

ABSTRACTS

Tibor Balla

■ ***The Battle of Caporetto and Its Antecedents***
Keywords: *Battle of Caporetto, 1917, Italian Front, victory of the Central Powers*

The author of the article presents the preliminaries of the Battle of Caporetto in the year of 1917 on the Italian Front; the preparations of the Central Powers for the offensive against the Italian army and the establishment of the German 14th Army; the allied Austro-Hungarian and German troops' advance to attack; as well as the opposing Italian, Austro-Hungarian and German forces. The reader may learn about the events of the breakthrough at Caporetto on October 24, 1917 and the details of the operations to the reaching of the Piave River by the Central Powers' forces on November 10. The author summarizes the Italian (340,000) and the Austro-Hungarian and German losses (70,000), and emphasizes the military historical significance and the results of the Battle of Caporetto, which was the largest victory of the Central Powers on the Italian front during the First World War.

Tibor Glant

■ ***US Entry into World War I, 1917***

Keywords: *United States, 1917, World War I, Allies*

This article reviews the main reasons why the United States abandoned her logical neutral position assumed in August 1914 and entered the First World War on the side of the Allies in April 1917. It analyzes American neutrality and the challenges it faced from within and without. It also explains why Wilson was so reluctant to go to war and why he decided to take that drastic step after all, 32 months into the global conflict. Special attention is devoted to submarine warfare, trade, sabotage, ethnic relations, diplomatic and military preparedness, and various US elections. The immediate causes of US entry into the war (Mexico and submarines) are used to show that national prestige was the key factor in the decision. By highlighting the philosophical differences between Republicans and Democrats over the conduct of American foreign affairs, we also place Wilson's ideas and decisions in the broader context of twentieth-century international relations.

Tibor Hajdu

■ ***1917 – The Two Faces of the Russian Revolution***

Keywords: *1917, Russian Revolution, two different aims, “proletarian dictatorship”*

The 1917 “February” Russian Revolution started as a spontaneous revolt of Petrograd people, it was not “prepared” by anybody,

being rather a surprise for everybody. The socialist leaders convened the Petrograd Soviet only after the revolt, and sent the moderate socialist Kerensky into the Provisional Government, to represent there the Soviet. The Government was formed by the Duma. Thus, a dual power existed, at least until July. During April-May, the Soviet parties collaborated from the Bolsheviks to Kerensky. The Revolution had two different aims – ending the war, and establishing democracy and a constitutional Republic. For the people and the soldiers, peace stood on the first place. Foreign Minister Miliukov, in his note of May 1, assured the Allies that Russia's war policy remained as before. The Petrograd and Moscow workers and soldiers went on the streets with the slogan: “Down with Miliukov!” On May 18, the Cabinet was transformed: Miliukov resigned, Kerensky got the War Ministry, and the Socialists received six portfolios. Kerensky, after declaring that Russia has no territorial or other war aims, started a new offensive on the fronts. Thus, Kerensky lost the sympathy of both sides: the Generals kept to the Allies and the secret treaties, the Left demanded peace immediately, and the soldiers didn't understand why they should fight without war aims. The Kerensky-offensive collapsed in July. On July 3 and 4, the Petrograd soldiers' armed demonstration against the Kerensky-offensive collapsed too. They were influenced by the Bolshevik agitation, but the latter were not ready yet to lead them to a risky coup d'état. Kerensky arrested some Bolshevik leaders, and on July 21 formed a new Cabinet, which convened the Constitutional Assembly, but it was soon late: on November 7, the Soviet seized power, preventing the Assembly elections. This move was of course contrary to the classical principles of democracy. There was no real majority on either side – instead a civil war was started, which lasted for three years.

