

## **Policy of Friendship: The Image of Hungarian-Finnish Relations during the Kekkonen Era**

**Mari VARES**

### **1 Introduction**

A high-ranking Finnish foreign policy official, Keijo Korhonen wrote in his memoirs about the role of Hungary in Finnish foreign policy during the Kekkonen era. To quote Korhonen:<sup>1</sup>

The Russians were first in importance, after them there was no-one in importance, even after no-one there was no-one, then there were the Hungarians and at the tail of the queue there were East Germans, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rumanians.

In this article the aim is to discuss the image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations during the Kekkonen era from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the period when the relations between Finland and Hungary improved at both the intergovernmental and non-governmental (civil society) level. The main problematic deals with Finnish foreign policy – conducted by President Kekkonen – towards Kádár's Hungary, but to make the picture more complete Hungarian points of view are illuminated as well. What sort of image did Finland and Hungary have of each other at the state, diplomatic and political levels, and, on the other hand, how did they rate the mutual relations? It is not enough to ask, which were the practical questions discussed, but one also has to clarify how the representation of the relations was managed: how were they defined and by what means were they practised? How

were these relations established and what kinds of relations were pursued?

It can be anticipated that there are two contradictory elements as starting points for this study: first, the heritage of the old cultural relations, which were based on the feeling of kinship, and second, the political reality of Cold War Europe and *détente* in the 1960s and 1970s. The Hungarian-Finnish relations can be approached from two angles: as the meeting point and convergence of two states representing two different social and political systems and as the encounter of two states which both saw themselves and each other as 'small states' in the world of Cold War politics.

Expressions of the Finnish policy towards Hungary can be found in the context of the meetings of the countries' leadership. Therefore, focus is on the meetings of President Kekkonen with the representatives of the Hungarian party (HWSP) and state leadership. The questions are: What sort of confidential or open interpretations were made, what was discussed and what kind of public statements were made? The visits as such and their contents are the mirror of the relations: they contain data of the relations, and their forms give indirect information of the weight that was attached to them.

First, two visits Kekkonen paid to Hungary in the 1960s will be analyzed: the private visit in May 1963 and the state visit in autumn 1969. First, these visits were symbolically significant as openings of the relations or as first steps in the history of visits. The first visit was made at a time when Hungarian relations with the West were problematic after the 1956 uprising. Kekkonen's visit in 1963, although it was officially only a detour after the visit to Yugoslavia, was the first visit of a Western leader since 1956. The state visit of 1969 was an official state visit and a part of a visit to Rumania and Czechoslovakia as well. It was made while the CSCE conference was being discussed and while the shadow of the occupation of Czechoslovakia was creating intense international pressure. This period can be named as the opening and developing of the Hungarian-Finnish political relations.

Second, I will discuss the next period lasting a decade, during which relations between Finland and Hungary were further developed in terms of actual political goals. Hungarian President Pál Losonczi visited Finland in 1971 and Kádár followed him in 1973 – both visits were first visits, since no Hungarian head of state had previously visited Finland, and, in addition to this, Kádár had never visited a non-socialist country officially before. In 1976 Kekkonen on his turn paid a state visit to Hungary. The series of meetings between Kekkonen and Hungarian leadership continued next year when the Hungarian Prime Minister visited Finland.

During the era of Kekkonen the President was unusually strong in formulating Finnish foreign policy. Kekkonen's Hungarian relations are of special interest to him because as a student politician he was an *aitosuomalainen*, an ardent Finn who respected Finnish-Estonian-Hungarian kinship, and knew Hungary and Hungarians personally. Presumably, this mental heritage might have influenced his opinions and policy towards Hungary.<sup>2</sup> Power politics was to him, however, a reality in which the relations with the Soviet Union were a primary consideration but, at the same time, reputation of Finland as a Western and neutral state was cherished. It is worth discussing how or if these two frameworks – the idea of kinship and the prevailing political conditions – were linked to each other in Kekkonen's policy. As a working hypothesis it is presumed that these two dimensions were united in his policy to make the mutual relations between Finland and Hungary a unique case in the field of Cold War Europe. In the context of satellite policy, the mutual interpretations and expressions on Hungarian Kádárism and Finnish policy of neutrality were obviously key issues. Furthermore, it is important to compare the attitudes of the diplomatic corps with the policy of the state leadership as well as the expressions of the press and publicity with the official rhetoric<sup>3</sup>.

In this article it is presumed that the two contexts – the tradition of kinship relations and the politics of Cold War – affected the visits too. In the case of Hungarian-Finnish

relations, the visits which Kekkonen paid in the 1960s seemed to be symbolically valuable as acts of recognition between two states. In the 1970s relations were further developed in the context of the state visits and discussions between the head of states. Hungarian policy emphasised their importance. Therefore, programs, symbols and forms of state visits are of special value and worth studying in order to illuminate the conduct of the Hungarian-Finnish relations.

## **2 Attitudes towards Kádár's Policy and Finnish Neutrality**

In the aftermath of 1956, the issue of Hungary was a controversial one in Finland. Official Finnish policy towards Hungary can be defined as a formal satellite policy and the attitude of public opinion was that of a warming cultural co-operation. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest defined it, there were two different dimensions in Hungarian-Finnish relations: the correct state level relations, resulting from the moderate Finnish policy towards Kádárism. At the same time there were the correct relations between Finns and Hungarians, which were based on the Finnish sympathetic attitude towards Hungarians and on the voluntary help to the Hungarians who had suffered in the revolution. There was thus a difference between the public opinion and the Finnish official policy. Kekkonen was well aware of this difference.<sup>4</sup>

In the context of the idea of kinship, Hungarian-Finnish relations were normalized soon after the revolution. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest stated, thanks to the Finnish sympathy for Hungarians, the relations between Hungary and Finland were restored to cherishing the idea of kinship as early as 1957. For example, the leaders of the *Suomi-Unkari Seura* (Finnish-Hungarian Society, FHS) visited Hungary. The *chargé d'affaires*, T.H. Heikkilä, warned, however, that there was no reason for too much optimism yet. According to Heikkilä, it was still important to consider the conditions in Hungary carefully, even if they seemed to be normalised.<sup>5</sup> It can be argued that the statement reflected, surprisingly, both the

attitude of Finnish public opinion and the official moderate policy towards Kádárism.

In spite of the quick return to kinship relations, state-level relations between Hungary and Finland remained cool. The relations were correct but reserved. Therefore, the fact that the Finnish government opposed all open protests against the Soviet occupation in 1956 and the Kádár regime did not imply that the official relations between Hungary and Finland were good. Heikkilä assumed that the relations were kept cool in order to preserve Finland's position as an independent country.<sup>6</sup>

Obviously, at the time of the first visit, the cool attitude towards satellite countries did not seem to be essential any longer. The relations between Finland and the satellite countries were gradually warming as a result of developments in international politics. In the case of Hungary, there were some new aspects to consider from the Finnish point of view. Kekkonen's visit to Hungary in 1963 was part of a process in which Hungary's diplomatic relations were normalised after the events of 1956. The Finnish political and diplomatic circles saw signs of liberalisation and de-stalinisation in Hungary as well as signs of a new orientation in the relations between Hungary and the United Nations.<sup>7</sup>

The question of Finland's reputation as a neutral state was also an important indicator in Finnish foreign policy. When there were perceptible signs of Western acceptance of Finnish neutrality, the Finnish political leadership was ready to improve the relations with the Eastern bloc. After the visits to Great Britain in 1960 and France in 1962, the West gave official signs of recognition that Finland was a neutral state.<sup>8</sup> In addition to this, cultural and scientific contacts between Finland and Hungary had increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>9</sup> Kekkonen's visit was discreetly discussed in Helsinki already in 1961 on Hungary's initiative, but the Finnish political leadership was not ready to accept Hungary's proposal.<sup>10</sup>

The visit of 1963 can be regarded as a turning point in the relations between Finland and Hungary. The policy in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution seemed to change. Finnish

contradictory attitudes towards Hungary were still apparent. 'Finnish sympathetic attitudes towards Hungarians were transformed to 'the policy of kinship' and the 'moderate attitude of the Finnish political leadership towards Kádár' was transformed into the 'Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary'.

Kekkonen himself considered that his visit had an important effect on Hungarian-Finnish relations. He stated a year after that it was the kinship movement that should form the basis for Finnish relations towards both kinship nations, Estonia and Hungary. He pointed out in his private speech to the representatives of the so-called national sciences – such as ethonology and linguistics – in Finland that these relations should be based on unofficial civil society circles rather than conducted at the state level. As he said:<sup>11</sup>

To the generation to which I belong and whose marvelous and good representatives are gathered here, the issue concerning Estonia and Hungary is an emotional subject. [...] Already for a couple of years I have had an idea that better relations with Hungary and Estonia should be established, not necessarily on a formal, official basis, because I understood that there would be difficulties with that, but merely at informal, cultural and social levels, but very carefully.

Accordingly, Kekkonen invited scholars to create informal networks. This was a way to establish and reinforce contacts between Finland and Hungary. One can ask whether this was a way to strengthen kinship relations as such or whether it was a way to get Finns involved with Hungarians in spite of political differences. Were these informal contacts aimed to further official political relations?

### **3 Opening New Relations**

Finnish political leadership emphasized the unofficial nature of the 1963 visit. This tentative attitude of the Finnish political élite towards Hungary can be sensed in Finnish official reports to the press. The Finnish News Agency, STT, pointed out that Kekkonen would only 'call at' or 'stop in Hungary' during his way home from Yugoslavia.<sup>12</sup> And, Kekkonen then 'stopped in' Hungary on 12 – 15 May 1963, immediately after his visit to

Yugoslavia. President Dobi and Mrs Dobi acted as hosts. The program consisted of cultural events, sightseeing in Budapest and a visit to the countryside and Debrecen. Kekkonen also met Finns who lived in Hungary. There was no mention of a meeting between Kekkonen and Kádár in the official program – a fact that can also be interpreted as a symbol of informality.<sup>13</sup> In the Hungarian draft of the program, however, it was mentioned that on 14 May there would be a meeting between the two leaders, should Kekkonen request it.<sup>14</sup> Also the fact that the Hungarian leadership implied the political importance of the visit in the official lunch and the festive dinner by inviting also the Party leadership, Kádár in particular, to these occasions, reveals the symbolic value the Hungarian leadership attached to the visit.<sup>15</sup>

Kekkonen's visit attracted some attention in Finnish media: in the press there was a slightly critical tone. Already before the visit, Kekkonen had been annoyed about the tone of the right-wing newspaper *Uusi Suomi*. He interpreted their tone as questioning the judgement of the Finnish political leadership – i.e. Kekkonen's judgement. In *Uusi Suomi* the question was asked whether it was reasonable to visit a country in which the prevailing conditions were suspect. Kekkonen brought this matter up with the Chief Editor, Eero Petäjaniemi, who denied that he had indirectly criticised Kekkonen in this way.<sup>16</sup>

After the visit, it was claimed in a Finnish magazine *Kuva-Posti* that the state visit to Yugoslavia was successful but insinuated that the informal visit to Hungary may have been unnecessary at this time.<sup>17</sup> The reason for these comments can be found in the post-1956 context: the press might well have been afraid that Finland was being identified with the Eastern bloc.

Hungarian media also commented on the informal nature of Kekkonen's visit. For example, the Hungarian women's magazine *Nők Lapja* concentrated on Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen, wrote about *Kalevala* and presented the city of Helsinki in a richly illustrated article. In the pictures published in newspapers and magazines, Kekkonen was photographed in informal situations: in Hortobágy and visiting suburban housing developments,<sup>18</sup> both in traditional and modern

Hungarian contexts. One can only ask whether these pictures reflected symbolically new Hungarian-Finnish relations in which the traditional context and the modern one were present concomitantly.

