

The Rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: British Postwar Planning in the Second World War

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In the interwar years, academics tended to consider the Austro-Hungarian Empire a “failure” and focussed their attention on the nationalities of eastern Europe. Then after 1945, a revolution occurred and there arose a truly remarkable proliferation of specialized studies on the Habsburg lands and peoples. A 1964 survey revealed that between the wars Austro-Hungarian history had been an inert area of academic publishing. Yet since the Second World War it has spawned 83 major books and 366 learned articles by 175 North American academics.¹ This achievement was celebrated in 1966 by an international conference of Habsburg scholars at Indiana University, at which Paul Schroeder reported with satisfaction on the past generation of an expansion in Habsburg studies in North America, while Adam Wandruska and Fritz Fellner reached the same conclusion with regard to Europe.²

At this meeting, Wandruska posed the question of why after 1945 there had appeared so many “Habsburg” publications. He gave, as the main reason, the postwar search within Austro-Hungarian history for a multinational model, or a solution to the evils of integral or extreme nationalism in the Danubian area.³ After the Second World War, the main cause for the collapse of the region into disunity and conflict was seen to be nationalism. Perhaps the old multinational empire had, after all, something to teach the world. In 1968, the doyen of this new historical school, Robert Kann, proudly reflected that at the end of the war he had selected the nationality problem in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as his Columbia University thesis topic for this reason:

It occurred to me to compile and comment on the various attempts that had been made towards a solution of the nationality

problem in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to investigate to what extent they might correspond to the upcoming problems of a peaceful order in Europe. ... What interested me above all were the modifications of basic ideas of the nationality problem in a changing historical framework — possibly a framework of the future.⁴

The new postwar sympathy for the Habsburg monarchy of the previous generation represented a reversal in mood, from national towards multinational answers.

This paper will link this shift in sentiments to official post-World War II British plans for central and southeastern Europe. Assisted by some of the best academic minds available, the British and the American governments came to the conclusion, during the war, that Austria, Hungary, and the successor states were too weak to be set up again as independent states, but must instead be formed into some sort of Danubian federation; an Austria-Hungary without the Habsburgs. Despite Russian reservations, this federative program was to remain basic Allied policy to the end of the war. Whereas during the First World War propagandists had called for the dismemberment of the Empire in the interests of nationalism, by World War II, planners felt the breakup of Austria-Hungary had been a mistake and hoped to re-establish a multinational solution for the area. In the process, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was rehabilitated. As the wartime academic planners returned to the universities with their new “multinational” conclusions, this view entered the mainstream of academic historical interest. Although this study will discuss the British side of the story, it is important to note that the Americans came to a similar conclusion during this period.

The Second World War was fought by the West, at first, not to bring about change in the international order, but to rescue Europe from Hitler; a later aim was to rebuild Europe on a sounder basis. The planners were certainly unable, at least in the early stages of the war — during which their own nations’ existence was threatened — to conceive that the hostilities would end in a completely unexpected fashion with a weakened Britain, a strong Soviet presence in eastern Europe, and a United States deeply implicated in European affairs. Thus, planning in a wartime vacuum became, in effect, a series of historical seminars about the peace of 1919 and its consequences, rather than an analysis or speculation about an as yet unknown future of a very different nature. The net result was a sharp repudiation of some of the basic principles of the post-World War I

treaties, especially the touchstone of nationalism as a historically legitimate organizing factor for political life in central and south-eastern Europe.

Between the wars, the mysterious arena of foreign affairs was opened up for the first time to public and academic scrutiny, creating a large pool of interested citizens and scholarly experts. Wilson's 1917-19 "Inquiry," a private group of scholarly advisers to the peace conference, was the harbinger of change, which became more general as broader groups of people began asking how it had been possible for the nations to have fallen into such a bloody and costly war and unsatisfactory peace.⁵ Large public, and publicly funded, bodies appeared on the scene to arouse public opinion about international relations that, before the war, had been the preserve of statesmen and professional diplomats. Two powerful (and public) international affairs organizations sprang from the British and American delegations to the 1919 Versailles conference: the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York.⁶ Other interested groups, such as the various League of Nations and peace societies, prospered as well. New chairs of international affairs were established at universities, and history courses stressed international affairs more than ever. Public political inquiries studied the causes of war and the foundations of peace.

