporelle.

Dompté pendant près de deux ans et demi par les premiers emportements de l'amour, le caractère de Sommervieux reprit, avec la tranquillité d'une possession moins jeune, sa pente et ses habitudes un moment détournées de leur cours. La poésie, le peinfure et les exquis jouissances de l'imagination possèdent sur les esprits élevés des droits imprescriptibles.⁶⁷

An example from Kemény's novel gives an indication of his inclination to shun generalizations when describing a character's emotions. This passage describes Albert's frustration at the fact that he cannot simply abandon his wife Eliza for his lover Iduna:

Albert's fevered nerves, which in his dreams conjured forth specters from the past and in the mirror of the future sketched Iduna's sufferings with fantastic outlines, made him minute by minute more frantic, and since he attributed his misfortune to Eliz's stubbornness, his rage towards her went beyond all boundaries/

This should not be understood to suggest that a reader does not find any generalizations in Kemény. The difference between his works and those of Balzac lies in the fact that in Kemény's novels such moments are rare. Dengi's contention, a

⁶⁶ Albertet lázas idegei, melyek álmaiban a múltból szellemeket idéztek föl, a jövődő tükrében pedig Iduna szenvedéseit rajzolták le fantasztikus vonalokkal, percenkint dühöngőbbé tették, s minthogy szerencsétlenségét Eliz makacosságának tulajdonira, ellene haragja minden határon túlemelkedék. (*Férj és nő*. 210.)

view shared by several other critics,⁶⁸ constitutes an oversimplification that ignores this crucial distinction. To characterize Kemény as the 'Hungarian Balzac' or 'Balzac's follower,' as has often been done, is to miss entirely the attention given in his novels to the creation of individual characters rather than 'social species.'

The other type of psycho-narration identified by Cohn, consonant psycho-narration, is distinguished by the tendency of the narrator to adopt the perspective of **the** character. Here there is no cognitive privilege. The narrator's knowledge of the character's mind coincides with the character's self-knowledge. Nor is there any striking contrast between the idiom of the narrator and that of the character. A character's mental state is presented in words and images that might have occurred to the character himself. In consonant psycho-narration the narrator "remains effaced and (...) readily fuses with the consciousness he narrates."⁶⁹

As an example of consonant narration Cohn cites a passage from Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*:

The rain-laden trees of the avenue evoked in him, as always, memories of the girls and women in the plays of Gerhardt Hauptmann; and the memory of their pale sorrows and the fragrance falling from the wet branches mingled in a mood of quiet joy.⁷⁰

Here the presence of the narrator is less palpable than in the passage describing Senno's despair. There are none of the conceptual terms that imply a distanced, analytical perspective. Where there is evidence of an interpreting presence (for example the metaphorical phrase "pale sorrows") this seems to be the result of the interpretive activity of the character, which is then reported by the narrator. Moreover, there is no sign of any cognitive privilege of the narrator. He offers no explanation of the thoughts and impressions he describes. Unlike the sentence describing Senno's despair, in which the narrator identifies specific causal relationships between Senno's varying emotions, this passage gives no indication as to why, for example, the rain-laden trees evoke memories of women from the plays of Gerhardt Hauptmann.

Consonant psycho-narration is far more common in Kemény's novels than dissonant. His narrators rarely partake of the cognitive privilege implicit in dissonant psycho-narration. Often they seem as uncertain as the characters themselves. In the following passage the narrator of *Pál Gyulai* describes the impressions of Sofronia, mistress to Prince Zsigmond, as she begins to sense that she has fallen in love with Genga, one of the members of the Italian troupe of traveling entertainers. Sitting alone in her chamber Sofronia gazes at her own reflection in the mirror:

Her feelings were numbed by the breath of a sensual pleasure. It seemed as if to press her lips to the image in the mirror would be the

most delirious and sating joy, to bury her breast against her own breast, to mingle her breath with her own breath. It seemed as if with her eyes another eye watched her, as if another yearned, as if this body reclined in the armchair was the object of the desire on the face of an unfamiliar stranger, as if her ardor and languor were at the same time someone else's.

And whose was this dreamt form, onto whom Sofronia had cast her own feelings, with whom, in her imagination, she already felt frail and sinful? She herself could not say, for it was but a colorfully mingled vision of her impressions. One moment the outlines of the prince seemed to rise to the surface, then those of Genga, but amidst all the transformations the dark, scorching, penetrating eyes of the Italian were there, the serenity of the face on which long vanished passions still flickered occasionally betwixt the ruins of extinguished joys.⁸

As in the passage from Joyce, there is little evocation here of the narrator as a distanced, critical presence. Phrases that imply interpretation ("the dark, scorching, penetrating eyes," "the ruins of extinguished joys") seem to constitute moments where the narrating voice has borrowed terms and images from Sofronia's consciousness. There is, moreover, little indication of any cognitive privilege. Rather than present himself as more knowledgeable than Sofronia, the narrator actually defers to her. "She herself could not say," he comments, implying that if she doesn't know then he certainly cannot (though this could also be construed as a disingenuous tactic). The narrator seems as hesitant as Sofronia herself, raising the question "Whose was that dreamt form?" but not offering an immediate or unambiguous answer.

This passage illustrates well the expressive potential of consonant psycho-narration. The merging of the perspective of the narrator with that of the character allows for a depiction of Sofronia's consciousness in all its uncertainty. By failing to make explicit Sofronia's vague sense that she may have feelings for Genga, the narrator hints at the elusiveness of these feelings. The relative paucity of dissonant psycho-narration in Kemény's novels suggests a reluctance on the part of the author to imply that mental states can ever be subsumed in words, whether by a

⁸ Érzékeit a kék illatlehe zsibbasztotta. S úgy rémlett, mintha ajkát a tükörkép ajkára forrasztani, keblét keblére temetni, meleg leheletét leheletével vegyíteni lenne a legittasabb és szomjú gyönyör. S rémlett, mintha szemeivel egy más szem nézne, egy más vágya, mintha e tetemet a karszékből idegen arc áhítná, mintha az ő heve és lankadásai másé is volnának egyszerre.

S kié ezen álmodott alak, melyre Sofronia saját érzéseit átruházta, mellyel szemben már képzeletben gyarló és bűnös? Ő sem tudná megmondani, mert a való anyagaiból tarkán vegyített eszmény volt. Most a fejedelem vonalai, majd Gengáé merültek föl benne, de minden átváltozások közt ott volt az olasz sötéttüzü és átható szeme, ott azon életunt kifejezésnek derűje, mely a kihalt örömök romja közül föl-föllobogott. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 252.)

character or by an omniscient narrator. Even in the hands of a narrator with access to the inner lives of his characters language still serves as little more than an list of labels and images with which one can allude to, but never capture or finally name, elusive thought.

Cohn's discussion of psycho-narration suggests a trend in European literature towards an ever more intimate relationship between narrator and character. While at the beginning of the nineteenth century narrators evinced a hesitancy to describe the inner lives of their characters, by the 1850s such descriptions were common. Towards the end of the century these descriptions had often come to subordinate the narrative so completely to the viewpoint of the character that Wayne Booth went so far as to contend that in such passages the character becomes the narrator.⁷¹ Although Kemény is characterized in secondary literature as the author of psychological novels, the frequency with which this characterization is accompanied by a comparison to Balzac suggests that an important aspect of his works has been overlooked. Though his novels contain examples of both kinds of psycho-narration, the preponderance of consonant psycho-narration suggests his works have more of an affinity, at least from the point of view of characterization, with the novels of twentieth century authors such as Virginia Woolf or Joyce than they do with those of Balzac. Kemény's novels are populated not with representative figures of social species, but rather with characters striking in their individuality.

£. Quoted Monologue

If psycho-narration evolved from tentative assertions concerning a character's emotions to detailed descriptions of the depths of a character's psyche, quoted monologue can be said to have undergone a similar development. Beginning as intricate soliloquy that adheres both to rules of grammar and conventions of discursive composition (use of extended metaphor, parallel constructions, etc.), quoted monologue evolved over the course of the nineteenth century into passages comprised of short, ungrammatical phrases that seem, according to modern linguistics, to mirror more accurately the verbalization of unspoken thoughts. The beginnings of this process could be located in the spoken monologues of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century novels, while its culmination could be said to have come with the publication of *Finnegan's Wake*, in which the narrator fractures not merely the unit of the sentence, but the unit of the word.⁷²

The tendency in Kemény's novels towards monologue has not gone unmentioned in secondary literature. Péterfy notes that "Kemény's characters speak more to and with themselves than to or with each other."⁷³ "If monologues could create a dramatic hero," he contends, "Pál Gyulai would be the striking example."⁷⁴ Mihály Sükösd claims that the monologue "is [Kemény's] most successful

tool in depicting his characters."⁷⁵ Dániel Veress says of Kemény's characters, "They are almost incapable of real dialogue, their natures, their interest in themselves make them prone, above all else, to monologues."⁷⁶ What these critics fail to note, however, is that the monologues in Kemény's novels take very different forms. These include both the audible speech of characters, who, when left alone, give voice to their thoughts, as well as the unspoken thoughts of a character either in solitude or in the company of others. Moreover, interior (or quoted) monologues in Kemény's works vary considerably in length and complexity. Whereas many are prolonged passages in which the character expresses his thoughts in complex sentences, others are merely short exclamations that seem almost to burst spontaneously from the character's mind. Kemény's novels thus contain examples of the monologue in all the forms in which it appeared over the century of psychological realism identified by Cohn.

The monologue was by no means absent from narrative fiction in the eighteenth century. Chapter two of book seven of *Tom Jones*, subtitled "Containing a conversation Mr. Jones had with himself," for example, contains a long monologue. However, as Colin points out, this monologue is explicitly introduced as the audible speech of a character. It is prefixed with the statement, "and starting up, he cried". This tendency to have characters speak monologues aloud lasted well into the nineteenth century. It occurs, notably, in Stendhal's *The Red and the Black*. While the protagonist of this novel, Julien, could be characterized as one of the first obsessively introspective characters of third person narrative fiction of the early nineteenth century, several of the monologues in which he frequently indulges are avowed as speech rather than thought. As Cohn observes, in his longest monologue, which occurs when he is in prison, Julien even rebukes himself out loud: "Talking to myself in solitude, two steps away from death, I am still a hypocrit."⁷⁷

Like the works of Fielding and Stendhal, Kemény's novels contain examples of spoken monologues. Senno, for example, speaks aloud to himself in prison:

'Saint Antal of Padua!' Senno often cried out, 'could a slave spend his time more usefully than I do here? Does not every minute reward me? I am a usurer, who gets great interest for a trifling sum. Gyulai locked me away, and here I make use of this circumstance, which others would regard as disheartening. For tomorrow the common folk will hold for me a man of civic virtue, a great patriot.].'

