

ABSTRACTS

Gergely Ambrus

■ ***Naturalized Ghosts?***

Keywords: *Gilbert Ryle, René Descartes, “ghost in the machine”, analytical philosophy, philosophy of mind, 4e approaches*

The paper addresses Ryle’s famous critique of Cartesian theories of mind, according to which the mind is a “ghost in a machine”, and mental processes are to be understood as “para-mechanical”, and investigates whether and to what extent this characterization may also be accurate for later accounts of mental phenomena in analytical philosophy. It presents a large-scale overview of the development of analytical philosophy of mind from the mid-20th century until today, including diverse versions of materialism (reductive and non-reductive), functionalism and the cognitivist paradigm, the so-called separationist view of the mind and its criticism based on representationalism about phenomenal content, phenomenal intentionality and cognitive phenomenology, and also the latest alternatives to classical cognitivism, i.e. the so-called 4e approaches (embodied, extended, enacted and embedded theories of mind). The paper considers in some detail whether these accounts may be charged with (still) presenting the mind as being a ghost in the material world, and argues that in different ways and to a different extent this characterization is still applicable, by showing that the first-personal aspects of the mind and mental phenomena cannot be easily explained or explained away, neither by the classical naturalist theories, nor by their new alternatives. Hence, the conclusion is that the ghost is still with us, even if naturalized.

Tamás Demeter

■ ***What Mary Didn’t Know: An Illustration of Mental Fictionalism***

Keywords: *analytical philosophy, philosophy of mind, mental fictionalism, psychological ascriptions*

In this essay I use the episodes from the television series *Downton Abbey* pertaining to Lady Mary’s hesitation to marry Matthew to illustrate the subtlety of human psychology. I argue that it reflects insights about the mental similar to those that can be found in some distinguished parcels of the history of literature from Henry James to Michael Frayn. These can be exploited to illustrate philosophical considerations supporting the largely indeterminate or even fictional character of everyday psychological ascriptions. According to the most obvious interpretation of Mary’s behaviour, her hesitation is due to the uncertainties surrounding the future of the estate: is it going to belong to Matthew or the eventually unborn son of Lord Grantham. This long missing piece of information may be seen as a crucial element in Mary’s deliberation. But in the light of future developments, her motivations might be interpreted differently, and it might shed a different light on her character. For example, she hints at her ignorance of her own motivations behind her wavering (those may, again, be interpreted in various ways), and later it becomes explicit that her affair with the Turkish diplomat poses another psychological obstacle. So there are several, at least partly conflicting interpretations and more complex ones could be invented. In my essay I argue that the conflicting interpretations illustrate either a deep indeterminacy in our psychological practices or the fictional nature of attributing intentions and motivations.

Lajos Horváth

■ ***The Ghost in the Machine and the Animated Body***

Keywords: *Gilbert Ryle, Edmund Husserl, “ghost in the machine”, analytical philosophy, philosophy of mind*

In this paper, I examine the contemporary possibilities of crosstalk between phenomenology and analytical philosophy. In a wider context, the debate between analytical and continental philosophy will be reconsidered, especially focusing on the relation between Ryle and Husserl. The main goal of the paper is to answer the question whether the conceptions of embodied mind and embodied self are able to eliminate the doctrine of the “ghost in the machine”. The interdisciplinary dialogues concerning the phenomenal body are not only aimed at overcoming Cartesian dualism, but also at solving epistemological questions. However, the body-phenomenological turn in the philosophy of mind sheds light on the wider horizons of the unsettled relationship between naturalism and phenomenology, which is also one of the central themes of this paper. According to my conclusions, the result of the contemporary interdisciplinary dialogues may lead to the development of a new concept of the phenomenological unconscious, which is already lurking within the dialogues of body-phenomenology and pre-reflective awareness.

Bence Péter Marosán

■ ***Consciousness as a Higher Level of Information Processing***

Keywords: *philosophy of mind, philosophy of information, biocybernetics, biosemiotics, animal consciousness, phenomenology of mind*

In this article I propose a project-philosophy. My main thesis is that we can interpret consciousness as a

higher form of information processing of material systems (biological organisms). I define consciousness with the following essential features: 1) representation (it represents somehow the internal or external environment of the system, of the living being) 2) first person perspective (somebody is experiencing), 3) phenomenality (qualitative character of certain experiences). By information I mean series of such internal or external effects concerning the system, which are “interpreted” as a sort of sign by the system. My hypothesis is that the emergence of consciousness is in a strong correlation with the special way of operation of a particular material system, with a special level of complexity and a special sort of information processing. In order to explain the emergence of consciousness, according to this hypothesis, one must carry out a comparative analysis of living beings of different level of complexity, with special regard to their particular way of functioning.

