

**On the Borders of Propaganda and What Can Be Said:
Hungarian-Finnish Cultural Relations during the
Kádár-Kekkonen Era**

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1 Introduction

In this article the focus is on what kind of political aims were set to cultural exchange and in what way it was manifested in practice in the cultural relations between Kádár's Hungary and Kekkonen's Finland. There is no doubt that cultural relations after the Second World War were a scene of the use of power. During the Cold War cultural relations became highly politicized both in the East and in the West and cultural relations became the so called fourth dimension of foreign politics together with political, military and economic relations – cultural exchange was now in the service of foreign policy.

In Hungary – as well as in every socialist country – culture and international cultural relations were openly a part of foreign politics and they were given political and ideological tasks. It is also a question of language, or rather of discourse, particularly of the ideologies and use of power which are concealed in language. This discourse deals with the constituting of ideologies of languages. Furthermore, the questions of language usage have led to wider political actions; language serves as a major means of manipulating, and even of transforming power relations. In addition, it is a major factor influencing, affecting, and transforming social relationships. Yet, once selected, the very form of language used also affects by defining and concretizing the conceptions that may not have yet been spelled out.

Further, language can be used as a means of control across the range of social relationships.¹

I examine the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary first of all as a forum of discursive power and – it can be stated – as state socialist Hungary's way of making propaganda in Finland. The focus is, thus, on discursive actions, that sometimes turned into propaganda, and the purpose of which was to influence the intellectual maps, attitudes and actions of the subjects who were the objects of those actions. When discourses of two social orders meet, the consequence is clashes, misunderstandings, resistance of the other's discourse, or efforts to adapt at least to some extent to the other's discourse. It is also a question of a power relationship, where the situation constantly changes and where the actions of both sides affect the power relationship, which is consequently constantly in motion and under change.

2 Propaganda or Information?

The word 'propaganda' is of a relatively recent origin; the first documented use of the term occurred in 1622. Originally propaganda was the Catholic Church's means of coordinating efforts to bring people to the 'voluntary' acceptance of church doctrines. The term thus took on a negative meaning in Protestant countries but a positive connotation in Catholic areas. However, the term propaganda was widespread only in the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was used to describe the persuasion tactics employed during the First World War and those later used by totalitarian regimes. Propaganda became to be defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception. The term has since evolved to mean mass 'suggestion' or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual.²

It is, of course, difficult to write about propaganda, since the term itself is questionable and has been understood in different ways depending on the period of time and society in question. In this context it is relevant to ask in which ways the conception

of propaganda differed in Hungary and in Finland, and for what (historical, political, traditions of thinking) reasons.

From the strong faith in the communist elite having the right consciousness and the right knowledge in its possession follows that in socialist rhetoric 'propaganda' does not appear as negative as in the West. Rather than implanting an organized lie in peoples' minds it seems to have been the purpose to get reality onto the right track, so to speak. Propaganda was a necessary part of building the right kind of world, and thus it was not needed to make any value judgements of it. It was about, as it was often said by Hungarian authorities, 'informational work' (*tájékoztató munka*). Propaganda made in the West, however, demanded a different approach than the one made inside the socialist camp, since in the West the attitude towards propaganda aspirations was very suspicious. 'Informational work' was to be handled with consideration and as unnoticed as possible, which required sometimes the most complicated round-about methods.³

Nevertheless, defining 'propaganda' has long been based on not making value judgments about its contents. 'Propaganda', however, has a very negative connotation in peoples' minds even today in the West, while in Eastern Europe – it seems to be – it has been accepted as a much more neutral notion. This causes problems also in examining the official documents – which is my main source – of socialist Hungary: when is it about propaganda as we understand it, and when is it about something which can be called 'marketing' or 'information'? And when is 'information' a euphemism for propaganda?

This is also a question of reception of the target polity of propaganda aspirations, which is influenced by history, tradition, political culture etc. The inner circle of Hungarian officials responsible for dealing with information delivered to foreign (Western) countries seem to have been aware of the differences in understanding propaganda, as they speak about 'propaganda' in their classified memorandums, letters and so forth, but categorically use euphemisms when dealing with Western officials or citizens. This leads to the idea of borders for what can be said: there clearly were bor-

ders which could not be overstepped without encountering resistance and unwillingness to take the given information seriously or as truth. This seem to have been the case both in the attitude of the Finns toward the Eastern propaganda, and in the reactions caused by self-censorship when there was a doubt of having stepped over this border.⁴

When we examine the cultural relations between a socialist regime and a West-oriented democracy, the idea of alliance between knowledge and power is obvious. The aim of the state socialist Hungary was to spread 'correct knowledge' or 'correct information', and in this case the power relation can be localized in who has the power to define the contents of the 'correct knowledge'. Thus, one of the crucial themes of the relations, especially cultural ones, between the regimes is controlling contents and meanings. The idea of the Great Narratives by Lyotard is also close to this pattern of thought: socialist rhetoric has strived to create great, whole narratives about the heroic nature of Socialism, and about the epoch-making effect of the endeavour to build up Socialism on the quality and happiness of the lives of the subjects. This is also linked with a kind of mission-thinking. It is thought to be a responsibility of the bearers of the 'correct knowledge' to make dissident individuals, polities and societies to change their way of thinking, and as a consequence of that, their sense of reality corresponding with the socialist thought.

The final aim of action in Marxist thought, namely, is emancipation through correct knowledge. Freedom, however, requires first the subjects (the citizens) being brought up into the right consciousness, in other words, into the suitable subjects for the politics in question. The entire propaganda and its legitimization in the Soviet bloc were based on this thought, and, on faith in the liberation which was to be a result of the right consciousness produced by scientific Socialism. Of course there is a strong paternalistic tone in this thinking: the starting point is that there are agents in the society who know better than ordinary citizens, what kind of society is best for them. Western thought and perhaps also certain Finnish omnipotence was by no means compatible with this kind of way of thinking.

In the case of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary I will examine the mechanism, its principles as well as the way in which propaganda aspirations were manifested in practice. We can often find attempts to spread 'correct information', which can be found in numerous reports written by the Hungarian Embassy in Finland. This way of thinking is linked both in the element of power that labelled modern society and the problem of knowledge it brought about. Faith in knowledge is one of the basic principles of modernity, and it is based on absolute faith in Reason as the carrying force of modernity. The problem of knowledge is crucial if we consider discursive use of power as a principal power producing element in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary, which is manifested in practice as endeavours to spread 'correct information', often simply propaganda, through cultural relations.

Compared to the way of thinking in the East, it is interesting to consider how the concept of 'knowledge' and 'truth' were understood in the West: the same faith in Reason guided also the Westerns thinking, but it included also the faith in authenticity. In other words, Western thinking assumes a stable, monolithic, authentic and 'right' state of affairs, which can be manipulated and distorted by discursive actions. In the Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the 'reality' was seen in another way: the 'right' and 'correct' reality was something that was reachable in the future after active endeavours. Thus, in both cases 'the reality' was seen as a construction and the conception of the constructive nature of 'reality' and 'truth' seems to have been even stronger in the Eastern thinking.⁵

Communist ideology in theory has always been oriented toward 'the world revolution of Socialism'. After Communism came to power in major countries, however, notably in the Soviet Union and China, it predictably became increasingly oriented toward the growth of the international power and influence of these countries. Communist international propaganda has been extensively developed through the press, radio, television, tourism, and the use of economic and military aid for propaganda purposes. The Soviet foreign propaganda was di-

rected toward both communist and non-communist sectors of the population, as well as, notably in terms of economic and military aid and commerce, toward rightist groups, which had reasons of *Realpolitik* for sympathy toward or alliance with the Soviet Union. The themes of communist propaganda toward capitalist countries were primarily anti-American, and it particularly concentrated on the issue of peace, through various front organizations and through constant propaganda stress on the theme that communist countries were for peace while capitalist opponents were for war.⁶ According to the plan by HWSP (1971) the main purposes of the development of propaganda were to affect the masses, to update the propaganda and to develop the material used in propaganda. According to the basic line of the propaganda defined in the report the fundamental principle of the activity was a wider understanding of propaganda: there was room for spreading socialist ideology through cultural and scientific activity, endeavours to bring socialist social order to a relevant alternative also for other than Eastern European regimes, and promoting Hungarian culture and works of art abroad. This definition, as a matter of fact, brings out the essence of the whole cultural exchange of the socialist countries: cultural relations were without any doubt an instrumental activity, the purpose of which was to propagate the socialist ideology in the first place, and only in the second place the promotion of the own culture abroad.

Hungarians, thus, strived to convey information, the purpose of which was to change the Finns' attitude towards ('new') Hungary and also towards the socialist ideology - ultimately the whole socialist block - through the agency of various institutional cultural formations. Among these was the agreement of cultural exchange - which was the basis of the cultural exchange - Finnish-Hungarian Society as well as the lecturers of Hungarian language at the University of Helsinki, who also had a role in this respect. We can point out discursive use of power in all cultural exchange, such as literature, theatre and even music, but they will be left aside in this article. Instead the focus will be in clearly institutional formations, most of all in the

agreement of cultural exchange and in friendship activities. At the end of the article I will analyze some special cases that illuminate the borders of the 'sayable' during the Kádár era.

The principal material used in this study is the official documents produced by the officials of Hungarian political regime, such as Foreign Ministry and, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. It is relevant to take into consideration the often tactical nature of those documents: rather than an image of the 'reality' of that time, they reflect the political culture, relations between the agents of officials and those who had the power, political hierarchy, and especially the paranoid and controlling atmosphere of everyday socialism. The purpose is not to state anything about how things 'really' were, but how reality was chosen and striven to be outlined.

3 Hungarian Propaganda in Finland

The basis of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary changed dramatically after the Second World War. Before the war it was based on the kinship ideology and the project of national identity, which was not possible in the new situation. On the grounds of the documents it seems to be that now Hungary's attempt to spread 'correct information', often pure propaganda, became the crucial issue of the cultural exchange. It was not an easy situation, since the former generation of the agents of cultural exchange represented the 'wrong' ideology. The basis of the kinship ideology was seen as nationalist, as well as fascist, and at least historically also Finno-Ugristics leaned on nationalist ideas. Kinship ideology was banned in the peace treaty, so that it was not a part of the cultural exchange anymore, but Hungarians could not get rid of Finno-Ugristics despite their desire. Propaganda, which was directed to Finland, was, nevertheless, taken seriously by the Hungarians since historical background made contacts between the two countries possible despite the fact that the political and social position of these countries had radically changed. Finland for Hungary was on the one hand a bridgehead towards the West, on the other hand a textbook example of the functioning peaceful co-existence.

In a thorough memorandum from the archives of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HWSP) from 1971⁷ we can find a report on the situation and possibilities as well as a plan for cultural and scientific propaganda directed abroad. This memorandum is quite straightforward in using the term 'propaganda', which is usually not the case: also in Hungarian classified documents it is typical to use euphemisms, most often the expression 'informational work'. The constructive way to see how things are is revealed in the chapter in which the writer states that imperialism is in serious crisis in general, whereas socialist ideology is 'in itself stronger and our culture, which serves society, more democratic.' The conclusion of this complete superiority of Socialism is that there is greater and greater interest towards Hungary abroad, which is seen as a consequence expressly of the invincibility in the field of the intellectual life. According to the memorandum, propaganda had been successful not only in socialist and 'progressive' countries, but in capitalist countries as well. In addition, the period of transition followed by the war was over and new groups of people were now in the sphere of influence of Hungarian propaganda, and they had already overcome the biggest obstacles to get propaganda through. There were still important goals to reach: broadening the sphere of influence of propaganda and organising effective information services. Furthermore, an efficient filing system was required, by means of which would be possible to make thorough analyses of the experiences gained from propaganda activity. Thus, it would be possible to further increase the efficiency of the planning of propaganda.

The matter to be criticised, according to the memorandum, was that propaganda had been too limited: now it was important to widen the scope of propaganda to the masses and the youth of the capitalist countries, as the key agents – such as politicians and leading agents of cultural and scientific fields – of the societies were already reached. It was to be done by planning propaganda which would be richer in nuances and carefully targeted to the different layers of these societies. In practice, Hungarians had continuous problems in their endeav-

ours to spread propaganda in Finland, since it was not possible to assume a single social subject: different layers of society would have demanded different kinds of propaganda.

The other major problem was that Hungarians soon understood that the majority of the Finns were non-socialist or not interested in politics, especially those who were in hegemonic positions. It had to be taken into consideration also in the propaganda- and information activity in the way that it was not worthwhile e.g. to spread too political material. Instead, it was still valuable to rest on an old thought of the kinship – for the time being, until the correct knowledge would disprove the old mistaken conceptions. The Hungarians realized this already in the 1950's.⁸ In a long report by Ambassador Sándor Kurtán (1964) about the tendencies in Finnish cultural and mental life especially concerning Hungary, it is stated that there is no serious opposition towards Hungarian propaganda. As a conclusion the Ambassador states that public opinion is positive. Unfortunately it was primarily due to the long Finno-Ugric traditions. The good thing for Finland was that she was not involved in the Cold War and hardly accepted any Hungarian immigrants after the 1956 uprising. Thus the counterrevolutionary ideas did not spread in Finland through immigration.