In the political rhetoric certain value was afterwards given to the visit. It was to be interpreted as an opening of relations between Kekkonen's Finland and Kádár's Hungary. One year later, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stated in the Hungarian Parliament that the relations between Hungary and Finland did not reflect only 'a romantic ethnographic kinship' but that the relations were at a level of modern progress. Péter argued that there were 'many useful economic and cultural achievements' between Hungary and Finland. The work of the joint Culture Committee and the trade treaty gave fresh content to these traditional relations. Later, in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Péter's statement was cited as an example of the prevailing image of Hungarian-Finnish relations. Péter had referred to the 'high level visits' as a proof of good relations. Ambassador Palas presumed that Hungary would in the future also continue to develop relations especially by these visits.<sup>19</sup>

Kádár himself stated to Palas after Kekkonen's visit that 'Hungary carefully observed Finnish foreign policy'. He emphasized the 'good relations' between Finland and the Soviet Union and used the concept of kinship in a modern sense. 'Kinship' was defined as not only a cliché, but a scientific truth. At the same time there was in Kádár's rhetoric another concept, 'peaceful co-existence'. The fusion of 'old' with 'modern' rhetoric produced a modern conclusion: the two kinship nations wanted peaceful co-existence.<sup>20</sup>

The communist state leadership of Hungary was also consulting with the Finnish Communist Party (FCP) on Finnish policy but also others, the social democrats and the Agrarian Union, exchanged thoughts with the Hungarian Ambassador. Also the plan of a visit by a parliamentary delegation pointed out the Hungarian interest during this time. Hungary was interested also in how the communist and other radical cultural circles were functioning in Finland.<sup>21</sup> An interesting detail in the relations between the two different political systems was a



discussion between Kádár and the FCP Chairman, Aimo Aaltonen, a year after Kekkonen's visit. The discussion was reported to Kekkonen by the Finnish State Police. Aaltonen complained about the various difficulties created by Kekkonen's policy. He explained to Kádár that one of the reasons why there could not be a communist revolution in Finland was that Kekkonen was taking the wind out of its sails. Kádár commented with a smile: 'So God help you!'<sup>22</sup>

At the informal level – as Kekkonen wished – there began to appear concrete signs of good relations. For example, the Hungarian leadership decided in autumn 1963 to grant Kustaa Vilkuna a decoration when he was attending an international ethnologists' conference in Budapest. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) mentioned that in addition to scientific merits, Vilkuna had had a significant role in developing Hungarian-Finnish relations. He had been active in the Hungarian-Finnish Society and in the Hungarian Ethnological Society since 1939 and in concluding the Cultural Treaty between the countries. It was also known that Vilkuna was among Kekkonen's entourage and an adviser in foreign policy issues.<sup>23</sup> On a more popular level, a sign of 'understanding' between the two countries was that in 1964 package tours to Hungary were for the first time organised in Finland. This told of – as the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated – the 'popularisation of Hungarian-Finnish relations'.<sup>24</sup> Tourism and travel as well as increasing student exchange were undoubtedly ways to re-establish the contacts between Hungary and Finland.<sup>25</sup> In the beginning of the year 1970, as a result of Kekkonen's state visit to Hungary in 1969, compulsory visas between the two countries were abolished. The agreement was important, because for the first time Hungarian citizens were allowed to travel to a non-socialist country without visas.<sup>26</sup>

#### **4 Two ideas of Brotherhood: Tradition and Progress**

If the visit in 1963 was remarkable because it was understood to be the opening of a new era of relations between Finland and Hungary, the visit of 1969 also had a similar importance. In the

late 1960s, respect for Soviet interests was still paramount in the relations across the Iron Curtain. One new element in the foreign policy of Hungary was the increasing openness to the West. A key motivation behind it was the opportunity which the West offered to gain access to the latest technology and to participate in economic development. The first contacts in this respect were Finland and Austria. The visit paid by the Austrian Chancellor, Josef Klaus, in 1967, as well as Kekkonen's visit, were given wide publicity.<sup>27</sup> For Kekkonen, the tour in Eastern Europe offered an opportunity to formulate the Finnish position on post-Prague international politics. In 1969 there were signs of normalisation in international relations after the events in Prague. This might have encouraged Kekkonen to visit Eastern Europe.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the situation in 1969 resembled the situation in 1963: stabilisation after tension.

The Hungarian activity and emphasis on visits was evident also in the fact that Hungary so often took the initiative in the contacts with the Finns. János Péter suggested on the 16 August 1968 to the Politburo of the HSWP, that President Losonczi should invite the Finnish President to an official state visit to Hungary. He reminded them that already in 1961<sup>29</sup> an invitation to this effect had been forwarded, but Kekkonen had not been able to accept it 'because of domestic policy reasons'. Péter said that Kekkonen was planning a visit to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Italy, and he had been informed that Kekkonen might also like to visit Hungary.<sup>30</sup> Before the visit, the Finnish Embassy in Budapest assumed that the policy of peaceful co-existence had given Finland a certain position in Hungary's policy. In the report concerning the political events in Hungary it was again estimated that relations with the Soviet Union formed the basis of Hungarian policy. This was not, however, contradictory to the idea of peaceful co-existence. It was stated that 'this pleasant side of the socialist bloc is more evident in the case of Hungary than in other socialist countries'.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to political conditions, attention was also drawn to cultural relations. Culture and science were seen as central aspects of mutual relations. A report which was drawn up by

the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated that the reason for the good co-operation was that Finland accepted Hungarian cultural policy: the policy which was conducted at the higher political level.<sup>32</sup> It pointed out the importance of the idea of kinship to the relations between the countries; the tradition had been formed by the philologists had initiated Hungarian-Finnish relations. They were the starting-point for state level relations, which had gained more momentum due to the Kekkonen visit in 1963.<sup>33</sup>

The speeches provide an interesting insight into the image and into the system of the relations between the two countries. Kekkonen's speeches in Budapest in 1969 reflected both the concept of kinship and the concept of progress: old concepts were again linked to new ones. As Kekkonen expressed it, the relations between Hungary and Finland were founded not only on historical grounds but also on modern co-operation. For example, Kekkonen praised the progress Hungary had made during the 1960s: the development in Hungary between the years 1963–1969 had shown 'the high level of Hungarian civilisation and culture'. He emphasized both political and cultural understanding between the two countries. In this connection 'kinship' was reevaluated as a scientific truth, not as a romantic speculation or a myth. In this rhetoric, the kinship was not, however, the only aspect of brotherhood but it was paired with the willingness to make cultural and commercial agreements. The concept of a small nation implied this twin brotherhood uniting the two countries politically, and its rhetoric was carried out with concepts of 'kinship, brotherhood, progress and small nation'.<sup>34</sup>

The kinship aspect in the traditional sense was visible also in the informal part of the state visit. Such details were the *Kalevala*-show held in Budapest and a new Hungarian-Finnish dictionary. According to Kustaa Vilkuna, the dictionary was a 'neat or, in other words, smart and solid expression of the special status of Hungarian-Finnish relations'. Vilkuna had recommended that the dictionary should be presented to some of the Hungarian high-ups.<sup>35</sup>

The HSWP had also decided that the reception of Kekkonen was to reflect his positive role in international policy and to

emphasize the importance of the visit. (The way the points of the protocol were organized reflected this, too). Hungary decided to take a positive view on freedom of visas and to conclude a treaty of technology and economy with Finland.<sup>36</sup> The discussions between Kekkonen and Kádár can be linked to the idea of mutual understanding between small nations in the field of international politics. Discussions of world politics and mutual interests dealt with the typical, actual political issues. Notes of the discussions show that an exchange of views concerning the NORDEK, European security and commercial and economic co-operation were on the agenda.<sup>37</sup> The official memorandum which the President and the Finnish Foreign Ministry gave on the state visit emphasised the correct nature of the relations between Finland and Hungary. It is worth noticing that there was an expression of 'the similarity of opinions on world politics and of the direction of the mutual relations between the two states'.<sup>38</sup>

The Finnish press, however, did not adopt such a positive tone: their treatment of the visit was not necessarily in accordance with the official line. An incident of this latter visit was the case of 'muckraking journalism' of which Kekkonen accused one reporter of the Finnish newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, Lauri Karén. The codes of the official 'liturgy' were disturbed by Karén's critical articles on Kekkonen's visit to Hungary.

Karén had written that Hungary had shown only little interest in Kekkonen during the visit. Karén gave an explanation: the Soviet Union disliked the potentially increasing contacts between Hungary and neutral countries. Karén noticed that the typical symbols of a state visit had been lacking in Budapest: there was no red carpet at the airport and Kádár was not there to personally welcome Kekkonen. In addition to this 'lack of symbols at the airport', there were only a few Finnish or Hungarian flags in the streets of Budapest. He believed that the atmosphere in Czechoslovakia and Rumania had been much warmer towards Kekkonen. Karén had discussed with some British and French diplomats, who had also considered that the

reception was rather cool. Maybe Karén's tone was coloured by French or British opinions.

The President made his attitude to Karén's articles clear. He would not accept this kind of reporting and accused Lauri Karén 'of taking a waste bin instead of a pen' with him to Hungary. Kekkonen further complained that 'it was clear that a journalist who had equipped himself with these kinds of tools could not write a truthful description'.<sup>39</sup>

Karén stated later in his memoirs that the Hungarians had not paid much attention to his writing.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, the Hungarian appraisals of Kekkonen's visit in 1969 have pointed out the huge publicity which was given to it in Hungary.<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, János Péter had proposed to the HSWP Political Committee that before the visit the Hungarian media would deal with Finland and the relations between the two countries. In practise, this meant that on the day of Kekkonen's arrival the daily newspapers were due to wish him welcome in two languages and that the editorials were to show respect to the importance of the visit. The speeches were to be made public and bulletins in colour were to report the results of the visit. Should Kekkonen so wish, a TV interview could also be arranged.<sup>42</sup>

### **5 Towards Friendship**

During the 1970s the dualist idea of 'brotherhood' was further developed: contemporary questions brought 'modern friendship' to the limelight. The concept of friendship was gaining more weight at the expense of the idea of kinship. The new image was that Hungary and Finland could become members of the international community. It is possible to presume that rather contemporary political circumstances and goals made an impact on the statements concerning mutual relations than the tradition.

Up to 1969, the 1960s had been the period of establishing and consolidation in Hungarian-Finnish relations. In the 1970s, however, an increase in sheer volume of interchange at political, state and diplomatic, cultural, economic and civil society levels took place. Political relations and the visits were more open than

in the 1960s, when the images of Hungary and Kádár were still undeveloped. In time the relations between Finland and Hungary improved on both intergovernmental and civil society level as the repercussions of the 1956 faded away. When President Pal Losonczi visited Finland from 23<sup>rd</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> of August, 1971, the themes of negotiations were essentially the same as during Kekkonen's state visit in 1969, but it is evident that the political relations were now discussed more openly and publicly.

During the visit, the Hungarians were especially keen on discussing Finnish views on the CSCE, and the commercial relations between the countries, including co-operation in the fields of technology, science and economy. The Hungarian expert in these questions was Deputy Prime Minister Miklós Ajtai. That he was not a member of the politburo was interpreted by the Finnish Ambassador Martti Ingman to mean that the Hungarians intended to loosen the grip of the party on matters of technology.<sup>43</sup> Ajtai had expressed to Ingman his interest in getting acquainted with how the scientific research was organized in Finland, what the status of Hungarian-Finnish co-operation was and what the plans for the future were. He also wanted to discuss the prospects of co-operation on the economy, sounding whether the Finns thought that joint projects in industry and agriculture were possible.<sup>44</sup> The interest in technology, economy and agriculture can be seen in the visit plan of Losonczi; the President was to visit, for example, the Agricultural Institute in Mustiala and the Rosenlew factories in Pori. Education, culture and health care were prominent in the program of the Presidential spouse. The program included for example a lunch on an ice-breaker and visiting Tapiola in Espoo, which shows wish of the Finns to show clean nature, construction technology and technical skills – tradition and the modern side of Finland.<sup>45</sup>

Since the most traditional part of the relations, culture, was by now in the eyes of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, consolidated and unproblematic, the focus was on modern themes during the visit. Therefore, according to Ingman, there was hardly anything else to discuss in culture during the visit than to 'note the positive development'.<sup>46</sup> Of course, Finno-

Ugrian philology and ethnology were still the key issues in the treaty of cultural exchange but the field of co-operation had become wider. As was stated in a preliminary memorandum, there was a mutual wish to deepen and widen the contacts in different fields of science and arts. The objects of interest were not, however, necessarily the same. The Finnish Embassy estimated that the Hungarians were more interested in Finnish science than art, and especially in gaining benefit from 'hard sciences', whereas the Finns were interested in Hungarian art. Moreover, the Finns thought that the treaty on culture was not supposed to cover all cultural exchange, but rather to show the way and incite initiative, after which it would be possible to create direct contacts.<sup>47</sup> The more diversified and 'natural' cultural exchange would be the better: after the official agreements one could proceed to striking direct contacts.

However, the discourse of the visit also offered a role to 'tradition'. The trend of the conversations between the two Presidents was that good relations arose from tradition, on which the countries now could build 'more modern' relations. They would answer to the needs of the present day. This 'need' was now about economy, technology, industry and society, as the Finns had prophesied already before the visit. Losonczi expressed the Hungarian interest in co-operation in health care and to conclude an agreement on co-operation in science and technology. He suggested that co-operation should be widened and that other sciences would develop the same kind of co-operation as already existed in ethnology and linguistics. He also mentioned the need to further develop the relations on the economy. Kekkonen reacted in principle positively to these proposals. Losonczi also mentioned that the cultural relations rested on the sound base of old tradition. According to Kekkonen, these cultural relations had also created the circumstances for the development of economic co-operation. Thus the cultural relations were seen as the foundation and the example for other aspects of the relations, and they were also the proof of the long tradition of the relations between the two nations. The idea of tradition was linked to the cultural

relations and they were also seen as the bridge to modernity. It can be maintained that the concept of tradition could be used as a reference point to the entirety of the relations, but the 'new' relations, established from the 1960s onwards, were linked to this tradition. Losonczi's reference to how the high-level visits had advanced the positive development of the relations reflected the emphasis the Hungarians laid to the visits as a means of foreign policy.<sup>48</sup>

The view of the roles of Finland and Hungary had in international context was expressed by the concept of mutual understanding. In the talks with Losonczi, Kekkonen defined the Finnish line in international politics as 'an active policy of neutrality' which had been, in co-operation with the Soviet Union, consolidated as a part of European political reality. The relations with the Soviet Union were extremely important to Finland. The prolongation of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance by 20 years had set 'our consolidated good relations with the Soviet Union outside speculations as a process of change was starting in Europe'. Kekkonen placed the Finnish foreign policy as a part of a 'more stable and peaceful *status quo*'. This was connected to the aspirations to realize the plans for a European Security Meeting. In the conversation references to Hungarian-Finnish understanding in international issues were made. Losonczi, for his part, stated that the mainstay of Hungarian foreign policy was the relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; close co-operation with them was one of the factors which had 'helped us to the calm situation which now prevails in Europe'. Losonczi aligned the Finnish active policy of neutrality with the policy of 'the progress-loving forces' which had stabilized Europe, i.e. brought about the situation in which there had been no war in Europe for 26 years and the international tension had eased.<sup>49</sup>

The key concepts of the joint *communiqué* on the visit had it that the relations were unproblematic: multilateral co-operation, mutual understanding and friendship. The visit was considered to be 'a new manifestation on friendship and mutual respect between our nations'. The relations were described as stable,



traditional and up-to-date. Economy and technology were emphasized and relations in them were to be developed. Both sides stated with satisfaction that the relations between Hungary and Finland were developing favourably in all fields of social, economic and cultural life. This was thanks to the high-level visits and discussions which 'have promoted the co-operation and traditional friendship between these two kindred people'. In recent years 'many important results have been reached in bringing the two kindred peoples closer to each other'. Getting to know the other's traditions and present status, and the new scientific contacts represented the progress of the relations.