^t 'Páduai Szent Antalra!' kiálta gyakran Senno, 'telhetnék-e rabnak több haszonnal ideje, mint nekem? Nem díjaz-e minden perc? Uzsorás vagyok, ki nagy kamatot von potomságért. Gyulai bezáratott, s íme én e körülményt, melyet mások leverőnek tekinthettek volna, hasznosítani, s a nép maholnap polgár erélyekkel díszlő egyénnek, nagy honfinak... fog tartani. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 413-414.)

Péterfy makes the remark that, had Kemény written dramas, "his protagonists would have taken stage separately, one after the other, and in profound, poetic voices speculated about fate."⁷⁸ This suggestion is particularly interesting considering that several chapters of *Pál Gyulai* are given in the form of a dramatic script. This script includes stage directions and even the voice of the 'director.' In scene twelve of this play within a novel one of the characters does indeed appear separately to speak in poetic terms about his fate:

Gergely: Excitement, this alone is life: the rest is but vegetation. (Pause)... are not my prospects magnificent? I, who spent six years as a schoolteacher in Enyed, am now the master of events (...) rapturous is the feeling of strength, of power... even if the world hardly even suspects it."

Alongside the chapters of *Pál Gyulai* that are written as dramatic script are others that incorporate letters, excerpts from characters' diaries, and poems recited by the characters. These constitute several of the forms of narrative that have been characterized by critics and theorists of stream of consciousness fiction as precursors to the interior monologue.⁷⁹

By the time Kemény began his literary career in the 1840s, the spoken monologue had begun to defer to the silent interior monologue. This is the mode for presenting consciousness to which Cohn refers as quoted monologue, achieved through "the silencing of the monologic voice."⁸⁰ Cohn offers an example from Stendhal:

Before my journey, I took her hand, she withdrew it; today I withdraw my hand, she grasps and presses it. A fine opportunity to repay her for all the contempt she had for me. God only knows how many lovers she has had! She perhaps chooses me only because it is convenient for us to meet.⁸¹

From the Realist perspective quoted monologue has the advantage that it does not rely on the reader's willingness to accept the implausible premise that the characters of a novel, when left alone, speak aloud to themselves in complete, and sometimes complex, sentences.

Kemény made extensive use of the quoted (interior) monologue. Szegedy-Maszák notes, "There is hardly a Hungarian novel in the nineteenth century in which the interior monologue plays a role as frequently as in *The Fanatics*."⁸² In *Pál Gyulai*, for example, while some of Senno's monologues are avowed as speech,

- Gergely: Csupán izgalom az élet: tengés a többi. (Szünet után) Azonban pályáin nem egyszerű-e? Én, ki Enyeden hat évig voltam gyenektanító, most mestere vagyok az eseményeknek (...) Kéjes az erő, a hatalom érzete... ha létezését a világ nem gyanítja is. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 139-140.)

others are not. In the following passage Senno thinks about his wife, who, to his surprise, has come to the city in which he was arrested hoping to be able to see him:

Ah Eleonóra, even the deepest sufferings could never excite you to fever, your sturdy constitution scoffed at besieging grief (...) why did you long for your husband's prison cell, you, who could not have given the vain artist the gratification of taking back into his warm arms the spark from which he draws life.

Saint Antal of Padua! - Senno often cried out.^v

The vocal outburst with which this passage concludes makes it clear that it is presented as unspoken thought, or, in Cohn's terms, quoted monologue. Often, however, Kemény's novels offer no hint to indicate whether a monologue is to be understood as spoken or silent. Szegedy-Maszák suggests that this may have been a deliberate strategy on the part of the author to avoid estranging his readership: "The silent interior monologue was so rare in Hungarian prose in the mid-nineteenth century that the author of *Pál Gyulai*, *Widow and Daughter*, and *The Fanatics* probably didn't aim to resolve this ambiguity because he thought this way his audience would more readily accept the unusually frequent use of monologue."⁸³

Quoted monologue creates opportunities for contrasts between a character's speech and his thoughts that would be impossible with spoken monologue. Passages of quoted monologue falling alongside passages of dialogue can reveal a character's insincerity with another character. Kemény's novels develop the expressive potential of such contrasts. In the thirteenth chapter of *Widow and Daughter*, for example, Haller, the aging man to whom young Sára is betrothed against her will, comes to Sara's home. Here he meets Sara's aunt Judit, who has helped Sára to flee. As the two of them converse Judit struggles to conceal her nervousness, while Haller muses that Judit is a pleasant, attractive woman:

'What a beast,' Judit thought to herself...

'What a modest, shy woman,' Peter thought at the same time, noticing [Judit's] agitation.

(...)

'[Widow Tarnóczy] often mentioned the beautiful [Judit]' Haller continued.

'Ah!' gasped Judit, blushing.

Blood rushed to her face as if she were a little girl.

'What innocence!' Haller thought.

^v Ah, Eleonóra, te a legmélyebb fájdalom miatt sein tudtál forró lázba esni, szilárd egészséged dacolt az ostromló bánattal (...) miért vágytál hát férjed börtönébe, te, ki a hiú művésznak azon elégtételt nem adhattad volna, hogy meleg karjai közt nyerj ismét életszikrát?

- Paduai Szent Antalra! - kiálta gyakran Senno[.] (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 413.)

I can imagine all the awful things [Tamóczy] said about me!
[Judit] thought bitterly to herself.

(...)

([W]hat skin! [Judit thought.] Yellow parchment taken from the covers of old books! And the bones!...) "Ah, what a beautiful gold necklace," she said, looking at the jewelry... (Has my sister-in-law gone mad?)^w

Cohn contends that, set against the backdrop of dialogue, passages of quoted monologue acquire a sincere tone. "For no matter how insincere we are with ourselves," she argues, "we are always *more* insincere with others."⁸⁴ The passage from *Widow and Daughter* suggests that this is not always the case. While Haller is indeed sincere in his thoughts about Judit, Judit, as becomes clear in later chapters, has deceived herself concerning her feelings for Haller. Her sigh, and the blush that accompanies it, hint that the affection she later develops for Haller is present in her first meeting with him, though she herself doesn't realize it. A reader could interpret her fixation with Haller's appearance, though ostensibly an expression of her sympathies for the young Sára, as an indication of an unconscious attraction that Judit's conscious mind labors to deny. In this passage an older approach to the presentation of consciousness, the mention of an observable detail from which an emotion can be inferred, supplements what could be considered a younger approach. The contrast between Judit's thoughts, expressed in quoted monologue, and her bashful reaction suggests that quoted monologue can serve both to depict a character's thoughts as well to expose self-deception.

The possible insincerity of quoted monologue is a topic touched on several times in Kemény's novels. A long passage of quoted monologue is often followed by a comment from the narrator that throws into question the character's sincerity with himself. In *Pál Gyidai*, for example, Sofronia lies to herself about her feelings for Genga. Embroiled in the struggle to save Senno, she devises a plan to win the aid of Boldizsár. She resolves to write Boldizsár a letter professing her fondness for him and pleading with him to intervene on Senno's behalf. Upon hearing

^w "Egészen állat," gondolt Judit...
"Szeinémies, félénk nő," gondolta ugyanakkor Péter a háziasszony zavarodását észrevevén.
...
"Húgom sokszor emlegette a szép özvegyet," folytatá Haller.
"Ah!" sóhajtott Judit kipirultán.
Vére arcára szökellett, mint a tizenhat éves lánynak.
"Minő ártatlanság!" gondola ekkor Haller.
"Képzelem, hányszor rágalmazott derék sógorasszonyom!" hánytorgatta magában.
(...)
(S milyen bőr! Régi könyvek táblájáról levont sárga pergament. És hát még a csont!)... "Ah, igen szép régi arany nyaklánc" - szólt már az ékszerekre is tekintve... (Megőrült-e sógorasszonyom?) *Özvegy és leánya*. 107-114.)

her plan, Genga, a close friend to Senno, seems skeptical. He cautions her that it does not befit a woman to prostitute her affections. In light of the dire circumstances, however, he accedes to Sofronia's plan. Together the two of them craft a letter entreating Boldizsár to come to their aid. Genga departs with the letter, leaving Sofronia alone to contemplate the dangers she faces:

'Strange,' she thought, 'that I was daunted by the danger of this undertaking, whereas he feared because of its moral implications! Why didn't Genga say, 'Sofronia, you may suffer, because of your noble nature' (...) Why didn't he speak of these awful things? Are there not sufficient examples of this? (...) Well I know the fate that threatens the mistresses of princes, emperors and sultans once they have fallen under suspicion. One is tied in a sack and tossed into the waves of the Marmora, another the king strangles with his own hand on the plush pillows of his chamber, slowly, smiling, without uttering a single word of reproach to her. (...) Why was he more afraid for my virtue than my life? Should I not seek here (...) the admission of some tender affection...? Ah, what dreams these! (...) Sofronia, he never offered you love, and you... yes, you wouldn't have accepted it. (...) I don't love him, that's certain.'*

The narrator appends this passage with the remark, "Sofronia's emotions tired themselves out as they strayed in these deluded musings."^y Here again one mode for presenting consciousness supplements another. The narrator intervenes (psycho-narration) to underscore the insincerity of the character's ruminations (quoted monologue).

This passage suggests a comparison between Kemény and Marcel Proust. Although Proust is cited by Edel as the author of one of the first modern psychological novels, his approach to the narration of consciousness stands in stark contrast to that of Joyce. As Genette notes, "Nothing is more foreign to Proustian psychology than the utópia of an authentic interior monologue[.]"⁸⁵ In Proust's work a character's inner speech invariably reveals less about his true feelings than it does about his self-deception. In *A la recherche du temps perdu* Proust gives a descrip-

* Különös - gondola -, hogy én vállalatom veszélyétől valék áthatva, ő pedig annak erkölcsi eredményeitől félt! Mért nem mondta Genga: Sofronia, kegyed szenvedhet nemeslelkűségéért, szenvedhet, sok, igen sok kint és megaláztatást. (...) Mért nem beszéllett rémítő dolgokat? Nincsenek rá példák? (...) Hisz én is haliám, mi sors fenyegeti a podeszták, fejedelmek, hercegek, királyok, császárok és szultánok gyanús kedveseit! Egyiket a Marmora hullámai közé vetik zsákba kötve; másikat a felséges úr legpuhább vánkoston saját kezével megfojtja lassan, mosolyogva, szemrehányások nélkül. (...) Mért féltette ő inkább erkölcsemet, mint életemet? Ne keressem-e itt egy (...) gyöngéd érzés nyilatkozatát...?(...) Minő álmok ezek. (...) Hisz, Sofronia, ő neked soha szerelmet nem ajánlott, s te... igen, te el sem fogadnád. (...) én nem szerettem őt, ez kétségtelen." (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 254-255.)

