

# Angol nyelvű összefoglaló

## Husserl's Methodological Transcendentalism

LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI

Husserl's 'transcendental idealism' has been a stumbling-block in the eyes of several thinkers, who have been attracted by the phenomenological method. Among these thinkers, not only Ingarden, Patočka or Merleau-Ponty can be mentioned but also Heidegger, who severely criticized the subjectivism and idealism he had detected in Husserl's *Ideas I*. However, it is almost immediately after the publication of *Ideas I* that, in the draft of an amended second edition of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, published now in the volume XX of the series *Husserliana*, the meaning of Husserl's transcendental idealism begins to change. It is documented by some research texts, now available in the volume XXXVI of the series *Husserliana*, how, between 1914 and 1917, Husserl increasingly realizes that, in *Ideas I*, he did not properly take into account the embodiment of the subject and the fact of intersubjectivity. As a result of this reflection, transcendental idealism takes an entirely new form. Assuredly, Husserl continues to consider the world as constituted by consciousness. That is why he rejects dogmatic materialism or naturalism and insists on what he designates as 'transcendental idealism'. However, he does not shrink from assuming a phase of purely material nature in the history of the world. This fact shows that, in reality, *phenomenological transcendentalism does not entail any commitment to idealism in the customary sense of this word*. Indeed, Husserl envisages a world *without* subjects that actually experience it, adding that such a world is only conceivable as the past of a world *with* such subjects. What is meant here is a past constituted retroactively ('backwards') by these subjects. Since the transcendentalism of backward constitution does not seem to entail any commitment to idealism in the customary sense of this word, it may be misleading to designate it as 'transcendental idealism'. Therefore, it is suggested in the paper that Husserl's phenomenological approach should be characterized as a *methodological transcendentalism*, even if this term is not used by Husserl himself. It is added that only a methodological transcendentalism can find a way out of the irresolvable antinomy between a dogmatic materialism or naturalism and an equally dogmatic idealism.

## **Philosophical Naturalism and the Problem of Natural Kinds**

FERENC HUORANSZKI

The paper argues that all properties that are essential for a particular or stuff to belong to a certain natural kind are dispositional. Both phenomenal properties (e.g. having a certain color) and macro-structural states (e.g. having certain number of legs) are kind-specific essential properties to the extent that they are the manifestations of the particular's or the stuff's dispositions. The usual arguments against the view that phenomenal and macro-structural properties can be metaphysically essential for kind-membership fail to distinguish properly between the conditions of having a disposition and the conditions of its manifestation. Finally, the paper shows that constitution and genetic makeup is metaphysically essential for kind-membership only if they are necessary for the explanation of the relevant set of dispositional properties. Thus, if Twin-Earth scenarios are metaphysically possible – which is not obvious – then they prove that the type of constitution is not essential for kind-membership.

## **The Origin of our Species**

ÁKOS SIVADÓ

In this paper I study the connection between our social and biological kinds and the way we divide our natural and social environment according to our scientific interests. The article tries to examine the nature of our biological and social kind terms based on the differences in their constitution – and the consequences that follow for the scientific generalizations, explanations and predictions they make possible. I also try to show that these differences render a reductionist methodology untenable.

## **Naturalism, Skepticism and Rationality**

### **The Evolutionary Skeptical Argument of Alvin Plantinga**

MIKLÓS SZALAI

According to Alvin Plantinga's famous „Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism” (EAAN), the evolutionary-naturalistic account of our cognitive powers should make us skeptical about their reliability – because the truth, justifiability, implication and other logical-epistemological properties of our beliefs are „invisible” to natural selection, which selects the most adaptive, and not the most truth-conducive beliefs and cognitive mechanisms (or their bearers). The author analyzes Plantinga's argument from an epistemological standpoint. To some extent EAAN is self-refuting, and externalist and common-sense philosophical strategies also may be working against it. However, the conclusion of the article is, that the really effective response to Plantinga's challenge is a non-naturalistic, apriori account (and defense) of the reliability of our cognitive powers.

## **Naturalism in Psychology**

CSABA PLÉH

The paper first shows that naturalism as such does not clearly show up in present day psychology. It certainly is evidenced, however, in discussing materialistic reductionism. The author goes on to argue that present day naturalism has a better fate than its predecessors. There are two main reasons for this. First, we are approaching the mind from two biological perspectives, both Darwinian and neuroscience models are used to interpret the mind. Second, present day biology with its emphasis on neuronal plasticity and epigenetic models in unfolding the genetic envelope allows the psychologist to entertain naturalism while at the same time avoiding any strict determinism.

## **Philosophical Naturalism and the Heterogeneity of the Sciences**

GÁBOR ZEMPLÉN – GÁBOR KUTROVÁ CZ

The paper argues that philosophical naturalism, in the light of a view of science emerging as a consensus-view in the social and cultural studies of science, is facing some fundamental problems. On the one hand, the profound and manifold heterogeneity of scientific practice poses serious difficulties to many ontological versions of naturalism - adding arguments to the classical criticism given by Craig and Mellor. On the other hand, methodological interpretations of naturalism seem either inconsistent when relying on a Utopian vision of the unified scientific enterprise, or empty when including itself among the plethora of scientific practices. The paper urges the reconsideration of essential findings of contemporary empirical investigations of science when carrying out philosophical analyses, especially when these are intended to be naturalistic.