The image of the visit of President Losonczi was that it was largely a visit of friendship and it offered a forum to declare how the relations were unproblematic and advanced positively. The Finnish and Hungarian interests were considered to be common from the viewpoint of history and the present-day international position and role. It was also expressed how the policy of the other part was appreciated: Finland 'appreciated the endeavours of the Hungarian government to maintain good relations with their neighbours and to develop their co-operation with all nations contributing to international peace and security'. Hungary expressed that the Finnish policy of neutrality served as a basis for efforts aiming at strengthening of international peace and security and at promoting mutual understanding between nations.<sup>50</sup>

The 'kindred' aspect was not as evident as it had been before. It was mainly emphasized in dinner speeches, not in official conversations or in the *communiqué*, and even in the speeches the contemporary aspect and the challenges of the modern age were stressed. Losonczi highlighted the role of the state in developing the relations on the economy, but also the civic society level was appreciated: the friendship relations between Hungarian and Finnish and the Friendship Week<sup>51</sup> were, according to him, new useful ways to co-operate through 'popular diplomacy'. Losonczi saw these relations as the foundation for developing political, economical, technical and cultural relations. As he referred to the different social systems, he also found a uniting factor: the policy in

international questions and the fact that also Finland was advancing the mission of peace. Thus the speech declared 'mutual understanding' both at a popular level and in international politics.<sup>52</sup>

The concept of friendship was central also in the draft of Kekkonen's speech, written by Ambassador Ingman: the good Hungarian-Finnish relations were presented through the idea of 'romantic friendship'. This kind of friendship was usually very difficult to realize in state relations. Friendship was the undercurrent of the relations, and both the state-level relations and civil society contacts were to be built on it. The Hungarian-Finnish relations had originally been created by personal friendships and the studies on the origins of kindred nations and their languages in the nineteenth century. The hobby of closed circles had now become an object of interest for masses. This was due not only to the situation in Hungary, but also to the feeling of friendship. The Finnish interpretation of 'popular diplomacy' and the role of the state were put in a way that the initiatives of the civic society and the official arrangements together apparently guaranteed best results.

Kekkonen also referred to the economic problems with the idea of understanding: 'It has sometimes been jokingly said about the trade between Finland and Hungary that both parties are equally dissatisfied with its development'. Thus also trade was linked to the idea of friendship: getting actively acquainted with the other would help in removing obstacles. Simultaneously the development of the economy was linked to the idea of being members of the international community and having an important mission in it. Both countries had been pawns in Great Power policy game – even this had helped to understand each other. Thus Finland and Hungary had been on the same side in the past and so they were in the present.<sup>53</sup>

The Finnish newspapers did not cause any reason for uneasiness to Kekkonen this time. They described the relations between the two countries mainly with the same discourse as the speeches mentioned above and thus also romanticized Hungarian-Finnish relations more than the reports of the 'inner circles' in diplomacy.<sup>54</sup> This consensus was transmitted in Kekkonen's words, cited also by the leading conservative

paper, *Uusi Suomi*, according to which 'despite their different social systems, Finland and Hungary have created consolidated forms for mutual communication'. Thus both countries had advanced 'the developing tendency of European policy which aims at creating more mutual contacts between countries with different social systems'. The paper estimated that Hungary aimed at becoming an interpreter for East European countries in East-West questions, like the Berlin Treaty.<sup>55</sup> The Hungarian role in the preparation of the European Security Meeting was thus made public in Finland already during Losonczy's visit.<sup>56</sup>

Soon afterwards the official discussions between the Finns and the Hungarians were started, and yet again the high policy of visits and agreements was evident. The need for co-operation in issues of technology, science and economy was once more put forward, and it was agreed that the number of meetings of the officials of the Finnish and Hungarian Foreign Ministries was to be increased on a regular basis. Hungary suggested more ministerial level visits and proposed that the Finns would get acquainted with the Hungarian-Austrian co-operation, about which the Hungarians had given a memorandum to the Finns in spring 1971 and which could be used as a basis for advancing the Hungarian-Finnish co-operation.<sup>57</sup> The Finnish connection was, seen from the Hungarian point of view, most useful in the same context as the Austrian: an avenue to Western technology and economy through a neutral and thus 'easy' country.

The image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations was more rhetorically defined in a speech given by János Péter on 13 December 1972 in the Hungarian Parliament. According to him, the tradition and kinship laid the foundation for present-day relations. He thanked 'the well-deliberated stand and suggestions of the Finnish political leaders which had advanced the mutual understanding'. The relations with Finland had got 'impulses from traditional kinship relations, and they can be pursued in the prevailing international conditions in a manner which is useful to both countries'.<sup>58</sup>

## 6 Evaluating Hungary in 1973 – Kádár in Finland

The formal head of state of Hungary was followed to Finland by the strong man two years later. When János Kádár visited Finland in 25 – 28 September 1973, the leading Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* noted that this was the first time Kádár visited a capitalist country and that he was received like a head of state even though he was not the President of his country. This was not really a critical remark since – to make a comparison – the paper mentioned that also other East European party leaders had been received similarly in France and the United States.<sup>59</sup>

Once again the initiative for the visit had come from the Hungarian side. Frigyes Puja, when visiting Helsinki in the matters of the European Security Meeting, had invited Kekkonen to Hungary. However, Kekkonen interpreted the conversation with Puja to the effect that it was in fact more important that he invited Kádár to Finland. This he had done even before, but Kádár had wanted a confirmation of the suitable time.<sup>60</sup> Puja explained to Kekkonen that Hungary wanted to develop the mutual relations also in future and answered that Kádár would gladly accept the invitation.<sup>61</sup> In Hungary it was decided that the visit would be an official one and take place according to the personal invitation by Kekkonen. It was also considered important that Kádár would also meet the leadership of the Finnish Communist Party. That the political culture of Hungary was dominated by the HSWP was evident also from the fact that during the visits one made such contacts with the brother parties as well as with the government.<sup>62</sup>

Before the visit, Ambassador Paul Jyrkänkallio delineated the Hungarian political line: in foreign policy it followed the Soviet line and lacked 'any distinctive features worth mentioning'. Unlike Rumania, Hungary followed the Soviet line without reservations in order to be able to loosen the strains in domestic policy and pursue such economic policy which could 'increase the welfare and comfort of the private citizen'. According to Jyrkänkallio, it was only the more Western way to express things which might give cause to think that Hungary would have any independent views of foreign policy. The

official line on European détente was identical with other socialist countries.<sup>63</sup>

In domestic policy a more individual policy was followed: Jyrkänkallio stated that Hungary strove to create – without keeping noise about it and without articulating the final goal because of past experiences – a socialist society with a human face. Hungary tried to take into account also of the wishes of the new generation and to create a viable environment in which the people could feel at home and would not risk rising against socialist society. There was some flexibility, but if someone was about to overstep permissible borders he/she would get a swift, although ‘not lethal’ reminder. The Hungarian leadership had ‘the reins tightly in its hands’. Kádár’s personal attitude was still decisive, although there had been changes which had increased freedom in the society. The Hungarians still saw Kádár as fighting against both revisionism and dogmatism: ‘the one who is not against us is with us’. However, the main principle was that the leading positions in the society belonged to party members. Also the cultural policy followed this line. Seen from the Finnish viewpoint and in the light of the information received by the embassy, it seemed that nowhere else in the socialist bloc the intellectual life was so free. It seemed that Kádár was popular and that positive development was connected to his person.<sup>64</sup>

Jyrkänkallio found the relations between the neutral Austria and Hungary interesting; in trade these relations had developed better than the Hungarian-Finnish ones, and they were warm despite the memories of the Dual Monarchy. Austria was a rival for Finland as a close trading partner with Hungary. In this Jyrkänkallio saw similarities with Finnish-Swedish sense of belonging together and compared the football matches between Hungary and Austria to the athletic competitions between Finland and Sweden. He also emphasized how important good Western relations were for Hungary because the country was very dependent on foreign trade. The share of the Western industrialized countries of Hungarian trade was increasing.<sup>65</sup> In comparison, the Hungarian-Finnish trade was really modest and the 1969 agreement on economy, technology

and science had not created much concrete co-operation although the delegations and direct contacts in culture and economy were a sign of the 'consolidation and the vitality of the relations'.<sup>66</sup>

### **7 Policy of Understanding**

The theme of friendship was outwardly as central as ever during Kádár's visit but also the political lines were now dealt with more precision than during Losonczi's visit. The main point was that differences of opinion did not affect friendship and understanding of the two countries. Both Kekkonen and Kádár emphasized in their conversations their mutual interests and the similar roles in the international arena.

For example, considering the Finnish policy, there were differences but also a mutual understanding as both sides had an opportunity to make their own interpretations of it. Both defined the Finnish policy in principle in the same way, but Kádár's 'acceptance' of Finnish neutrality meant essentially a soviet interpretation of neutrality. Kádár explained that the Finnish policy was also in the Hungarian interest, even though the countries disagreed especially on the question of the relations with the EEC. Kádár defined the Finnish policy as a 'policy of positive neutrality' and thanked Finland for taking the initiative for the CSCE and on the German question. He remarked that the Finnish policy had sometimes gone against the West but that it had been the right policy. He was also thankful for Finland's correct attitude towards Hungary in 1956. And later Kádár emphasized: 'Differences of opinion may not endanger mutual co-operation and friendship'. It is hardly surprising that he drew a parallel between Finland and Hungary in the international field: both were small countries which had their roles to play in international policy but the mutual relations of which were also of importance. The countries operated in the same field and had similar interests although 'the friends also had different opinions'. Also Kekkonen pointed out that 'connecting ties are much more important and numerous than the differences of opinion'.<sup>67</sup> In his speech during the festive lunch Kádár yet again defined the

Finnish policy as a 'policy of positive neutrality'. Thus Finland and Hungary did not use peaceful co-existence only to their own benefit but were able to advance it also internationally. They had similar interests because of the CSCE and a similar role in international policy. These opinions were also conveyed to the Finnish public.<sup>68</sup>

It is remarkable to realize that Hungary accepted the Finnish policy of neutrality in these years without conditions although the Soviet Union did not.<sup>69</sup> According to the *communiqué* of the visit, the Hungarian party confirmed again that the Hungarian government appreciated the Finnish policy of neutrality which aimed at strengthening international peace and security especially in Europe. Finland, for its part, expressed its appreciation of the determined effort of the Hungarian government to maintain good relations with all European countries and the Hungarian contribution to increasing international peace and security. The *communiqué* described the mutual relations as versatile relations of friendship of which Kádár's visit was proof.<sup>70</sup> So it can be said that Finland and Hungary in a way guaranteed each other and accepted the other party's definitions of itself. The image of the mutual relations was thus a kind of mirror of mutual understanding.

The ideal of this understanding can be questioned and one can speculate on it further. The Finnish policy of neutrality may well have been accepted in another sense than Finland itself did. The Hungarian leadership had a tendency to bring the countries verbally nearer by putting Finland into the same 'camp of peace' in which Hungary itself was. Accordingly, Hungary expressed its liberal attitude towards the co-operation with Western countries. Naturally, the Hungarian foreign policy was dependent on membership in the Eastern bloc but simultaneously Hungary defined itself also as an active party. It was possible to achieve understanding with the other party in a context which one oneself defined: the actual meaning of the understanding was somewhat different from the articulated one. Additionally, it can be speculated that the more Hungary 'westernized' its political image and the more Finland paid

attention to Eastern policy, the easier it was for the countries to adapt to each other and align with each other's political line.

The interpretation of the CSCE by Hungary and its criticism of the process itself<sup>71</sup> were not prominent in Hungarian-Finnish talks, economic relations and trade prevailed. It is easy to see that Kádár wanted to concentrate especially on these issues. He wanted information especially on Finnish-Comecon relations. The cultural relations were 'excellent and flourishing', the economic ones were lagging behind. Thus economy was the sector of friendship which needed improving. To begin with, Kádár described the Hungarian motives by defending Socialism which was, in his view, becoming more democratic – basically in the same way Ambassador Jyrkänkallio had described it. It stressed Hungary's 'Western' features: freedom of culture, contacts with the outside world through tourism etc. Thus Kádár was emphasizing how Hungary was becoming a more open society. Also the economic relations with the West were improving – especially with Austria but Kádár pointed out also the co-operation with France and Germany and added: 'We do not have any prejudices in these matters'. He suggested that despite the 'free economy' in Finland the Finnish government might encourage the Finnish economy in a direction beneficial to Hungary. The message was that Hungary was very liberal and tolerant in its Western relations.<sup>72</sup> Presumably Kádár was not seeking political acceptance of 'Kádárisim' as such but ways to strengthen it with economic ties with Finland. And as during Losonczi's visit, the Hungarians wanted to advance direct contacts with state support whereas the Finns saw direct contacts as such as a positive development.