^y Sofroniának e tévegekben egészen kifáradtak érzelmei[.] (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 255.)

tion of a process he refers to as "the rectification of an oblique interior discourse" that bears an eerie resemblance to Sofronia's monologue:

And if in some cases - where we are dealing, for instance, with the inaccurate language of our own vanity - the rectification of an oblique interior discourse which deviates gradually more and more widely from the first and central impression, so that it is brought back into line and made to merge with the authentic words which the impression ought to have generated, is a laborious undertaking which our idleness would prefer to shirk, there are other circumstances - for example where love is involved - in which this same process is actually painful. Here all our feigned indifferences, all our indignation at the lies of whomever it is we love (lies which are so natural and so like those that we perpetuate ourselves), in a word all that we have not ceased, whenever we are unhappy or betrayed, not only to say to the loved one but, while we are waiting for a meeting with her, to repeat endlessly to ourselves, sometimes aloud in the silence of our room, which we disturb with remarks like: 'No, really, this sort of behavior is intolerable,' and: 'I have consented to see you once more, for the last time, and I don't deny that it hurts me,' all this can only be brought back into conformity with the felt truth from which it has so widely diverged by the abolition of all that we have set most store by, all that in our solitude, in our feverish projects of letters and schemes, has been the substance of our passionate dialogue with ourselves.⁸⁶

Just as the words that Swann repeats endlessly to himself constitute deviations from the 'felt truth' that must be abolished, Sofronia's monologue is an expression of feigned indifference (feigned to herself) that clouds her understanding of her own emotions. While the quoted monologue may seem to bring the reader closer to a character's psyche than psycho-narration by silencing the narrator and allowing the character's thoughts to 'speak for themselves' (as it were), there is no guarantee, as Kemény and Proust suggest, that the character's understanding of his psyche is lucid or that the words in which some of his thoughts find form accurately depict every aspect of his inner life.

One way in which quoted monologue can depict different dimensions of a character's inner life is by rendering these 'passionate dialogues' in an explicitly dialogic form. By incorporating patterns of self-address in which the second person pronoun refers to the speaking (thinking) subject, quoted monologue can present conflicts within a character's psyche in the form of multiple voices. *Pál Gyulai* contains a fascinating example of internal dialogue between character and conscience. This dialogue is achieved through a blend of psycho-narration and quoted monologue, but a quoted monologue that gives voice only to the accusations that weigh on Gyulai's soul:

As soon as he was alone Gyulai thought of Senno, and the thought condemned him, tyrannically and unjustly. His conscience, the judge bribed and corrupted by false reasoning, never wanted to believe that he had had the prisoner of the bastion killed because, out of loyalty to the family of the Prince, he had wanted to provoke Báthory Boldizsár to commit an offense against public order. In vain Gyulai explained to him the circumstances, in vain he described all his former fights, in vain he conducted him to the dungeon of Fogaras, where he had sat shackled, only then to win back at the hands of Zsigmond's father both his freedom and honor, (...) because his overly rigorous judge, the stubborn conscience, listened to the accused's pleas with a bemused smile, and with cold words, like so many daggers, answered: My good friend, you rave, you are delirious, and that is why you imagine your deeds so poetic and romantic. Matters are otherwise. You murdered Senno out of revenge, your genteel pride could not tolerate the cursings of a common man. You are a delicate yet ferocious lord. Yours is the spirit of the minion of Tiberius or Caligula moved into the favored advisor of Zsigmond. Oh, I believe that you were the one who murdered Agrippina and the mother of Nero! You are an evil creature, and whatever protests you make, you are eternally damned.²

Cohn contends that passages of quoted monologue like this one, in which a character refers to himself in the second person, "seem to confirm Freud's notion that the voice of the conscience (the superego) is constituted through the internalization of the parental voice, or the voices of other authority figures."⁸⁷ Whether or not such a passage confirms Freud's view, it indicates, at least, that the conception of consciousness as an amalgamation of competing voices was a theme in literature well before the advent of modern psychology.

A more vivid example in support of this notion of the internalization of the voice of authority is found in Kemény's *Widow and Daughter*. Mrs. Tarnóczy

¹ Gyulai, mihelyt magányban volt, Sennóra gondolt, és e gondolat elítélte zsarnokul, igazságtalanul. Lelkiismerete, az álokoskodásoktól megvesztegetett bíró, sohasem akarta hinni, hogy a bástyaráb azért öletett meg, mert Báthory Boldizsárt törvénytelenésre kellett izgatni a Kristóf háza iránti hála miatt. Hasztalanul beszélt el Gyulai neki minden körülményt, hasztalan világosította föl régi küzdelmeiről, hasztalan vezette őt a fogarasi börtönbe, hol bilincsre volt verve, és Zsigmond atyjától egyszerre nyerte a szabadságot a becsülettel vissza, (...) mert túl szigorú bírāja, a makacs lelkiismeret, misztikus mosollyal hallgatta a vádlott mentségeit, s fagyos szavakkal, melyek megannyi gyilkok valának, válaszolá: "Jó barátom, te őrnöngsz, s azért képzeled ily költőinek, ily vadregényesnek tettetted. A dolog másként áll. Te megöletted Sennót bosszúból, úri gögöd nem tűrhette egy porembernek szitkait. Te kényes nagy úr vagy és vérengző nagy úr. A te szellemed Tibérius vagy Caligula valamelyik kegyencéből költözött Zsigmond kegyencébe. Én elhiszem, hogy Agrippinát és Néro anyját is te gyilkoltad meg. Ah, gonosz lény vagy te, s bármint szabadkozol, elkárhoztál. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. II, 306-307.)

fears that her plot to ruin the Mikes family may come to nothing. She gives expression to her rage, but another voice emerges from the depths of her psyche:

'Let me not see the proud and ostentatious castle of the Mikes family until the flag of mourning flaps above the emblem on its gate!' Mrs. Tarnóczy sighed in a wild outburst.

But lo, a foreign voice startled in her breast, from the lips of her seemingly dead conscience, which until now had been silent. It is written in the pages of the holy book, it reads: Why should I wish evil upon someone on whom the Lord wishes no evil? Why should I curse him whom the Lord has not cursed?... Horrible, horrible! ... But the lord will curse them, his hand will weigh down on them. It is on them already (...) If they are not to suffer unending torment, why have I prayed, and why did I suffer, if all my loathing is futile?¹¹

Here it is apparent that the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's conscience, or rather the words in which this voice finds expression, is the internalized voice of authority. This authority is not merely the Biblical passage to which the voice alludes. It is the figure making the allusion. This is the figure with which the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's hatred for the Mikes family enters into a dialogue. It is significant that, whereas in the passage from *Pál Gyulai* one of the voices of Gyulai's consciousness is rendered in psycho-narration, in *Widow and Daughter* both the voices of Mrs. Tarnóczy's consciousness find expression in quoted monologue. The fact that the voice of Gyulai's protestations of innocence is merely summarized by the narrator (psycho-narration) suggests that the voice of his conscience (which is quoted) has triumphed. There is no longer any competition, Gyulai has succumbed entirely to his guilt. In the passage from *Widow and Daughter*, on the other hand, where both voices are rendered in quoted monologue, there seems to be a moment of struggle in Mrs. Tarnóczy's mind. The absence of any response to the questions with which this internal dialogue concludes, however, suggests that this struggle has been decided and the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's conscience has fallen silent once more.

This dialogic approach to the rendering of consciousness is identified by Bakhtin as one of the distinguishing characteristics of the fiction of Dostoevsky. In his

¹¹ 'Ne lássam a Mikesek büszke és hivalkodó várát, míg kapujának címere fölött a gyász zászlója nem lobog!' sóhajtá Tarnóczy né vad kitöréssel.

De íme, idegen szózat rezzent meg keblében, a lelkiismeretnek, e tetszhalottaknak, eddig néma ajkairól: – írva van a szent könyv lapjain, hangzék: 'Miért mondjak gonoszt annak, akinek nem mondott gonoszt az Úr; és miért átkoznám azt, kit az Úr nem átkozott' ... Borzasztó, borzasztó! ... De meg fogja őket átkozni az úr; rajok nehezedik keze! Hisz rajtok van, (...) Ha nem szenvednének végtelen kint, miért imádkoztam, s miért szenvedtem én, ha gyűlölni csak erőtlenségül szabad? {*Őzveggy és leánya*. 395.)

book *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Bakhtin observes that in the works of Dostoevsky the inner life of a character is "thoroughly dialogized":

in its every aspect it is turned outward, intensely addressing itself, another, a third person. Outside this living addressivity toward itself and toward the other it does not exist, even for itself. In this sense it could be said that the person in Dostoevsky is the subject of an address. One cannot talk about him; one can only address oneself to him. Those 'depths of the human soul,' whose representation Dostoevsky considered the main task of his realism 'in a higher sense,' are revealed only in an intense act of self-address.⁸⁸

In an essay entitled "The Problem of the Text," Bakhtin contends that, "After Dostoevsky, polyphony bursts powerfully into world literature."⁸⁹ As only one of Kemény's novels has ever been translated into any other language (*Husband and Wife* was translated into German), they obviously never had the same influence as those of Dostoevsky. However, the fact that in his novels the conflicts taking place in a character's consciousness are depicted through dialogue can be interpreted to suggest that Dostoevsky's fiction, however innovative it may have been, was also in part a product of broadly international trends in conceptions of the relationship between language and the psyche, trends that left their mark in works composed by a Hungarian author two decades before Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*.

There is another significant difference between the passage from *Pál Gyulai* and the one from *Widow and Daughter* that points to one of the limitations of quoted monologue as a tool for the rendering of unspoken thought in language. If the shift from spoken to silent (quoted) monologue constituted a step towards greater realism because it no longer demanded of the reader that he accept the premise that characters, when left alone, speak out loud to themselves in long, grammatically complete sentences, it presented an entirely different problem of verisimilitude. While few would deny Victor Hugo's contention that "It is certain that people do talk to themselves,"⁹⁰ modern psycho-linguistics would raise questions concerning the form Hugo gives verbalized thought in Jean Valjean's monologue in the third chapter of the seventh book of *Les Misérables*. Over the course of several paragraphs Valjean attempts to persuade himself that he need not trouble himself over the fact that another man has been arrested for his crimes. His monologue traces a carefully reasoned argument from beginning to end with only occasional interruptions in the form of short exclamations ("good God," "Ah!"). There is little indication of any stylistic peculiarity that might distinguish this unspoken monologue from a speech that a character might make in the course of spoken dialogue. Unspoken thought seems to adhere to the same rules that govern speech.

In his book *Thought and Language*, published shortly after his death in 1934, linguist Lev Semenovich Vygotsky takes issue with this conception of inner speech as "speech minus sound."⁹¹ Vygotsky contends that inner speech is a distinct phenomenon, "with its own laws and complex relations to the other forms of speech activity."⁹² The distinguishing feature of inner speech, according to Vygotsky, is its syntax. "Compared with external speech," he writes, "internal speech appears disconnected and incomplete."⁹³ The tendency in inner speech towards abbreviation and discontinuity is the result of a process Vygotsky refers to as predication. When putting thought into words, a person will omit the subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, focusing only on the predicate. The explanation for this, Vygotsky contends, is the invariable presence in inner speech of the factors that allows for predication: "We know what we are thinking about - i.e., we always know the subject and the situation."⁹⁴ Inner speech, according to Vygotsky, consists of predicates only.