In the First World War, there had been little attempt to discuss a comprehensive peace settlement while hostilities continued. In the Second World War the planners hoped to avoid what they saw as the mistakes of the previous war by scanning the past for clues to a better future. Their historical approach was reinforced through a unique cooperation between official diplomatic planners and highly qualified academic experts from the universities, the RIIA and the CFR. Many of these leading outside experts pressed into planning service in the Second World War were the same scholars who, in World War I, had praised the principle of nationalism as the only basis for a legitimate and secure peace in Europe. In 1939 when the tragedy of war exploded once again, the scholarly RIIA and CFR almost immediately initiated studies on the future peace and offered their vast resources for research and planning to the Foreign Office and the State Department. The offers were gratefully accepted by busy diplomatic bureaux overwhelmed by the rush of day-to-day events, in this way encouraging — in the official World War II planning process — a historical and academic slant to postwar peace problems.

British wartime political planning was centred in the Foreign

Office, which made sure that it maintained its predominant influence over the process. The Foreign Office produced the government's long, thoughtful background planning papers and policy recommendations for the War Cabinet, based on position papers written for it by Arnold Toynbee's RIIA independent wartime research branch, the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), and its successor, the Foreign Office's Research Department (FORD). The FRPS was a research, and eventually a planning, agency organized in 1939 by Toynbee and staffed largely by academics, which operated until 1943 as a branch of the RIIA at Balliol College, Oxford. The FORD eventually took over this work when Toynbee and some of his staff entered the Foreign Office directly in 1943.

Toynbee was no stranger to the Foreign Office, having been active there as a young man during the First World War, if only as a propagandist. Early in that war the Foreign Office established a four-man Political Intelligence Department under the chairmanship of the eminent historian Sir James Headlam-Morley.⁸ His staff consisted of the two young historians: Toynbee and Lewis Napier, as well as two Australian brothers, Allen and Rex Leeper. Their activity at the Foreign Office under Headlam-Morley had more to do with propaganda than with the historian's craft, as Toynbee later admitted. One of Toynbee's first tasks was to edit the Blue Book on the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He also collaborated with Lord Bryce on official propaganda publications about alleged German atrocities in Belgium and France, an activity he later regretted, writing that "we behaved irresponsibly."⁹ Like others of his generation, Toynbee believed strongly that nationalism was the force of the future and deserved to take the place of the old multinational empires in eastern Europe. His first books on the virtues of nationalism for Europe were published during this phase of his career.¹⁰

Five years after RIIA's foundation, Toynbee joined its staff in 1925 as research director, remaining active in that position for over thirty years.¹¹ He had just left his chair of Byzantine and Greek studies at the University of London, after supporting the Turkish side in the Greco-Turkish War, and gratefully accepted the new position.¹² Until 1939 Toynbee spent half his time on the *Survey* and the rest on his other activities as a professor of international relations at the University of London and as author of the multi-volume *Study of History*, which began to appear in print in 1934 under RIIA sponsorship. In theory, Toynbee completely supported the RIIA aim of encouraging the writing of objective, non-partisan studies of

international affairs, and then the Nazi threat became serious and he felt moved to take sides and warn against it.¹³

The year 1938 was a great lesson, as the *Anschluss* and threats of war over Czechoslovakia caused some to begin to listen to Cassandras such as Toynbee. At the same time, the Foreign Office became aware that it was unable to keep up with the Nazis' new, hyperactive style of foreign policy initiatives. Its small staff could do nothing more than try to cope with its traditional diplomatic activity, leaving it powerless to meet any additional crisis or task.¹⁴ Rex Leeper, Toynbee's old colleague from the days of World War I Foreign Office propaganda work and now an official in the F.O., turned to his influential friend for advice and assistance.¹⁵ The result was the formation at Oxford of a nominally independent, but in reality Foreign Office-supported, research organization run by Toynbee, the FRPS.

They agreed Toynbee would recruit a large team of international affairs experts from the RIIA in London, as well as from the universities, to operate as a semi-independent, confidential information and intelligence group for the Foreign Office. In return, the government would subsidize the group's work.¹⁶ Toynbee made an agreement with Oxford to set up his new group at Balliol College. He attached to it other eminent specialists in international affairs, including Professor Robert W. Seton-Watson (one of the most powerful voices during the First World War in favour of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire).¹⁷ This arrangement was formally confirmed between RIIA and the Foreign Office on the eve of the second war, in August 1939.¹⁸ Toynbee collected a large staff of 121.¹⁹ Oxford and its colleges agreed to cover the salaries of 11 of Toynbee's academic assistants.²⁰ At the end of 1940, Toynbee reorganized FRPS's research structure on a new basis of geography and included a separate unit for the "Danubian Countries," which was to consider the crucial postwar problems of those nations.²¹