One of the problems in the propaganda work was that Finland was non-socialist and agrarian, where people preferably let go unnoticed the fact that Hungary had turned into a socialist country. However, this does not correspond to the optimistic view of the propaganda plan made for Finland. According to Kurtán's report there was clear resistance against socialist realism in arts. In addition, since the publishing in Finland was occupied by non-socialist forces, it was not easy to get new Hungarian literature published in Finnish. On the whole, making propaganda was rather problematic in Finland, although there was no opposition against Hungary itself. Rather it was because of the mental undertone, the ethos, which was predominant in Finland. The right tactics were to avoid hard tones, to make contacts with the key figures of the society, thus to influence through individuals, and to further utilize the idea of

kinship, although it was politically negative. The idea was this way to infiltrate information for Finns about the 'real' Hungary, the kin nation that was now building up Socialism. The Hungarians counted on the power of the right knowledge to the extent that they estimated the most effective method of making propaganda being to invite individual authors or journalists to Hungary. After the visit they would write about their experiences in Hungary '... in a realistic manner and from a Finnish point of view.' The writer of the report predicts that eventually the correct information would work, in other words: '... the economical and international achievements of the socialist system slowly start to have influence on the conservative and social democratic public opinion.' It is thus a question to realize and accept the reality.

In the already mentioned memorandum of the HWSP (1971) we can read that in Hungary propaganda was steered through a carefully organized system, which was based on the doctrine of Lenin. Lenin was a voluntarist, far more so than Marx: he believed that the consciousness of the masses could be and must be manipulated. Thus, propaganda, according to Lenin, must be exhaustive, differentiated, and entirely controlled by a centralized propaganda apparatus.⁹ In Hungary, the organisation of foreign propaganda consisted of domestic institutions and foreign 'bases', the structure and mutual relations of which were complicated. The steering and practical actions among these different sectors differed considerably, and foreign propaganda was only one of them. To reach a desirable purpose it was important to centralize the forces of propaganda, and to operate unanimously. The institutional basis of the foreign propaganda was built in a hierarchical way. On the highest level the steering and executing of propaganda was the responsibility of several high level organs, whereas among the expert bodies were scientific institutions, universities, scientific research institutes, as well as cultural enterprises and official instances, such as publishing houses, and art, film, music and art agencies. The bases of propaganda abroad were, according to the memorandum, the embassies, cultural and scientific att-

chés abroad, Hungarian representatives in the central office of UNESCO in Paris, Hungarian institutes and cultural centrals (Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, Rome, Paris), as well as commercial sections and offices abroad. Funds for this activity came from different sources: the state, companies, royalties of the artists, copyrights, other sources (government funds pointed for cultural and public relations activity etc.).

This highly organized propaganda machinery states the totalitarian nature of Leninist propaganda. It was intended to dominate and control not only all means of elite and mass communication, but also all history, social science, literature, art, and music. This led to the instrumentalist view of education, too. In Soviet type socialism, all the fields of society, especially art and literature, were harnessed to propaganda. As pointed out above, the institutional basis of the propaganda and the organs which were controlling the practical level of the propaganda work formed a complicated and intertwined network, which corresponds to the organization of power in socialist Hungary on the whole. The mutual hierarchical and other relations between the instances were obscure to the extent that they seem to have functioned to conceal the use of power. It is nearly impossible to understand where the decisions were actually made and who the actual agents who made the decisions were.

For instance, the position of the Institute of Cultural Relations (KKI) in the organization of the use of power is difficult to outline. After the uprising of 1956 there were some rearrangements made in Hungary. A new Ministry of Culture was founded, and it was a unification of the former two ministries that were responsible for educational and cultural affairs (*Művelődésügyi Minisztérium, Népművelésügyi Minisztérium*). Among the departments of the new ministry there were also independent offices, yet steered by the ministry and ultimately by the Party, such as the KKI. Along with the organisational reform the Department of International Relations by the Ministry of Education was unified with the KKI.¹⁰ From that on the KKI, which was originally established in 1949, was the central institution of the coordination and development of the solid cultural

propaganda of Kádár's Hungary. After 1956 it concentrated more than before on the practical level of administration. Consequently, on the one hand the KKI was a separate body in the Ministry of Culture, but on the other hand, in practice, the KKI was directly responsible for the Party and its departments, depending on the particular case in question. Naturally, György Aczél as the highest controller of the cultural policy was the actual head of the KKI as well, but we can hardly find his name in the documents concerning the operations of the KKI. This is again an indication of the opaque, concealing power exercised in socialist Hungary.

The larger campaigns, fundamental questions such as the way propaganda should be spread, how to disturb the immigration etc., were carried out by the Political Committee of the HWSP, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and the Department of Foreign Affairs of the HWSP. Although the KKI was the central coordinating institution of the foreign relations, there were other bodies as well that operated in the same sector. The Committee for Culture and Information was established in 1960. It fell directly within the authority of the government, and it was the main organization organizing foreign propaganda at ideological level, while the KKI was a practical organizer. There were representatives of KKI in the Committee for Culture and Information, and it is likely that the KKI got instructions mainly from there, but also from the bodies mentioned above.¹¹

In the memorandum of the HWSP (1971) the writer especially stresses the point that cultural, scientific and educational foreign propaganda is an organic part of propaganda in general, and propaganda of different fields shares the same aim, which is to promote political and economical connections and that way to open new possibilities for increasing the efficiency of foreign propaganda. According to the memorandum cultural and scientific propaganda had, however, some special features because of the special character of these fields, and it caused special requirements for the propaganda. Ideological commitment was considered to be especially important for the propa-

ganda made in the fields of culture and science, as these fields were seen as door openers in foreign relations. That is because culture and science opened doors to those groups and sections of people which were impossible to reach in any other forms of propaganda. Thereby it was possible to avoid the so called political discrimination, which means in the case of Finland that the right-wing groups did not accept direct political propaganda.

According to the memorandum referred to above, the Hungarian authorities presupposed that all the cultural activity between Finland and Hungary was harnessed to propaganda. For example, the writer of a memorandum from 1964¹² outlines the possibilities of propaganda in Finland. He emphasizes the importance of individuals and personal relationships, and as an example he refers to the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society, Väinö Kaukonen, whose attitude and influence is praised. According to the memorandum, Kaukonen had realized that the task of the society was not only to cherish the relations between the two countries, but also to make 'the gallant people of the new Hungary, who bravely and successfully build the new socialist life', known to the Finnish people. The society had also managed to fulfil one of its basic duties, which was to strengthen its influence by increasing the number of members among new groups of Finnish people. The FHS was important propaganda machinery for the Hungarians in many ways. On the whole, all the bigger cultural and scientific happenings were seen as mutually supporting propaganda occasions.

In the above memorandum, it is especially recommended to promote cultural products, making scientific and personal contacts as well as 'constantly being in public and influencing'. The basic idea was to convince the masses through smaller groups. The key figures of these groups were, according to the memorandum, those influential persons who had the opportunity to influence public opinion. All the practical actions were to be harnessed to the main aim, which was to spread socialist ideology: film festivals, art biennials and competitions, literature and theatre happenings and matinées, scientific conferences and so on. From this point of view music and folk art were especially favourable art

forms, as there was no language barrier to hinder the reception of the message. Nevertheless, the Hungarians had to face the fact that they could not get socialist realism through in Finland.¹³

4 Clashes

In the cultural relations between the countries representing two different social systems the question was also about the politics of truth and a language game: which words were suitable to use, in what way were the patterns of thought forced onto the right track, who had the power to define the rules of the game and to say what was regarded as truth? In this case there were two language games, the socialist one of Hungary and the Western non-socialist one of Finland. At times there were great difficulties encountered in the two language games. The Hungarians had to think carefully about what issues were possible to bring up in Finland, or rather about those borders which were not to be overstepped without encountering resistance. It was a question of a certain vocabulary that defined the space where the accepted discourse could operate. If the borders were crossed, the group that played according to the other language game (the Finns) reacted negatively and propaganda thereby turned ineffective. On the other hand, borders were indistinct and changing. For example, the phrase 'peaceful co-existence' was very doubtful to the Finns at first, but soon it became a crucial part of the accepted discourse of foreign policy of Finland.

The *chargé d'affaires* of the Finnish Embassy in Budapest, Toivo Heikkilä, stated in his report from 1959 that there are a lot of doubts about the possibility of mutual understanding and 'real' cultural exchange with peoples' republics of Eastern Europe. There were doubts about the possibility of getting in contact with the 'real' people, instead of the party cadres. According to the *chargé d'affaires*, 'Cultural relations with the Eastern regimes are encumbered with several mortgages. We have every reason to be cautious when it comes to the plotting for peaceful co-existence by the Eastern regimes.' Furthermore, Heikkilä stated that due to the differences between the social systems cultural exchange '[...] does not seem to be completely

genuine. There is some kind of unfamiliar and strange tone. Political appropriateness shows itself all too clearly. Tactical calculations produced by the idea of peaceful co-existence disturb the atmosphere.' Heikkilä believed, however, that the purpose of the cultural exchange was not to infiltrate Communism into Finland, and the situation could thus be taken calmly. In addition, Heikkilä surmised, it would be unwise not to make contacts with the communist world, because 'Besides, it may be that in the course of time, artificiality that is hindering this cooperation will disappear and it will turn open and natural. Right now the course seems to be in that direction, but all kinds of turns are possible.'¹⁴

In the beginning of the 1960s great changes took place in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. The uprising in 1956 and the suppression of it aroused interest in Finns toward Hungary and, furthermore, it increased the interest toward Hungarian culture and literature, too. Since the official Finland refrained from commentating on the uprising, it did not cause any troubles for the relations between the two countries – on the contrary. In any case, the Hungarians were convinced that Finland was not likely to act 'unexpectedly' in its politics. Furthermore, Finland was an important bridge builder between East and West, and through the good relations between Finland and Hungary the latter could make contacts with the really important Western countries. Furthermore, peaceful co-existence between the Soviet Union and Finland seemed to be possible and even successful, and in that sense Finland was important for the whole socialist camp.

Still, little by little it became clear that the differences between the two different social systems needed to be taken into consideration. In all the socialist countries, also in Hungary, cultural life was centrally steered and controlled, and, accordingly, the cultural relations were also organized by the official instances of the state administration without exception, whereas most of the cultural import in capitalist Finland took place within the framework of the rules of market economy.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there have always been interests of (foreign) poli-

tics in Finnish cultural politics, too, in addition to the laws of the market economy.

Although the suspicions of the Finns were reduced as the years went by, Hungarians still understood that they had to change their strategies fairly often, and that they had to make subtle and discrete propaganda. In a memorandum from 1966¹⁶ it is stated that the opportunities for propaganda in Finland were, first, as wide as possible in personal relations and, second, in 'indirect information'. For example, it was important to make contacts with the right-wing press (*Uusi Suomi*, *Helsingin Sanomat*), when it would be possible to publish material supplied by the embassy in those newspapers. Furthermore, it was crucial to make contacts with radio, television and the news agencies. It was emphasized in the report that building networks for propaganda purposes served not only the propaganda interests of Hungary, but also of the whole socialist camp.

Accordingly, cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary seems to have been permeated with propaganda endeavours. For example the Friendship Weeks in 1967 was, according to a report written about it¹⁷, an occasion where the Hungarians utilized 'every single opportunity to make propaganda'. Nevertheless, the Finns were uninterested. The writer complained, for instance, that the participants of the Finnish delegation were seemingly completely apolitical, and thereby 'political information' did not reach them at all, except for an opportunity to answer the often provoking questions posed by the Finns. At the end of the visit the hosts offered the Finns an opportunity for discussion about the people's front movement, the NEM, foreign politics of Hungary, foreign cultural relations etc. According to the report, the guests did not pay any attention at all to the offer, even though it was made several times, so that the Hungarians had to give it up. Nonetheless, the Hungarians counted on the positive experiences the Finns had in Hungary, the consequence of which was likely to bear fruit later on. Again faith was exposed to the 'right knowledge'; when the Finns had seen with their own eyes the success of the socialist Hungary, they would slowly but surely change their attitude

not only toward Hungary but toward the whole socialist camp. The Hungarians were even hoping for new propagandists to be found among the Finnish delegation, which once again emphasized the importance of personal contacts in propaganda.