The contention that inner speech is governed by its own set of laws makes new demands on authors seeking, through quoted monologue, to give a realistic depiction of a character's mental life. Quoted monologue must be stylistically distinct from speech. It is in the works of Joyce that a reader finds the canonical examples of monologues that adhere to Vygotsky's definition of inner speech. An excerpt from the third chapter (Proteus) of *Ulysses* suffices to illustrate the tendency towards incomplete sentences and associative thought patterns:

Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking his sponce against them, sure. Go easy. Bald he was and a millionaire, *maestro di color che sanno*. Limit of the diaphane in. Why in? Diaphane, adiaphane. If you can put your five fingers through it, it is a gate, if not a door. Shut your eyes and see.

Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush crackling wrack and shells.⁹⁵

Numerous features of this passage, including the shift from present to past tense verbs and from first person to third person pronouns, suggest that, while the first paragraph represents Stephen's unspoken thoughts, the second represents the discourse of a third person narrator. But this change of perspective (or speaker) is also implicit in the shift from the grammatically fractured structure of Stephen's inner speech to the grammatically complete sentence with which the citation concludes.

Vygotsky's distinction between inner and outer speech undermines the plausibility of quoted monologue as it appears, for example, in the passage cited by Cohn from Stendhal, which I give again here for ease of reference:

Before my journey, I took her hand, she withdrew it; today I withdraw my hand, she grasps and presses it. A fine opportunity to repay her for all the contempt she had for me. God only knows how many lovers she had had! She perhaps chooses me only because it is convenient for us to meet.

There is a rhetorical complexity to the first sentence that may seem too deliberate for mental speech. The sentence is comprised of two striking figures: parallelism and chiasmus. The parallelism consists of the repetition of the subjects in the two phrases separated by the colon (I/she), as well as the repetition of an adverbial phrase ("before," "today") that introduces the two opposed statements. The chiasmus is created by the transference of the verb 'withdraw' from the second clause of the first phrase to the first clause of the second: "I took/she withdrew: I withdraw/she grasps." The intricacy of the interaction of these figures creates the impression that the passage is not a spontaneous thought, but rather the product of deliberate composition.

It is the presence of rhetorical figures in passages such as these, along with a tendency to adhere to rules of grammar and discursive composition, that led some critics to draw a distinction between interior monologue and what they referred to as soliloquy. Derek Bickerton gives an example from Walter Scott's *Fortunes of Nigel* (1822) that illustrates clearly the possible complexity of (what he refers to as) soliloquy:

She is right, and has taught me a lesson I will profit by. I have been, through my whole life, one who leant upon others for that assistance, which it is more truly noble to derive from my own exertions. I am ashamed of feeling the paltry inconvenience which long habit had led me to annex to the want of a servant's assistance - I am ashamed of that; but far, for more I am ashamed to have suffered the same habit of throwing my burden on others, to render me, since I came to this city, a mere victim of those events, which I have never even attempted to influence - a thing never acting but perpetually acted upon - protected by one friend, deceived by another; but in the advantage which I received from the one, and the evil I have sustained from the other, as passive and helpless as a boat that drifts without oar or rudder at the mercy of the winds and the waves.⁹⁶

As Bickerton points out, not only the syntax and sentence length, but also the rhetorical figures of this passage suggest careful composition. The third sentence,

Bickerton notes, contains repetition ('I am ashamed'), antithesis ('never acting... perpetually acted upon,' 'protected by one friend, deceived by another,' 'the advantage which I received from the one... the evil I have sustained from the other'), and parallel pairs of adjectives and nouns ('passive and helpless,' 'oar or rudder,' 'winds and waves') that all contribute to create the impression of deliberate oratory rather than unstructured thought. Given its complex rhetorical structure, Bickerton argues, this passage cannot not be equated with interior monologue. It should be referred to, rather, as soliloquy.

While it is not necessary to accept Bickerton's distinction (Cohn does not⁹⁷), no reader can fail to notice the stylistic differences between inner speech as it is suggested in the citation from Scott and the inner speech of Stephen. There is a similar contrast between the passage in which Gyulai's conscience condemns him for his pride and the passage in which Mrs. Tarnóczy dismisses a fleeting doubt concerning her righteousness. The voice of Gyulai's conscience speaks in long, intricate, and grammatically complete sentences. This may add to the impression that Gyulai has succumb to this voice, which speaks deliberately, in complex forms, with no fear of interruption. The voice of Mrs. Tamóczy's hatred, on the other hand, responds to the voice of her conscience with two ellipses (in the original), emphatic exclamations, and unanswered questions. For ease of reference I quote this passage again here:

But lo, a foreign voice startled in her breast, from the lips of her seemingly dead conscience, which until now had been silent. 'It is written in the pages of the holy book, it reads: Why should I wish evil upon someone on whom the Lord wishes no evil? Why should I curse him whom the Lord has not cursed?'... Horrible, horrible! ... But the lord will curse them, his hand will weigh down on them. It is on them already (...) If they are not to suffer unending torment, why have I prayed, and why did I suffer, if all my loathing is futile?

While it would be an overstatement to equate the discontinuities and associative patterns in Mrs. Tamóczy's internal dialogue (that stand in contrast to the deliberate, rhetorical patterns in Gyulai's) with the discontinuities in the passage cited from Ulysses, there is the suggestion in Mrs. Tamóczy's monologue that internal speech is distinguished from external speech by the tendency towards fractured syntax in structure and association in content. This passage can be seen as an early example of an interior monologue distinguished from traditional soliloquy by stylistic features that imply a radically different grammar governing the verbalization of unspoken thought.

This is not the only instance of discontinuous inner speech in Kemény's novels. In the last pages of *Widow and Daughter*, for example, Mrs. Tamóczy scuttles

gleefully to the castle where, she mistakenly believes, lies the body of a member of the despised Mikes family:

Her feet stumbled on the rocks and sweat trickled down her forehead. Doesn't matter! Who'd worry about one's health, one's life now! ... Revenge! Revenge!

She reached the gate.

Full of coaches the courtyard. The main hall shimmers, glimmers, much more than the room in Szeben where Sára lay... Now she lies in the grave! But what's happening here?^{bb}

There are two crucial features of this passage that bear resemblance to the interior monologue in Joyce. For the sake of comparison I offer the following example, again from the Proteus chapter of *Ulysses*:

His feet marched in sudden proud rhythm over the sand furrows, along by the boulders of the south wall. He stared at them proudly, piled stone mammoth skulls. Gold light on sea, on sand, on boulders. The sun is there, the slender trees, the lemon houses.⁹⁸

In Kemény as in Joyce the shift from past to present tense suggests the shift from the discourse of the narrator to the quoted monologue of the character. This is the 'unsignaled' interior monologue, identified by Cohn as "an innovative pattern" introduced by Joyce." More importantly, in both passages the quoted monologue is distinguished by unconventional syntax. The phrase "Full of coaches the courtyard" is an example of the predication to which Vygotsky refers. Whereas according to standard word order this sentence would read, "The courtyard is full of coaches" ('Az udvar tele van kocsikkal'), here the emphasis is on the sight (the predicate) that captures Mrs. Tarnóczy's attention. Moreover, the verb 'is' is omitted entirely. The jump from the main room to the room in Szeben where Sara's body lay is an example of the associative patterns typical, according to Vygotsky, of inner speech. This pattern continues to the end of the passage. Mrs. Tarnóczy's thoughts skip quickly and without deliberation from the room in Szeben to Sara's grave and then back to the room in which she stands.

This comparison between Joyce and Kemény should not be exaggerated. What in Joyce becomes a standard approach to the presentation of consciousness in

^{bb} Lába kövekbe botlott, s veríték csurgott homlokáról. Nem tesz semmit! Ki ügyelne most egészségére, életére! ... Bosszú! A bosszú!

A kapuhoz ért.

Teli kocsikkal az udvar. Csillog-villog a főterein, sokkal inkább, mint Szebenben az a szoba, hol Sára feküdt... Most ő a sírboltban alszik! De mi történik itt? (*Özvegy és leánya*. 434.)

Kemény still constitutes a rare exception. One finds in his works several examples of interior monologues that show a tendency towards predication, but these are few and far between in comparison to the number of interior monologues (or soliloquies according to Bickerton) that seem to make little distinction between unspoken thought and audible speech. However, these examples do suggest that Kemény was uneasy with the identity between inner and outer speech implied by interior monologues that follow standard discursive patterns. The presence, in novels written in the mid nineteenth century, of 'predicated' interior monologues can be interpreted as evidence in support of Cohn's conclusion that the first 'pure' incarnation of this technique in the novels of Joyce "appears not so much as a creative miracle but as the result of very high probability."¹⁰⁰ Joyce's innovation lies, according to this view, not in the introduction of a radically new technique, but rather in the development of the expressive potential of this technique.

Yet whatever its expressive potential, the quoted monologue is a limited approach to the presentation of consciousness. As Cohn points out, "just as dialogues create the illusion that they render what characters 'really say' to each other, monologues create the illusion that they render what a character 'really thinks' to himself."¹⁰¹ This illusion can be difficult to maintain. Often passages of quoted monologue can seem to be unjustifiable oversimplifications of complex mental processes. Kemény touches on this several times in his novels, appending a quoted monologue with a remark suggesting that it represents only an approximation of a character's thoughts. In *Widow and Daughter*, for example, an old man at the seat of a carriage carrying the body of a youth who has been killed in a duel reflects on the vanity of life:

Horváth quietly drove the carriage carrying the body.

(...)

How short is life! What vain, fatiguing effort to bother with tomorrow, and to let our cravings carry us off into the distant future! How laughable the sun-worship of the ground-hog or the day-fly's dream of immortality, the day-fly who, flying above the river from which it rose, is immediately drowned by the first wave!^{cc}

At the conclusion of the passage the narrator adds, "Tedious variations of this thought kept returning to Horváth's mind." A similar example is found in *Pál Gyulai*. Senno fears that someone has learned of his wife's presence in the town:

^{cc} Horváth csendesesen vitte halottját kis útikocsijában.

(...)

Mily rövid az élet! Mily hiú fáradság törődni a holnappal, s vágyainkat a távol jövőendő felé eregetni! Mily nevetséges lehet a vakandok napiniádása s a kérésznek álma a halhatatlanságról, míg a folyam fölött, melyből kikelt, röpködve, az első habbal ismét belemerül!

E gondolat untató változatokban tért vissza Horváthhoz[.] (*Őzvegy és leánya*. 363.)

