

ABSTRACTS

Ottó Hévízi

■ ***Diacritical Ethics: On the Ethical Consequences of Tengelyi's View of the Late Kant and of Temporality***

Keywords: *László Tengelyi, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Lévinas, Immanuel Kant, diacritical ethics, antinomy*

In his early works, László Tengelyi made an attempt to create a theory aiming to unify the “diacritical system” of Merleau-Ponty and the “an-archic” ethics founded by Lévinas upon the thought of “radical alterity”. Later on, Tengelyi turned away from this theory that he himself developed. In my paper, I would like to argue that this ethical approach of his is indeed both possible and relevant, and that one can call it a *diacritical ethics*. My thesis is based – within the framework of a kind of “philosophical replay” – on two elements: on the radical temporality of the “diacritical model”, and on Tengelyi’s interpretation of the late Kant, whom he calls “the thinker of antinomies”. I believe it is precisely Kant’s well-elaborated antinomies that can reveal the main differences (the main oppositions) of our ethical decisions as well as the *temporal dimensions* of our ethical theories. Three differences are to be detected and distinguished here, namely those in respect of [1] ethics, [2] morality, and [3] virtue. One can call these differences unbridgeable gaps: gaps [1] between theories founded upon the immanent (*present-focused*) and transcendent (*future-focused*) ground; [2] between the theories of deontologism (their measure is always *a priori*) and consequentialism (their measure is always *a posteriori*); and [3] between the theories of free will (all these notions reckon with the beginning) and (beginningless) determinism. Nevertheless, these antinomies are not to be resolved. Rather, they exist as limits for considering our ethical problems. It is by these limits that a *diacritical space* of our ethics is, from time to time, constituted and reconstituted. It is only within these limits that our *diacritical ways* appear, moving always between the past and future, sometimes crossing each other in radical turns, which Tengelyi calls “destinal events in life history”. The conclusion of

the paper is that as the diacritical ways of our “life histories” exist always *diachronically* in a diacritical space, which is *also* limited by our thinking of temporality, the theory of a diacritical ethics is a possible, coherent and acceptable approach.

Károly Kókai

■ ***Arnold Hauser and the Social History of Film***

Keywords: *film industries, interwar period, Marxism, Austria, migration, cultural transfer*

Arnold Hauser has become well known with the publication of *The Social History of Art* in London in 1951. The book analyzes the social context of cultural productions from the ancient times until the mid-20th century. The last chapter, dealing with the times of the author, is entitled “Under the sign of the film”, and also the entire work shows a remarkable interest for viewing cultural phenomena from a filmic perspective. Taking a closer look at Hauser’s activities as an immigrant intellectual in Austria in the 1920s and 1930s, it becomes clear that his interest in film has developed from his general preoccupations in two steps. First, he was the representative of the US production company United Artists, and later he started to lecture and publish in the field of film studies. He brought along that interest and practical knowledge into his second exile in England in 1938. The insights into the emergence of a new art form, into the mechanisms of cultural production and distribution, and into the sociology of the film audience enabled him to not only understand how culture worked, but also shaped his work, which finally brought his breakthrough as a Marxist cultural historian.

Gábor Kovács

■ ***István Bibó and the Genre of Political Philosophy***

Keywords: *political philosophy, essay, interwar Hungarian culture, substitute genre, political thinker*

Bibó István has often been mentioned as the most prominent representative of Hungarian political thought in the 20th century. But how can the genre of his work be defined? Was it political philosophy? It was not, at least not in the sense of systematic analytical political

philosophy. However, in a wider meaning, putting his oeuvre into the context of continental philosophy and of interwar Hungarian thought, Bibó belongs to the essayistic tradition of political thought popular in different European countries, including Great Britain, France and Germany. This genre of essay was especially popular in Hungarian culture after the First World War. It was, in a sense, a substitute for political philosophy. Writers and thinkers like Gábor Halász, László Cs. Szabó, Antal Szerb, and Németh László, whose essays deeply influenced Bibó's intellectual socialization, cultivated it on very high level. This Hungarian essay genre provided the possibility for dealing with pressing historical, social, and political problems in a form which was accessible for the wider public within a culture in which literature had enjoyed higher prestige than philosophy. Bibó's political essay grew out of this interwar Hungarian context. He was an outstanding political thinker, but not a professional political philosopher.