Around the mid-1960s the Hungarians were concerned about the tendency in the cultural relations between the two countries, which they even called 'an age of stagnation'. In a report dated in October 1964¹⁸ Ambassador Kurtán was worried about the changing emphasis of activity in cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. He saw the relations being at stake for two reasons: it was rumoured that money was tight, and that the emphasis in general was moving away from the Finno-Ugrian relations in Finland. The impression of the Ambassador was that there were also some kinds of political intrigues involved, and that some individuals were acting in their own institution's or orientation's interest. The Ambassador thought that the stagnation was caused deliberately, and despite the difficult funding situation, it was rather a political-diplomatic problem.

Taken as a whole, the situation was not especially critical, although there actually was some kind of change in the emphasis of activity in Finnish cultural politics and general approach towards the cultural relations. One of the consequences of that was an administrative reform of the Ministry of Education carried out in 1966, the result of which was the change of the role of the Finnish sub-committee. Among the other new departments was a Department of International Relations, the task of which was to coordinate the relations in the fields of culture and science. Also the relations between Finland and Hungary fell within the authority of this new department. The reform was made on the one hand because of the revival of international relations both with the West and with the East, and on the other hand because of the strong institutionalization of Finnish cultural and scientific policy, which was completed at the end of the 1960s.

The cooling down of the so far privileged relations with Hungary seems to have been confusing for the Hungarians, and they tried hard to find out what was going on. According to the

reports, Ambassador Kurtán made inquiries about who had said what to whom and why the Finns had acted the way they had. One of the reasons for the change of attitude was, according to Kurtán, the approach of the head of the Department of International Relations, Kalervo Siikala, who was also the director of the Finnish office of UNESCO. During his visit to Budapest in summer 1964, he stated that as the work of the Finnish sub-committee was so weak, it would be worthwhile to strengthen cultural co-operation based on UNESCO, instead.¹⁹ Suspicion toward Siikala was probably one of the reasons the Hungarians were so doubtful towards the reform in the Ministry of Education a couple of years later.

According to the report by Ambassador Kurtán in 1964²⁰, he had found out that Academician Kustaa Vilkuna had something to do with the tightening of money and slackening of the Finnish-Hungarian relations. To quote Kurtán: 'The fact that Vilkuna lies behind everything does not mean that he has turned into our enemy, but that he secures the interests of Finland by his political and diplomatic means. Presumably, in the future he will also give support to all kinds of relations between Finland and Hungary, but, naturally, he will do this bearing in mind the interests of Finland. Of course he has been acting this way all the time, even though we were not aware of it. Still, we must give our support to him in the future, too, but in the way that enables us to utilize him.' During a conversation with Vilkuna later that year²¹ Kurtán inquired about the effects of a funding problem for the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. According to Kurtán, Vilkuna was evasive and 'changed the subject', which gave Kurtán a reason to adopt a sceptical attitude towards him. Kurtán seems to have thought that Vilkuna was in line with those who wanted to widen the relations both toward West and East, which would endanger Hungary's previous privileged position. Hungarians were especially concerned about Finland's plans to sign a cultural agreement with France.

In the reports mentioned above, one of the obstacles for the steps called for by the new cultural agreement is also seen to be

the factors of world politics. According to the analysis by the Ambassador Kurtán, in the new situation in world politics it devolved upon Finland to act 'in a spirit of disruption and agitation', which did not offer favourable possibilities for reciprocal cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary. The Hungarians interpreted Finland's plans to widen its cultural relations with other people's republics than Hungary (in the first place with Poland and Estonia) as disruption and agitation as well. All this is connected to the point that only now it started to be completely clear that Finland was a part of the Western camp, and that culturally and mentally it was independent from the Soviet Union, despite good relations with it. In fact, as Kurtán stated in his report, even President Kekkonen had unambiguously stated that ideologically Finland was certainly not a neutral country.²²

The Hungarians took up a doubtful attitude towards the new department of the Ministry of Education, although in the beginning they thought that it would not reduce the influence of the joint committee.²³ Nevertheless, in connection with the Finnish reform the sub-committee became less important, as its role was seen rather as advisory. Also in Hungary the execution of the work plan was moved from the sub-committee for the Institute of Cultural Relations (KKI). From Hungary's point of view, the centralization of cultural and scientific co-operation was solely a negative turn. Even in the working plans for the years 1968 and 1969 it was written that the changed attitude towards cultural relations by the Finns is 'unambiguously negative', since the Finns had come to the conclusion that the cultural relations should be as equal as possible with all the foreign countries, and that such a privileged position as that of Hungary's should not exist. The Hungarians also estimated that Finnish non-socialist hegemony had become suspicious towards Hungary, because she had been so active in the cultural relations. For that reason, according to the analysis by the Ambassador, the Finns wanted to turn to the West in their cultural relations.²⁴ According to a memorandum by the Ambassador Rudolf Rónai (1969²⁵) the purpose of the reform was besides to

centralize the state control as well as the funding of the international cultural activity, also to weaken the special position of the Finnish-Hungarian relations among the cultural relations of Finland. He referred to Kalervo Siikala's statement, according to which Hungary's position had aroused wonder both in the West and the East. Accordingly, because of Finland's new arrangements the Hungarians started to intensify the activity *outside* the agreement. Many of the memoranda and reports from the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasize it. In practice, this trend meant intensification of the role of the FHS.²⁶

The emphasis of the idea of kindred languages and Finno-Ugristics was one of the major problems for socialist Hungary in its relations with Finland. From the point of view of the Hungarians it brought the wrong kind of contents to the cultural exchange, which they had difficulties to control. The Hungarians accepted Finno-Ugrian traditions as a starting point as useful and viable, but their purpose was to have the idea of kinship effaced in the course of time. There was a lot of discussion on the topic around the mid-1960s between the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki and the Foreign Ministry of Hungary.²⁷ They saw Finno-Ugristics and kinship thinking as nationalistic ways of thinking, which they wanted to purge from the cultural contacts. On the other hand, the Hungarians thought that even though there were a lot of politically negative features in that thinking, it could still be utilized. The starting point would in that case be the fact that Hungary is a kindred nation of the Finns, which is successfully building up Socialism. In addition, most of the Finno-Ugrian peoples lived in the area of the USSR. Finland was the only one, which had a capitalist system, but, nevertheless, a well functioning Eastern policy. From this point of view it was possible to see Finno-Ugrian contacts as internationalism and peaceful co-existence.²⁸ The Hungarians also considered writing a new history of Finno-Ugristics, 'from a critical point of view'. Here we can see one example of how truth politics was functioning and in what ways the discourses being used were striving to be influential. In practice Finno-Ugristics

based on long traditions could never be properly eliminated from the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary.

5 The Cultural Agreement of 1959

The 1958 American-Soviet cultural agreement was a landmark achievement and arguably one of the most successful initiatives in the Cold War. Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 posed a temporary setback to the cultural rapprochement between the superpowers. The agreement was so important for the USA that its reaction to the uprising was seemingly strong but at the same time the superpowers were negotiating about the agreement behind the scenes. On the 28th of February, only four months after the Soviet repression in Budapest, a survey of editorials revealed that the American and allied publics would look favourably upon a resumption of contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁹ One cannot avoid thinking that it may have been significant for the cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, that the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement of cultural exchange 27th of January, 1958. However, it is not mentioned in the files.

The practical political activity in cultural relations was based on the official cultural agreement and the executive role of the joint committee. The joint committee was divided into the sub-committees of Finland and Hungary. After the war there was a temporary state of no cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, as the new regime of Hungary did not take the old agreement as valid. Due to the administrative organization of the socialist countries the cultural co-operation with them required official arrangements, and the Western countries usually organized the cultural relations with them based on the agreements. The accomplishing of a new – or renewed, according to the point of view – agreement was crucially important to get cultural exchange started after the war. After a fairly complicated process the agreement was signed officially June 6, 1959.

Typical of socialist regimes was an aim for official agreements at the state level with the foreign (especially with the Western) countries, the purpose of which was to prevent any material con-

tradictory to the aims of the society to enter the country. On the background there was also a desire to strengthen the national cultural identity in the eyes of the rest of the world, and to prove that the change-over to the socialist system did not make culture become shallow and uniform. There were several converging features in the cultural exchange and the execution of the agreements with the socialist countries resulting from the similarity of their administrative organization. First, it was typical to require a reciprocal approach, second the authority of the state authorities and the sovereignty of the countries in deciding the contents of the cultural exchange, and third the principle of the exchange without using currencies. That way the exchange did not encumber the balance of currency account. The requirement for reciprocal cultural exchange was carefully controlled, so that always precisely the same number of scholarship students, visitors, exhibitions and materials were exchanged between the countries involved.³⁰

Consequently, one of the preconditions for the recovery of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary was the accomplishment of an official cultural agreement. On the other hand, Finland's good relations with the Soviet Union were the most important premise for reviving Finnish-Hungarian relations. The matter of the agreement was taken up already in the late 1940s by both the Hungarians and the Finns (The Commission for Finno-Ugristics, the leaders of which were actually agents of the previous era). In a memorandum by the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki from the year 1948 it is written about how the agreement should be up-dated. The basic problem seems to have been the reciprocity, as Hungary was mainly responsible for assuming the expenses of the cultural exchange. The purpose of the new agreement was, obviously, to solve this problem.³¹

After the Second World War the new socialist countries were very willing to make cultural agreements because of the questions of prestige and image. Nevertheless, there were many factors that affected the conclusion of the agreements. As suggested above, the agreement between the USA and the USSR, signed in 1958, was likely to have been one of the most impor-

tant preconditions for the agreements between socialist and non-socialist countries. The turning points in the relations between Finland and Hungary, however, were the FCMA Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union (1948), and the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Furthermore, an agreement with Finland was important for Hungary also because it was to be the first agreement concluded with a capitalist country. The aims imposed for the agreement were to get cultural relations under the control of the state, to broaden the impact of them to all areas of society, and to lay a political foundation for the cultural work in Finland.³² Finland, however, was for a long time reserved towards new cultural agreements, and until the beginning of the 1970s only the agreements with Hungary and Poland signed before the war were revived, and a new one was consummated with the Soviet Union (1959). The agreement was necessary first of all for the literary exchange. After the war there was a rather tense period, which started to ease off in the mid-1950s. The crucial turn was, however, the signing of the cultural agreement, and after that the number of translations in both countries started to increase.³³

The Finns were aware of the political nature of the cultural relations and the agreement, and they strived to prevent propaganda from entering the country through it. The Hungarians, however, found the agreement important, but they did not want to look too eager in the matter. In a letter from the year 1954³⁴ the Foreign Ministry of Hungary tells the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki to keep a low profile and to act only in the case that the Finns brought the matter up first, which happened the very same year. Academician Kustaa Vilkuna had an official discussion about the agreement question with the representatives of Hungary, and on that occasion promised to bring the question up among the governmental circles, to be more precise, with the then Prime Minister Kekkonen³⁵. Vilkuna was very active in the question of the cultural agreement, together with Counsellor Väinö Kaukonen and Professor Erkki Itkonen. That time the Hungarians found the agreement important from the political point of view. In a report by the embassy it is stated

that the reviving cultural relations with Finland will not only be an improvement of the relations with Finland, but will also help to normalize Western relations of Hungary. The final aim was, however, the peaceful co-existence between the two social systems³⁶, which disturbed the Finns, as noted above. In the mid-1950s the Hungarians were quite cautious with the matter, yet they scrutinized it, looked into the contents of the old agreement, and sounded out the views of the Finns, but so that the Hungarians did not look too eager in the matter.³⁷

In the cases of Poland and Hungary, the old agreements were used as a basis of the new agreements. It is noteworthy that Finland concluded a new bilateral cultural agreement with Hungary even before the agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union, which was signed later in the same year. Consequently, Hungary was both in 1937 and in 1959 Finland's first contracting party. It must be pointed out that in comparison with the other cultural agreements of Finland the agreements with Hungary and the Soviet Union differ quite remarkably from the other agreements. In the case of Hungary the explanation is the idea of the kindred languages and that the agreement originates in earlier times. The bilateral cultural agreement was concluded with France in 1970, which caused anxiety among the Hungarians. Usually the agreements with the Western countries were wider than those signed with the socialist countries, and, thereby, the agreements with Hungary and also with Estonia were more like the agreements concluded with the Western countries than with the socialist countries.³⁸

One of the key questions was how to name the upcoming agreement: whether it was a renewal of the old agreement, or a completely new one. A document from the year 1956³⁹ refers to the earlier agreement as a possible basis for a new cultural agreement. The matter was deliberated from various points of view, but the crucial view was that the earlier agreement was signed by 'the fascist and chauvinist states of Finland and Hungary'. According to the Hungarians, the earlier agreement was not valid, as it was concluded between the governments, and not between the countries. Nevertheless, for the Hungarians it

was also 'politically appropriate' to conclude a new, functional agreement with Finland, in consideration of the fact that the earlier agreement could not be a basis for 'co-operation between the People's Republic of Hungary, which was now building Socialism, and the Republic of Finland, which was in a process of democratization'⁴⁰. The naming of the agreement was a bone of contention until the very signing of it, and finally the Hungarians had to face the fact that if the new Finnish government would not accept the idea of a totally new agreement, the only possible starting point would be to negotiate an agreement, which was based on the earlier one. At the turn of the year 1958–59 the Hungarians agreed on this arrangement, since it was still politically appropriate.⁴¹

