Summaries

Attila Németh
Epicurus on Self-awareness

Epicurus on Self-awareness takes up the task of reconstructing an element of Epicurus' ethical theory, for which the primary evidence is only available on some surviving papyri from the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum, Italy. Some of the scrolls of book XXV of *On Nature*, Epicurus' *magnum opus*, preserved Epicurus' ideas of self-awareness through the so-called *pathologikos tropos* or through the manner of one's affections. On the strength of the available evidence I venture to give an account of Epicurus' understanding of self-perception in this particular manner, which also helps us understand its ethical function in Epicurus' self-reflective thinking that is also apparent in some of these papyri fragments.

Attila Hangai
Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Stoic phantasia kalalēptikē

Once Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his *De anima*, identified the capacity of phantasia and defined what true and false phantasia are, he set out to comment on the epistemological consequences of his account (*De anima* 71. 5–21). This, as has already been attested by commentators, is a reaction to the Stoic view according to which *katalēptikē phantasia* (cognitive impression) is a criterion of truth. Alexander, as an Aristotelian, cannot admit that phantasia—belonging to the perceptual part of the soul—should be a sufficient criterion of truth in itself. But since his own account of true phantasia is reminiscent to the Stoic phantasia kalalēptikē—both in the concepts used and in wording—Alexander briefly marks his view off the Stoic theory. My aim in the paper is to show that (1) Alexander's remarks are similar to a skeptic, Carneadean, attack against the Stoic theory, and can be treated as an outline of a reliabilist epistemology, and (2) that inspite of this Carneadean parallel, Alexander's position is consistent with the orthodox Aristotelian view, according to which knowledge may not be based on phantasia or perception exclusively, but a higher cognitive faculty of the soul is also required: the intellect (nous).

ÉVA BEKŐ
Dualism as Redemptive Recognition: The Philosophy of *Sāṃkhya*

The subject of this essay is the Indian Sāṃkhya philosophy. My aim is to show the differences between Sāṃkhya and the most significant Western dualist theories, namely substance dualism and property dualism. I intend to demonstrate two essential differences between Sāṃkhya and the Western dualist theories. First, Sāṃkhya defines itself not as mind-body dualism or a dualism of mental and physical properties, but makes a contrast between the spiritual, passive experiencer and the experienced, active, material world. As a result of this, Sāṃkhya avoids the problem of mental causation which is the most difficult problem for the Western dualisms. Second, Sāṃkhya, as opposed to the Western dualist theories, emphasises a practical, soteriological aim: the right practice of philosophy leads people to salvation, i.e. to the eventual cessation of suffering.

ÁDÁM SMRCZ
The Conflict of Faculties, or Edward Herbert of Cherbury on Innatism

Ever since the publication of Locke's *Essay*, Edward Herbert of Cherbury has been uncritically regarded as an advocate of innatism. However, recent scholarship has highlighted that Locke might have had other motivations in mind when he chose Herbert as his opponent than philosophical ones. The aim of this paper is to show that Locke in fact used Herbert as a strawman, and that the latter thinker can be regarded rather as an empiricist than an innatist. In orded to show this, the paper reconstructs the line of argument provided in Herbert's *De Veritate*, and contrasts it with Locke's interpretation.

OLIVÉR ISTVÁN TÓTH
Forms, Infinite Modes and Eternity of the Mind in Spinoza's *Ethics*

In this paper, I link the problems of the eternity of the mind, of infinite modes and of form in Spinoza's *Ethics*. I argue that Spinoza uses four interrelated concepts consistently: form, formal essence, formal being and formal causation. I present a reading of Spinoza's distinction of finite and infinite modes based on Tim Crane's philosophy of mind and I argue for an interpretation of finite modes as events and infinite modes as properties. I argue that formal essences are infinite modes and their instantiations are the formal beings of finite modes, whereas by form Spinoza refers to either of these categories. I claim that this reading helps us to understand Spinoza's doctrine of the eternal part of the mind, which has been either understood as a substantial claim about personal immortality (Stock 1990; Matson 2000), or as a trivial claim about eternal truths (Garrett 2009; Schmaltz 2015; Yovel 1989).

JÓZSEF SIMON
Miklós Bethlen and the Praying Automaton

The paper examines the problem of speaking without conscious control of the mind in Early Modern philosophy by analysing a passage from Miklós Bethlen's (1642–1716) Introduction to his *Autobiography* written in 1708. Bethlen's central example is the following: imagine a person who unconsciously repeats the words of a priest praying during a divine service and who is thinking simultaneously of some undetermined other thing which has nothing to do with the context of his mechanical act of speech. On the one hand, the example challenges the traditional Cartesian view according to which the structured appearance of signs during acts of speech is a strong argument for the existence of an immaterial human mind. On the other hand, the theorem of unconscious speech performance is supported by Bethlen's conviction that human mind cannot execute more than one act at the very same time. The paper interprets Bethlen's argument concerning speech, mind and attention in the context of leading Cartesians' (Claude Clerselier, Gérauld de Cordemoy, Frans Burman etc.) achievements.

ÁKOS CSEKE
The Government of Self and Others
The Ethical, Political and Theological Aspects of Care
in Foucault's Later Work

The starting point of this paper is the book of Giorgio Agamben (*The Use of Bodies*) in which Agamben gives a critic of Pierre Hadot's reading of the late Michel Foucault. In this article I try to argue that while Agamben is right to demonstrate that by „aesthetics of existence" Foucault meant a sort of ethical experience (thus we cannot speak about a „dandysme" of the late Foucault), this experience is all at once a political *and* a theological experience. Foucault does not elaborate a single ethical or aesthetical theory but rather several ones, sometimes quite antagonistic theories of the subject in which he argues, surprisingly enough, not only that the divine as „a subject in the subject" is the ontological basis of the self, but also that the care of the self and the care of the others is inconceivable without the real presence and the care of the divine in the heart of the human subject.

FERENC TAKÓ
Notions of Love in Japanese Confucian Thought

This article is a study of the interpretation of "love" as "care for someone" (*ai* 愛) in Japanese thought, focusing on Confucian teachings. The paper shows that in native *shintō* thought love constitutes a link between human and divine spheres, and in Buddhist teachings it is rejected as "worldly desire". In Confucian thought, although love is traditionally marginalized, it becomes more central in 18th century Japan due to neo-Confucian thinkers' emphasis on feelings. I argue that although there is a fundamental difference between primarily individualistic Western notions of love and the nature of "love"

in the Japanese tradition, through the Confucian understanding of "love as care" we can grasp the Japanese notion of love, which can later serve as a basis for further, more comparative studies.

GYÖRGY MÁTÉ J.
The Butterfly and the Ant
Some Remarks on Lessing's *Ernst and Falk, Conversations for Freemasons*

Much has been said about G. E. Lessing as one of the key figures of German Enlightenment. Particularly well known is his parable of the three rings *(Nathan the Wise)*, a symbolic tale about religious tolerance. Nevertheless, relatively few articles have investigated his *Conversations for Freemasons*. First, this paper reconstructs Lessing's fragmentary philosophy of language through the text, which can be considered as an early modern version of a Socratic dialogue. Second, it will analyze the German writer's ideas on politics – a utopian response to history. Third, the article discusses some problems of the many faceted 18. century German freemasonry.