Finnish publicity was left with the understanding that Kekkonen appreciated the Hungarian role in the CSCE and that both countries had the same viewpoint on this issue.<sup>73</sup> The public image rested again on official speeches and the image and history of the relations were represented in and for the media as a narrative; from the kindred interests of the scholars to present-day state relations. Also Kádár had paid respect to the past while talking about the present-day challenges, i.e. the



relatives and friends were developing tradition-bound relations in a modern context.<sup>74</sup> Kekkonen, on the other hand, had emphasized the process of building the friendship during 15 years: this had demanded work and was now bearing fruit. The speech also contained the same arguments of traditional relations as stepping stones to present-day needs and was published as a shortened version in the *Helsingin Sanomat*. However, Kekkonen talked about kinship and tradition more than Kádár had done and expected that even more could be built on the traditional foundation. The tradition thus surpassed, for example, the ideological differences – the Finns wanted to be bridge-builders to countries which represented another social system.<sup>75</sup>

Bridge-builders role was reserved for Finland also in the Hungarian foreign political discourse in the report which FM Frigyes Puja presented to the Hungarian Parliament in April 25, 1974. Equally illustrative is his article in *The New Hungarian Quarterly*. On these two occasions he defined the Hungarian motives towards the non-socialist countries; they were 'on a correct foundation brought about by mutual interests'. Puja stated that 'taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the easing of international tension, we aim to utilize negotiations and strengthen co-operation which is beneficial to both parties, and to strengthen the ties between our states'. According to Puja, it was a success that Hungary had signed treaties with 'almost every highly developed country'. In this connection, Puja mentioned especially Finland; the Hungarian-Finnish relations were 'in many respects a good example'. They showed how countries which had different social systems could maintain intensive, high-level contacts. Puja followed the state visit rhetoric: tradition and present needs. Besides, Finland had the same view on issues like European peace and security. According to Puja, Kádár's visit had played a major role in the development of the relations. It can be said that the 'visits' were an argument with which it was possible to point out the success and development of the relations.

Puja also compared the relations with Finland to the ones with Austria. His conception of traditional friendship and contemporary scientific and economic goals suited both cases. In the Finnish case, the idea of tradition meant kinship, in the Austrian case the friendship was based on sports and culture and on being neighbours.

Also the Finns paid attention to Puja's interpretation of the Finnish neutrality. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio maintained that it was essential that Puja had talked about the concept of neutrality in his article and had mentioned two neutral countries, Finland and Austria, with which Hungary had 'especially cordial relations' – which was shown as an example of peaceful co-existence. Even so, the word neutrality did not necessarily mean the same in both cases since Austria was referred to both in the speech and the article as 'neutral Austria', and there was no corresponding definition of Finland's policy in the parliamentary speech at all.<sup>76</sup>

In November 1973 Puja had repeated the image of Finnish neutrality and Hungary's wish to peaceful existence in his talks with the Finnish State Secretary Richard Tötterman. He had stressed that this meant that Hungary had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. It wanted to respect sovereignty and self-determination. The Hungarian-Soviet relations were principal and regulated the Hungarian policy. The message seems to have been that Hungary was following the Soviet line and did not want to be active itself in world policy. Tötterman, in his turn, described the Finnish policy as a policy of peaceful co-existence which served Finnish national interests and also benefited the international community. When he discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy, the topic of visits surfaced again. Now Hungary wanted to increase the amount of the ministerial contacts. Both Puja and Nagy argued against the EEC and the Finnish contacts with it and maintained that they were detrimental to Hungarian-Finnish economical relations which were not as developed as the political and cultural ones. Puja couched the 'disadvantage' of the EEC also in more political terms: the EEC was anti-Soviet

and forestalled the progress towards the CSCE. Political integration would have a negative effect on Hungary. Tötterman stressed, however, that Finland carried trade with both socialist and non-socialist countries, and repeated the old Finnish dogma of direct contacts advancing cultural relations.<sup>77</sup> Yet politically the EEC had become an issue which did not fit in with the normal friendship rhetoric in which both parties had allowed the other to interpret the content of the definitions. Even so, the Hungarian publicity defined Finland as a friendly country towards Hungary in the beginning of 1976. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP, Gynes, explained in *Népszabadság* that according to the principles of peaceful co-existence, Hungary strived for mutually beneficial relations with the neighbouring Austria and the friendly Finland, and also with the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy. Relations to economically developed capitalist countries – also to the United States – belonged to this policy.<sup>78</sup>

In view of this, the Finnish Embassy had interpreted in 1975 that as far as the visits were concerned, Finland and Austria had distinguished themselves as a group of their own. Puja had even commented to the Austrians on Hungary's Western relations that Hungary cultivated especially warm relations not only with Austria and Italy, but also with Finland 'which was not due to the common origins of the Finns and Hungarians'.<sup>79</sup> The existence of the good relations was explained rather by contemporary conditions, by the 'new tradition' of the relations than by the 'old tradition'. It consisted of such factors political like-mindedness, history of the relations and common visions concerning the future.

### **8 Hungarian Policy Towards the Visit in 1976**

The central role of the visits as a means of taking care of the foreign relations in the Hungarian political culture became once more evident in 1976 as a meeting of the heads of the states was arranged. When Ambassador Tivadar Matusek visited the Finnish Foreign Ministry and officially invited Kekkonen to visit Hungary, he reminded them that one such invitation had

already been forwarded in 1971.<sup>80</sup> Also the Hungarian PM, Jenő Fock, called Kekkonen and renewed the invitations by Losonczi and Kádár; he added that he had unofficially heard that Kekkonen might accept the invitation.<sup>81</sup> Kekkonen responded positively by declaring his readiness to a 3–5 day visit in November – five days would be possible if the program would include, for example, hunting.<sup>82</sup> The Finns hoped that the program would be sufficiently light.<sup>83</sup> According to Ambassador Jyrkänkallio the Hungarians understood that the program should not be too strenuous and that there would be possibilities to rest, even though this wish was considered difficult to fulfill.<sup>84</sup>

Also the differences in mentality and practical work sometimes seemed difficult in the Finnish eyes. To quote Jyrkänkallio's confidential letter to a Finnish colleague: 'I have been told – and I indeed do know that myself – that the Hungarians always start to act only at the last minute and then they improvise a lot. And in most cases everything then goes smoothly. But our preparations are endangered by their slackness – that is worse.'<sup>85</sup> The practical details of the visit were meaningful as symbols and expressions of the relations between the two states: simultaneously the Finns felt the needs to comply with the hosts and express their own opinions. Different customs clashed when the language of the invitation cards was chosen and also in choosing suits, meals and decorations.<sup>86</sup> So did the different ways to act in politics and diplomacy, for example, Ambassador Matusek's wish to have a say in the choice of the Finnish participants in the talks was not well received in the Finnish Foreign Ministry since it did not fit the Finnish political culture.<sup>87</sup>

Kekkonen's visit took place in 17<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> November, 1976 and was publicly characterized as a friendship visit. Kádár was acting as the host. Compared to Kekkonen's visits in the previous decade when, for example, meetings with Kádár had been slightly 'back-stage', the state level and official features were now clearly visible. As the relations were now more stabilized and the meetings of the heads of states did not create

any sensations, substance become more important than sheer symbolism of the meetings. Kekkonen's visit in 1976 seems to have followed the pattern of state visits.<sup>88</sup>

In 1976, it seems to have been important for the Finns that the Hungarians would understand correctly the international status of both Finland and of the Hungarian-Finnish relations. For Hungary, on the other hand, the main point seems to have been the image of Kádár's Hungary and the disappearance of the memory of 1956. As the Hungarian preparatory papers pointed out, the visit would take place at a time when 20 years had elapsed since the 1956 'counter-revolution' and henceforth an international propaganda campaign was to be expected from the West. Therefore the demonstrative value of Kekkonen's visit became more important. It was suggested to the Central Committee of the HSWP that the reception Kekkonen would receive in Hungary would show the Hungarian 'respect towards one of the most remarkable statesmen of the time'. The memorandum described Kekkonen as a statesman who had advanced peace, security and friendship between nations. Kekkonen had also created good, friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The Finnish relations were a practical example of peaceful coexistence between countries which had different social systems. These characterizations were very much the same in 1971. Also the development of present Hungarian-Finnish relations – which had international importance – was seen as Kekkonen's personal merit.

It was also suggested that it would be useful to declare that Hungary approved the Finnish policy concerning the security interests of the neutral countries. Hungary approved the Finnish concept of neutrality and Hungary would express its positive attitude towards Finnish foreign policy in the Hungarian-Finnish negotiations. Hungary would also show its appreciation towards neutral countries in general – which perhaps implies an effort to make them Hungary's friends. The memorandum used traditional rhetoric: it should have been made clear during the visit that Hungary believed that the neutral countries advanced more and

more readily peace, security, arms reductions and friendship between nations. The Hungarians expected the Finns to demonstrate their policy of neutrality and their international activity with this visit, especially as the visits to the Soviet Union and the United States were approaching. It was also expected that Kekkonen would be willing to negotiate about questions of economy and trade and thus to advance the Hungarian-Finnish relations even further. The political questions were without problems, and it was expected that the CSCE would be the basis for negotiations for the Finns (the conference had finally taken place in 1975 in Helsinki). It was also expected that the Hungarian and Finnish policy in international questions would be the same, and Hungary would seek co-operation with Finland in this. The goal was to 'act' in common with Finland for the next conference which was to take place in Belgrade. So it was hoped that in addition to the normal references to the mutual friendly relations and traditions also principles of co-operation and the Final Act of the CSCE would be mentioned in the *communiqué*.

It is hardly surprising that yet again it was mentioned that the economic relations would have to be raised to the same level as the cultural ones. But even the wishes concerning the cultural and scientific relations were now more extensive and detailed: it was hoped for more and faster progress in co-operation in natural and social sciences. The present goal was to realize the working plan for cultural co-operation for the years 1976–77: a common television series, co-operation in translations and a general widening of the field of co-operation. The Finnish-Hungarian Society was expected to have an important role in this.<sup>89</sup> Some issues might be delicate from the Hungarian point of view: purchasing of the real estates of the Finnish Embassy by the Finns, foundation of the Hungarian-Finnish Society (the Hungarians had only one friendship society, namely with the Soviet Union) and the joint film project *Fenyő és gránit* (Fir-tree and granite).<sup>90</sup> The Hungarian expectations were not necessarily dramatically far-reaching but nevertheless relatively high.

### **9 Good Relations and Successful Policy with Exceptions**

The Finnish delegation in 1976 was mainly the traditional one, and during the visit Hungarian initiatives did not cause particular surprises. However, the lack of a partner to Finnish-Hungarian Society was a slight because the Finns of the FHS were receiving, organizing and arranging exhibitions and other cultural visits far more often than the Hungarians.<sup>91</sup> In 1974 the Finns had tried to found a Kalevala-club under the auspices of the Patriotic People's Front but in the last moment the meetings had been forbidden. The Embassy had tried to support the local people who were interested in Finland and Finnish culture by presenting them samples of Finnish literature. According to Jyrkänkallio, it was not sure whether the difficulties were caused by local authorities who 'still lived in the Rákosi times', or by higher authorities. However, the system of friendship towns compensated for the lack of a friendly society to some extent. But even here there were difficulties: PM Fock had informed without giving any reason PM Kallevi Sorsa already in 1974 that there would be no new friendship towns from Hungary. Ambassador Jyrkänkallio considered all this confusing but it was probably not something directed against Finland, rather it was a consequence of the separation of the ideological worlds; '... even though there are so many warm friends of Finland in Hungary, Finland still represents the world against which an ideological battle is fought'. There had been clear limits for Hungarian-Finnish contacts although Jyrkänkallio admitted that it was possible to do much more even within these boundaries. It was mainly a question of resources and personnel.

Cultural relations had anyhow been stabilized but there was still ground for widening and improving them. The problem was that the Hungarian 'free cultural life' could not be separated from the society and party. According to Jyrkänkallio, free cultural exchange in a socialist system simply was not possible. A centralized government kept control. However, Jyrkänkallio criticized also the Finnish policy and dared to write that contrary to official courtesies in Presidential

speeches, citizens of the two nations actually knew only little of each other. As he put it: 'The image of Finland is quite dim to the Hungarians, even to the educated ones'. This was due to the fact that the Finns still concentrated on exhibiting the traditional culture, although the urban public of Budapest might be more interested in more contemporary themes which would have changed the image of the old-fashioned Finland. Hungary always exhibited the modern Hungary and 'its achievements'. To quote Jyrkänkallio:<sup>92</sup>

The achievements of the semi-unknown kindred people, for example, the modern schools and library buildings or the masterpieces of the great Finnish Jugend-period or the exhibition of the excellently organized Finnish health care, would improve the image of a poorly developed country and nation which Hungary still seems to have of the Finns. The image has hardly been improved by films of the dreary life of a smallholder wife or the lethal bullets etc., which were offered to the public of Budapest during the culture week in May 1973. A large flock of the audience made their exit midway from these occasions of Finnish exhibitionism.

In other words, the cultural differences between the urban Hungary and the 'natural' Finland as well as the concepts of civil society activity and organizing collided. Jyrkänkallio's wish to modernize the Finnish image is a sort of equivalent to the emphasis on modernity in political speeches. Since it seemed important to the Hungarians to exhibit the modern Hungary of Kádár, Finland should follow the example. It seems that Jyrkänkallio's recommendations indeed did affect the later Finnish policy in cultural relations.

Despite practical difficulties, even the Finns estimated that the Hungarian-Finnish relations were unproblematic. The survey of the Finnish Embassy considered that the crucial year had been 1959 when the cultural agreement had been renewed. In those days Hungary had been in difficulties and isolated. The Finnish action had been 'exceptional and demonstrative' since Finland had concluded very few cultural treaties, until 1959 none. After 1959, Hungary had begun to establish ties with the rest of the world, and Kekkonen's unofficial visit in 1963 helped the process considerably.