The polishing of the contents of the agreement required a lot of negotiation, as the nature and naming of the agreement was so complicated. Eventually, the new agreement was based on the earlier agreement. It was a little shorter, and the emphasis of the kindred ideology was lessened; for example there was no mention of the kinship day, which was celebrated in schools in the 1930s. It was accepted in the agreement that the anniversary of the liberation of Hungary on 4th of April was given attention in schools, whereas the earlier agreement mentioned the Hungarian national day of the 15th of March. In socialist Hungary both the 15th of March and the 20th of August were rather doubtful, even dangerous, anniversaries⁴². Nevertheless, it was impossible to prevent citizens from celebrating those days in one way or another, and therefore the authorities strived to take away the true contents of the anniversaries by creating new traditions: socialist parades, flag-raising, literary matinées and so on.⁴³ In the agreement there is a stipulation about the school books, and in 1937 it was still important for the contracting parties that 'in school books there must be attention to the culture, life and circumstances of the kin nation, and the books have to be written not only truthfully, but also in a friendly spirit', whereas in 1959 the demand is to 'give a clear picture about the other country'.⁴⁴ The introductory chapter of the agreement had to be changed, because the name of the state of Hungary had

officially changed, but also because now the cultural relations ought to be developed 'according to the best democratic traditions, for peace and progress.' Nevertheless, there is still one crucial sentence left in the introduction: '[...] in consideration of the kin relations that join together these nations [...]'. It can be stated that this was very exceptional in an agreement text of the countries representing the two social orders in the situation subsequent to the war.

There was agreement on the possibility of appointing joint committees in different fields in addition to the executive joint committee, which is an indication of striving to have extensive general agreements, and a change-over of the focus of the activity towards the co-operation programs and plans by the joint committee. In the light of the documents we can see a radical change in the practice of the cultural exchange after the agreement became effective, the most important change being connected to the role of the joint committee. At the beginning the meetings of the committee were arranged every year, and from the mid-1960s every two years, which was a desire of the Finns. Interestingly enough, the participants of the committee had a rather different view of the working methods of the committee, depending on the country they came from. While the Finns strived for lessening the bureaucracy and lightening the execution process, the Hungarians, on the contrary, demanded more and more precise and binding work plans, and more detailed planning of the activity on the whole. For instance, the Finns refused to form working committees, but wanted to negotiate about the matters in full scale meetings instead, but it was not official enough for the Hungarians. Ambassador Kurtán stated in his report, however, that the Hungarians can expect good results from the Finns, if they did not make too categorical demands on them. It was, for instance, unwise to use expressions like 'it has to be done', or 'it needs to be done', because the Finns did not like that kind of purpose and easily become reluctant.⁴⁵ Here we can see the differences between the two political cultures, which urged the participants to search for the compromises at the official level of the cultural relations.

The Finnish and Hungarian members of the joint committee seem to have had quite different ideas of the openness of the work of the committee, since the Hungarians found it clear that there were things that ought to be discussed off the record. One such case was for instance Kaukonen's inquiry about the possible change of the lecturer of Hungarian language (István Nyirkos). According to the report about the meeting by Ambassador Kurtán, the Hungarians were quite annoyed about the incident, first because of the inquiry itself, and second, that it had been done during the meeting and not off the record. Later on the Ambassador discussed with Kaukonen the forms and procedure of meetings. In the report Kurtán said that they had reached mutual understanding: in the future all the unpleasant or minor matters would be discussed off the record. According to the report, Kurtán and Kaukonen had agreed not to bring up such matters at the meeting, so that they would not 'divert the members' attention from the truly important matters'. Among the matters of no importance was, for example, the incapability of Endre Gombár to organize properly visits agreed in the agreement and organized by the consent of the joint committee. Gombár was responsible for the cultural exchange between Finland and Hungary in the KKI.⁴⁶

To all appearances doubts about the unwillingness of the Finns for co-operation with the Hungarians were dispelled in the mid-1970s, and the Hungarians could again count on the traditional willingness of the Finns to have cultural contacts with them. As the final aim of the Hungarians was to make propaganda in Finland, it did not matter that Hungarians had more activity in Finland than vice versa; in other words that the principle of reciprocity was not realized. Although scientific relations were slowly reaching a satisfactory level, they were still far from the volume that cultural co-operation had reached long before. In the 1970s, however, the cultural and scientific co-operation agreed on in the agreement continued to expand. Furthermore, the cultural exchange was still realized on the basis of the work plans by the joint committee. Accordingly, the endeavours of the Hungarians to expand also the scientific co-

operation had been successful, as in the working plans for the years 1974–75 the forms of scientific co-operation, such as the expert visits between the universities and the student- and trainee exchange were emphasized. Moreover, also in the field of culture the stress seems to have been on the expert exchange at the cost of artist exchange and art happenings.⁴⁷

Along with the agreement there was a new level in the activity, which seemingly made the planning and practice of the cultural exchange open and translucent. Nevertheless, in practice this was not the case, because although the decisions were made in the meetings of the joint committee and there were records and documents about everything, a second, secret level still remained. The Hungarian way to deal with some matters unofficially and off the record was one of the clearest indications of it. As a matter of fact, also the huge amount of paper increases the opacity of the activity. It even feels that this mountain of paper conceals the way decisions were made in reality, as well as what was decisive in decision-making in the end.

6 The Finnish-Hungarian Society as Propaganda Machinery

Some of the institutions were originally founded and harnessed for propaganda. For example, the Finnish-Hungarian Society was established, because the Hungarians realized that they needed an organization through which they were able to reach the masses of the Finnish society.⁴⁸ The idea of re-establishment of the FHS was already put up in the late 1940s. The first document I have found is from the year 1948, when the Hungarian Ambassador in Helsinki had as his opinion that the matter was not possible to handle before the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between Finland and Hungary. In addition, broadening the relations between the two countries became possible due to the FCMA Treaty concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union the same year. Furthermore, after the war there were even boycotts hindering the revival of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary.⁴⁹

Usually the activity of the Finns in the agreement issue is emphasized in the sources, but the documents show clearly that the

Hungarians were at least as active, behind the scenes. For instance, in a report by the Ambassador Ferenc Münnich (1950) he mentions that information about Hungary should be organized more efficiently, for example through the planned FHS. According to the report, the matter had proceeded to the point that the Ambassador had some persons, who could establish the society, and he presumed that the society would be established by October or November of the same year. The main purpose was not, in the beginning, to create a mass organization, but to get 'information' better organized and to avoid the publicity of the embassy in ceremonies or cultural occasions.⁵⁰ A friendship society between Finland and Hungary already existed, but in a new situation, and with the new ruling powers it was ideologically problematic, in the same way as the old cultural agreement. Quoting the first chairman of the FHS, Ele Alenius: 'The old friendship society was very suspicious about new Hungary, and visa versa'⁵¹. According to Väinö Kaukonen, the tone of the new society was different from that of the old one: now the leading role was played by the workers' delegations.⁵²

There was also a Club for the Friends of Hungary, which started before the war (1937), but it was never in favour of the establishment, like the 'official' Finnish-Hungarian Societies before and after the war. The club kept quite a low profile in its activity, so that it did not attract the attention of the Hungarian Embassy, at least not until 1956, when the members of the club became active due to the uprising in Hungary by e.g. organizing collections and writing in newspapers about the matter. In 1957 it was written in a report by the Ambassador⁵³ that the club is illegal and that it sympathizes with Horthy's Hungary. On the other hand, the club seems to have been harmless for the FHS. In 1960, when FHS celebrated its 10th anniversary, the Club for the Friends of Hungary was at hand again. The Secretary of the FHS stated in his main speech of the celebration that the club was not interested in making contacts with new Hungary, and that it was operating on a very narrow basis. Interestingly enough, the old Finnish-Hungarian Society was not mentioned at all as a forerunner of the new FHS.⁵⁴

The problem with these old friendship societies was, naturally, that they were labelled as the organizations of the kinship work, which was prohibited in the peace contract. Nevertheless, the Club for the Friends of Hungary was not suppressed, as it was apparently not officially registered. That was obviously one of the reasons the Hungarians regarded it as illegal. In any case, all the activity that could be seen as kinship work was absolutely prohibited, especially when the Allied Control Commission was still in Finland. The old kinship activists continued their work within the framework of the club, although according to different principles than before the war. They for example kept in contact with the Hungarians who stayed in Finland and organized programme connected to Hungary and especially to its culture. Vicar Martti Voipio was a key figure in the club. Viljo Tervonen, who was active in the club, says that it functioned until its members grew old and the club died 'a natural death'.⁵⁵

The special features of the various friendship societies, among them the Club for the Friends of Hungary, were analyzed in a document from the mid-1960s⁵⁶. There is a general view of the history of cultural relations between Finland and Hungary and of the role the kinship ideology played in those relations. This ideology is labelled as nationalist and politically right-wing. According to Tervonen, the authorities of Hungary did not have a negative attitude towards the club, but the documents tell another story. In 1964 Ambassador Kurtán analyzed the candidates for the board of the FHS, e.g. professor Antti Sovijärvi, who was one of the active members of the club, which was considered as a problem and led to the long lasting negotiations about his joining the board. The club was accused of hesitation with respect to Sovijärvi. The reason for the endeavours to get Sovijärvi into the FHS was the aim to isolate the club from all the activity concerning Hungary. The plan seems to have been successful, because Sovijärvi agreed in giving a speech (both in Finnish and in Hungarian) to President Kekkonen, when a folk music group from Debrecen was performing in Helsinki. The occasion was organized by the FHS,

and thus, according to the interpretation of the embassy, it came to engage Sovijärvi into the society in the eyes of both the audience and the membership of the society.

The majority of the key members of the FHS were close to the FPDL or the FCP, in other words communists, but there were also politically independent members – the founders of the society from the very beginning wanted to get together a membership of the representatives of different aspects of Finnish society, with different views. It strived to be an organization for the whole nation, to quote Alenius. Nevertheless, the society had to take into consideration the foreign policy of countries representing different social orders, and the activity of the society had to be in harmony with it.⁵⁷ According to Hungarian documents, however, the task of the FHS was to propagate achievements of the socialist Hungary in the fields of politics, culture and economy, as well as the life of the Hungarian working class, farmers and intelligentsia. One of the crucial tasks was also to give a contribution to the masses who fought against the Western, decadent culture, and that the society was 'fighting for the international solidarity, and had a role to play in the fight for peace, as well as the building a society and a world that respected the equality of all human beings.'⁵⁸ Official foreign policy was indeed taken into consideration, when the number 4/1953 of the *Suomi Unkari -lehti* (the Finland Hungary Magazine) was dedicated to Stalin.