Miklós Márton

■ ***Contemporary Theories of Consciousness***

Keywords: *philosophy of mind, consciousness, transitivity, transparency, non-reductivity, higher-order representation, reductionism*

In this paper I offer a short survey of the main contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness, and compare them. I introduce three fundamental common sense intuitions about consciousness, namely: 1. The Transitivity thesis – which says that a state is conscious if the subject is aware of it; 2. The Transparency thesis – which says that in a conscious state the subject is always aware of something else; and the 3. Non-reductivity thesis – which leans on the fact that the consciousness of a state is always a brute fact, and as such, cannot be

reduced to other facts. In the paper I argue that one can associate a theory of consciousness to each of these intuitions. The Higher-Order Representation theories fit nicely to the transitivity thesis, the Representational theories express our intuition about transparency, and the Non-reductionist theories emphasize that consciousness is a brute fact of our mental life. As a result of the comparison, I argue that the first two theories can be plausibly objected to on the ground that they try to reduce consciousness to some functional facts, and that is counterintuitive, while the Non-reductionist theories can be attacked for their weak explanatory power.

Levente Papp

■ ***The Limitations of Functionalism***

Keywords: *phenomenal states, intentionality, representations, functional states, naturalism, the easy and the hard problems of consciousness*

In this study I give a very brief overview of the general theory of functionalism and a particular interpretation of it, which is related to the views of David Chalmers. I consider some of the main objections to functionalism, and then I focus on one of them, namely the critique according to which functionalism leaves out from its account the subjective, qualitative, phenomenal side of the mind. Interestingly enough, Chalmers agrees on this point about this weakness of functionalism, although he still accepts it, thinking that, although this theory cannot be the whole story about the mind, it can quite successfully account for the so-called functional or psychological mind, which can be investigated independently of its phenomenal aspect. According to this strategy, the rise of functionalism and the cognitive sciences with their methods of investigation and their computational models actually

made it possible for the first time to naturalise many workings of the mind. The only metaphysically mysterious part of mentality consists in its first personal mode of existence. But this problem does not prevent us from understanding such processes as sensations, perceptions, thinking and so on – because these processes can very well go on in entities incapable of any subjective experiences (for example, in robots, computers or zombies). I think this move is very problematic and should be rejected on the ground that it assumes falsely that the representational aspect of the mind can be accounted for by the methods of cognitive sciences independently of the subjective aspect of the mind. But if content and consciousness are tightly related to each other, the phenomenal character is constitutive of intrinsic intentionality, and both are part of the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness.

Jenő Pöntör – János Tózsér

■ ***David Lewis (1966)***

Keywords: *David Lewis, mind-body problem, phenomenal consciousness, physicalism, dualism, behaviourism, type identity theory, functionalism, non-reductive materialism*

It was 50 years ago that David Lewis published his paper entitled “An Argument for Identity Theory”. His paper has been one of the most influential works in the area of the philosophy of mind. You can like it or not, but it is certain that Lewis’ paper determines the way of our thinking about the mind-body problem and the nature of consciousness. Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part, we outline the climate of philosophy of mind in the first half of 1960s. In the second one, we reconstruct the argument presented by Lewis. And finally, in the third part, we analyze the very effect of his paper on our contemporary notions of the mind.

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TÁMOGATÓK



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„A kísértetmetafora szerint az elme nem található meg az agyban, illetve a testben, hiszen nincs kiterjedése. Ugyanakkor mégiscsak a testhez kötődik valahogy – úgy szoktuk gondolni, az elménk ott van, ahol a testünk. A »kísértetjelleg« azonban nem csak a kiterjedés-nélküliségben nyilvánul meg: a descartes-i lélek más olyan tulajdonságokkal is bír, amelyek miatt az agy és a test ismerete nem elégséges a megismeréséhez, »megtalálásához«. A lélek olyan különleges létező, amelyik »privilegizált hozzáféréssel« rendelkezik önmagához, azaz közvetlenül és tévedhetetlenül ismerheti meg önmagát, »magánjellegű« lelkiállapotait, úgy, ahogy a »nyilvános«, mások által is megismerhető testi és agyi állapotai alapján nem lehetséges. Az elme tehát nincs az agyban, de mégiscsak ott van valahol, ott kísért – mondhatni.”

(Ambrus Gergely)

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**FANTOMA DIN MAȘINĂ
GHOST IN THE MACHINE**