Now that the relations between it and Finland were good, it was difficult to remember the problematic days. Finland and Austria were mentioned after the socialist countries 'always first and in a cordial tone'. The socialist countries measured their political relations with high-level visits and agreements, and seen even in this light Finland was a country that had drawn the attention of Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s. Kekkonen's state visit had been – according to the Embassy which hardly could belittle the event – 'exceptionally festive and visible'. Also the Finnish Ministers put Budapest first in their visit lists, a fact the Finnish newspapers did not fail to notice. Exchange of visits had been extensive and several invitations were still valid. The net of treaties and agreements between the countries was extensive and created possibilities for wide co-operation. In addition to the Finnish Communist Party, also the Social Democratic Party, led by Sorsa, had contacts with the HSWP.

Jyrkänkallio acknowledged the difficulties in trade and explained them by the fact that as industrialized countries Finland and Hungary were unknown to each other. Both had traditional import countries of their own, especially the FRG, and the neighbouring countries were the most important trading partners. The geographical factors also had created prejudices and practical obstacles on both sides. Normal trade would not take things much further, and consequently the countries should look for possibilities in scientific and industrial co-operation. However, Jyrkänkallio was not very optimistic about that either. It had been extremely difficult to reach agreements. In this sector, Finland was not the first option for Hungary; not only Germans and Austrians, but also the Swedes and the Swiss outdid the Finns.<sup>93</sup>

The deciding factors had not changed. As the embassy estimated, the definition which FM Puja had given in the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary on Hungarian foreign policy, was still valid. Hungary stood by the Soviet Union in foreign policy. Its goal was to create favourable circumstances to build Socialism, unity of the socialist countries and solidarity with those people who were advancing the same goals in capitalist

countries. Furthermore, Hungary wanted to support the developing countries and the national liberation movements, and to advance peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems. In the last context, Finland, Austria and lately also Italy were the first ones to be mentioned. In relations with the non-socialist countries, commercial interests were the essential ones. Hungary's line towards the EEC and the EFTA was decided by the Soviet Union, and also the policy towards the CSCE was identical with the other socialist countries. It was even possible that Hungary had been given a mission to be active in this, because it enjoyed a better reputation in the West than some other socialist countries. There were also reasons connected with foreign trade for this activism.<sup>94</sup>

As far as the Hungarian domestic scene was concerned, Jyrkänkallio maintained that the situation was stable, as it had been moulded after 1956. The Hungarian rhetoric had treated Kekkonen as the supporting pillar of the relations and also of Finland, and likewise the Finns saw Kádár as the man behind the developments in Hungary. The stability was seen as Kádár's, 'the great statesman's', and the people's merit. According to Jyrkänkallio, the Hungarians had 'wisely' decided to tolerate even dissidents in certain limits, even though a common belief in Socialism of the whole people was the goal. The question of ideology created some breaches in the society. Jyrkänkallio recalled that there were many signs in Hungary which indicated that there was some sort of disciplinary action going on in order to make the people immune to Western influence. Even in culture ideology was now emphasized. However, it was hard for the outsider to see beneath the surface of the lively cultural life. The most visible problems in the society concerned the differences between interest groups. An outside observer could detect increasing differences in wealth, although Jyrkänkallio considered that they meant only normal conflicts in a stable society.<sup>95</sup>

The overall picture of the mutual relations and the Hungarian society were thus favourably evaluated by Finnish diplomacy. To a keen eye, the image of the relations was more

than understanding: it meant that two different cultures were adapting to each other.

### **10 Discussing the Relations and the Policy Line**

To explain neutrality and to explain kádárism are parallel: it was just these topics that Kekkonen and Kádár wanted to clarify. In spite of 'windy' domestic policy and conflicts, Kekkonen defined the Finnish policy as if consensus had prevailed in Finnish foreign policy: it had risen above domestic conflicts in the beginning of the 1960s. Kekkonen suggested that Finland and Hungary should co-operate in Belgrade, because 'our interests are strikingly similar'. Kekkonen wanted to see the guidelines of the Finnish foreign policy in international context: the definition of Finnish policy was not the main question but the fact that Finland aimed at having friendly relations with the Soviet Union and every other country. To quote Kekkonen:<sup>96</sup>

By pursuing the policy of neutrality and by defining our own policy as a policy of neutrality we can create a lot of contacts in various directions as bridge-builders, and also the CSCE is based on such activity. The content of foreign policy was not endangered and will not change, be the title of it what it may. Our position demands that we have mutual confidence with the Soviet Union which is very important to the will to act for world peace I just mentioned.

While Kekkonen was explaining Finnish foreign policy Kádár concentrated more on Hungarian domestic conditions. On foreign policy he gave very much the same picture Jyrkänkallio had given; on domestic policy he naturally had to play down the problems and present the Hungarian model as a success. According to Kádár, Hungary was a non-homogenous state in which a single party held the power but also other voices were tolerated and there existed different classes, albeit not capitalists. The main principle in domestic policy was to follow common policy between various classes, the religious circles included. The main program was to build a socialist society and to develop socialist democratic direction so that still wider masses would participate in the decision-making. Referring to the year 1956 he expressed the hope that the Finns

would trust that there was at present a socially balanced situation in Hungary.

Kádár also dealt with travel and tourism in the political context reminding that after 1956 the West had boycotted Hungary. However, Hungary had started to pursue a more open policy in travel, and tourism had indeed increased. 'In view of Hungary's relations with the West', Kádár remarked, 'this policy has proved to be the right one'. He admitted that travel had been economically beneficial. Also the Western attitude towards Hungary had changed.

It is evident that the year 1956 was reflected in the way Kádár presented the Hungarian conditions and political line; he wanted to explain the Western image on Hungary, still influenced by the uprising. He also reminded Kekkonen that the Hungarian leadership takes care of the people who had suffered and did not want them suffer still more – and the people appreciated and supported this. According to Kádár in November 1976, the Hungarian policy was based on the principle that 'you will not give cause for joy to the enemy and you will not let friends down'. Kádár commented also on the international reputation of Finland and stated that, 'as everyone knew', Finland was a neutral country but Hungary belonged to the Warsaw Pact and was a People's Republic. Hungary aimed at having beneficial relations with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the Third World countries, but also with the Western countries. The relations with Austria had improved, and there were good trade relations with West Germany. According to the consolidated rhetoric, Kádár praised the Hungarian-Finnish relations and Kekkonen's role in the CSCE and repeated the Hungarian line of how the relations were to be continued by high-level meetings. As always, he also advocated the state-controlled direct contacts between enterprises and assured that the foreign companies had good possibilities to function independently in Hungary. This – although controlled and encouraged by the state – was largely in congruence with the Finnish aspirations.<sup>97</sup> The emphases of Kádár and Kekkonen were not naturally quite identical, but understanding was reached by letting both parties interpret the idea in their own way.

The same formula to reach understanding can also be found in the talks on neutrality which were stressed in the *communiqué* negotiations. The *communiqué* is especially noted for its being the official public image of the 1976 meeting – at the very least to the historian it is the best documented part of the visit. These talks are also the most notable proof that politics defined the image of the relations more strongly than the idea of kinship. Kádár demanded that the *communiqué* should be formulated in a way that ‘even an outsider would [...] get the idea that there are extensive relations between our countries’.<sup>98</sup>

The preparatory negotiations for the visit proved to be quite difficult. When a Hungarian delegation of preparing officials visited Finland in 27<sup>th</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup> October, 1976, it could be seen that the drafts contained same elements but their order and some details differed from each other. Hungary, for example, wanted to describe the cultural relations much more widely.<sup>99</sup> But the most difficult part was to find a suitable definition to Finnish foreign policy since the Hungarians would have liked to define the foreign policy of both countries in a later passage of the *communiqué* than Finland. Seen from the Finnish viewpoint this suggestion was ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘misleading’. Furthermore, the Hungarians suggested that the Finnish line should be connected with the CSCE. The Finnish Foreign Ministry, however, interpreted that this would give an erroneous picture of the basic Finnish attitude.

The Finns assumed that the Hungarians aimed at a ‘political action’ in order to avoid a situation in which the Finnish policy of neutrality would be emphasized in the joint *communiqué*. The Finns, on the other hand, wanted to stress peaceful coexistence and the CSCE as such. Besides, the negotiations revealed basic differences in political culture, especially in concepts of state control. The Finns felt no need to include detailed chapters on various forms of co-operation in the *communiqué*; this should, after all, be mainly a high-level communication. Difference of concepts can also be seen in the fact that Kádár had also put travel in a political context and connected it with the goals of the Hungarian state. The Finns, however, did not regard travel

as belonging to immediate state control. Thus it did not require a specific chapter in the *communiqué* either.<sup>100</sup>

The first Finnish suggestion emphasized the image of neutrality and aimed at getting Hungarian recognition of it. Finland also expressed its support for 'Hungary's successful policy of peace'. The relations between Finland and Hungary were a concrete example of peaceful co-existence between two countries with different social systems. The Final Act of the CSCE formed the basis for the relations and for other international activity. The Hungarian suggestion, for its part, defined both countries as pursuing international peace and security. They would influence together the *détente*. The references to the Conference and to the peaceful co-existence were mainly the same as in the Finnish suggestion.<sup>101</sup>

Nevertheless, in the *communiqué* it was pointed out with satisfaction that 'the traditionally good, friendly relations and the multilateral co-operation between Finland and Hungary were developing in all fields and equally served the interests of two countries and peoples as well as the cause of international peace and security. The parties reaffirmed that they both would develop their bilateral relations and international activities in full accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of CSCE in Europe.' In this context it was deemed appropriate to refer to the ideal of peaceful co-existence. The relations between the two states were a good example for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In the context of the CSCE Kádár and Losonczi 'appreciated the peace-loving, active policy of neutrality of Finland as well as the valuable contribution of the government of Finland and President Kekkonen personally to the stabilization of international peace and *détente* and to the cause of security and co-operation in Europe'. It was pointedly added that: 'President Kekkonen has expressed his high esteem towards the effective peace policy of Hungary.'<sup>102</sup>

Thus the political publicity was sent a message of how the parties had given their approval to each other's policies: policy of peace was the link – although more loosely in the *communiqué* than in the speeches.

### 11 Speeches and Public Statements of Up-To-Date

The same problems and differences as in the *communiqué* negotiations and the talks can be found also in the speeches given during the visit. Mainly: What did Finnish neutrality imply? In what context should it be expressed and whose interests did it represent?

In the speeches of Kekkonen and Kádár tradition and the present day were connected. According to Kekkonen's and Kádár's rhetoric, the tradition was not only a story, it was genuine reality and it had created the basis for modern friendship. Especially the draft of Kekkonen's speech linked Kekkonen's personality strongly to Hungarian-Finnish relations: he had been to Hungary already as a young student and visited the country already as a head of the state. His relations with Hungary thus had historical perspective which obviously increased the value of the relations. Not only tradition but also modern Hungary was central; Kekkonen had arrived to see progress in Hungary – which was actually the same rhetoric as in 1969. Thus he had not become solely one to live up his memories – the present day was more important. But simultaneously he paid homage to the tradition of the visits and to their role in cultivating the relations between the two countries. The modern tradition of the new relations proved the stability of the relations. Even this could be expressed positively as a part of modernity and the liveliness and versatility of the relations. Kekkonen expressed his appreciation towards the progress and building process in the Hungary of Kádár – his approval of Kádár's policy.

It might have been on the Embassy's advice that Kekkonen's supper speech was drafted so that one should distance oneself from the old, 'wrong' Finland-image painted by folklore-clichés. The friendship was presented as 'more correct' and more up-to-date than the old images; both parties wanted to leave the romantic and ethnological 'shepherd in the folk costume' -image behind and replace it with an image of an interesting modern partner. The Hungarian-Finnish friendship was supposed to be unique in the world, and this lay the foundation for the relations. The speech did not make an issue

of the problems in trade either; these did not harm the complete image of friendship. According to the speech, there were economical, political and educational reasons for paying special attention to the 'multilateral and balanced' development of the co-operation. Part of the message was that the Hungarian and Finnish peoples had given their support to the chosen policy and to the Hungarian-Finnish relations; thus the civil society level was connected to the interests of the state leadership – as a sort of Finnish counterpart of the role the Hungarians had wanted for the government. The micro and macro levels were thus intertwined. In this context, Finland and Hungary actively took part in international life and the co-operation between nations. This could not be done without bilateral relations; the countries could not live isolated, they could live only relation to the others. This meant that Finland and Hungary were a part of the international politics and active agents within it.<sup>103</sup>

Kádár's speech emphasized broad political lines and especially the CSCE; these were issues on which Finland and Hungary agreed. The fact that he also stressed the importance of Kekkonen's visit and state visits as such was also in congruence with the traditional Hungarian line. According to Kádár, Hungary followed the policy of peaceful co-existence; the supporters of peace aimed at defeating the obstacles built by reactionary forces. Kádár once again placed Finland in the camp of the pro-peace nations: Finnish peace-loving foreign policy had proven its vitality. Kádár thus wanted to point out the similar interests and mutual understanding; he placed both countries in the peace-loving camp, but of course, this could be understood in many ways. However, in this sense Finland was a 'brother nation' (*veljeksansa*).<sup>104</sup>

It is evident that Hungary wanted broad and open publicity. The newspaper propaganda was restrained, but one could not avoid the message that Finland and Kekkonen were very much appreciated. The Hungarian newspapers had a task: they had to highlight the importance of the visit and write about Finland, Finnish foreign policy and Kekkonen. Similarly, the Hungarian television was to run a joint Hungarian-Finnish film '*Suomi*'.<sup>105</sup>



President Kekkonen was also interviewed on Hungarian television before the visit.<sup>106</sup>

The Finnish publicity continued with the thematic of friendship by repeating that the relations were unproblematic. Hungary was presented as a socialist country which permitted also the Western culture to have living space: cultural life was controlled from above but in fact both countries were small countries with rare languages and thus had troubles with balancing domestic and external culture. The Finnish press cited the statements of FM Puja who had also maintained that the common policy line with other socialist countries did not limit Hungary's possibilities; on the contrary, it offered more of them.<sup>107</sup> Following Kekkonen's speech the *Helsingin Sanomat* actually transmitted the same image as the state leadership: two small countries operating in the international field, since even a small country could not live in isolation.<sup>108</sup> FM Keijo Korhonen offered basically the identical view in the Hungarian *Népszabadság* in addition to which he also gave a bright picture of the future of the economical relations, the promotion of which needed a political decision. Relations relying on old traditions were good and they were not to be forgotten in the future either.<sup>109</sup>

Thus the public image in the media followed flawlessly the official political discourse. The difference in emphasis between the countries was that Hungary stressed the economic relations, Finland getting to know the modern features of the 'friend'. Thus the argumentations reflected those of each other. The Finnish Ambassador's view that the image of Finland in Hungary was too old-fashioned had also made its way to the official discourse and to the media. One could say that the mission of the visit had been to 'update' the friendship, and this was the also dominant trend later in the 1970s.