One of the first postwar planning papers requested of the FRPS by the Foreign Office dealt with the sensitive problem of the Danubian region or as one official worded it (apparently not realizing that the term had no relevance in the context of the day), "the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."²² Long before officials considered entering into the difficult question of Germany's reconstruction, in 1941 they took up the problem of how to avoid another German, or perhaps Soviet, threat to the splintered and weak area of Austria, Hungary and the successor states in southeastern Europe. The FRPS was commissioned to see whether this region should be returned to its prewar condition as a collection of independent

countries, or whether this area would stand a better chance politically, economically and strategically in the postwar world if its nations aligned themselves in some sort of eastern European bloc.²³

It quickly became evident that official Foreign Office and academic FRPS opinions on the Danubian question were similar. Prewar official reports had long pondered this intractable Danubian problem from the viewpoint that the internal instability of these countries and their sharp, irreconcilable interstate rivalries had allowed Germany to move easily into the area. The victors of the First World War had expected the region to become sufficiently strong and prosperous to resist German and Soviet pressures, but these hopes were dashed in the interwar period.²⁴ Such Foreign Office views did not differ, in essence, from those held before the Second World War by the scholarly RIIA experts.

Between the wars, nationalist ideologues such as Toynbee and Seton-Watson had begun to reverse their positions. In 1929, in his *Survey of International Affairs*, Toynbee had compared the area's weakness and rivalries and the Franco-Italian competition there to the situation immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War.²⁵ Seton-Watson, who had once been a leader in the campaign for national independence in the region, and who saw that ideal as the only practical and historically justified solution for the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire, by the 1930s, also came to the reluctant realization that the importance of the question of frontiers in southeastern Europe had to be reduced in importance in order to arrive at some sort of supranational economic and political union or federation.²⁶ His son Hugh took up his father's cause during the war.²⁷ A 1939 RIIA study on southeastern Europe, although concentrating specifically on the Nazi threat, was able to record only geographical, political, economic, and cultural friction in the area, rendering it impotent and indefensible.²⁸ Thus, even before FRPS was established in 1939, official and academic minds had moved towards the notion of a federative solution as the only possible route out of the Danubian labyrinth for Austria, Hungary and the successor states.

The 1941 FRPS paper on southeastern Europe, therefore, not surprisingly suggested that the countries of the Danube should form a multinational Danubian state of some sort after the war. The organizational approach to the problem was to forecast the future on the basis of the past, generally a not unreasonable strategy in the eyes of historians. Almost its entire thirty-two pages were devoted to reviewing the sad history of southeastern Europe since 1918. Its multinational recommendation was arrived at as a historically

determined conclusion. No attempt was made to speculate about the role of Soviet Russia there. This was probably not too surprising because at the time, the Russians were still battling for their lives and their continued survival was in grave doubt. On the other hand, one of the advantages of the federation proposal was that it countered not only a possible German threat, but it might counteract any Soviet pressure as well.²⁹ When the document was adopted almost unchanged by the War Cabinet as official policy two years later in 1943, the military situation of the Soviets had changed dramatically, yet the same purely historical arguments regarding a revived, postwar German threat were still mustered.³⁰

Southeastern Europe, or as the paper termed it, "Danubia," had finally fallen prey to undesirable forms of nationalism. What this bold admission represented was a savage repudiation, on the part of Toynbee, Seton-Watson, and the other FRPS experts, of what they had once called for as the only possible solution for the region. The League of Nations had provided a wholly inadequate interstate bond, and there had not been, after 1918, the hoped for movement towards voluntary political and economic cooperation between the states. Any evolution in this direction, essential for the well-being of all the nations in the region, had been rendered sterile by local interstate rivalries. These rivalries, and the ensuing regional weakness, had allowed Germany easy penetration of the area in the 1930s, first economically, then politically and, in the end, militarily. A later Foreign Office memorandum said: "The time for a healthy and independent Danubian union, in which Austria could have found her natural function as an experienced and cultured 'older brother' of the successor states, had gone."³¹ Instead of giving the region the benefit of their greater experience, Austria and Hungary, still smarting from the loss of their conationals and the breakup of their economic hinterland in the First World War, had done their bit to regain lost territories and rend asunder the post-1919 territorial arrangement.

Ironically, the one-time critics of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire now found themselves cast in the role of its defenders in more modern dress. The failed 1919-39 model of independent eastern European states dominated their thinking. The national principle had obviously proved to be unworkable in a "Danubia," as its people were too intermixed and too inclined towards emotional displays ever to coexist in peace and order, and so some other supranational idea had to be introduced. The FRPS's chastened historians and planners now admitted that the easy application in 1919 of the national principle to the region had been a misapplica-

tion of a sound western idea in a totally different and inappropriate context. At the basis of the area's tragedy lay the "enthusiastic application of Western ideas torn from their Western context." One of the main derivatives of this shattering new wisdom was that the old, multinational Habsburg state, as viewed from 1938, seemed to have been much more successful than it had appeared prior to and during the First World War. What then of the future? Once touted in its innocent, untried youthfulness as the area's road to salvation, nationalism had instead turned into the disease of the age. To attempt to reorganize the area after the war as it had existed after 1919 would simply be to insist on marching down the same suicidal road, leading again to a weakened and isolated Austria, another *Anschluss* by an aggressive Germany, and renewed German penetration into and control of the weak states of the Danubian region. A second Austrian *Anschluss*, the inevitable first step in this evil process, had to be avoided. Hungarian national resentment, too, had to be moderated.