In any case FHS was dependent on the Hungarian Embassy, and every action had to be accepted by it. For example, the society had to send bulletins to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, which checked them, made comments on them and gave further instructions for the information spread by the society. The embassy sometimes also complained to FHS of not informing the embassy about the plans precisely enough in advance⁵⁹, whereas the embassy drew up monthly reports for the Foreign Ministry about the activities of the FHS. In a letter from the year 1953 the ministry reproaches the embassy for not keeping a firm hand on the society, so that the embassy should pull itself together and give the society a push. One of the most important tasks was to

recruit new members from new sectors of Finnish society, the main task of the society being 'to search for [...] a way to those public circles that have until now bore distrust of our peoples' democracy, or had even adopted a harmful attitude towards it.' The task of the leaders of the society was to make contacts with as many public circles as possible, among which efficient propaganda could produce good results. Thereby, the FHS would not only help the Hungarians, but also the international peace movement.⁶⁰ The openness of the role of the embassy behind the FHS was deliberated about as well, and it was decided to keep it 'in certain matters at a general level and concealed'.⁶¹

The activity of the FHS grew rapidly, the purpose of which was to enlarge the basis of the FHS. Among the new activities there was a magazine, *Suomi Unkari -lehti* which was established in 1952. At first the majority of the editorial material came from Hungary, and thus only a tiny minority of the articles was contributed by Finns. Also the twin town movement and Friendship Week organized every third year, were the responsibility of the society. In time the twin town movement became a remarkable factor in the relations between Finland and Hungary, also because it furthered the co-operation between the society and the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front (*Hazafias Népfront*).⁶² The twin city activity was seen as important in bringing Finland closer together to the socialist camp: it was supposed to be a manifestation of a peaceful co-existence doctrine in practise.⁶³ Later on the Hungarians noticed that the twin city relations also had other political advantages. In 1969 the Ambassador wrote in his report that it had been possible to make contacts with the social democrats through the twin city relations during the time when they were still enemies: the twin city relations were a natural way of co-operation with them, as it was not yet possible at an official level.⁶⁴

In 1956 the Embassy wanted to find a new chairman for the Society to replace Alenius. According to Alenius himself, the reason was that the new Ambassador, József Szipka, distrusted Alenius. Szipka went to the office of FCP to announce that Alenius was no longer suitable as a chairman of the society, be-

cause he suspected Alenius of having connections with the CIA. Alenius mentions this incident as an example of the stalinist manner of proceeding.⁶⁵ On the other hand, according to a later memorandum by the Ambassador Kurtán, the reason for the resignation of Alenius was unknown, although Kurtán wrote that according to his sources of information Alenius was involved in an argument, as a consequence of which he was offended and resigned. Nevertheless, Alenius was a key figure for the Hungarians, and they wanted him to stay in the society. According to Alenius himself, in 1963 Ambassador Kurtán presented an official apology to him because of the incident.⁶⁶

The chairman designate, Professor Erkki Itkonen, then, joined the board of the FHS at the beginning of 1954 together with Väinö Kaukonen and Erkki Ala-Könni among others. He paid a visit to Hungary the same year, and when applying for the visa, he was evaluated by the embassy. According to the report, Itkonen was estimated to be 'just a linguist', and, furthermore, so completely apolitical, that he had for instance never been a member of any organization. From the point of view of the Hungarians, thus, it was a victory for them to have him as member of the FHS. Hungarians calculated that through Itkonen they could reach the traditional, conservative academic circles, that had until then been beyond reach. Itkonen himself had a different impression about his task, as he said in a speech after his nomination: 'Let the kinship spirit encourage us, and let us strive to build such an organization, which all the friends of our sister nation could join'.⁶⁷ It is worth noting that Itkonen mentioned the kinship ideology, which was forbidden even as a word, and in that kind of connection.

The planned visit of Itkonen was an important starting point for Hungarians to get these cultural-scientific circles inside the sphere of their influence. To achieve this goal, it was important to handle Itkonen in the right way, considering his character. According to a memorandum, in a discussion with him, the method to be used was to keep subtle, patient and not too aggressive. According to the instructions, Itkonen should first be supplied appropriate and thorough information, and only after making

good and lasting relations with him, would it be time to 'work further on him'.⁶⁸ The next year Itkonen was one of the candidates for a new member of honour of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The purpose of taking a new member of honour was – officially – to advance cultural and scientific relations between Finland and Hungary. Academician Vilkuna became the new member of honour, in the end, and in reality the most important qualifications for him were his good relations with PM Kekkonen and his strong political influence on the whole.⁶⁹

In May 1956 professor Itkonen was invited for a supper by the Ambassador Szipka to discuss the change of the chairman of the FHS. During the evening Kurtán suggested Itkonen to become a new chairman, but Itkonen hesitated on grounds that he did not want his name to be used for political purposes. The Ambassador, nevertheless, affirmed that the society was a completely apolitical, cultural organization, and that the claim that it would be a political weapon of the embassy, was nothing but wicked slander of the right wingers. Itkonen was convinced and agreed. He did not, however, wonder about how the Ambassador could decide or even negotiate regarding the chairman of the society, which should have been independent from the embassy.⁷⁰ Itkonen's period as chairman remained short and he resigned on the 26th of October. The reason for the sudden resignation was the uprising, more precisely the demand for Itkonen to express a public condemnation of it which he could not do. The following day the society decided to join the appeal of the Finnish Red Cross for helping the distressed people of Hungary by organizing a collection of funds. After the suppression of the uprising the operations of the FHS went on, and contacts were made with the new ruling powers of Hungary under a leadership of the new chairman, Erkki Ala-Könni. In the annual report of the society the uprising is characterized as 'a disorder of the previous year'.⁷¹

After the suppression the FHS had direct contact with the KKI during the whole socialist era. Formerly the connections between the society and Hungary went through the embassy. This new arrangement gave the FHS an official role in the rela-

tions between Finland and Hungary, given the position of KKI in the hierarchy of Hungarian foreign policy. According to a memorandum by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary (1973) the political steering of the FHS was a duty of the Foreign Ministry, and at a practical level a duty of the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki. The KKI was, however, the base of the practical cultural and propaganda work of FHS. The Patriotic People's front was only involved in the organization of the so called Friendship Week every third year.⁷²

The rules of the FHS were changed in 1957: now the only purpose of the society was to 'work to develop and promote the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary, and to consolidate the friendship between the two countries'⁷³. The rather strong contention of Itkonen of the uprising did not, in the end, hinder the co-operation between him and the Hungarians. In a report from the year 1963 it is written that it was extremely important to get Itkonen back to the management of the FHS. The embassy had an interesting hypothesis about the reasons for the resignation of Itkonen: it was said to have happened because Itkonen had an argument with the previous chairman Alenius. Thus, Itkonen's resignation seemed to be a matter that concerned only the Finns – as the resignation of Alenius as well. At the same time the uncomfortable 'problem of the 1956' could be avoided. It seems to be that the Hungarians could close their eyes to a 'wrong' attitude to the uprising, when a useful representative of bourgeois Finland was in question, as it was not realistic to expect orthodox thinking, whereas the leftists were objects of a careful ideological investigation in the context of the uprising. It was a question of political appropriateness which in certain manoeuvres passed ideological matters.

It seems to be that being a member of the FHS tended to increase political credibility, although it was not as big credit as being a member of the Finnish-Soviet Society. Already in 1960 the society had five deputy chairmen and actually 20 board members. As noted above, the Hungarian Embassy was active in choosing the chairman and the board members. One could think that some of the board members were there only because of po-

litical reasons, especially those who in fact did not take part in the meetings.⁷⁴ Being a member of the FHS was also favourable for those who wanted to visit Hungary and were examined by the embassy: the leaders of the society could also guarantee them.⁷⁵ The board members of the society took part in the visits of the Hungarian delegations to Finland, and they also reported on conduct unbecoming to them to the embassy, such as during the visit of László Kovács in 1960. According to the report by the secretary Sulo Muuri to the Hungarian Embassy, Kovács mentioned that he was 'on a free soil again', and that it would be difficult to vote in the coming elections in Hungary, because 'there are only oranges similar in appearance on the plate'.⁷⁶

The role of the FHS changed after the signing of the cultural agreement in 1959. Until then it had partly been a substitute of the official bodies of cultural relations, in the post-war situation.⁷⁷ Due to the agreement, part of the duties that were earlier the responsibility of the society, were now moved to the state organs, but especially the financial preconditions of the society improved remarkably at the same time.⁷⁸ The FHS and some of its central figures were fairly influential in completing the new cultural agreement between Finland and Hungary, as concretely as negotiating the details of the agreement in Budapest in 1957.

Despite the agreement, the society's role was from then on the propaganda and information activity outside the agreement. It was an important sector, as the official cultural exchange was based on the traditional co-operation between the finno-ugrists and ethnologists, which was based on the idea of kinship. Thus, it was necessary to have an organ to take care of the tasks that were not mentioned in the agreement, such as advancing Socialism in Finland.⁷⁹ Broadening of the role of the FHS was also connected to the rearrangements made in the Finnish cultural politics in the 1960s, which changed the role of the joint committee.

Thus, the influence of the FHS both in cultural relations and as propaganda machinery remained great despite the agreement. And the striving to expand the sphere of influence of the society especially to the right-wing circles of Finland was still on the

agenda in the mid-1960s. The Secretary of Legation, Mr Vincze wrote in his report in 1964 that the basis of the society should be further broadened to get new members from such public circles which could increase its influence in Finnish society. He also stated that 'we must create such an impression that FHS is autonomous in a way a truly Finnish organization should be'. The embassy was still strictly steering the operations of the society, as becomes apparent in a mention that the embassy had considered closely and from different points of views the composition of the board of the society. They had come to the conclusion that they should also take right-wingers, but not to the extent that they would have real influence on the line of the FHS. Comrade Poikolainen from the FCP, who was present at the meeting, assured that the management of the society would be kept in the hands of communists, and if some troubles appeared, they would immediately ask for instructions from the embassy.⁸⁰

The basic line of policy was that the embassy indirectly supported the policy of the FCP, and accordingly, the communist members of the FHS were to support the aims of the Hungarians inside the society. The interests of the embassy and the domestic political interests of the FCP were consistent with each other: they wanted to establish relations with the radical wing of the bourgeoisie in order to be able to disseminate socialist propaganda there. The aim behind the establishment of relations with the right-wingers was to advance the people's front policy in Finland. The establishment of the front was the main goal of the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary in the 1960s, when the Hungarians rested their hope on the rise of a leftist radicalism especially among the youth and cultural circles. This ideological battle could, such were the expectations of the Hungarians, open new prospects for Hungary to advance the victory of Socialism in Finland, which was the final aim. Consequently, cultural diplomacy was considered a central area of operations, and its sectors to be the cultural agreement, the planned culture and science centre of Hungary, and the FHS. In a report from the year 1963 cultural relations are mentioned as the most important manifestation of Finnish-Hungarian relations.⁸¹

The leaders of the society seem to have been willing to participate in the accomplishment of the mission the embassy had set to the FHS as well, at least still in the 1960s. In 1964 the chairman Väinö Kaukonen said in his speech he gave at a meeting between the representatives of the society and the embassy that the duty of the society was, besides cherishing the traditional friendship between Finland and Hungary, also to make the Finns 'like' the new Hungary, whose people were bravely and successfully building up new life. This statement even surprised the Hungarians, although there had been signs of a change of the line earlier already. The Ambassador Kurtán surmised that the change of the line happened because of the influence of Kaukonen, who is characterized in the memorandum as one of the leading figures of the radical professors. The FHS was openly political and communist until Kaarina Virolainen started as chairman in 1964. The new chairman was important for the Hungarians especially as Mrs. Johannes Virolainen (Johannes Virolainen, one of the leaders of the Agrarian Party, since 1965 Centre Party, PM in 1964–66), and as a close friend to Mrs. Sylvi Kekkonen. In addition, she was a central figure in Finnish social life and in the circles of the Centre Party.⁸²

The endeavours to increase the importance and to broaden the sphere of influence of the FHS seem to have been successful, since in 1964 President Kekkonen himself was present at a gala evening organized by the society. According to a memorandum by the embassy, the presence of Kekkonen attracted attention in political and diplomatic circles, because he had not been present on occasions of any of the friendship societies, except the Finnish-Soviet Society. Ambassador Kurtán assumed that there were several reasons for Kekkonen being there. The main speech was given by the writer Väinö Linna, who 'belonged to Kekkonen's immediate circle', and, according to Ambassador, the FHS had 'managed to achieve a role as a Finnish institution'. There were also higher political reasons: Khrushchev visited Hungary about that time, and the *communiqués* given by him and Kádár were in line with Kekkonen's foreign policy: they stressed the importance of peace-

ful co-existence. Naturally the Ambassador referred also to Kekkonen's visit to Hungary the previous year.⁸³

In the mid-1960s the Hungarians found new ways of making propaganda, especially among the university students. The New Friendship Circle (*Új baráti kör*) was established under the guidance of lecturer István Nyirkos. It was an organization for the students, and the sole purpose of it was to strengthen propaganda among them. Later it was planned to be merged with the Petőfi Circle (*Petőfi kör*) of the FHS. The embassy wanted its role to remain a secret, as well as the fact that lecturer Nyirkos acted as guided by the embassy.⁸⁴ Another Petőfi Society was established as well, but it was independent from the embassy. Consequently, the embassy attacked it and its leader, Sulo Ikonen. In a report by the embassy there is a claim that Ikonen himself is a homosexual, and that he has established the society to be a meeting place for his kind. According to the report, the aim of this new society was to cause damage to the FHS and its Petőfi Circle. Ikonen had to resign from the FHS 'obviously because of his unhealthy inclinations'. The embassy even went to the point that when the members of the Petőfi Society planned a trip to Hungary, the embassy advised the KKI not to receive them.⁸⁵ According to Outi Karanko-Pap, some of the friends of Hungary avoided the FHS because of its political nature, and they wanted to establish a new society as a non-political association of those who were interested in Hungarian culture. Karanko-Pap says that the embassy put hard pressure on the Petőfi Society, and even expelled it from the premises of the FHS, where they had their meetings at the beginning.⁸⁶