Béla Mester

■ ***Hungarian Philosophy as It Writes Its Own History***

Keywords: *Boëthius de Dacia, East-Central Europe, history of philosophy, Hungarian philosophy, János Erdélyi, János Pósaaházi, József Rozgonyi*

János Erdélyi, a 19th century Hegelian classic of the historiography of Hungarian philosophy has summarised his narrative in the following scheme. The first epoch was the prehistory of Hungarian thought, formulated in a foreign language, Latin; the second one was the long period of the turn from Latin to Hungarian; and the third and last one is when Hungarian philosophy writes its own history, beginning with the foundation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. After Erdélyi's masterpiece on Hungarian philosophy, there have been no serious candidates for a new synthesis until the second half of the 20th century. This paper offers an overview of the last two centuries of the history of Hungarian philosophy in the mirror of its paradigmatic errors. First, it discusses the case of Boëthius de Dacia as a Hungarian mediaeval philosopher, and then the misinterpretation of the early modern

works of János Pósaaházi and József Rozgonyi, following the pattern of the *history of reception*. According to the hypothesis of this paper, all these paradigmatic errors have been caused by a wrong formulation of the connection between the *universal* and the *national* narratives of the history of philosophy. After an overview of the usual solutions to this problem in the Hungarian historiography of philosophy, the author outlines a new method for establishing the paradigm of an East-Central-European history of philosophy, *above*, but *not instead of* the national narratives, which can also modify the universal narrative in several details.

László Percz

■ ***Consistency or Inconsistency? "Passengers" and "Excursionists" in the History of Hungarian Philosophy***

Keywords: *existentialism, history of Hungarian philosophy, Neo-Kantianism, "New-Idealism", Imre Pauer, Ákos Pauler, positivism, Bódog Somló, Béla Tankó*

The essay deals with four significant personalities in the history of Hungarian philosophy in the 20th century: Imre Pauer, Ákos Pauler, Bódog Somló, Béla Tankó. Its argumentation distinguishes two types of philosophers. The "passenger" consistently perseveres in his first chosen philosophy: he is not diverted by new philosophies. The "excursionist", on the other hand, inconsistently, leaves behind his original philosophy, and chooses himself a new one. The conclusion of the essay: Pauer and Tankó are "passengers", Somló and Pauler are "excursionists".

Róbert Somos

■ ***The Young Ákos Pauler and the Italian Philosophers***

Keywords: *history of Hungarian philosophy, Ákos Pauler, philosophical reception, Italian philosophy, Mario Calderoni, Benedetto Croce*

Although his main favourites were German, French and English thinkers, Ákos Pauler, the most respected Hungarian philosopher of the first decades of the 20th century, had also substantial connection with Italian philosophers and works. Treating the topic of the Italian line, according to the chronological order, the following items should be

analysed: 1. Pauler's longer sojourns in Italy before the First World War, when he attended different conferences and made personal relationships with different philosophers, especially with Mario Calderoni. 2. Benedetto Croce's influence on Pauler and the Hungarian philosopher's criticism on Croce's position relating to the problems of pure logic and aesthetics. 3. Pauler's view on Mussolini and its import for the political ideas of the Hungarian thinker. 4. The reception of Pauler's *Grundlegung der Philosophie* in the philosophical school of Naples (Cleto Carbonara, Nicola Abbagnano) and Pauler's answers to their criticisms. 5. Antonio Rosmini-Serbati's and Giovanni Peano's influence on Pauler in his later years in the fields of theistic metaphysics and symbolic logic. The paper focuses on the influences of the early phase of Ákos Pauler's activity and it deals with the first two points.