Is there someone who knows that the maestro has a wife, who knows this woman, who could have discovered where she is lodged? We raise these questions only once, because we do not count ourselves among those who favor repetition, but for the sake of faithful presentation we feel it necessary to mention that Senno rolled it before himself in several different versions.^{dd}

These qualifying remarks imply an uneasiness with the identity between language and thought implicit in quoted monologue. The mental state of a character, Kemény seems again to suggest, cannot be transcribed. The narrator of *Pál Gyulai* makes an observation that expresses this view. Commenting on Gyulai's deliberations as to whether or not he would be justified in having Senno executed, the narrator remarks,

Who can look into his own soul's inner sanctum at his whim? (...) I am firmly convinced that all the moods of our soul derive from our thoughts, but mostly from fragments of thoughts so miniscule, smaller and faster than could ever materialize in words, that we never grow aware of them. In such a process, independent from us, yet under the spell of these tiny promptings wholly rooted in us, the seed-bed of our actions, our state of mind takes shape."

It is curious to note that similar reservations concerning the quoted monologue appear in the writings of the twentieth-century novelist Nathalie Sarraute. As a member of the nouveau roman generation Sarraute was writing well after stream of consciousness fiction had lost its novelty. Her own novels, like those of Kemény, tend to blend psycho-narration with quoted monologue, as if in recognition of the limits, perhaps, of each. In her essay *Conversation and Sub-conversation* she uses imagery not unlike that used by Kemény to refer to the depths of the psyche inaccessible through quoted monologue:

the immense profusion of sensations, images, sentiments, memories, impulses, little larval actions that no inner language can convey, that jostle one another on the threshold of consciousness, gather together in compact groups and loom up all of a sudden, then immediately fall

^{dd} Létezik-e más, ki tudná, hogy a maestrónak neje van, ki ismerné e némbert, ki fölfödözhetette lakását? E kérdéseket mi csak egyszer hozzuk föl, mert nem tartozunk az ismétlések barátai közé, azonban az előadási hűség kedvéért szükségesnek tartjuk érinteni, hogy Senno több versen gördítette maga elébe.] (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. I, 188.)

^{ee} Ki tudna saját lelkének szentélyébe tetszése s kénye szerint nézni? (...) Állhatatosan hiszem, hogy minden hangulata keblünknek eszméinkből származik, de többnyire oly eszme-párányokkal, melyek kisebbek és gyorsabbak, mintsem szavakban megtestesülvén észrevétessenek magunk által is. Ily tőlünk független, noha belőlünk támadt hatásocskák közt alakul tetteink növényágya, a kedélyállapot. (*Gyulai Pál*. Vol. n, 130.)

apart, combine otherwise and reappear in new forms, while unwinding inside us, like the ribbon that comes clattering from a telescriptor slot, is an uninterrupted flow of words.¹⁰²

That two authors writing at such different times (one long before William James coined the term stream of consciousness, the other well after this term had been adopted to describe a genre of narrative) would both refer to spheres of psychological existence impenetrable through quoted monologue suggests that Cohn is correct to argue that despite stylistic differences, the interior monologue is effectively identical to the soliloquy that prefigured it. The essential features of both are the same ("the reference to the thinking self in the first person, and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense"). As the comments of Kemény and Sarraute indicate, the limitations of these techniques are also the same: they touch only on the spheres of consciousness that find expression in words.

F. Narrated Monologue

If quoted monologue and psycho-narration seem, as approaches to the presentation of consciousness, to stand in opposition to each other (one consisting entirely of the narrator's discourse, the other entirely of a character's), the **technique** referred to by Cohn as narrated monologue can be said to constitute a bridge between these two poles, or, in Cohn's words, a "synthesis of antitheses."¹⁰³ Narrated monologue allows for the expression of a character's thoughts in that character's idiom while preserving the third-person reference and tense of narration. Unlike psycho-narration, narrated monologue represents a character's discourse, not the narrator's. Unlike quoted monologue, however, it blurs the boundary between thought and language.

Cohn is careful to distinguish narrated monologue from other, similar critical concepts. She notes that the French *style indirect libre* and German *erlebte Rede*, though they too designate the rendering of silent thought in third person narrated form, refer also to the analogous rendering of speech. Cohn's term refers only to the rendering of thought, which, she argues, "presents problems that are quite separate, and far more intricate and interesting than its more vocal twin."¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, Cohn's narrated monologue does not refer to figurá narration in which the discourse of the narrator seems to express the viewpoint of a character. This concept, described by Pouillon as "vue-avec," refers more broadly to a character's perspective, whereas Cohn's term applies only to thoughts. Narrated monologue should not be conceptualized as "vue avec," but rather as "pensée avec." "By implying the correspondence to a (potential) quoted monologue," Cohn explains, "[narrated monologue] pinpoints a more specific 'thing'."¹⁰⁵ The line between

figurái thought and its context is not always clear, Cohn concedes, but "the term 'narrated monologue' suggests a method for discerning its location - or for explaining its effacement."¹⁰⁶

Narrated monologue, according to Cohn, is easily distinguished from the other two modes. Grammatically it resembles psycho-narration, but the absence of what Cohn refers to as "mental verbs" lends it the appearance of quoted monologue. As an example Cohn cites the following passage from *Portrait of an Artist*. Stephen is in church, waiting to give confession:

The slide was shot too suddenly. The penitent came out. He was next. He stood up in terror and walked blindly into the box.

At last it had come. He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. *God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins. His confession would be long, long. Everybody in the chapel would know then what a sinner he had been. Let them know. It was true. But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry.* He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form[.]¹⁰⁷

According to Cohn the italicized portions of this citation represent Stephen's thoughts. A simple transition of pronoun from third to first person and verb from past to present tense, she contends, will 'translate' this passage into a more traditional narrative form in which a character's thoughts are introduced with inquit formulae: "He thought, 'at last it has come'. He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. 'God can see that I am sorry,' he said to himself. 'I will tell all my sins. My confession will be long, long.'" However, this 'translation', Cohn notes, is not the text. "By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent," she argues, "the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figurái consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation."¹⁰⁸

As an interpretive tool, narrated monologue enables a reader to construe a passage of third-person narration as an expression of a character's thoughts. In Kemény's novella *Love and Vanity*, for example, one finds a sentence that, though it is given in third-person past tense, can hardly be said to represent the view of the narrator:

The beautiful lady [Sarolta] found them far less interesting nowadays. Their ideas no longer possessed any *channel*, their ways of thinking quickly sunk to *betises*, and their conversation was undeniably *fade*. Why and how? Only the demons of caprice know.^{ff}

^{ff} [A] szép delnő most sokkal érdektelenebbnek találta őket. Eszméiknek többé nem volt elég *allure-je*; gondolkozásmódjuk hamar sülyedt/>/fi//Hífe-be, s társalgásuk kétségkívüiü«f/<? volt.

Neither the content of the sentence beginning with 'their ideas' nor its idiom can be plausibly attributed to the narrator. It reflects, rather, the unspoken, perhaps un verbalized thoughts of Sarolta, who has grown bored with the company of her acquaintances.

This passage illustrates the potential of narrated monologue as a tool for irony. Because narrated monologue involves the narration from a third-person point of reference of a character's mental discourse it invariably transforms that discourse itself into an object. While the semantic content of the sentence of narrated monologue in this passage is perhaps a sufficient indication that it does not represent the view of the narrator, the style also suggests the agency of a character. The French terms, a vocabulary used by some members of the Hungarian upper class in the nineteenth century as a sign of refinement, are features of Sarolta's idiom. While these terms have their own objects (or signifiers) in Sarolta's discourse, here they take on additional meanings. Embedded within third-person narration, Sarolta's discourse itself becomes the signified of the narrator's discourse. It represents the speech - and the mannerisms - of the particular social milieu that has shaped her pretensions and aspirations. While Sarolta's discourse refers to her acquaintances, the narrative refers to her discourse. By foregrounding a character's discourse, narrated monologue creates an ironic distance between the narrator and the language of the narrative.

Narrated monologue, like the other two modes defined by Colin, is not limited to third person narratives. It can be used by a first-person narrator retelling, for example, a moment of his youth. Kemény's unfinished novella *The Life of Love* begins with the narrator's description of the days of his childhood, when he was often distracted by thoughts of his bewitching classmate Mari. He writes of the times he and his friends would sneak into her father Bartalics' garden:

If, in the springtime, we stole into his garden to pick dark violets (...) what did he care? Just let us keep our peace with their big, wooly dog, just don't let Mari see us: Bartalics, he didn't even get up to leave his room! But Mari, the agate-dark eyed Mari, she was our great persecutor. If we were up to some mischief, not with words -

S hogyan és miért? A szeszély démonai tudják[.] (*Szerelem és hiúság*. 199.) I must say a few words to justify the translation I have given of this passage. In the original Hungarian text the italicized words are not 'charme,' 'betises,' and 'fade,' but rather 'allure,' 'plaitudes,' and 'fade.' I replaced 'allure' and 'plaitudes' with 'charmes' and 'betises' only because these first two words have identical English cognates. I took this liberty in order to preserve an important feature of the original text. Had I translated these words 'correctly' they would have blended into the rest of the text. In the Hungarian they stand out as pretentious affectations that evoke a particular context. I thought it important to retain this aspect of the original text. I offer this English version of the original as one possible translation and freely admit I have taken an interpretive liberty in my translation.

no - but with a single look she chased us off. Though she went to school, just like us, and her coat was more worn than the other girls' who studied with us in that building.⁸⁸

Though this memory, specifically avowed as such, is rendered in past tense verbs from a third-person perspective, the inclusion of words and phrases characteristic of a child's idiom suggests that certain statements represent the thoughts of the little boy. The imperative statements ("Just let," "just don't let"), by momentarily effacing the past tense, close the distance between the moment recounted in the narrative and the moment of narration itself. While the adult vocabulary of the brief interruption ("the agate-dark eyed Mari!") reestablishes this distance by introducing an utterance that cannot be attributed to the mind of the little boy, the childish logic of the concluding sentence again reduces this gap by evoking the thoughts of the disgruntled boy as he puzzles over his own timidity.

This passage is a superb example of one of the most important uses of narrated monologue. Because it does not rely on phrases such as "I thought" or "it seemed to me," it enables an author to introduce into a retrospective first-person narrative the thoughts of his younger self without disrupting the flow of the story. In this example it creates virtually seamless shifts from the voice of the narrator as an older man recounting his childhood to the voice of the child. The difficulties of creating vivid accounts of past experiences in first-person narratives have been noted by numerous critics ever since Percy Lubbock made his infamous claim that authors seeking to narrate the workings of a character's mind should abandon the first-person form "as soon as the main weight of attention is claimed for the speaker rather than for the scene[.]"¹⁰⁹ Lubbock's meaning is lucidly summarized by Adam Abraham Mendilow:

Contrary to what might be expected, a novel in the first person rarely succeeds in conveying the illusion of presentness and immediacy. Far from facilitating the hero-reader identification, it tends to appear more remote in time. The essence of such a novel is that it is retrospective, and that there is an avowed temporal distance between the fictional time - that of the events as they happened - and the narrator's actual time - his time of recording those events. There is a vital difference between writing a story forward from the past, as in the third person novel, and writing one backward from the present, as in the first person novel. Though both are equally written in the past, in the former the illusion is created that the action is taking place; in the latter, the action is felt as having taken place.¹¹⁰

⁸⁸ [H]a tavasszal fekete violát szedni (...) belopóztunk, mit bánta ő? Csak a házi komondorral éljünk békeségben, csak a kis Mari meg ne lásson; Bartalics bizony érettünk ki sem mozdult a szobából! De Mari, az agát-sótét szemű Mari, nagy üldözőnk volt. Ha csínyet tettünk, nem szavaival, tekintetével kergetett ki. Pedig ő is iskolába járt, mint mi, s köntöse kopottabb vala a többi leányokénál, kik velünk egy épület alatt tanultak. (*A szerelem élete*. 228.)