The FHS went on actively when the political life became stable both in Hungary and in Finland. The FHS was the second largest friendship society in Finland after the Finnish-Soviet Society, even though the difference between the number of members was considerable: the FHS had 1200 members, while the Finnish-Soviet Society had 220,000. Although there was the cultural agreement and the executive joint committee, the position of the society remained fairly official. In the programme of every official, political guest and delegation from Hungary

there was included also negotiation or meeting with the management of the society. The FHS was a kind of model example of a well functioning friendship society as well. As the position and importance of the society was remarkable, there were sometimes also political tensions connected with Finnish domestic politics, power relations and the inner power struggle of the FCP, where the dogmatic and moderate wings were struggling for the hegemony of the party. In the party, as well as in the society, the moderate wing was in the majority. The embassy paid attention to this power struggle between the Finns in the mid-1970s, when the boards of most of the local sections of the society and the central office in Helsinki were occupied by the representatives of the three major parties of Finland (Centre Party, SDP and FPDL). The embassy had also noticed that the parties had a power struggle for the positions inside the FHS. An example of how hot a question the power relations could be is that, to be quite sure, there was exactly the same number of representatives from different parties on the board of Espoo's FHS as on Espoo's municipal government. Obviously as a consequence of mandate thinking, there were as many as 40 members in the management of the society at the beginning of the 1970s.⁸⁷

In the 1970s, the basis of the society remained the same: its duty was to operate under the guidance of the Hungarians in disseminating Hungarian propaganda in Finland, which the Hungarians saw as having succeeded during the 1960s. In a memorandum from the year 1971 it is written that during the three or four previous years informing the Finns about the Hungarian culture and 'present-day life of Hungary' had produced remarkable results. A special emphasis was laid upon the importance of the society as a basis of Hungarian propaganda work in Finland. The continuous controlling and steering of the activities of the society were among the duties concerning Finland that were considered as the most important by the HWSP.⁸⁸ The efficiency of the society as propaganda machinery was considered so important that according to a memorandum by the embassy (1974), the whole cultural work of Hungarians in Finland was based on the work of the society.⁸⁹

In the mid-1970s the Finnish Ministry of Education wanted to move as many duties as possible hitherto belonging to the joint committees and ministries, to the friendship societies. In fact, the diminishing of the role of the joint committee suited the Hungarians well, because the joint committee was occupied by the 'old school' agents, who were ideologically problematic: they had connections with the 'old Hungary' and were politically too conservative. In the mid-1970s there were already many friendship societies (46 altogether) in Finland, among which the FHS was middle-sized, but, according to a memorandum by the embassy, among the most active.⁹⁰

In the course of the 1980s it started to seem that Kádár's power was beginning to totter. The political nature of the cultural exchange was lessening, as Hungary was liberating, and as the interests of Hungary towards Finland were changing. Now it was indeed more a question about the real cultural and scientific contacts and economic co-operation. According to Heikki Koski, who was the chairman of the Finnish-Hungarian Society in the 1980s, the society started to have the reputation of a non-political organization of citizens, also from the outside. There was a further broadening of the political basis of the society, as also the National Coalition Party (NCP) was brought closer to the society, which also happened on the party's own initiative. In the 1980s the society was fairly active and influential, since it was the fourth largest of the friendship societies in Finland, after the Finnish-Soviet Society, Finnish-American Society and *Pohjola-Norden* (Nordic) Society. The Hungarian Embassy was still active in controlling the operations of the society, but it is not at all relevant to compare the relation between the society and the embassy with the relations between other Eastern European countries and their friendship societies, especially not from the point of view of politics or propaganda.

The founding of the Centre for Hungarian Culture and Science in 1980 caused another change in the role of the society, because now there was another strong institution that introduced Hungarian culture and science for the Finns. They did not, however, compete with each other, because in the 1980s the Finns

were more and more interested in Hungary, its culture, society and science. According to Koski, founding the centre as a matter of fact supported the society, and they also had close co-operation with each other.⁹¹ Nevertheless, there was a conflict of political nature, which affected the political balance in the society. That was in the mid-1980s, when the board of the society chose a new executive director, and the people's democrats, the FPDL saw the post as belonging to their mandate. The board, however, gave its support to a candidate other than FPDL's, and it seems to have been a lot of discussion on the matter, both in the society and in the circles of the FPDL.⁹²

7 The Limits of What Can be Said – Two Case Studies

The limits of what can be said were not the same for the Finns and for the Hungarians, and it caused also clashes. Next I deal with two cases, that illuminate these different limits, first with the reactions that Academician Vilkuna's actions caused in Hungarians, and second the limits that some of the Finnish public circles had set for themselves. At first there is Kustaa Vilkuna, who played various roles in the post-war political life: he belonged to President Kekkonen's immediate circles, and, furthermore, he was a kind of messenger to him as well. Vilkuna also delivered information about Kekkonen's opinions to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, which drew the attention of the Hungarians, too.⁹³ Vilkuna's relations with Kekkonen were important for the Hungarians, and in addition to that he acted as a Minister of Education for a shorter time. Although Vilkuna had an important role in reviving and developing the cultural relations after the war, the co-operation between him and the Hungarians became difficult before long. It seems to be that Vilkuna no longer accepted the role the Hungarians had chosen for him, and, moreover, he did not keep to the limits of the allowed discourse, which is often reported with resentment.⁹⁴

One example is a report by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary about Mr. and Mrs. Vilkuna's visit to Budapest in 1964. According to the report, they had posed provoking questions several times and behaved in a provocative manner, in other words, they

had not obeyed the unwritten rules about the allowed topics of conversation. Vilkuna had for example asked if lecturer Nyirkos was in the service of the Foreign Ministry of Hungary or if some individuals were Jews or not. 'To crown everything', Vilkuna was reported to have told jokes about the secret police of Hungary, the ÁVH. Mrs. Vilkuna, on the other hand, had distinguished herself by asking about the situation of cardinal Mindszenty. The writer of the report, Rezső Mikola, proposed that in the future the Hungarians should be careful not to 'fraternize' with Vilkuna anymore. Mikola assumed that Vilkuna was withdrawing from scientific life, and entered into a less influential position in the foreign politics of Finland than before. Furthermore, he referred to the coming presidential elections (1968), after which Kekkonen might not be a President anymore. Such being the case, Vilkuna would remarkably lose his influence.⁹⁵

The reactions of the Hungarians reveal, above all, the unwritten rules of what was possible to say and was not, within the framework of the cultural relations. Vilkuna constantly broke these rules, thus refusing to play a language game according to the Hungarian rules. As Vilkuna broke the rules, the confusion and reactions of the Hungarians were interesting: usually it seems that the hosts did not at all enter into conversation about the denied topics, but changed the subject or kept completely silent. For example, there is a description in the report mentioned above about an episode, during which Vilkuna without any warning asked, how the Soviet Union paid for the uranium it got from Hungary. He added that the matter had been discussed in a 'propaganda occasion' earlier that day. Since there officially was no propaganda in Hungary, but only 'informational work', the hosts obviously got so confused that the only answer Vilkuna got was, according to the report: 'We will travel to Tihany tomorrow'. In another occasion the answer to an inappropriate question posed by Vilkuna was silence. The Hungarian official recalled: 'I did not react'.

There were fairly strictly defined borders of the allowed and denied discourses in Finland, too, especially in the 1970s. The political atmosphere was inflammatory, which becomes appar-

ent in a denunciation case that happened in the mid-1970s and almost developed into a scandal. In 1975 a Hungarian writer, Dénes Kiss, visited Helsinki as a reporter of the newspaper *Népszava* to report about the Hungarian Weeks in Helsinki together with the reporter of the newspaper *Magyar Hírlap*, Pál Belley. The Finnish Writers' Union organized a meeting for them to have an opportunity to speak with Finnish writers. An unofficial conversation was organized in 11 March, and the participants were supposed to discuss on the position and situation of the Finnish working-class writers. The Finnish participants were the interpreter and a writer Anna-Maija Raittila, writers Matti Rossi, Veijo Meri, among others.

The topic of the conversation did not inspire the participants, not until the discussion turned into writer Väinö Linna, and the Finnish wars. Kiss was interested to know if there was a remarkable novel about the Winter War, too, in Finland. As the Finns stated that there was not, the company started to search for the reasons for that. According to a current article of *Suomen Kuvalehti*⁹⁶ Veijo Meri, who was analyzed to be a right-winger, saw as his responsibility to explain to the guests the reasons for the breaking up of the Winter War, after which he entered into an altercation with Matti Rossi (who represented the radical wing of Finnish communists, and it is worth pointing out that Rossi also had connections to Finnish Maoism in the 1970s). The argument became so excited that it started to be unbearable for the others. When Rossi declared as his standpoint that 'Finnish Winter War has to be understood as an attack by international Fascism against Socialism', Kiss tried 'in a typical Eastern European manner', as it is written in the article, to liven up the atmosphere by asking: 'Which Fascism?' (*Melyik fasizmus?*). Much later (1997) Kiss returned to the matter in an article he wrote for the *Suomen Kuvalehti*⁹⁷, in which he states that he really was uncertain of which Fascism the excited writers were talking about. Moreover, he writes that he only wanted to point out that there was not only German Fascism, but also a Soviet one. This short and seemingly innocent utterance was to be the core point of the prolonged dispute. Raittila, who acted as an

interpreter, asked Kiss if he was sure he wanted the question to be translated, and after receiving a positive answer, translated, trying to clarify: 'Which Fascism, Eastern or Western?'. Kiss also tried to ease the situation by saying: 'We should not argue. We are both small nations. We are poets. We are not diplomats. Let us discuss on these matters as poets.'

Later Raittila realized that she had made a crucial mistake. In the article in *Suomen Kuvalehti* later that year⁹⁸ she says: 'I could as well have not translated that sentence. Or I could have stayed in the literal translation: "Which Fascism?"' The writer of the article stated that Raittila had misjudged the situation, as she had not realized that the argument between Rossi and Meri had provoked Rossi, 'a man of absoluteness', the way it had. Rossi indeed was so infuriated after the conversation that he threatened Meri that he would write about it. Meri thought that Rossi meant a newspaper article about the Winter War, but in reality Rossi wrote a letter to the Writers' Union of Hungary the very same day. In the letter, written in English, Rossi accused Kiss of anti-Soviet propaganda. Rossi wrote, for example: 'After I had given my view of the so-called "Winter War", linking it with what followed and pointing out that the two wars should be regarded as one and that the deep reasons of the tragedy lie in the rise of Fascism in Europe, Mr. Kiss asked me whether by Fascism I meant also "Eastern Fascism". As the term was unknown to me, I asked Mr. Kiss to be more precise. Mr. Kiss explained to us that "Eastern Fascism" means the fascist and imperialist Soviet Union. I was obliged to point out that to me, as to the majority of my fellow-countrymen Fascism has an entirely different meaning.'⁹⁹

Rossi added as his opinion that a statement such as that is not merely an opinion, but 'everywhere a lie', and, furthermore, can be seen as provocation in Finland. He stated that fortunately there were no 'reactionary powers' present, when the provocation would have succeeded, as it would have entered into the front page of every reactionary newspaper. Rossi judges Kiss's behaviour as 'irresponsible and stupid'. In the end of his letter Rossi threatens that 'Mr. Kiss may rest assured, that should he

feel again inspired to travel this way, I shall not be present at those press conferences or meetings in which he expounds the particularities of Eastern Fascism.' It was probably this sentence that led to the misconception that Kiss would have expressed his opinion in a press conference, and not in a closed, unofficial conversation. For instance *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹⁰⁰ writes about the incident: '[...] a letter, in which [Rossi] claims [...] that Kiss made anti-Soviet propaganda in press conferences in Finland.'

The Hungarians' actions caused by those two words reveal above all, that Finnish political atmosphere was indeed inflammatory in the 1970s. Some public circles were very sensitive about the use of correct discourse, and accusations about anti-Soviet propaganda were in some circles a striking weapon. On the other hand, this procedure illuminates how the Hungarian political machinery worked in a situation in which someone was suspected to have crossed the line of what can be said in public. Rossi's letter was addressed to the Writers' Union of Hungary, and he delivered a copy of it also to the Ambassador Rudolf Rónai, which, according to the interpretation of the Finnish Writers' Union, made it a letter of denunciation. Rossi did not inform the members of the Writers' Union about the letter, so that they could hear only hazy rumours of it during the spring. Accordingly, they did not know what was in the letter, to whom it was addressed, and what was likely to be its consequences for Kiss.

Those two crucial words 'Which Fascism?' seem to have been so important that Hungarian authorities tried to find out precisely, first, what Kiss really said, and second, how the words could be interpreted. The case was examined and handled in fairly many instances in the Hungarian political system, it was commented in Finnish media, opinions, defensive letters and statements were made both for Kiss and for Rossi. In the following I present some citations from the documents, because in that way it is possible to illuminate the importance of the right discourse and the definitions of the accepted borders of what could be said.

Kiss was questioned by Editor in Chief of his newspaper, together with the eye witness and a colleague of Kiss's, Pál Belley.