Árpád Hornyák

■ ***The First Official Manifesto of Southern Slavic Unity – the Declaration of Corfu***

Keywords: *Southern Slavic Unity, independent Southern Slavic state, Declaration of Corfu, 1917, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes*

The idea of Yugoslavism (creation of an united state of the South Slavs, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians) dates back to the 16th century. In the 19th century there were serious attempts on the side of the Croatian and Serbian politicians to find a political solution for the establishment of a common state. Nevertheless, the real opportunity for creating such a state came by with the outbreak of World War I. During the war, there were two centres promoting the

unified South Slav state. The Serbian Government on the one side and the Yugoslav Committee founded in Paris on the other side. The cooperation of the two bodies was rather strained due to the differences in their views regarding the form of the future state. Should it be a federation (the view of the Yugoslav Committee) or a centralist state (the Serbian point of view). During the whole period the Serbian Government was in a stronger position, however, due to some changes in the international relations, Pašić was forced to accept the Yugoslav Committee at least formally. This led to the Corfu conference, where after more than a month long negotiations the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav committee signed for the very first time a common declaration that envisioned a constitutional monarchy under Serbia's ruling Karađorđević dynasty, the so-called Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Zsolt K. Lengyel

■ ***The Hungarian Plan for Transylvania's Re-creation – 1917/1918***

Keywords: *Erdélyi Szövetség (Transylvanian Alliance), Plan for Transylvania's re-creation, Új Erdély (New Transylvania)*

This study analyses the second phase of the Erdélyi Szövetség's (Transylvanian Alliance's) activity. From early 1917 it urged to represent Transylvania's national political interests. The starting point for this endeavour was the idea that Budapest should have the last word in matters of the region's business, but the government should pass on the handling of Transylvania's problems in the hands of persons familiar with local affairs. The Alliance wanted foremost to prevent the Transylvanian Romanians from expanding any further. The old-Transylvanistic weekly "Új Erdély" (New Transylvania) from Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), which appeared in the first half of 1918, also assessed identically the reform possibilities the region. At the same time, this journal sought the modus for a larger consensus, an arrangement extending also over the Transylvanian Romanians. In the early autumn of 1918, the Transylvanian Alliance defended the Hungarian Kingdom's unity, while it could not even imagine that it might also look for Romanians among the Transylvanian persons designated for renewing the country's system.

Zoltán Maruzsa

■ ***Neither in the Government, nor in Opposition: the Internal Political Activities of Tisza István after His Second Tenure as Prime Minister***

Keywords: *Tisza István, prime minister, internal politics, electoral law, crises*


Tisza István has become the prime minister of Hungary for the second time on June 10, 1913, as the leading figure of the National Work Party, which held the absolute majority within the House of Representative. After the outbreak of World War II, Tisza concentrated his attention on preserving the internal calm of the country and maximizing military potential, governing Hungary with an iron hand. Since Tisza already counted as an adept of warlike policy, and Charles IV wished to see someone else as the prime minister of Hungary, the Hungarian prime minister handed in his resignation on May 23, 1917. Thus, the formerly stable government gave way to a new period: a prolonged governmental crisis followed, since the majority within the Parliament continued to belong to the party of Tisza István. The study presents the most important internal political events of the one and a half year period following the resignation of Tisza, with particular emphasis on the debates concerning the amendment of the electoral law.

Ferenc Pollmann

■ ***Romania in the War Planning of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff***

Keywords: *the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, Romania, war planning, Great War*

Since her debut as a sovereign European state, Romania caused great anxiety to Austria-Hungary's military leadership. The hardly defensible Carpathian border of the Dual Monarchy would require permanently deployed troops in Transylvania and/or a chain of frontier forts. Austria-Hungary, however, could not afford either of them. Therefore, it was vital for Vienna to link the SE neighbour to the Triple Alliance established in 1882. The agreement between Romania and Austria-Hungary (1883) solved the security problems of Transylvania for a long time, converting Romania into an ally. In the era of General Beck (1881-1906), the Austro-Hungarian General Staff counted on the Romanian army's help against Russia, and this attitude remained in effect during the tenure of Beck's successor, General Conrad. After the Second Balkan War and the Peace of Bucharest (1913), however, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff could not help but recognize Romania's loss as an ally, and gave order to prepare deployment plans of an imminent war against Romania. These plans could not be finished before the outbreak of the Great War. Their basic principles, however, were the same as implemented in the 1916 campaign.