The passage from *The Life of Love* suggests that Lubbock's contentions concerning the limits of first-person narrative may be somewhat hasty. Genette makes the provocative claim the Proust's *Recherche*, a first-person narrative in which there are layers of retrospection, nevertheless "involves no modal distance between the story and the narrative: no loss, no weakening of the mimetic illusion. Extreme mediation, and at the same time utmost immediacy."¹¹¹ Kemény's novella could be mentioned as another example of the potential of retrospective narrative to evoke the past not as it is remembered, but as it was experienced. By blurring the distinction between recollection and experience it symbolizes, as Genette says of Proust, "the rapture of reminiscence."¹¹²

Narrated monologue is especially effective as a tool for the presentation of hesitant deliberations. Because, unlike quoted monologue, it does not imply that a character has successfully verbalized an impression or a suspicion, it renders thoughts in a tentative form. In the following passage from Kemény's *The Fanatics*, Klára, a devout Sabbatarian, thinks of her husband and the sin she fears he has committed by betraying his faith:

She didn't want to weep or sigh, she didn't want to think on her own misfortune, only the thought of freeing her husband turned in her head.

And from what must she free him?

She had to free her husband from sin.

Ah, but if she freed him... could she save him from the accusation of his conscience?

Klára shuddered in her premonition of the grave, the critical hours.

What should she do if her husband lost his self-respect, or if, unable to bear the shame, instead of seeking sanctifying repentance he should sink into the maelstrom of wild despair?

After what had happened it was impossible for Klára not to believe that her husband, because of some secret and tremendous temptation, had strayed from the path of virtue, broken with God, and risked his eternal being for worldly interests.*¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Nein akart könnyezni, sóhajtani, nem akart saját szerencsétlenségére emlékezni, csak férje megszabadítása forgott elméjében.

S mitől szabadítsa meg?

A bűnből kellett férjét kiragadnia.

Ah, de ha szabaddá tette... megmentheti-e a lélekváltót?

Klára visszaborzadt a komor, a válságos órák előérzete ben.

Mit tegyen, ha férje elveszti önbecsülését, vagy ha a szégyent nem tudva hordozni, a tisztító bánat helyett a vad kétségbeesés örvényébe süllyed?

Az előzmények után lehetetlen volt Klárának nem hinni, hogy férje valami titkos és nagy kísértés miatt letért az erény útjáról, meghasonlott az Istennel, s földi érdekekért örökkévalókat kockáztatott. (*A rajongók*. Vol. I, 256-257.)

Though the borders between standard narrative and narrated monologue are perhaps not immediately clear in this passage, syntactic and stylistic features of several of the sentences suggest that they can be interpreted as thoughts on the threshold of verbalization in Klára's mind. Narrated monologue, as Coñn points out, "teems with questions, exclamations, repetitions, overstatements, colloquialisms."¹¹³ Here it is precisely these features that imply shifts to narrated monologue. Words and phrases such as "accusation of his conscience" ("lélekvád"), "sanctifying repentance" ("tisztító bánat"), and "path of virtue" ("erény útja") evoke the language of Klára's consciousness. The question in the second sentence and the response to this question depict the dialogue taking place in her mind. With the exception of the narrator's assertion that "Klára shuddered in her premonition of the grave, the critical hours" (an example of psycho-narration), the pattern of question/answer dialogue continues through the rest of the passage. This is not unlike the dialogues from *Pál Gyulai* and *Widow and Daughter* that are rendered in quoted monologue. The crucial difference is that by maintaining the third-person reference the narrative does not insist that Klára has actually formulated these thoughts in words. Her doubts and fears tremble in regions of her consciousness not immediately accessible to language.

Klára's thoughts are often rendered in narrated monologue. The following excerpt describes her anxieties as she lies awake after a long and fatiguing journey:

The trip had tired Klára, but it failed to bestow peaceful dreams on her.

She knew that the next day she would come to a turning point in her life and in the destiny of her family.

If she fled with her husband, where would they settle in this vast world?

And if her husband didn't want to leave, when would they find peace in this life, which quarreled so with their fates and their hearts?

There the desert horizon without a point where the eye might rest, here the depths with their twisting whirlpools.

There squalor, here doom!

So many reasons why the woman's eyes would not close.ⁱⁱ

ⁱⁱ Az út elfárasztá Klárát, de mégsem ajándékozta meg csendes álommal.

Tudta, hogy másnap fordulóponthoz jut élete és háznépének sorsa.

Ha férjével bujdosásnak indul, hol fognak tanyát verni a széles világon?

S ha férje nem akar távozni, mikor fognak nyugalmat lelteni az életben, mellyel sorsuk vagy szívük meghasonlott?

Ott a sivatag láthatár nyugpont nélkül, itt a mélység a sodró örvénnyel.

Ott nyomor várhat rájuk, itt süllyedés!

Mennyi ok, hogy a nő szemei be ne csukódjanak! (*A rajongók*. Vol. I, 292.)

Again, though grammatically these questions and the two statements expressing hopelessness that follow them are rendered from the third-person point of reference, the content and the style imply that they are Klára's un verbalized thoughts reported by the narrator. The narrator's vague remark, "so many reasons why the woman's eyes would not close," suggests the elusiveness of these thoughts in Klára's mind. Klára is perhaps the most introspective and least vocal character of a novel in which virtually all of the characters are introspective. Her thoughts, however, almost never find form in quoted monologue. She is also one of the characters least in control of her fate. Tossed by circumstance into situations entirely foreign to her, she is constantly troubled by fears and doubts that she struggles to confront. Narrated monologue, because it renders her thoughts without imposing the rigid order required by quoted monologue, is the ideal approach to presenting her disordered mind. Quoted monologue, no matter how inchoate, can only present thoughts as a succession of words. This inevitably creates the impression of linearity. Narrated monologue, though it preserves a character's idiom, avoids this implication by maintaining the hiatus between thought and language.

Narrated monologue thus incorporates advantages of both of the other two modes identified by Cohn. Like psycho-narration, narrated monologue can touch on a character's thoughts without implying that the character has sufficient grasp of these thoughts to have translated them into words. Like quoted monologue, narrated monologue allows for the expression of a character's thoughts in that character's idiom. It minimizes, without removing, the narrating presence, focusing the text on the inner life of the character without relinquishing the narrative to the voice of that character entirely.

According to Cohn's historical model of the history of the novel, narrated monologue emerged comparatively late. While it appeared occasionally in eighteenth century novels such as *Tom Jones*, it was in the middle of the nineteenth century that it emerged as a dominant approach to the narration of consciousness. This coincided with two trends: the growing interest in inner over outer experience; and the desire to create unobtrusive narrators whose presence would hardly be noticed by the reader. The supreme practitioner of this technique (according to Cohn but also Lubbock, Proust, Stephen Ullmann, R. J. Sherrington, and others¹¹⁴) was Flaubert. It continued to figure in the novels of twentieth century writers such as Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Faulkner and even novelists of the nouveau roman generation such as Sarraute, but in competition with the syntactically fractured, discontinuous interior monologue exemplified by certain passages in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Kemény's use of narrated monologue reflects both his desire to create narratives that give voice to the thoughts of their characters as well as his anxiety concerning the inadequacies of interior monologue.

G. Conclusions

If the nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the focus of narrative fiction away from the retelling of events towards the narration of the thoughts and feelings of characters, Zsigmond Kemény can be said to fall in the middle of this shift. His novels are reflections of the emerging interest in individual, subjective experience that accompanied the Romantics' rejection of the Enlightenment faith in the uniformity of humankind. John Stuart Mill's contention that the true poet is not heard, but rather overheard could be applied to the characters of his novels.¹¹⁵ Incessantly losing themselves in their own thoughts (even when in the company of others), they seem constantly to explore the limits of self-knowledge through language.

Yet as the critical tools provided by Cohn help demonstrate, Kemény does not rely on a character's verbalization of his thoughts alone in exploring the complexities and contradictions of the human psyche. He adopts all the available narrative techniques for the presentation of consciousness. If Wolfgang Kayser is correct to assign drama the "priority of event" and "to the private world of the novel the priority of figure,"¹¹⁶ Kemény's novels represent works that develop this genre to its full distinctive potential.

Kemény has often been characterized as an author of works that are difficult and even tediously complex. As Szegedy-Maszák observes, these contentions tend to focus on those passages of Kemény's works "in which the author struggles to find means of expressing the human psyche." Szegedy-Maszák writes,

I find this accusation unjust, or rather historically unfounded, because Kemény had very few precursors to whom he could look back. Henry James succeeded only decades later, through long and focused effort, in achieving a similar goal, though he wrote in the language of Shakespeare, and there were, among his precursors, such investigators of the psyche as the masters of the eighteenth century epistolary novels, Sterne, or Jane Austen. The stylistics of the psychological novel must be created in each individual language, and in this respect there was no organic tradition behind Kemény.¹¹⁷

If Kemény's works can be regarded as part of a trend in European literature, they may equally be construed as seminal texts in Hungarian literature. Twentieth-century Hungarian authors such as Dezső Kosztolányi or Sándor Márai, whose works (for example *Skylark* translated by Richard Aczel - 1993 - or *Embers* translated into English from German by Carol Brown Janeway - 2001) have, through translation, won acclaim even outside of Hungary, owe a debt, it could be argued, to Kemény, whose experiments with the uses of language as a tool for the representation of consciousness created a new genre of novel in Hungarian literature.