### **12 New Aspects in Hungarian Foreign Policy – Lázár in Finland**

Significant interpretations of Finnish foreign policy and of Hungarian policy towards Finland were received as the new Finnish Ambassador in Budapest, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen, was invited to have a discussion with Kádár.

It was not Kádár's habit to receive diplomats from non-socialist countries on other occasions than during the state visits. The Ambassador interpreted this special treatment to be a recognition of the special status Finland had in Hungary's policy. As such nothing essentially new seems to have been said in the discussion: the arguments were based rather on present-day politics, not on the tradition of kinship. According to Kádár, the relations were of special nature, the development of which had largely been decided by Finland's foreign policy and its 'basic line, increasing security and co-operation in Europe'. Naturally Kádár confessed that being linguistic relatives helped but at the end of the day it was of secondary importance. It was Kekkonen's personal contribution which had been essential in building the relations.

If there was any new substance in Kádár's statements, it was the fact that he remarked how Hungary's policy did not consist only of loyalty towards the Soviet Union. According to him, Hungary took care of its own foreign political and economical interests while taking the Soviet co-operation into account. Kádár praised the Finnish foreign policy: Finland had achieved 'a far more important status than the size and specific country of Finland would have merited'. He pointed out that neutral Finland would have a chance to do services to 'strengthening peace and security' also in the future.<sup>110</sup> Behind this rhetoric one can see the political motives of Hungary concerning Finland: co-operation within the CSCE was probably the foremost as a goal.

The Hungarian PM György Lázár had made similar references earlier the same year (15 - 17 June 1977). The Hungarians had wished to have talks on general international questions, the preparations for the Belgrade Conference and economic relations. They also looked towards having an opportunity to meet representatives of Finnish trade and industry.<sup>111</sup> Ambassador Jyrkänkallio had interpreted that replacing Fock with the 'economist' Lázár was a sign that economic questions were essential to Hungary and that the direction of policy was becoming more orthodox marxist – there were also other indications of this trend.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand, the embassy pointed out that Lázár was said to enjoy a good name in the West.<sup>113</sup>

The notion that there were also independent and specific features in Hungarian foreign policy which differed from the general policy socialist bloc was new for the Finns. Especially activity and initiatives concerning the CSCE were new; Hungary had, for example, made initiatives to the Western CSCE-countries for co-operation in order to carry out the Final Act at a bilateral level. According to the Hungarian view, a peaceful Europe would be built together with the progressive elements of Western Europe at the Belgrade meeting. Yrjö-Koskinen estimated that even though the Soviet Union had naturally approved of the Hungarian initiative, first and foremost it served the Hungarian national interests. The interpretations and emphasis of the Final Act were typical and used as political means, for example, in trade disputes. The new direction was due to the détente which had given Hungary as well as the other socialist countries a good opportunity to pursue its own and the bloc interests. Ambitious goal to develop the country and economic contacts with the West were possible to achieve only in the atmosphere of international détente. So the Hungarians wanted the Belgrade Conference to be constructive. The Finnish Embassy also thought that Hungary was better off in human rights issues than most socialist countries and had thus better chances to influence the Western countries in Belgrade.

The survey was largely based on an article by FM Puja, published in the review *Külpolitika* in April 1977. Puja had argued the Hungarian foreign policy line partly in keeping with national traditions and historical ties, as was the case in the relations with Austria, the Western social democrats and the German labour movement – but he had not mentioned Finland in this context. Nevertheless, the embassy still had it that Austria and Finland were always the first ones to be mentioned after the non-socialist countries. With these countries Hungary had ‘really good relations without problems due to reasons easy to understand’. An essential factor in the relations with non-socialist countries was the commercial interests.<sup>114</sup>

The Hungarian line concerning the CSCE and Finland became more concrete when Puja visited Finland in June 1976 and suggested that the decisions of the Final Act would be

carried out in bilateral Hungarian-Finnish relations.<sup>115</sup> The issue was also dealt with in official negotiations in October 1976 before Kekkonen's visit to Hungary. Finland had given a written answer to Budapest in November in which it had not been against the idea in principle but was of the opinion that neither new institutions nor new channels were needed; the existing ones were sufficient. Furthermore, some of the Hungarian suggestions needed to be clarified. The Foreign Ministry emphasized that Hungary had made similar suggestions to various other Western countries and that none of them, perhaps suspecting that Hungary had tactical motives, had been more positive than Finland. Most of them had not given an answer at all. So the Finnish attitude can be characterized as relatively careful. The Political Department of the Foreign Ministry suggested that if the question of developing the relations on the basis of the CSCE came up and if the Hungarian suggestions emerged again, Finland could say that the development had been positive in many different levels since the signing of the CSCE Final Act, and these achievements were compatible with the co-operation and the resources of the countries.<sup>116</sup> This answer was at its best evasive.

### **13 Common Policy Line?**

The image which the Embassies painted of the history of the relations remained largely unchanged; traditional scientific relations and the Kekkonen visit of 1963 were the most important milestones. A new feature was that during Lázár's visit the relations of the Finnish political parties to Hungary had come to the forefront. The economic relations were troublesome as ever because of a lack of traditions, geographical distance and inability to reform. Cultural relations were without problems but the Ambassadors were still worried about the old fashioned image of Finland; the problem was how to offer the 'right' one to the urban Hungarians. The planned exhibitions of Timo Sarpaneva and *Marimekko* in Budapest were seen as a step in the right direction.<sup>117</sup>

Even during Lázár's visit the Hungarians tried to attach a more 'political' meaning to the concept of friendship through the arguments of co-existence, peace and détente. Lázár placed Finland in his toasting speech on the same side as Hungary in international questions – 'the side of peace'. Policy which had achieved 'the positive support of both the Hungarian and Finnish societies' served the national interest of both countries and advanced the causes of friendship between nations and détente. The embassy's draft for the Prime Minister's speech, on the other hand, made a point of the different levels of friendships and visits and the cultural agreements and relations which were presented as internationally significant. And when Hungary emphasized trade policy, the Finns pondered how export might be promoted. Even the international aspect was milder in PM Sorsa's speech: the fact that Finland and Hungary were together in the international politics was put in the context of exchange of information.<sup>118</sup> So yet again the Hungarians wanted to 'politicize' the rhetoric whereas the Finns played down this tune as much as possible – without changing the essentials of the liturgy.

The Finnish Embassy noted Hungarian aspirations also in the fact that the Hungarian press regarded the Lázár visit as a 'top meeting' in the same way Kádár's visit to Rumania and meeting with Ceausescu were rated. The newspaper *Magyar Hírlap* titled its article 'Relations without shadows' and considered them both official and human: they were multilateral relations, relations between good friends, and in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act. This time also the linguistic kinship was presented as a cause. Mostly, however, the Hungarian media emphasized strongly the economic aspects of Lázár's visit. Finland was presented as depending on foreign trade, and it was maintained that co-operation with socialist countries had been beneficial to Finland.

The organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, *Népszabadság*, interpreted that the Hungarian-Finnish relations were even deeper than what was recommended in the CSCE Final Act – a definition of the relations which the Hungarians had usually used to describe the relations between socialist countries.

It seems that 'friendship' was now used to verbally incorporate Finland in the same camp as Hungary and make it an example of co-existence. According to *Népszabadság*, the Hungarian-Finnish relations were based on 'sincere interest and political realism trying to find possibilities to deepen the relations to mutual benefit, while the Hungarian government and the Finnish leadership were carrying out the peaceful active policy of neutrality'. The question of the image of Finnish neutrality came to the forefront when the Finnish Embassy mentioned that Western diplomats had noticed how there was no mention of the Finnish neutrality in the Hungarian-Finnish *communiqué*.<sup>119</sup> It is worth speculating whether the interpretation of Finnish policy became more 'orthodox' at the same time when Hungary was assuring to the West how it had become more open.

As the end of the 1970s was approaching the key elements of the Finnish role in Hungarian foreign policy had thus become clearer. They can also be found in Kádár's speech in the plenum of the Central Committee of the HSWP in April 1978. Kádár stated that Hungary had intensified its relations also with its most important trading partner, FRG as well as with Austria, Finland, Italy, France and 'many other capitalist countries'. Hungary was maintaining good relations with capitalist countries, although some people were doubting and fearing that this would only bring 'inflation and the negative effects of the crisis of capitalism'. However, active policy in this direction was necessary for Hungary because of economical reasons. The goal of the policy was peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. It was the only alternative to a world war, and to carry out this policy economical, cultural and social connections and visits were needed. Peaceful co-existence between socialist and capitalist countries could not consist only of formal meetings and statements. It meant also negotiations on questions of international policy and efforts to understanding. In addition to this, it meant extensive economical relations. According to Kádár's rhetoric, there would not be a war between states which had beneficial mutual economic ties.<sup>120</sup>

To sum up: the Hungarians connected Finland with an interpretation which suited their own needs. Both in bilateral talks and in wider contexts Finland was regarded as a political friend. This friendship was obviously linked to the international politics in terms of co-existence, and it was supposed that economic advantages could be achieved by this policy. It can perhaps be said that in the Finnish case these economical benefits remained lacking but it was possible to express the idea of political friendship relatively freely.

One example of the special status of Finland and, above all, of making politics with the visits, was also the Hungarian idea of Kekkonen's 'holiday' in Hungary in 1978. Kádár and Losonczi invited Kekkonen to a holiday and recreation trip to mark the 50th anniversary of Kekkonen's first trip to Hungary.<sup>121</sup> The Protocol Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not consider the idea very realistic. There were already enough travelling to Hungary at various levels – they had to be rather restricted, especially as Hungary seemed to be so keen on them.<sup>122</sup>

#### **14 Conclusion**

In the 1960s the tradition of cultural co-operation and the tradition of cherishing the idea of kinship was linked to the Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary. The concept of kinship was undoubtedly a way to establish Hungarian-Finnish relations. There was, however, a trend to modernise the concept of kinship in order to strengthen its value. This myth offered common discourse and it was a way to assure the structure of good relations at the time when the relations were reopened. As Kekkonen put it, these relations were meant to be primarily unofficial: academic contacts, cultural co-operation and increasing tourism.

Kinship activities offered a basis not only for popular, unofficial contacts between the Finns and Hungarians but for the political rhetoric as well. The only limitation on the use of the old tradition was, according to Korhonen, that the players of the game knew the rules of it. In other words, the rhetoric of tradition was to be used in the context of the limitations of the international policy.<sup>123</sup> Accordingly, the efforts to establish

unofficial contacts founded on the idea of kinship could be articulated as arguments in political relations. The liturgy of the first visits in 1960s reflected this policy. In addition, the concepts of a small nation and progress were used in the political liturgy, too. Similarly, just as with the concept of kinship, these arguments referred to the ties between the two countries. The role of science, both in terms of the kinship aspect and technical-scientific co-operation was essential. In conclusion, in the 1960s two ideas of brotherhood were developed: the traditional and the modern one.

In the 1970s, the key concepts of the image of the Hungarian-Finnish relations were the versatility of the relations, friendship, understanding and modernity. When the relations were stabilizing, the central idea was simply to develop them. The definition János Péter had given of the basis of the Hungarian-Finnish relations in 1964 – not only a romantic, ethnographic kinship, but also accomplishments in the fields of economy and education<sup>124</sup> – can be seen as the constant feature in the development of the state-level relations from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.

For Finland, relations with Hungary were – in terms of state level politics – an integral part of Finnish policy towards the satellite countries, even though a special one, because the civil society activity and tradition were exceptional. The Hungarian direction was sometimes even a bit crowded with visits. In the 1970s the visits of the heads of state received no such criticism in Finland as it had in the 1960s and they were not seen as demonstrations: the Hungary of Kádár had consolidated its place as a part of the foreign relations of Finland, and both the Foreign Ministry and the public had a positive attitude towards Hungary. The visits as such were no longer an ‘issue’ for Finland, only a way to conduct relations. For Hungary, on the other hand, they were a way to measure and develop the relations with non-socialist countries. The trend of the Hungarian political culture was to take care of the bilateral relations with visits and treaties.

The economic relations were very central in the Finnish relations with the socialist bloc in the 1970s because they were usually the most troublesome aspect of the relations. The Finns inter-



preted that the Hungarian motives in Finland concerned trade policy which served the needs of domestic policy. For Hungary, the correct state level relations with Finland were important in order to create and develop technical-scientific contacts with the West. The Hungarian focus on economy, trade and the CSCE as a theme already began in the 1960s but was lifted even to a higher plane during the visits of the 1970s. Even though the trade did not develop as was hoped, the relations were maintained well in all contexts: it was a friendship with a tradition, and the Finns argued that it was born among the 'people' because of the idea of kinship.