KORUNK

TÁRSADALOMTUDOMÁNY
KULTÚRA
IRODALOM

a Kárpát-medence egyik legrégebb alapítású magyar nyelvű folyóirata
értelmiségi fórum – kisebbségi szemle – nemzetiségi intézmény
az erdélyi és európai hagyományok ötvözete
híd az erdélyi és egyetemes magyar tudománypublikálás,
irodalom és művészet között

**KORUNK – KORUNK AKADEÉMIA
KOMP-PRESS – KORUNK STÚDIÓGALÉRIA**

**TÁMOGASSA A KORUNK FOLYÓIRATOT
ÉS INTÉZMÉNYRENDSZERÉT**

Anyagi támogatása lehetséges módzatairól a korunk@gmail.com email címen,
a (0040) 264-375-035 és (0040) 742-061-613 telefonszámokon, illetve az Új Budapest Filmstúdió
telefonszámán: (+36 1) 316-0943, konkrét felvilágosítást nyújtunk.

*Segítségével a KORUNK
és intézményrendszere életben maradásához járul hozzá.
Köszönjük!*

SZÁMUNK SZERZŐI

A lapszámot szerkesztette:
Kovács Kiss Gyöngy

- Balla Tibor** (1965) – történész, az MTA doktora, HM Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum, Budapest
- Budai Gábor** (1975) – egyetemi oktató, ELTE Pedagógiai és Pszichológiai Kar, Budapest
- Codău Annamária** (1993) – mesterképzős hallgató, BBTE, Kolozsvár
- Ferencz Zoltán** (1980) – grafikus, Szárhegy
- Glant Tibor** (1967) – történész, habilitált egyetemi docens, tanszékvezető, Debreceni Egyetem
- Hajdu Tibor** (1930) – történész, az MTA doktora, Budapest
- Hornyak Árpád** (1971) – történész, PhD, egyetemi docens, Pécsi Tudományegyetem
- Horváth Lajos** (1979) – egyetemi tanársegéd, PhD, Debreceni Egyetem Filozófia Intézet
- Kántor Lajos** (1937) – irodalomtörténész, az MTA külső tagja, Kolozsvár
- Kenéz Ferenc** (1944) – költő, Budapest
- K. Lengyel Zsolt** (1960) – történész, dr. habil., igazgató, Regensburgi Egyetem Magyar Intézet
- Majdán János** (1953) – történész, habilitált egyetemi tanár, Pécsi Tudományegyetem
- Maruzsa Zoltán** (1977) – történész, dr. habil., ELTE BTK, Budapest
- Pollmann Ferenc** (1955) – hadtörténész, PhD, HM Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum, Budapest
- Romsics Ignác** (1951) – történész, az MTA rendes tagja, egyetemi tanár, Eszterházy Károly Egyetem, Eger

TÁMOGATÓK



nka
Nemzeti Kulturális Alap



„Az Erdélyi Szövetség 1917-es föléledése után előbb a magyar főhatalom megerősítéséért, majd már csak fennmaradásáért küzdött a világháború végéig. Az állam és a társadalom berendezkedésének a reformját ajánlotta és kívánta, többnyire követelte. Nemzet- és rendszerpolitikai kettős célkitűzésével 1913/1914-es első megalapításakor a budapesti központosítás enyhítését sürgette a kormányzati feladatrendszer fellazítása, azaz dekoncentrációja által. 1917 első felétől azonban már Erdély országos politikai érdekképviselőtét szorgalmazta újra meg újra, ezáltal immár egy decentralizációs jellegű programot követve, amely a régiót felértékelte legalább részben önerőből cselekvő alannyá. Tehát nem 1914-ben, hanem a világháború második felében fokozta a Budapesttel szemben igényelt illetékességeinek a mértékét.”

(K. Lengyel Zsolt)

ISSN 1222 8338



5 LEJ
500 FT

1917 ÎN ISTORIE
1917 IN HISTORY