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Notes

1. Leon Edel, *The Psychological Novel* (New York, 1955, 1961), 11.
2. *Ibid.*, 16.
3. Lewis likens the following passage from the *Pickwick Papers* to the monologues of Leopold Bloom:
 "Terrible place - dangerous work - other day - five children - mother - tall lady - eating sandwiches - forgot the arch - crash - knock - children look around - mother's head off-sandwich in her hand - no mouth to put it in - head of a family off - shocking, shocking..."
 (Cited in Edel. 18.)
4. *Ibid.*, 27.
5. R. J. Sherrington's *Three Novels by Flaubert* is an extreme example of this. Sherrington contends that in the works of Flaubert, "only scenes and actions which can be seen through the eyes of the characters, and which are important to them, are now presented." R. J. Sherrington, *Three Novels by Flaubert* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 81.
6. Pouillon's *vue-avec*, adopted later by Todorov, served to denote passages of a text that could be said to depict the viewpoint of a character, while Benveniste's distinction between *histoire* and *discours*, renamed personal and a-personal by Barthes, attempted to identify the speaker of a text. However interesting, from a theoretical perspective, the concepts proposed by these critics may be, they rest on highly questionable methodology. Pouillon claimed that the perspective of a character (*vue-avec*) could be recognized on the basis of its deviation from the perspective of an "impartial observer." This raises the obvious question, how can one speak of impartial observers in fictional texts? Todorov, who adopted and expanded Pouillon's approach, attempted to develop a similar framework, basing his conclusions on an equally problematic distinction between "objective" and "subjective" language. Benveniste's concept of *discours* and *histoire* (text spoken by a narrating presence and text that narrates itself) rests on such tenuous distinctions that Barthes, in his essay *Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits*, actually confuses the two and ends up reversing Benveniste's original conclusions. See: Jean Pouillon, *Temps et roman* (Paris: Gallimard, 1946); Tzvetan Todorov, "Les catégories du récit littéraire," *Communications* 8 (1966): 125-151; Emile Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); Roland Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits," *Communications* 8 (1966): 1-27.

7. Käte Hamburger, *The Logic of Literature*, trans. Marilynn J. Rose. (Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1973), Second, revised edition, 83.
8. For example, Lóránt Czigány, author of *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature from the earliest Times to the Present*, makes the vague assertion, in the few pages devoted to Kemény, that he "learned from Walter Scott." (*The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 209); István Sötér, chief editor of the six-volume *History of Hungarian Literature*, claims that in Kemény's first unfinished novel one feels the influence of Victor Hugo and Walter Scott. ("Kemény Zsigmond," in *A magyar irodalom története 1849-től 1905-ig*, ed. István Sötér (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1965), IV, 244. "Regényén érezhető Hugo, Scott [...] hatása." In his book *Aspects et parallelismes de la littérature hongroise*, Sötér describes Kemény's novel *Férj és nő* (Husband and Wife, 1852) as "an imitation of the French social novel of the time." (*Aspects et parallelismes de la littérature hongroise* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1966), 118. "...une imitation du roman social français du temps.") Béla G. Németh, a prominent scholar of Hungarian literary history, notes that Kemény's characters have often been compared with those of Dostoevsky and adds that "One could, with no less justification, liken Kemény to the great demonic eccentric of German romanticism, Heinrich von Kleist." *Türelmetlen és késlekedő félszázad* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1971), 132. "Alakjait és őt magát is többször hasonlították Dosztojevskij figuráihoz. Nem alap nélkül. De nem kevesebb joggal lehetne hasonlítani a német romantika nagy démoni különéhez, Heinrich von Kleisthez.")
9. Pál Gyulai, "Kemény Zsigmond regényei és beszélei," *Pesti Napló* (1854): 93-99. 93. ("a szenvedélyek hű festése... lélektani kifejlésre helyez fősúlyt").
10. Ágost Greguss, "A nevezetesb tüneményekről: legújabbkor regény- s beszélyirodalmunkban." *Kelet Népe* I (1856): 213-225. 219 ("Mindegyik műve egy-egy lélektani tanulmány a szó legszorosb értelmében").
11. Ferenc Szinyei. *Novella és regényirodalmunk: A Bach-korszakig* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1925), Vol. I-IH., Vol. II. 149 ("megteremtője ... irodalmunkban a modern lélekrajzi novellának és regénynek").
12. Dániel Veress, *Szerettem a sötétet és szélzúgást: Kemény Zsigmond élete és műve*. (Kolozsvár-Napoca: Dacia Könyvkiadó, 1978), 122. ("... ez az első, a fogalom teljes értelmében vett lélektani regény a magyar irodalomban").
13. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó), 110. ("[Kemény] a realizmusnak olyan továbbfejlesztését is megkezdte, mely a lélektani regény kialakulásához vezetett.")
14. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, "Idő és tér Kemény Zsigmond regényeiben," *Literatura* (1979), 79. ("A XIX. században egyetlen magyar prózaíró sem érdekelt ilyen mértékben a belső okság - a világirodalomban pedig Stendhalt leszámítva talán senkit sem Flaubert, Dosztojevskij, és James előtt.")
15. Dezső Kozma, *Eleven örökség* (Kolozsvár: Tini vár, 2000), 51. ("fróink közül kevesen tudtak annyit az ember belső világának legfinomabb rezdüléseiről, mint ő.")
16. Ferenc Szemlér, *A költészet értelme* (Bucharest, 1965), 119. ("A művet és az embert egymástól elválasztani nem lehet. Az alkotóból fejlődik ki a mű, de a műben teljes egészében felfedezhető az alkotó maga. Az irodalomtörténetirő az életrajz alapján igyekszik magyarázatot találni a műre[.]")
17. Edward Morgan Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York, 1954), 45.
18. Thomas Mann, "Versuch über das Theater," in *Gesammelte Werke* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag), XI, 19-58, 25. "Der Roman ist genauer, vollständiger, wissender, gewissenhafter, tiefer als

das Drama, in allem, was die Erkenntniß der Menschen als Leib und Charakter betrifft, und im Gegensatz, zu der Anschauung, als sei das Drama das eigentlich plastische Dichtwerk, bekenne ich, daß ich es vielmehr als eine Kunst der Silhouette und den erzählten Mensch allein als rund, ganz, wirklich, und plastische empfinde. Man ist Zuschauer bei einem Schauspiel; man ist mehr als das in einer erzählten Welt."

19. *Aristotle's Poetics*, ed. and transl. by Stephen Halliwell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 53, 1450a.
20. *Ibid.*, 51, 1450a.
21. Miklós Jósika, *Regény es regényítészet* (1858), 500. ("Újabb idöben az ítészet nem egyszer azon sajnálatos tévedésben van, hogy a szép forma minden űrt betakar s minden hiányt elföd, miként erre már feljebb céloztunk. Mi ezt sohasem fogjuk elhinni, s az *érdekes mesét* a regény egyik fokellékének tartjuk." Italics in original.)
22. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions*, transl. Angela Scholar (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 534. (Book 11.)
23. *Ibid.*, 534.
24. Friedlich von Blankenburg, *Versuch über den Roman, Ml A* (Rpt. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1965), 265.
25. William Wordsworth, "Preface to the Lyrical Ballads," in *William Wordsworth and Samuel T. Coleridge: Selected Critical Essays*, ed. Thomas M. Raysor (New York: Appleton Centuivy Crofts, 1958), 5.
26. John Stuart Mill, "What is Poetry," in *Mill's Essays on Literature and Society*, ed. J. B. Schneewind (New York: Collier Books, 1965), 102-117, 106.
27. Aristotle, 51, 1450a.
28. Meyer Howard Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Artuer Lovejoy, "The Parallel of Deism and Classicism," in *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1948).
29. David Hume, "An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding," in *The Philosophical Works of David Hume* (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1964), IV, 94-95.
30. Johann Gottfried Herder, "Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele," in *Werke in Zwei Bänden* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1953), JJ, 378. ("Der tiefste Grund unsers Daseins ist individuell, sowohl in Empfindungen als Gedanken (...) alle Tiergattungen untereinander sind vielleicht nicht so verschieden, als Mensch vom Menschen.")
31. Blankenburg, 263. ("Wenn wir in der wirklichen Welt nicht jedesmal alle die Ursachen, die eine Begebenheit vielmehr so, als anders hervorbringen, begreifen und beobachten können: so geschieht dies, weil die Summe der wirkenden Ursachen zu sehr groß und mannichfältig; das Ganze zu sehr in einander geflochten ist, als daß wir sie darinn ze entdecken vermögen.")
32. Robert Humphrey, *Stream of Conciousness in the Modern Novel: A Study of James Joyce, Virginia Woolf Dorothy Richardson, William Faulkner and Others* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 8.
33. William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), Vols 1-3. James first used this term in the sixth chapter of *Principles*, entitled "The Mind-Stuff Theory," in which he wrote, "one need not treat as the physical counterpart of the stream of consciousness under observation, a 'total brain-activity' which is non-existent as a genuinely physiological fact" (Vol. 1,180). In the ninth chapter, entitled "Stream of Thought," he explained the grounds for this metaphor: "Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. /// *talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought,*

of consciousness, or of subjective life" (Vol. I, 233. Italics in original). Later in the same chapter, in a passage that could be said to prefigure Joyce's innovations, he writes of the inadequacies of language as a tool for the presentation of consciousness: "If there be such things as feelings at all, *then so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum naturae, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known.* There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades" (Vol. I, 238. Italics in original).

34. Dorrit Cohn, *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 9.
35. Mihály Szegegy-Maszák, "Romantic Irony in Nineteenth-Century Hungarian Literature" in *Romantic Irony*, ed. Frederick Garber (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988), 202-224, 223.
36. András Mártinké, "Töredékes gondolatok Kemény Zsigmond palackpostájáról," in *Teremtő idők* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977), 328-386. 346. ("A perspektíva (...) bonyolult alkalmazásának a magyar szépprózában Kemény egyik legnagyobb mestere.")
37. Edei, 38.
38. In his *Narrative Discourse* Genette outlines categories similar to Cohn's and illustrates them with examples similar to mine. He distinguishes three possible techniques for the narration of speech: narrated speech, transposed speech, and reported speech. He gives the following examples:
 - Narrated speech: I informed my mother of my decision to marry Albertine.
 - Transposed speech: I went to find my mother: it was absolutely necessary that I marry Albertine.
 - Reported speech: I said to my mother (or: I thought): it is absolutely necessary that I marry Albertine.
 These would correspond to Cohn's psycho-narration, narrated monologue, and quoted monologue. The crucial difference between Genette's categories and Cohn's is that, with the exception of reported speech (which, in spite of its name, refers, according to Genette's example, to thought as well), Genette's apply to speech, and therefore do not address the questions raised by the stream of consciousness novel, whereas Cohn's refer explicitly to thought. (Gerard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: an Essay in Method*, transl. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), 171-172).
39. Derek Bickerton, "Modes of Interior Monologue: A Fonnál Definition," *Modern Language Quarterly* 28 (1967): 229-239. Bickerton defines omniscient description as "inner speech rendered in indirect speech," 238.
40. Cohn, 12.
- 4L Cohn, v.
42. Edel, 27.
43. Blankenburg, 264. ("Der Dichter, wenn er sich nicht entehren will, kann den Vorwand nicht haben, daß er das Innre seiner Perſonen nicht kenne.")
44. Henry Fielding, *Tom Jones* (New York: Random House, 1950), 527.
45. Miklós Jósika, *Abaß* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1960). ("Egy lélekrajzot adok itt az olvasó kezébe.")
46. Cohn, 21.
47. Ferencz Papp, "B. Jósika Miklós és B. Kemény Zsigmond," *Budapesti Szemle* 140/2 (1909):