Nóra Szegedi – Tamás Ullmann

■ ***Autonomy and World Order: Guilt, Fate, and Life History***

Keywords: *László Tengelyi, Immanuel Kant, evil, moral autonomy, guilt, fate, life history, intersubjectivity, privation, culpability*

The article aims to give a picture of László Tengelyi's early works. The first part analyses Tengelyi's relationship to Kant and to the problem of evil in Kantian moral philosophy. The key concepts of his early works are moral autonomy, guilt, fate, history of life, and intersubjectivity. The second part presents Tengelyi's first original work after his significant Kant-interpretations. His *Guilt as Fate Event* (1992) concentrates on the problem of evil, rejecting the classical conception of the metaphysical tradition based on the "privation thesis". By showing that evil cannot be reduced to privation, nonbeing, and nullity, Tengelyi opens up another, latent tradition, that of the tragic view of culpability. The conception of guilt as an eminent event of fate is supposed to be able to substitute the privation thesis of traditional metaphysics. The elaboration of this concept is Tengelyi's first step toward creating his own philosophy.

László Tengelyi

■ ***My Way to Phenomenology***

Keywords: *László Tengelyi, phenomenology, Nicolai Hartmann, Rudolf Bernet, Klaus Held, Bernhard Waldenfels, Marc Richir*

In this interview, László Tengelyi answers the question of the Hungarian Phenomenological Society: "how did you arrive to the phenomenological tradition and to phenomenological thinking?" The form of the answer is an essay which was written in 2006. Tengelyi describes his first encounter with Husserl and Heidegger through Nicolai Hartmann's aesthetics and ontology. This attraction was deepened during his 1988-89 stay in Leuven with the support of the Soros Foundation. Rudolf Bernet and other prominent phenomenologists (Klaus Held, Bernhard Waldenfels, Marc Richir) convinced him that phenomenology is one of the possible ways of original thinking. What distinguishes phenomenology from other contemporary schools of thought (structuralism, analytical philosophy, critical social philosophy) is its inner relation to the whole tradition of Western philosophy. That is why phenomenology, "with its historical saturation", is able to maintain a kind of spiritual vigilance in the philosophical practice.

Tamás Valastyán

■ ***From the Judgement of Taste to the Enjoyment of Reality: Marquard, Fehér and Lyotard on the Disposition of Modernity/Postmodernity***

Keywords: *Jean-François Lyotard, Odo Marquard, Ferenc Fehér, modernity, postmodernity*

The paper compares Jean-François Lyotard's, Odo Marquard's and Ferenc Fehér's conception of aesthetics from the viewpoint of the disposition of modernity/postmodernity. None of the authors considers the comparison between modernity and postmodernity mechanically. While Marquard and Fehér claim the modernity of the postmodern, Lyotard affirms the postmodernity of the modern, with a view to Nietzsche's basic insight that reality can only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon.

Deodáth Zuh

■ *The Historiography of Mannerism Revisited: Arnold Hauser in the Context of 20th Century Criseology*

Keywords: *Mannerism, criseology, Arnold Hauser, Georg Lukács, Max Dvořák, Ernst Gombrich, unified aesthetics*

In this essay, I try to sketch the outlines of two conflicting inquiries concerning the historical position of Mannerism. My basic idea is that they share a common goal of constituting a multifaceted theory of investigating art history. The first is based on the Kantian tradition of unified aesthetics (epistemological, moral and aesthetical studies are grounded in the same architecture of knowledge) and describes the works of art as they are given to our intuitions as the documents of a certain world view or *Weltanschauung*.

The second is rather built on the idea that we have to emphasize the various ways in which the works of art were made and denies that such a world view could be reconstructed. Here I only present a historical case study of the first line of questioning, stating that the young Arnold Hauser was a fierce advocate of artistic style as the bearer of moral, ethical questions. In this way Mannerism is the document of a transitional, critical period in European art history and European culture. If this is correct, Mannerism could be interpreted as a model for investigating and comprehending contemporary instances of transition and crisis. Finally, I trace back this view (as a criseological approach to contemporary culture) to some ideas of the young Georg Lukács.