Finland was a part of Hungary's international Western relations concerning both the economy and the CSCE. It is clear that Finland was not the only window to the West. Seen from the Hungarian point of view, it was marginal compared to Austria. However, Finland was more ready than the other Western countries to conclude agreements and make joint *communiqués* which were important tools for Hungarian foreign policy. The Finnish foreign policy of good relations with the Soviet Union made it an easy partner, and since it was geographically far away, it was also 'safer' than Austria, for example, in the question of the freedom of the visa. On the other hand, the geographical distance was naturally also a drawback when one tried to add trade or other substance to the relations and fight the old clichés which the Hungarian people attached to Finland.

The concept of kinship was in time succeeded by the concept of friendship in the political argument. Friendship was contextualized to modern times and politics, not only to tradition, language and culture. The Finns used more often the traditional definitions which rose from kinship and friendship than the Hungarians. This tradition was the sound basis, and the early relations between the countries were seen in the work of the scientists and in their interest towards the kinship nation. However, it was important to step to also modernity in cultural relations, and even more important was that this concerned economy and trade. The aspect of kinship was the central argument for the close relations only in the beginning; after that it was duly mentioned in festive and commemorative speeches but the concept of friendship became more

important as a proof of understanding between nations and states. The mutual understanding in various fields could all be put under the umbrella of 'friendship'. Even the economy was mentioned as a part of 'understanding although, paradoxically, a bit negatively: both parties acknowledged the problems in this sector. It was also maintained that the friendship was working even despite differences of opinion and different social systems and, for example, despite the disagreement about the EEC.

The respect for the head of state also seems to have been an important part of the image of good relations and friendship. The image that was given of Kádár in Finland was undoubtedly positive, as was the image of Kekkonen in Hungary. As the Finnish press noted, Kádár was received as a head of state although he actually was the Party First Secretary. It is also clear that personal opinions about Kádár influenced the opinions on conditions in Hungary.<sup>125</sup> In the discourse of the visits, the central role of the party in the Hungarian society and politics faded, and even though the Hungarian leadership openly declared its allegiance towards the Soviet Union, it also managed to emphasize its own line and freedom of action Hungary enjoyed. Likewise, respect for Kekkonen as a person was a part of Hungarian policy towards Finland and evidently also a way to demonstrate the good relations. The organ of the party, *Népszabadság* published in 11 September 1975 an article by Péter Dunai, called 'The Road of the Finnish Foreign Policy' which was a kind of book review on the selected speeches and articles of Urho Kekkonen translated into Hungary. Dunai wrote also about the visits and the mutual relations and explained that they and the peaceful co-existence they represented were due to Kekkonen's policy – thus the success of the policy was connected to the person of the head of state. Naturally, also Kekkonen's relations with the Soviet Union and his peace policy were emphasized.<sup>126</sup> Actually it can be maintained that the personal interests of Kekkonen concerning Hungary had been more visible and important when the relations and the images had been established in the 1960s rather than during the time of consolidated satellite policy in the 1970s.

In spite of all modernity it was continuously the traditional cultural sector and non-state-level contacts such as travel and friendship activities that were seen as the most useful and most developed part of the relations. It seemed that Kekkonen's urge for the scholars of 'national sciences' he had expressed in 1964 had reached its aim. However, even here there were problems when the images were to be modernized and the old kinship images to be set aside. Modernity was connected to culture as well, such as to economy. Two cultures and societies met each other in the Hungarian-Finnish relations: for example the urban Budapest and the rules of the socialist society met the Finnish nature and civil society.

Friendship was also political friendship – especially from the Hungarian perspective. The idea that the countries had the same role in the international arena belonged to the discourse of the visits as well. The countries expressed their acceptance and appreciation for each other's foreign policy, although in practise they linked this acceptance to their own political framework. For Finland, the question of neutrality was essential; for Hungary, it was the social progress, Kádárism. These had to be explained to the other party during the visits. There were also comparisons with relations between Austria and Hungary.<sup>127</sup> The dilemma of neutrality can also be seen in the way the Finnish Embassy paid attention to others: how did the other neutral countries see Finnish neutrality?<sup>128</sup>

In the 1970s, the relations between the Finland of Kekkonen and the Hungary of Kádár were politically unproblematic. It was also usual to note the understanding in international questions. In the CSCE questions Hungary was especially keen on seeking understanding with Finland; it was stated that the countries had the same position in the international field. The Hungarian-Finnish friendship, based on the idea of kinship and political understanding, was given as an example which served the whole international community well– both in the sense of peaceful co-existence and in the sense of exemplary cultural relations. The image of two countries in the international field can thus be seen as a continuing trend from the opening of the relations until their consolidation phase.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Keijo Korhonen, *Sattumakorpraali*. Korhonen Kekkonen komennossa. Keuruu 1999, 122.
- <sup>2</sup> See Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika*. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962. Keuruu: Otava 1992, 64.
- <sup>3</sup> In this context: to study arguments, contents and forms. See Kari Palonen, Hilikka Summa, *Retorinen käänne? Pelkkää retoriikkaa*. Tampere: Vastapaino 1996, 10-13; Chaim Perelman, *Retoriikan valtakunta*. Tre: Vastapaino 1996.
- <sup>4</sup> Foreign Ministry Archives (UMA), 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 11 Jan.1958 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet; See Suomi 1992, 63-68 and see also Jukka Nevakivi, 'Kekkonen, a magyar '56 és a finlandizáció kezdete', *Hitel* 13 10 (2000).
- <sup>5</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 11 Jan.1958 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet.
- <sup>6</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, T.H. Heikkilä 3 Oct. 1959 Budapest Suhtautuminen Unkariin.
- <sup>7</sup> Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*. Budapest: Osiris 1999, 332-333; For Finnish interpretations see Memorandum by Finnish Foreign Ministry. UMA, 101/3/H/Kekkonen, Presidentin epävirallinen vierailu Unkariin 12.-15.5.1963; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, R.R. Seppälä (Washington) to Max Jacobson (Finnish Foreign Ministry) 18 Apr.1963 and Otso Wartiovaara (Wien) to the Finnish Foreign Minister Veli Merikoski 22 Apr. 1963.
- <sup>8</sup> See Suomi; *Kriisien aika*, 383; see also Juhani Suomi, *Presidentti*. Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968. Keuruu: Otava 1994, 88-97.
- <sup>9</sup> See UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, *Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin*. Presidentin vierailu Unkariin 26.9.-1.10.1969.
- <sup>10</sup> Hungarian State Archives (MOL), M-KS 288f./32/1961/14 öe. Szipka József nagykövet 11 Apr. 1961 Helsinki. Kekkonen köztársasági elnök meghívása.
- <sup>11</sup> President Urho Kekkonen's archives (UKA), *Vuosikirjat 1964*, Kekkonen papers.
- <sup>12</sup> See UMA, 101/3/H/Kekkonen, Memorandum by Veikko Hietanen 25 March 1963. The visit was paid on Hungary's initiative. President Dobi's invitation was presented when Hungarian Ambassador, Sándor Kurtán left his letter of credence in Helsinki.
- <sup>13</sup> See the program of the visit. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen; UKA, *Vierailut 1963-1966*. Kekkonen Papers 22/8.
- <sup>14</sup> MOL, M-KS-288 f-/5/299 öe. Péter János Budapest 25 Apr. 1963, Jelentés az MSZMP K.B. Politikai Bizottságához, Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök 1963 májusi magyarországi látogatásáról.

- <sup>15</sup> MOL, M-KS- 288 f./5/299 öe. Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1963. április 30-án tartott üléséről. Jelentés Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök 1963. májusi magyarországi látogatására. KB külügyi o. javaslat.
- <sup>16</sup> For the debate with Uusi-Suomi – newspaper see PUKA, Vuosikirjat 1963. Kekkonen papers.
- <sup>17</sup> UKA, Kuva-Posti 21 (1963). Väinö Länsiluoto, Vierailu Unkariin, Lehtileikkeet 1963-66. Kekkonen papers 41/61.
- <sup>18</sup> UKA, Nök Lapja 18 May 1963 and Lehtileikkeet. Vierailut 1963-33. Kekkonen papers 22/8.
- <sup>19</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus 1968; UMA, 7/E/Unkari 1964, Reino Palas 26 Nov. 1964 Budapest Unkarin parlamentin istunto ja János Péterin ulkopoliittinen puhe.
- <sup>20</sup> UMA, 5/C/27 Reino Palas 20 May 1963 Budapest.
- <sup>21</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/11 öe. Sándor Kurtán Helsinki 3 Oct. 1963; 5 Oct. 1963; 5 Dec. 1963; 21 Dec. 1963.
- <sup>22</sup> UKA, Vuosikirjat 1964. Kekkonen papers.
- <sup>23</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/1963 1 öe. Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi Bizottság Külügyi Osztálya. Előterjesztés az MSZMP KB Titkárságának 3 Oct. 1963.
- <sup>24</sup> UMA, 5/C/27, Memorandum by Finnish Embassy in Budapest 30 Sept. 1968.
- <sup>25</sup> On increasing mass tourism as a way of life in Hungary, see Romsics 1999, 402.
- <sup>26</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Yhteinen tiedonanto Suomen tasavallan presidentin tohtori Urho Kekkonen valtiovierailusta Unkarissa.
- <sup>27</sup> Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 408-409.
- <sup>28</sup> Juhani Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta. Urho Kekkonen 1968-1972. Keuruu: Otava 1996, 232-233.
- <sup>29</sup> See MOL, M-KS 288 f./32/1961/14 öe. Kekkonen köztársasági elnök meghívása.
- <sup>30</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f. /5/468 öe. Előterjesztés az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságnak, Péter János Budapest 16 Aug. 1968, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök meghívásáról.
- <sup>31</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Martti Ingman 9 Sept. 1969 Budapest.
- <sup>32</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin. Vierailu Unkariin 29.9.-1.10.1969.
- <sup>33</sup> UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestissa olevan suurlähetystön R-kirjeet 1968, E.O.Raustila 30 Sept. 1968 Budapest. Huomioita suomalais-unkarilaisista kulttuurisuhteista.
- <sup>34</sup> See the speeches, UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969.

- <sup>35</sup> UKA, Vilkuna Papers 1/54, Kustaa Vilkuna to President Kekkonen 14 Aug. 1969; for the program see UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969.
- <sup>36</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f./5/497 öe. János Péter Budapest 18 Aug. 1969, Javaslat az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságának, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatásával kapcsolatban.
- <sup>37</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin, Tasavallan presidentin keskustelut Unkarin pääministeri Fockin kanssa 26.9.1969 klo 16.30; Tasavallan presidentti Kekkonen ja Unkarin Presidentti Losonczin keskustelut 27.9.1969.
- <sup>38</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969, Tasavallan Presidentin Unkarin vierailun tiedonanto. 1.10.1969; Yhteinen tiedonanto Suomen tasavallan presidentin tohtori Urho Kekkonen valtiovierailusta Unkarissa.
- <sup>39</sup> UKA, Kekkonen Papers 41/88, 41/89, Lehtileikkeet. Valtiovierailu Romaniaan, Unkariin ja Tšekkoslovakiaan 1969. Helsingin Sanomat 27 Sept. – 1 Oct. 1969.
- <sup>40</sup> Lauri Karén, Herrasmiehiä valepuvussa. Juva: WSOY 1994, 174.
- <sup>41</sup> See for example Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 409.
- <sup>42</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f./5/497 öe. János Péter Budapest 18 Aug. 1969 Javaslat az MSZMP KB Politikai Bizottságának, Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogatásával kapcsolatban.
- <sup>43</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Martti Ingman 27 July 1971 Budapest.
- <sup>44</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Marri Ingman 9 Aug. 1971 Budapest.
- <sup>45</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Unkarin kansantasavallan puhemiesneuvoston puheenjohtajan ja rouva Pál Losonczin valtiovierailu Suomeen 23.-26. elokuuta 1971. Ohjelma.
- <sup>46</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Martti Ingman 27 July 1971 Budapest.
- <sup>47</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Ritva-Liisa Elomaa 11 Aug. 1971 P.M. Suomen ja Unkarin välinen kulttuurivaihto.
- <sup>48</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Muistiinpano Suomen Tasavallan Presidentin Urho Kekkonen ja Unkarin Kansantasavallan Puhemiesneuvoston Puheenjohtajan Pál Losonczin välisistä virallisista keskusteluista Presidentin linnassa 23.8.1971 klo 15.30-17.30.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losoncz, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Joint Communiqué on the State visit of the President of the Presidential Council

of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. Pál Losonczi and Madame Losonczi to the Republic of Finland.