Belley assured in his report¹⁰¹ that during the discussion about the Winter War, by 'Eastern Fascism' Kiss referred to stalinism, and that he did not notice that Kiss had said anything that could have been interpreted as anti-Soviet propaganda. Rather it was, according to Belley, a mistake made by the interpreter: ' [...] in my opinion, in his badly formulated question, by 'left-wing Fascism' Dénes Kiss meant stalinism [...] I think in Kiss's question there was not any hidden criticism against Soviet Union, rather it was an unfortunate formulation and an addition made by the interpreter which may have distorted the meaning.¹⁰²' Also *Népszava*'s Gerő wrote a report¹⁰³ in which he stated that the political view of Kiss is unambiguous: 'He is a man, who loves his socialist country, and works for it.' He assumed that the interpreter had made a mistake in the conversation in Helsinki, which had caused a misunderstanding.

Kiss, on the other hand, had to write over and over again what had happened, 'as in prison'¹⁰⁴. Two of Kiss's reports available in the MOL¹⁰⁵ are long and thorough, and it is possible to get a clear picture about the conversation from the point of view of Kiss. The discussion seems to have wavered from the original topic (position of the working-class writers in Finland) to TV's influence on Hungarian films, from the relation between form and content to the Winter War. According to his own words, Kiss was considering the possibility that maybe the Winter War, which had not yet been analyzed in Finland, was a consequence of stalinism, in other words, Soviet Fascism: 'Is it possible to think that a section of the Finnish public opinion could see the Winter War really as a consequence of – searching for a word – a Soviet Fascism?'¹⁰⁶

In the second report Kiss clarifies the core point of the conversation as follows: 'I asked, if the Winter War was interpreted at least by some Finns, as stalinist – we tried to find the correct word together with the interpreter – imperialism. It is possible that also the word 'Fascism' came up. We were also discussing about the danger of Fascism in Europe, and its destructive influence, mainly concerning the past.'¹⁰⁷ Kiss emphasized that this was only one of the many topics handled in the conversa-

tion, and that he could not get an exhaustive answer to it, because the Finns entered into a controversy over the matter. Kiss reported that he had asked about the 'Eastern Fascism', because he had been wondering about the many pictures of Brezhnev and Mao in the streets of Helsinki. He had posed the question thinking about Maoism. '[...] later on, when the present-day danger of Fascism came up, I asked again, that was it not possible that also Eastern Fascism existed, or something similar, which means an extreme left phenomenon.'¹⁰⁸

Veijo Meri reacted as well, and wrote his own letter, which is dated 16 May 1975 and addressed to *Népszava* (editor in chief Siklós). This letter developed into some sort of a scandal as well, as it was thought to be even more dangerous than Rossi's. *Suomen Kuvalehti* wrote on 11 July 1975 that Meri's '[...] excited counter letter, which aimed to declare false all the imagined accusations against Kiss, was addressed to the wrong place.' There were only rumours about the contents of Meri's letter, and still in 1997 Kiss claimed that he had never seen the letter in question. The letter was, however, published in *Suomen Kuvalehti* as a Finnish translation already on 1 August 1975. In his letter, written in English, Meri assures that 'In discussion Mr. Kiss did not say anything, which could offend the Soviet Union.' He refers to Rossi's 'original interpretation about the Winter War, which is not in line either with the Finnish one, or with the Soviet one.' To calm down the turmoil caused by his letter, Meri wrote also a letter to *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹⁰⁹, in which he explained the background of his letter, and the reason why he sent it to *Népszava*. Meri wrote that he viewed it sensible to address the letter to the superior of Kiss in order to get the problem solved at the original source, so to speak. He added that in Finland there was no knowledge about in which instances the case was handled in Hungary. Meri also included the translation of his letter, which was published, too. Kiss himself had the conception that it was Meri's letter that put him in a real danger, as appears in the article written by Kiss in 1997. Kiss said that he only got obscure threats, and that neither of the fateful letters was ever shown to him. At the end of his article Kiss labels both

Meri and Rossi as denouncers. In the light of the documents the situation was, however, completely different, as several Hungarian officials suggested the case to be closed already.

In Finland, however, there were still many rumours going around about what would happen to Kiss. The rumours were about his dismissal from the Writers' Union, losing his job, withdrawing his books from circulation, cancelling the Attila József Prize, sending him to physical labour, and so on. There were so many rumours that, according to *Suomen Kuvalehti*, 'There were times when it was the only topic people were talking about in the corridors of Finnish radio'. The last drop was the writers' conference of Mukkula, where the Kiss-case was a hot topic, and where the management of the Writers' Union constantly heard demands for concrete actions to help Kiss. The union felt that it was partly responsible for what had happened, because the conversation took place on the premises of the union, although Rossi sent his letter as a private person.

In a letter dated 8 July 1975¹¹⁰ János Nagy from the Foreign Ministry informed the HWSP about the actions by the Finnish Writers' Union. A delegation of the Union had approached Ambassador Rónai in 27 June 1975 that means, immediately after the Mukkula conference. The delegation gave the Ambassador a copy of a letter they had sent to the Writers' Union of Hungary, which, together with Meri's letter, had a great influence on the attitude of the Hungarian authorities towards Kiss. In the letter in question they rectified the misunderstanding that Kiss had been present at a press conference, defined Rossi's actions as provocation, claimed that Kiss never used the expression 'fascist and imperialistic Soviet Union', and confirmed that Kiss referred to stalinism. In the end they referred to the good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and appealed to Hungarian authorities to close the case.¹¹¹

In Nagy's report referred above, it appeared that Rossi himself had also been examined. The result was that he was found politically 'wavering'. He was also found to represent the minority of the FCP (the stalinists), and to have expressed negative opinions about what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and

so on. Thereby, during the thrashing out of the case, Rossi himself entered onto the dock, in a way: he himself as a writer and as a communist was carefully examined. Furthermore, his actions in the Kiss-case did not evoke a positive response even in Hungarian official circles in any stage. In addition, Rossi's friends interviewed by *Suomen Kuvalehti*¹¹² stated that 'There is enough punishment for Matti that the case has been published', and: 'It is not easy to be labelled as a denouncer.' There were also some demands for expelling Rossi from the Writers' Union in the public.

It seems to be that in July 1975 the Hungarians were willing to bury the case whereas in Finland, because of the electoral campaign and an excited political atmosphere, the case was still discussed in turmoil. The Kiss-case is even mentioned among the most known cases of the year 1975¹¹³. Meanwhile, despite the uncertainty and even fear that Kiss was experiencing¹¹⁴ the Hungarian authorities started to reach a decision. Kiss was given an admonition, and his exit permit had been denied until the end of the same year.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, when it comes to the Hungarians, the case was closed. After July 1975 the Hungarian documents only deal with the articles published in the Finnish press about the case. The Hungarians were surprised about the turmoil in an interview by *Suomen Kuvalehti*, in which they state that nothing at all had happened to Kiss. According to Kiss himself the Finns had been constantly asking him about the case, also in Hungary¹¹⁶.

8 Changing Boundaries

As a conclusion we can state that the Finns were sometimes even more sensitive than the Hungarians, when it came to allowed discourse, because of both domestic and foreign political reasons. Second, it is clear that the crucial boundary line in this case was not the remark about the 'Eastern Fascism', but if Kiss meant stalinism or 'the fascist Soviet Union' in general, by that. From the point of view of the Hungarians, it was correct and orthodox to criticize Stalin, but in the opinion of Finnish radical communists, including Rossi, that was among the denied themes as well. It is also clear that as the limits of what can be

said were obscure and changing people could not know what was allowed and what was denied at a certain moment¹¹⁷. In this case, both Dénes Kiss and the Finns presumed that the room to move was far smaller than it was in reality.

The aims of Hungarian foreign politics and propaganda followed the policy of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the propaganda made by Hungary in Finland was aimed first at the people's front policy, and second, at the victory of Socialism in Finland. This aim clashed in the course of time – in the 1960s – with the fact that it was possible to realize the policy of peaceful co-existence, but otherwise the reality was that as her ethos, orientation and aims Finland was undoubtedly right wing and orientated to the West, even though she was seemingly a neutral country. As the liberalization went on in Hungary, and as the Kádár regime was coming to an end, also the aims and contents of cultural exchange were changing. At the same time, the space of discourse was widening, and eventually the change of system in Hungary changed the framework and practice of cultural exchange in a drastic way.

Nevertheless, as Foucault says, power is everywhere and ever-present. However, we should bear in mind his insistence on the positive, productive characteristics of modern apparatuses of power. Thus, power constantly constructs in constituting discourse and knowledge. 'Power does not weigh on us as "a force that says no" instead it "induces pleasure". [...] It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. [...]. If power is strong this is because [...] it produces effects at the level of desire – and also at the level of knowledge.'¹¹⁸ There are power relations in all societies and in all human interaction, at all times, also in the cultural relations between Finland and Hungary. However, today the limits of discourse are set from different positions than in the era of Kádár and Kekkonen.

NOTES

- ¹ S. Mills, *Discourse*. London: Routledge, 44; W. M. O'Barr, 'Asking the Right Questions about Language and Power', in: C. Kramarae et al. (ed.), *Language and Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 260, 265.
- ² A. Pratkanis & E. Aronson, *The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company 1992, 9.
- ³ E.g. National Archives of Hungary (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL) XIX-J-1-k-Finn-07174/18 d.53. Budapest 19 June 1953. Memorandum by Márta Kolosz, head of department, HWSP.
- ⁴ See the Dénes Kiss –case, chapter 6.
- ⁵ See e.g. W. E. Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', in H. D. Lasswell et al. (eds.), *Propaganda and Communication in World History. Vol. II. Emergence of Public Opinion in the West*. Honolulu: The University of Hawaii 1980, 234-241.
- ⁶ Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', 245.
- ⁷ Archives of HWSP / MOL M-KS-288-22cs.-1971-43.öe, pages 117-133. Budapest 1 September 1971. Institute of Cultural Relations (Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete, KKI) to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the HWSP.
- ⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. Rezső Mikola, Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to Mária Balogh, KÜM.
- ⁹ Griffith, 'Communist Propaganda', 241.
- ¹⁰ MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002010/1957.12.d., Budapest 15 April 1957. Memorandum by Egon Forgács (Department Chief of the Political Department of HWSP).
- ¹¹ G. B. Cseh – M. Kalmár – E. Pór (ed.), *Zárt, bizalmas, számozott. Tájékoztatáspolitikai és cenzúra 1956-1963 (dokumentumok)* [Information Politics and Censorship 1956-1963. Documents]. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó 1999, 366-370.
- ¹² MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001079/1964, 46.d. Helsinki 13 January 1964.
- ¹³ See e.g. MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-004196/1964, 12.d. No date. A copy of a report by Ambassador Sándor Kurtán to KÜM.
- ¹⁴ A report of the chargé d'affaires Toivo Heikkilä. Report no. 15. Budapest 28 December 1959. Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Finland (UMA).
- ¹⁵ Jalonen, *Kansa kulttuurien virroissa*, 274.
- ¹⁶ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-142-003400/1966, 44.d. Helsinki 27 May 1966. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.

- ¹⁷ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002305/4-1967.37.d. Budapest 3 August 1967. A report about the Friendship Week 1967 by the Patriotic People's Front.
- ¹⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/8/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 5 September 1964. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ¹⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/8/1964.12.d. Helsinki 5 September 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/9/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 2 November 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-0013035/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 17 November 1964. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-004196/1964, no date. Ambassador Kurtán's report to KÜM about the possibilities to develop propaganda in Finland.
- ²³ MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8353-1/1965. Helsinki 1 December 1965. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001629/16/1967. Helsinki 28 November 1967. A report by Ambassador Kurtán. Even in 1973 it is written in a report: 'Számunkra kedvezőtlen módon centralizálja Finnország a kulturális és tudományos együttműködés irányítását.' MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8649-1973.153.d.
- ²⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-7-00558/6-1969.37.d. Helsinki 29 July 1969. Ambassador Rudolf Rónai to KÜM.
- ²⁶ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-002242-1969.37.d. Budapest 5.10.1968. Memorandum by KÜM about the history of Finnish-Hungarian relations.
- ²⁷ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-004196/1964, no date. Ambassador Sándor Kurtán's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the possibilities to develop propaganda in Finland; MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003592/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 26 May 1965. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003592/1965. Helsinki 26 May 1965. Memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, xii-xiv.
- ³⁰ K. Siikala, *Suomen kansainväliset kulttuurisuhteet* [The international cultural relations of Finland]. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1976, 13, 189, 191-192.
- ³¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18i-63753/6/1948, 17.d. Helsinki, no date. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM about the contents of the Cultural Agreement.
- ³² MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18 i-00780/1956, 17.d. No date. A report from the Embassy of Hungary to KÜM, Dezsó Keszthely, Political department.