SZÁMUNK SZERZŐI

A lapszámot szerkesztette:
Ungvári Zrínyi Imre
Rigán Lóránd

Dávid Gyula (1928) – irodalomtörténész, PhD, szerkesztő, Kolozsvár
Gy. Dávid Gyula (1957) – műéptész, Budapest
Demeter Tamás (1975) – tudományos főmunkatárs, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, PTE BTK Filozófia és Művészetelméleti Intézet
Gábor György (1954) – filozófus, egyetemi tanár, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, Országos Rabbiképző – Zsidó Egyetem, Budapest
Gömöri György (1934) – költő, irodalomtörténész, London
Hévízi Ottó (1959) – filozófiatörténész, DSc, tudományos tanácsadó, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, Budapest, egyetemi tanár, Debreceni Egyetem
Kántor Lajos (1937) – irodalomtörténész, az MTA külső tagja, Kolozsvár
Kókai Károly (1959) – hungarológus, egyetemi docens, a Bécsi Egyetem és a Bécsi Kőr Intézet munkatársa
Kovács Gábor (1959) – filozófiatörténész, PhD, tudományos főmunkatárs, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, Budapest
Lakatos Artúr (1980) – történész, PhD, Kolozsvár
László Szabolcs (1978) – szerkesztő, CEU Press, Budapest
Lászlóffy Csaba (1939–2015) – költő
Lurcza Zsuzsanna (1985) – posztdoktori kutató, MTA-ELTE Hermeneutika Kutatócsoport, Budapest
Mester Béla (1962) – filozófiatörténész, PhD, tudományos főmunkatárs, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, Budapest
Percz László (1989) – filozófiatörténész, az MTA doktora, egyetemi tanár, BME
Rigán Lóránd (1980) – filozófiatörténész, PhD, szerkesztő, Korunk, Kolozsvár
Somos Róbert (1958) – filozófiatörténész, intézetvezető egyetemi tanár, DSc, PTE BTK Filozófia és Művészetelméleti Intézet
Sükösd Miklós (1960) – szociológus, egyetemi docens, Koppenhágai Egyetem Média és Kommunikáció Tanszék
Szabó Csongor (1991) – mesterképzés hallgató, BBTE, Kolozsvár
Szegedi Nóra (1968) – filozófiatörténész, PhD, főkönyvtáros, MTA Könyvtár és Információs Központ, Budapest
Székely Géza (1958) – grafikus, könyv-illusztrátor, Kolozsvár
Tengelyi László (1954–2014) – filozófus
Ullmann Tamás (1966) – filozófus, egyetemi tanár, ELTE BTK Filozófia Intézet, Budapest
Ungvári Zrínyi Imre (1960) – filozófus, egyetemi docens, BBTE Magyar Filozófiai Intézet, Kolozsvár
Valastyán Tamás (1969) – filozófiatörténész, habilitált egyetemi docens, Debreceni Egyetem
Zuh Deodáth (1982) – posztdoktori kutató, MTA BTK Filozófiai Intézet, Budapest

TÁMOGATÓK



nka
Nemzeti Kulturális Alap



CM 2015-2016 CONSULIA/ROKOTIAN CUE



„Ki a következetes filozófus? És ki a következetlen? Aki azonnal orientálódó filozófiai irányzatot választ magának, mindvégig rendületlenül kitart mellette, új megközelítések csábításának nem enged, pályájának egészén a maga irányának szellemében gondolkodik? Vagy ellenkezőleg, aki a pályájának kezdetén választott filozófiai irányt inkább ugrópontnak tekinti, új irányok lehetőségeivel szembesülve nem habozik elhagyni az eredetit és megpróbálkozni az újjal, pályája során akár többször is megváltoztatja alapvető filozófiai álláspontját? Az első számára a bölcséleti utazás mintha vonatút lenne: az utast az előre lefektetett sínpályá, meglehet, korábban nem látott tájakra viszi, ám elkoborolni nem engedi. A második számára a bölcsélet útja mintha inkább erdei sétátút volna: a kiránduló egymásba fonódó, hol megszűnő, hol megnyíló ösvényeken jut előre, sétája közben pedig nemegyszer ugyanazt a tájat is másképp látja.”

(Percz László)

ISSN 1222 8338



9 771222 283304 1 5 0 0 6

5 LEJ
500 FT

**FILOSOFI MAGHARI
HUNGARIAN PHILOSOPHERS**