- <sup>51</sup> In Hungary the friendship weeks were connected to the state-level relations through the Presidential 'patronage' and high-level meetings. See for example MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/606 öe. Jakab Sándor 8 March 1973 Budapest Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak; 288 f. 5/614 öe. Tibor Baranyi 2 July 1973 Feljegyzés Pullai Árpád elvtársnak.
- <sup>52</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losonczi, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Unkarin Kansantasavallan Puhemiesneuvoston Puheenjohtajan puhe juhlapäivällisillä Tasavallan Presidentin Linnassa Helsingissä 23.8.1971.
- <sup>53</sup> UMA, 4/J/Unkari, Losonczi, Pál vierailu Suomeen v. 1971, Suurläh. Ingmanin laatima puheluonnos.
- <sup>54</sup> Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 24 Aug. 1971; Uusi Suomi (US) 24 Aug. 1971.
- <sup>55</sup> US 24 August 1971.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari suhteet 1972-1973, Suurlähetystösihteeri Ulla-Maria Tainio 2 Nov. 1971 Budapest.
- <sup>58</sup> UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja, Suurlähetystö Budapest 18 Dec.1972 postisähkejäljennös.
- <sup>59</sup> HS 26 Sept.1973. Kádár's program, covered by the press, included a wreath on Paasikivi's grave, an Embassy reception and visits to Hämeenlinna and Riihimäki and getting acquainted with the Market square and the 'businesses in the central area' in Helsinki and a sauna in Tamminiemi. The program for the spouses included the factories of Arabia, the old people's home in Riistavuori and the National museum. UMA, 7/E/Unkari, Yksityiskohtainen ohjelma.
- <sup>60</sup> Juhani Suomi, (ed.) Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 3 1969-74. Helsinki: Otava 2003, 314, 9 Feb. 1973.
- <sup>61</sup> MOL, M-KS-288 f. 5/605 öe. János Péter 15 Feb. 1973 Budapest Előterjesztés az MSZMP Politikai Bizottságnak.
- <sup>62</sup> MOL M-KS-288 f. 5/611 öe. Frigyes Puja 14 May 1973 Budapest Javaslat az MSZMP elvtárs finnországi útjára Kádár János elvtárs finnországi útjára.
- <sup>63</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 15 Sept.1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken ulkopoliittikka; also see 7/E/144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.
- <sup>64</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 16 Sept. 1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken sisäpolitiikka; also see 7/E/ 144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.

- <sup>65</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari 9/98 Pol-73, Paul Jyrkänkallio 15 Sept. 1973 Budapest Unkarin nykyhetken ulkopoliittikka; also see 7/E/144 Unkari, Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973.
- <sup>66</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari, Paul Jyrkänkallio 16 Sept. 1973 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin bilateraalisuhteet.
- <sup>67</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen keskuskomitean ensimmäisen sihteerin ja rouva János Kádárin vierailu Suomessa 25-28 syyskuuta 1973.
- <sup>68</sup> HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- <sup>69</sup> Juhani Suomi, Liennytyksen akanvirrassa. Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976. Keuruu: Otava 1998, 265-266.
- <sup>70</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Vierailukommunikea (luonnos).
- <sup>71</sup> See for example a Finnish translation of Puja's statement in Népszabadság. UMA, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Sept.1973 Budapest. ETYK. Unkarilainen näkemys ETYKin toisesta vaiheesta.
- <sup>72</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari Kádár, János vierailu Suomeen 25.-28.9.1973, Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen keskuskomitean ensimmäisen sihteerin ja rouva János Kádárin vierailu Suomessa 25-28 syyskuuta 1973.
- <sup>73</sup> US 26 and 27 Sept. 1973; HS 26 and 27 Sept. 1973.
- <sup>74</sup> HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- <sup>75</sup> HS 27 Sept. 1973.
- <sup>76</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari, Paul Jyrkänkallio Budapest 19 June 1974. Ulkoasiainministeri Pujan lausunnot suhteista Suomeen. Liite: Ulkoasiainministeri Frigyes Pujan 25.4.1974 parlamentille esittämän ulkopoliittisen katsauksen sekä kesällä julkais- [sic]artikkelin Suomea koskevat kohdat.
- <sup>77</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Tötterman, Richard vierailu Unkariin v. 1973, avustaja Tapani Lehtinen 15 Nov.1973 and 23 Nov. 1973 Budapest Muistio. The central role of economy in the relations was evident also during Prime Minister Sorsa's visit to Hungary. Kalevi Sorsa, Kansakoti ja punamulta. Poliitiikan kuvioita 1972-1976. Helsinki: Otava 2003, 169-171.
- <sup>78</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1976, Budapest 27 Jan. 1976.
- <sup>79</sup> UMA, 5-C-27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja v. 1975, Suurlähetystö Budapest 3 March 1975.
- <sup>80</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, osastopäällikkö Jaakko Itoniemi 11 Feb.1976 Helsinki.
- <sup>81</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Vt.avustaja Kari Mitrunen 27 March 1976. Unkarin entisen pääministerin Jenő Fockin käynti tasavallan presidentin luona 26.3.1976. Also Foreign Minister Sorsa and Matusek negotiated about the invitation and a suitable time.



- According to Matussek's suggestion it was agreed that the program would be discussed when Foreign Minister Puja would make his visit in June 1976. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, jaostosihteeri Kari Veikko Salonen 1 Apr. 1976. Unkarin suurlähettilään käynti ulkoasiainministeri Sorsan luona 1.4.1976.
- <sup>82</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, toimistopäällikkö Jaakko Blomberg 7 June 1976 Muistiinpano.
- <sup>83</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Bo Klenberg 27 Sept. 1976 Helsinki to Paul Jyrkänkallio Budapest.
- <sup>84</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Oct. 1976 Budapest.
- <sup>85</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 26 Oct. 1976 Budapest to Ossi Sunell Helsinki.
- <sup>86</sup> See the details in UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Oct. 1976 Budapest.
- <sup>87</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jaakko Iloniemi 11 Nov. 1976 Helsinki to Herra tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkonen Helsinki.
- <sup>88</sup> The program included – in addition to the talks – a visit in the turbin factory Lang-Gépgyár, shooting pheasants and rabbits in Soponya and Telk, a visit to a co-operative farm in Székesfehérvár and a press conference. See the details of the program in UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Muistiinpanot vierailun valmisteluihin liittyvästä keskustelusta Unkarin ulkoministeriössä 4.11.1976, Pertti Torstila suurlähetystösihteeri Budapest 4.11.1976; Ohjelma; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1876/160 öe. Puja Frigyes 15 Oct. 1976 Budapest (KÜM) Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.
- <sup>89</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 öe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 Szeptember 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogására / 1976 november 17-21/; M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/160 öe. ; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/703 Puja Frigyes 15 October 1976 Budapest (KÜM) javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.
- <sup>90</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 öe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 September 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogására / 1976 november 17-21/.
- <sup>91</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Ritva-Liisa Elomaa 10 Nov. 1976 Suomen ja Unkarin väliset kulttuurisuhteet.
- <sup>92</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 5 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Suomen ja Unkarin väliset bilateraaliset suhteet.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>94</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkalio 3 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Katsaus Unkarin ulkopoliittikkaan.
- <sup>95</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkalio 3 Nov. 1976 Budapest. Unkarin sisäpoliittinen tilanne.
- <sup>96</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Tasavallan presidentin ja Unkarin sosialistisen työväenpuolueen 1. sihteerin Janos Kadarin [sic] väliset viralliset keskustelut 18.11.1976 Budapestissa Unkarin parlamenttitalossa. Muistio J. Seppinen 8 Dec.1976. Also see MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/706 Jelentés a Politikai Bizottságnak Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök magyarországi látogatásáról.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid. The Hungarian interest to make initiatives for joint statements was again evident; Matusek emphasized that it was important for the Hungarians that a grand declaration would be signed during the visit. Foreign Minister Korhonen replied to Matusek that Finland did not usually prepare 'this kind of declaratory documents with other countries'. He let Matusek to understand that Finland was not ready to make an exception even for Hungary's sake. A statement like that had been given only with the Soviet Union in 1973, because then it was meant to stress the special nature of the relations between the two countries. UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Sunell 21 Sept. 1976 Tasavallan presidentin valtiovierailu Unkariin marraskuussa 1976; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 26 Oct. 1976 Muistio. Tasavallan presidentin Unkarin vierailun valmistelut; suurlähettiläs Matusekin käynti ulkoasiainministeri Korhosen luona.
- <sup>99</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu (kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 3 Nov. 1976 Unkarilaisen virkamiesvaltuuskunnan vierailu Helsingissä 27.-30.10.1976; kommuniqueaneuvottelut.
- <sup>100</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 8 Nov. 1976 Tasavallan presidentin virallinen vierailu Unkariin 17.-20.11.1976; kommuniqueaneuvottelut; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 16 Nov. 1976 vierailutiedonanto; UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Jukka Seppinen 11 Nov. 1976 kommuniqueaneuvottelut 10.11.1976 (kolmas neuvotteluvaihe).
- <sup>101</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Vierailutiedonanto 1. luonnos Suomen ehdotus 28.10.1976; Communique on the Visit of the President of Finland to Hungary; Tiedonanto Liite II Unkarin ehdotus Budapest 20.11.1976.
- <sup>102</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v.1976, Communique on the visit of president of Finland to Hungary.

- <sup>103</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Luonnos Tasavallan Presidentin puheeksi unkarilaisen isännän tarjoamalla juhlapäivällisillä 17.11.1976 and Luonnos Tasavallan Presidentin puheeksi hänen tarjoamilaan päivällisillä 18.11.1976.
- <sup>104</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, I.Sihteeri Janos Kadarin puhe 17 Nov.1976.
- <sup>105</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f. 32/1976/159 óe. Puja Frigyes 11 September 1976 Budapest. Javaslat 10 Sept. 1976 Budapest KÜM. Tárgy: Látogatási koncepció Urho Kekkonen finn köztársasági elnök hivatalos magyarországi látogására /1976 november 17-21/; 288 f. 32/1976/160 óe. ; MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/703 Puja Frigyes 15 Oct. 1976 Budapest (KÜM) javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak.
- <sup>106</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu(kutsu) Unkariin v. 1976, Unkarin television kysymykset presidentti Kekkoselle. Kekkonen had asked the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry to prepare drafts for answers for him in advance. The answers, however, have not been documented.
- <sup>107</sup> HS 17 Nov. 1976.
- <sup>108</sup> HS 18 Nov. 1976.
- <sup>109</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Vierailu Unkariin v. 1976, Népszabadság 21 Nov.1976. Eredményesen fejleszthetjük gazdasági, kereskedelmi együttműködésünket. Keijo Korhonen finn külügyminiszter nyilatkozata; Népszabadság ym. Budapestin päivälehdet 21.11.1976: taloudelista ja kaupallista yhteistyötämme kehitetään menestyksellisesti. Suomen ulkoasiainministerin Keijo Korhosen lausunto.
- <sup>110</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet: Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 9 Sept. 1977 Budapest.
- <sup>111</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Matti Tuovinen 6 Apr.1977 Unkarin pääministerin vierailu; Matti Tuovinen 27 Apr. 1977 P.M. Pääministeri Lázárin vierailu.
- <sup>112</sup> UMA, 5-C-27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja v. 1975, Paul Jyrkänkallio 19 May 1975 Budapest.
- <sup>113</sup> UMA, 12-L-Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, suurlähetystösihteeri Pertti Torstila 6 May 1977.
- <sup>114</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö Koskinen 26 May and 11 June 1977 Budapest; Unkari: Poliittiset asenteet ja ETYK:n päätösasiakirjan toteuttaminen, Budapest 7 March 1977.
- <sup>115</sup> MOL, M-KS 288 f. 132 1976/170 óe. Javaslat a finn félnek az európai biztonsági és együttműködési értekezlet záróokmányában foglalt rendelkezések végrehajtására magyar- finn viszonylatban.

- <sup>116</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Jaostopäällikkö Erkki Kivimäki, Muistio Suomalais-unkarilaisten suhteiden kehittäminen ETYK:in pohjalta; Unkarin ehdotukset kesäkuulta 1976.
- <sup>117</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 26 May 1977 Budapest Suomen ja Unkarin bilateraaliset suhteet.
- <sup>118</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen Budapest 24 May 1977 Pääministeri ja rouva Lázárin vierailu Suomessa.
- <sup>119</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Unkarin pääministerin vierailu Suomeen 1977, Budapest/um:n tiedote 8.6.1977; Magyar Hírlap 14. and 15.6.1977; Finnish Embassy 23 June 1977 Budapest.
- <sup>120</sup> UMA, 7/E/Unkari Ulkopoliittikka 1977-1981, Finnish Embassy 14 July 1978 Budapest.
- <sup>121</sup> Originally this was Rudolf Rónai's idea. According to the Ambassador, Rónai had raised the question with Kustaa Vilkuna in 1976. The official invitation was given to the President by Vice President Gáspár who visited Finland in autumn 1977. After that came the invitation of Kádár and Losonczy. According to the Ambassador, only these people knew about the plan. UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen 28 Feb. 1978 Budapest to state secretary Matti Tuovinen.
- <sup>122</sup> UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Protokollaosasto Ossi Sunell 8 March 1978 to Kaarlo Yrjö-Koskinen Budapest. The Hungarians repeated the idea once more: Ambassador Matusek had raised the issue of the 'fiftieth-anniversary-visit' during a supper with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. Matusek explained that Kekkonen and Kádár had talked about this in Moscow. UMA, 12/L/Unkari Suhteet, Suomi-Unkari v. 1977-1981, Kalevi Sorsa 9 March 1978 Helsinki P.M. keskusteluun Unkarin suurlähettilään kanssa.
- <sup>123</sup> Korhonen, Sattumakorpraali, 123.
- <sup>124</sup> UMA, 3/H/Kekkonen, Katsaus 1968; UMA, 7/E/Unkari 1964, Reino Palas 26 Nov. 1964 Budapest Unkarin parlamentin istunto ja János Péterin ulkopoliittinen puhe.
- <sup>125</sup> See for example Sorsa, Kansankoti ja punamulta, 170.
- <sup>126</sup> UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön raporttisarja, Népszabadság 11 Sept. 1975. Suomen ulkopoliittikan tie. Urho Kekkosen valittuja puheita ja artikkeleita.
- <sup>127</sup> See for example UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön r-sarja 1977, Finnish Embassy 4 Nov. 1977 Budapest.
- <sup>128</sup> UMA, 5/C/27 Budapestin suurlähetystön raporttisarja v. 1976, Paul Jyrkänkallio 9 Dec. 1976 Budapest. Asia: Suomi ja puolueettomien kerhot.