- ³³ Y. Varpio – L. Szopori-Nagy, *Suomen ja Unkarin kirjalliset suhteet vuosina 1920-1986* [The Literary Relations between Finland and Hungary 1920-1986]. Pieksämäki: SKS 1990, 167.
- ³⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-010713/1954, 16.d. Budapest 20 November 1954. Boris Fáí (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ³⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/1-00780/1956, 17.d. No date. Keszthely (KÜM). A memorandum about the Cultural Agreement.
- ³⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-020/7/1954. Helsinki 24 August 1954. Rezső Mikola (Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki) to Mária Balogh (KÜM).
- ³⁷ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-01713/1954, Budapest 20 November 1954. Boris Fáí (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ³⁸ Jalonen, *Kansa kulttuurien virroissa*, 37, 41-42; MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001035/8/1964, 12.d., Helsinki 5 September 1964. A memorandum from Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ³⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-18/g-005051/1956, Budapest 28 April 1956. A suggestion by KÜM for the text of Cultural Agreement.
- ⁴⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-00780/1956, no date. Keszthely (KÜM). A memorandum about the Cultural Agreement.
- ⁴¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/5/1958. Budapest 8 January 1959. István Sebes (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Valéria Benke (Minister of Education).
- ⁴² The 20th of August is the anniversary of the Saint Stephen and the 15th of March the anniversary of the fight for freedom in 1848. During the change of system the Saint Stephen's Day also had a political significance, because it connected Hungary to conservative traditions which were used prior to 1945. The latter is one of the symbols of the uprising of 1956, as the Prime Minister Imre Nagy re-established it as a holiday after Rákosi had abandoned it earlier. See H. Nyysönen, *The Presence of the Past in Politics. '1956' after 1956 in Hungary*. Jyväskylä: SoPhi 1999, 191-194.
- ⁴³ M. Kalmár, *Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája* [The Ideology of the Kádár Era]. Budapest: Magvető 1998, 263; about the meaning of the 15th of March, see also Nyysönen, *The Presence of the Past*, 191, 195.
- ⁴⁴ See the cultural agreements between Finland and Hungary, 1937 and 1959. National Archives of Finland, Helsinki.
- ⁴⁵ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001035/1964, 12.d. Helsinki 16 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-IV-71.-494-13/1965, 18.d. No date. A memorandum by the Embassy to KÜM about the situation of Finnish-Hungarian relations; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-001629/16/1967, 37.d. Helsinki 28 November 1967. Kurtán to KÜM.

- ⁴⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001588/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 5 November 1965. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM; 003595/3/1965, 46.d. Helsinki 1 December 1965. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁴⁷ MOL-XIX-A-33a-Finn-8649-1973.153.d. A copy of the work plan for the years 1974-1975 by the Hungarian sub-committee, no date.
- ⁴⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-06717/1950,11.d. Helsinki 26 September 1950. Ambassador Ferenc Münnich to KÜM.
- ⁴⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-63655/6/1948, no date; In any case, the matter had surfaced before the year 1949, which, according to Kaukonen and Huotari, is the year of the beginning of discussions about a cultural agreement. See Kaukonen, Väinö - Huotari, Tauno, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura' [the Finnish-Hungarian Society], in: János Nagy et al. (eds.): *Friends and Relatives: Finnish-Hungarian Cultural Relations*. Budapest: Corvina 1984, 221.
- ⁵⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-05651/1950. Helsinki 26 September 1950. Ambassador Münnich to KÜM.
- ⁵¹ E. Alenius, 'Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana tietä avaamassa' [Blazing a trail as the first Chairman], in: H. Honka-Hallila (ed.), *Meidän Unkari. Suomi-Unkari Seura 1950-2000*. [Our Hungary. Finnish-Hungarian Society 1950-2000.] Jyväskylä: Gummerus 2000, 9.
- ⁵² Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 29.
- ⁵³ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-12/a-003198-1957.7.d. Budapest 1 July 1957. A memorandum by Zoltán Majdik (Political department of HWSP).
- ⁵⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/a/0082810/1960, 11.d. A copy of Muuri's speech.
- ⁵⁵ An interview of Viljo Tervonen 13 December 2002, Helsinki.
- ⁵⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-004196/1964. 12.d., no date. A memorandum about the possibilities of making propaganda in Finland.
- ⁵⁷ Alenius, 'Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana', 14, 16; Kaukonen-Huotari, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura', 221.
- ⁵⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-013320-21/a/1952, 18.d. Budapest 23 November 1951. Ambassador Ferenc Dömötör to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-012234/1/1952, Helsinki 21 December 1952. A memorandum by Dömötör to KÜM about cultural life in Finland in November-December 1952; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-01920/6/1953. Melléklet a 212/1953-hoz. Helsinki 15 February 1953. A report on the speech given by Mária Balog in the AGM of FHS, 1953.
- ⁵⁹ See e.g. MOL XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/b-07174/1953, 11.d. Budapest 17 November 1953. Márta Kolozs (KÜM) to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.
- ⁶⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-01920/11/I.53, dated in 15 December 1953. A letter from KÜM to the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki.

- ⁶¹ There is a reference here to another document, which was not to be found in the MOL, and so the nature of these ‘certain matters’ remains conjectural. MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki, Rezső Mikola to KÜM.
- ⁶² Alenius, ‘Ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana’, 19.
- ⁶³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-142-003400/1966.44.d. Helsinki 27 May 1966. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁶⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-1-001386/19/1969.36.d., no date. A report about the situation in Finland by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 25-26.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.
- ⁶⁷ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 36.
- ⁶⁸ ‘[...] tovább tudnánk Itkonennal foglálkozni.’ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/g-0207/7/1954, 16.d. Helsinki 24 August 1954. A memorandum from the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM.
- ⁶⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/9-009295/1/1955.16.d. Budapest 3 November 1955; see also MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/1/1958.11.d. Helsinki 12 May 1958. Ambassador József Szipka to the Foreign Minister of Hungary, about KKI’s work plan for Finland for the year 1958.
- ⁷⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-005390/1956. Helsinki 18 May 1956. Ambassador Szipka to KÜM.
- ⁷¹ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 37-38.
- ⁷² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-I-19-003047/1973.45.d. Budapest 18 October 1973. A report by László Surányi, KÜM.
- ⁷³ Honka-Hallila, *Meidän Unkari*, 37-38; see also K. Vilkuna, ‘Miksi juuri suomalais-unkarilaiset kulttuurisuhteet ovat jatkuvasti vilkkaat?’, *Valvoja* 2/1967, pp. 78-82.
- ⁷⁴ Linna, a writer; Ervast, a writer; Taanila, a leftist journalist; Toivo Lyy, a writer and a translator; Donner, a writer and a film maker; Kokkonen, a composer; Blomberg, a film director; Lounela, a writer and a journalist.
- ⁷⁵ See e.g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-02746/1/1954. Helsinki 16 July 1954; 02746/1954.I, dated 17 April 1954. Reports by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki about the persons willing to visit Hungary.
- ⁷⁶ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001753/1960. Helsinki 15 January 1960. A report by the Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki to KÜM, based on the report given by the secretary of FHS, Sulo Muuri.
- ⁷⁷ MOL-XIX-J-1-k-Finn-002557/1/1958,11.d. Helsinki 12 May 1958. Ambassador József Szipka to the Foreign Minister of Hungary, about KKI’s work plan for Finland for the year 1958.

- ⁷⁸ Kaukonen - Huotari, 'Suomi-Unkari Seura', 224.
- ⁷⁹ E. g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-5/a-005569/1963.5.d. Helsinki 24 June 1963. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001079/1/1964, 49.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. The Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki (István Vincze) to KÜM.
- ⁸¹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-5/a-005569/1963.5.d. Helsinki 24 June 1963. Ambassador Kurtán to KÜM; MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-001079/1964.46.d. Helsinki 13 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸² MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-001079/1/1964, 46.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM; 265-001079/1964.46.d., Helsinki 13 January 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-21/a.003699/1964.10.d. Helsinki 27 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁴ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-001079/1964. 46.d. Helsinki 29 April 1964. Kurtán to KÜM.
- ⁸⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-002047/1966, 45.d. Helsinki 1 March 1966. Kurtán to KÜM; XIX-J-1-k-Finn-18/1-2082-1/1966. Helsinki 19 March 1966. The Embassy of Hungary in Helsinki (Gábor Sebestyén) to KKI (Department Chief Ferenc Buzás).
- ⁸⁶ An interview of Outi Karanko-Pap. 10 October 2002, Budapest.
- ⁸⁷ MOL-XIX-A-33-a-8003/1971. 147.d. No date. A memorandum about Finnish-Hungarian relations.
- ⁸⁸ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-I-19-003047/1973.45.d. Budapest 18 October 1973. A report by László Surányi (KÜM).
- ⁸⁹ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002882/1974.42.d. Helsinki 9 April 1974. Ambassador Rudolf Rónai to KÜM.
- ⁹⁰ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-265-002882/1974.42.d. Budapest 7 May 1974. Károly Zimboras (KÜM) to Géza Rybka (KKI). A copy of a report by Rónai (see note 111), with a covering note.
- ⁹¹ The interview of Heikki Koski 28 February 2003, Jyväskylä.
- ⁹² Ibid.
- ⁹³ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-006309/1/1962. Helsinki 14 May 1962. The report by the Embassy of Hungary in Finland says that Vilkkuna was a member of Kekkonen's 'sauna company', and an *éminence grise* of the government.
- ⁹⁴ See e. g. MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-003595/1965. Budapest 4 June 1965. A report by KÜM. Vilkkuna had posed provoking questions and remarks in the meeting of the joint committee, which, according to the reporter, he should have posed off the record.
- ⁹⁵ MOL-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-571-003807/1965. 46.d. Budapest 8.5.1964. A report by Rezső Mikola (KÜM).

- ⁹⁶ 11 July 1975.
- ⁹⁷ 12 December 1997.
- ⁹⁸ 11 July 1975.
- ⁹⁹ MOL-M-KS-143-145. A copy of Matti Rossi's letter to the Writers' Union of Hungary, dated in Helsinki 11 April 1975.
- ¹⁰⁰ 11 July 1975.
- ¹⁰¹ MOL-M-KS-173. Budapest 2 May 1975. Belley's (*Magyar Hírlap*) report.
- ¹⁰² '[...] a 'baloldali fasizmus' kitétel Kiss Dénes rosszul megfogalmazott kérdésben, amely alatt – véleményem szerint a sztalinizmust értette. [...] Megítélésem szerint, Kiss Dénes kérdése nem volt akár rejtett formában is támadás a Szovjetunió ellen, legfejlebb szerencsétlen fogalmazás és a közbeiktatott tolmács-szöveg torzíthatta el értelmét.'
- ¹⁰³ MOL-M-KS-179. Budapest 17 May 1975. Gerő (head of the Cultural Department of *Népszava*) to Siklós.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Suomen Kuvalehti*, 11 July 1975.
- ¹⁰⁵ Dated 3 and 6 May 1975.
- ¹⁰⁶ 'S elképzelhető, hogy a finn közvélemény egy részében ez a háború talán, mint a Sztalinizmus – keresvén a szót – esetleg 'szovjet fasizmus' következmény él?' MOL-M-KS-170-174. Budapest 6.5.1975. Dénes Kiss's report.
- ¹⁰⁷ ' - kérdeztem! ,- hogy talán a finn közvélemény egy részében ez a háború, mint a Sztalinizmus – a tolmácssal kerestük a szót – imperializmus s lehetséges, hogy a fasizmus szó is elhangzott, / előtte a fasiszta veszélyről és európai rombolásáról is szó volt, főként a múltra vetítve. MOL-M-KS-180-182, Budapest 3 May 1975.
- ¹⁰⁸ [...] amikor később a mai fasiszta veszély is szóba került, újra tettem egy megjegyzést, amennyi lehetséges 'keleti fasizmus' is, vagy ahhoz hasonló, ami szélsőséges baloldali megnyilatkozásokat jellemzi. Idem.
- ¹⁰⁹ 1 August 1975.
- ¹¹⁰ MOL-M-KS-170-173. Budapest 8.7.1975. Nagy (Foreign Ministry) to Kornidesz (Department of Science, Culture and Education of HWSP).
- ¹¹¹ MOL-M-LS-154-157. Nagy to Kornidesz.
- ¹¹² 11 July 1975.
- ¹¹³ SK, 19 December 1975.
- ¹¹⁴ SK, 11 July and 12 December 1975.
- ¹¹⁵ MOL-M-SK-169. Fodor (Central Committee of HWSP) to Kornidesz.
- ¹¹⁶ SK, 12 December 1975.
- ¹¹⁷ C.f. the system of the Three T's, see Oikari, 'Discursive Use of Power'.
- ¹¹⁸ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*. Transl. by C. Gordon et al. New York: Pantheon Books 1980, 119.