- 199–229,209. ("Jósika alakjait gyakran csak a külsőségek, néha csak eltérő nevek különböztetik meg egymástól.")
48. Szinyei, *Novella és regényirodalmunk: A Bach-korszakig*, JJ, 222. ("Kemény a korrajz külsőségeivel nem törődik annyit, mint Jósika.")
49. Papp, 209. ("Kemény alakjai, kikben minden pillanatban végtelen lelki élet mozgását érezzük, teljesen ellentétesek Jósika regény hőseivel.")
50. László Németh, "Az én katedrám," in *Németh László munkái* (Budapest, 1969), 602. ("Realizmusa itt tanulta meg a lelket szolgáló és lelket eláruló arcjátékok és testmozgások nyelvét.")
51. Jenő Péterfy, "Báró Kemény Zsigmond mint regényíró," in *Péterfy Jenő Munkái: Irodalmi tanulmányok* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat), 55. ("A képzelemnek a belsőre irányultságát a legfelületesebb olvasó is észreveheti Kemény első művén.")
52. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond*, 110. ("A lassú ütemű elbeszélésre azért volt szüksége, mert a belső cselekményességnek fontosabb szerepet szánt, mint a külsőnek.")
53. Cohn, 14.
54. Cited in Cohn, 24.
55. Cohn, 24.
56. *Ibid.*, 25.
57. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond*, 77. ("a figyelmet önmagára irányító elbeszélő akár még a hőseinél is hőbben ismerheti azt, ami végbemegy a lelkükben.")
58. Cohn, 29.
59. *Ibid.*, 28.
60. *Ibid.*, 25.
61. *Ibid.*, 23.
62. Cited in Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Structure of Literature* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975), 135.
63. Cited in Cohn, 23.
64. Cohn, 24.
65. *Ibid.*, 24.
66. János Dengi (the younger), "Kemény és Balzac," *Budapesti Szemle* 142 (1910): 72-97, 96. ("[Keménynek] okvetlenül aprólékosan kell ismertetni személyeinek lelki életét, szenvedélyeinek fejlődését, vagyis - mint Kemény mondta - a 'lélektani analysis bonczkészt' kell használnia. S ez az eljárás, mint láttuk, nem más, mint Balzac lélektani elemző módszere.")
67. Balzac, *La Maison du chat-qui-pelote*. Edition de Nadine Satiat (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), 83, 85.
68. See: Zoltán Ferenczi, "Kemény Zsigmond Emlékezete," *Budapest Szemle* 159 (1914): 1-25, 12: "Kemény studied in depth the nature of personality driven by passion, and in this doubtlessly Shakespeare and Balzac were his masters[.]" ("Ő mélyen tanulmányozta a szenvedély által vezetett jellemek természetét s ebben kétségtelenül Shakespeare és Balzac voltak mesterei[.]"); Ferenc Szinyei, *Kemény Zsigmond munkássága a szabadságharcig*. Akadémiai Széköglaló. (1920, Oct. 1) (Budapest: Stephaneum Nyomda Könyvkiadó R. T., 1924), 16. "He gave great attention to the appearances of a character, particularly the face, but here - partly under the influence of Balzac - he reaches deeper[.]" ("Alakja külsejének, főként arcának leírására nagy gondot fordít, de itt - részben Balzac hatása alatt - már mélyebbre nyúl[.]"); Jenő Pintér, *A Magyar Irodalom Története* (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1938), JJ, 327. "The way in which the writer sketches the psychological life of this unhappy man [the protagonist of Husband and Wife], this soul-searching and psyche-analyzing artistry can be said to be unparalleled in our old literature. In the choice and the adaptation of the theme of this novel Kemény stood under the influence of Balzac." ("Ahogyan az író ennek a boldogtalan embernek

elki életét megrajzolja, ez a léleklátó és lélekelemző művészet páratlannak mondható régibb regényirodalmunkban. A regény problémájának megválasztásában és feldolgozásában Balzac hatása alatt állott.")

69. Cohn, 26.
70. James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (New York: The Modern Library, 1916), 204. Cited in Cohn, 31.
71. Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: 1961), 164. Booth contends that, "any sustained view (...) temporarily turns the character whose mind is shown into a narrator."
72. In *Finnegan 's Wake* Joyce frequently runs words together, as in the following examples: As we there are where are we are we there from tomtittot to teetootomtotalitarian. Tea tea too oo. *Finnegan 's Wake* (New York: Viking Press, 1939). 260.
Methought as I was dropping asleep somepart in nonland of where's please (and it was when you and they were we) I heard at zero hour as 'twere the peal of vixen's laughter among mid-night's chimes from out the belfry of the cute old speckled church tolling so faint a goodmantrue as nighthood's unseen violet rendered all animated greatbritish and Irish objects nonviewable to human watchers save 'twere perchance anon some glistery gleam darkling adown surface of affluvial flowandflow as again might seem garments of laundry reposing a leasward close at hand in full expectation. And as I was jogging along in a dream as dozing I was dawdling, arrah, methought broadtone was heard and the creepers and the gliders and flivvers of the earth breath and the dancetongues of the woodfires and the hummers in their ground all vociferated echoing: Shaun! Shaun! Post the post! with a high voice and O, the higher on high the deeper and low, I heard him so! And lo, mescemed somewhat came of the noise and somewho might amove allmurk. Now, 'twas as clump, now mayhap. (403^104.)
73. Péterfő, 55. ("Kemény alakjai többet beszélnek magokkal és magoknak, mint egymással és egymásnak.")
74. *Ibid.*, 55. ("Ha monológok drámai hőst megteremthetnének, Gyulai Pál volna rá szemenszedett példány.")
75. Mihály Sükösd, "Kemény Zsigmond regényrétegei," *Új írás* 87/2 (1971): 1. ("jellembábrázolásának legeredményesebb eszköze: a monológ.")
76. Veress, 85. ("Szinte képtelenek az igazi párbeszédre, alkatuk, önmagukra irányuló érdeklődésük mindenekfelett a monológra teszi hajlamossá őket.")
77. Cited in Colin, 59.
78. Péterfő, 56. ("Ha Kemény drámát irt volna, azt hiszem, hősei mind külön, egymás után lépnek föl és mély, költői szavakban addig elmélkednek a sorsról.")
79. See: Melvin J. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1955).
80. Cohn, 61.
81. Cited in Cohn, 66.
82. Szegedy-Maszák, *Kemény Zsigmond*, 253. ("Aligha van még egy magyar regény a XLX. században, mely annyira gyakran szerepeltetné a belső monológot, mint *A rajongók*.")
83. *Ibid.*, 81. ("Kemény műveiben különösen gyakoriak az olyan részletek, amelyekről lehetetlen megállapítani, hogy belső monológok-e vagy külsők. A néma magánbeszéd még annyira ritkán fordult elő a magyar szépprózában a XLX. század közepén, hogy a *Gyulai Pál*, az *Özvegy*, *A rajongók* s a *Zord idő* szerzője valószínűleg már csak azért sem törekedett egyértelműségre, mert azt gondolhatta, így könnyebben elfogadja a közönség a szokatlanul gyakori monológokat.")
84. Cohn, 82.
85. Genette, 180.
86. Cited in Genette, 178–179.

87. Cohn, 91.
88. M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, transl. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 251.
89. M. M. Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text" in Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, eds., *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, transl. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 112.
90. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, transl. Charles E. Wilbour (New York: Modern Library, 1992), 189-190.
91. Lev Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, transl. Alex Kozulin (Cambridge, Mass., London, England: MIT Press, 1986), 225.
92. *Ibid.*, 225.
93. *Ibid.*, 235.
94. *Ibid.*, 243.
95. James Joyce, *Ulysses* (London: Picador, Macmillan Publishers, 1997), 37.
96. Cited in Bickerton, 234.
97. Cohn's term quoted monologue, as previously noted, refers both to soliloquy and what Bickerton calls direct interior monologue. She points out that this distinction rests on the definition of interior monologue as associate and the soliloquy as rational and deliberate. "[I]t is impossible," she argues, "to decide on the basis of such nuances whether a text is, or is not, an interior monologue: many quotations of fictional minds ... contain both logical *and* associate patterns. ... The interior monologue-soliloquy distinction, moreover, makes one lose track of the twin denominators common to all thought-quotations, regardless of their content and style: the reference to the thinking self in the first person, and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense." 13.
98. Joyce, *Ulysses*, 42.
99. Cohn, 272.
100. *Ibid.*, 174.
101. *Ibid.*, 76.
102. Nathalie Sarraute, "Conversation and Sub-conversation," in *The Age of Suspicion*, transl. Maria Jolas (New York, 1963), 75-118, 91-92.
103. Cohn, 98.
104. *Ibid.*, 109.
105. *Ibid.*, 110.
106. *Ibid.*, 110.
107. James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, 165. Cited in Cohn, 102.
108. Cohn, 103.
109. Percy Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (New York: P. Smith, 1931), 144-145.
110. Adam Abraham Mendilow, *Time and the Novel* (London, New York: P. Neville, 1952), 106-107.
111. Genette, 169.
112. *Ibid.*, 109.
113. Cohn, 102.
114. Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction*. Marcel Proust, "A propos du 'Style' de Flaubert," *Noiivelle Revue Française* 14 (1920): 72-90; Stephen Ullinann, *Style in the French Novel* (New York, 1964); R. J. Sherrington, *Three Novels by Flaubert* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
115. Mill, *ibid.*, 109. "Poetry and eloquence are both alike the expression or uttering forth of feeling. But if we may be excused the seeming affectation of the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is *heard*, poetry is *overheard*. Eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling

confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or action."

116. Wolfgang Kayser, *Das sprachliche Kunstwerk* (Berne: A. Francke AG Verlag, 1948), 369. ("Indem so die Figuren [eines Dramas] dauernd 'dem andern' zugeordnet und in die Spannung auf das Kommende gestellt sind, indem andererseits auch der Raum, soweit er nicht neutraler Schauplatz ist, voller Spannung steckt, kann man sagen, daß zum Dramatischen an sich der Vorrang des Geschehens gehört, so wie zur 'privaten' Welt des Romans der Vorrang der Figur gehört.")
117. Miliály Szegedy-Maszák, "Tragikum és ironia Kemény Zsigmond történeteszemléletében." *ItK* (1990): 94-100, 95. ("Akik Kemény írásmódjának nehézkességére hivatkoznak, általában azokra a részletekre szoktak utalni, melyekben az író küzdelmet folytat az emberi tudat kifejezésére. Jogtalanak, pontosabban történetietlennek érzem e vádat, s főként azért, mert Kemény nagyon kevés előzményre támaszkodhatott. Henry Jamesnek évtizedekkel később is csak hosszú s kitaró munkával sikerült elérnie hasonló célt, pedig ő Shakespeare nyelvén írt, s elődei között a léleknek olyan felderítői voltak, mint a levélregény XVII. századi mesterei, Sterne vagy Jane Austen. A lélektani regény kifejezésmódját minden nyelven meg kell teremteni, s ebben a tekintetben Kemény mögött nem állt szerves hagyomány.")