Consequently, the British planning paper under discussion recommended it was time to realize that before 1914, "a more practical alternative appeared to be not the maintenance of the unities of Austria and Hungary, but the application within them of national and cultural autonomy."³² This inclination to historical revisionism led the planners to the seemingly inevitable conclusion that the postwar interests of Europe and the Danubian states — not excluding Austria and Hungary — would best be served by following the historic path set by pre-1914 Austria-Hungary, only without the Habsburgs this time. The substance of the planners' major recommendation, the creation of a Danubian federation supported economically and diplomatically by the West, was modelled on the old Empire. Federal institutions, along with local and cultural autonomy, should combine to create a large, tolerant Danubian state able to form and maintain a large internal market and to defend itself against any renewed German aggression. "It needed the cataclysm of this war to open the eyes of European public opinion to the need of Danubian unity." The paper took it for granted that not only the British, but also the various peoples of "Danubia" would have reached this same enlightened view by the end of the war. Churchill favoured it in general, and there appeared to be no other possible solution.³³

In mid-1943, Toynbee and some FRPS staff were taken directly into the Foreign Office, and their federative Danubian recommendation became official policy. The Foreign Office appointed the FRPS staff as temporary civil servants within its growing Research

Department — FORD — and there they remained for the duration of the war. The FRPS's multinational and federative Danubian concept was recommended by the Foreign Office to the War Cabinet as by far the "most attractive solution to the region's problems," and was adopted as government policy. This notion was to serve as an end in itself rather than as a public policy, as there still existed too many variables in the equation. For the moment, such a "confederation" had to hover in a fairly "nebulous" state, as it was not yet apparent whether Poles, Czechs, and Russians were attracted to the plan. However, as the Foreign Office noted, it represented a solid goal to be pursued. It was "desirable to work for ... a Central (or southeastern) European confederation," although matters did not need to be rushed.³⁴ In accepting the federative concept in June 1943, the War Cabinet agreed with both the goal and this loose schedule for realization.³⁵

This Second World War rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by official and academic postwar planners later led to interesting repercussions concerning the direction of scholarly activity in the postwar era. Many FRPS and FORD experts returned at the conclusion of hostilities to academic posts and continued to write in the same vein about southeastern Europe. Toynbee's first postwar RIIA *Survey of International Affairs* sounded like an echo of the 1941 FRPS Austrian paper and the 1943 Cabinet decision. It again blamed the 1938-39 collapse of southeastern Europe on mistakes by the 1919 victors.³⁶ "The history of the Versailles system in eastern Europe," the *Survey* judged, "showed in microcosm what the League of Nations showed in the world at large, that sovereign states are incapable of disciplined co-operation for a long period in defence of a static international order."³⁷

True to these same wartime insights, Toynbee's FRPS colleague, historian C.A. Macartney (whose first university scholarship had been decided by a college board on which Toynbee sat), was still warning, in 1962, about the dangers of national independence in southeastern Europe. In effect, the Soviets had imposed by force a type of multinational structure on the region. Should Soviet control over the area one day disappear, Macartney questioned whether independent states in "Danubia" could offer a viable alternative:

To put back the fourteen national states of the interwar period, with their interwar frontiers, would be to invite a repetition of the former failure. ... The solution of the East European problem lies in the creation of some larger multinational state with special institutions appropriate to the special conditions of the area.³⁸

The question is still raised today.

In this way, the revised standard historical version of the multinational Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the adverse role of nationalism devised during World War II continued after 1945 to influence historical studies. The negative side of nationalism was now heavily stressed, and as eastern Europe fell under Soviet domination, national archives there remained closed to westerners. A remarkable revival of interest in, and nostalgia for, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire as a field of study and possible model for the political, economic, and cultural problems of southeastern Europe was witnessed. This trend became transatlantic, for, at about the same time, the Americans arrived at similar conclusions based on their own wartime study of Austria-Hungary and "Danubia."

Notes

1. Cited in the introduction to "The Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3 (1967), Part 1, p. 7.
2. Paul W. Schroeder, "The Status of Habsburg Studies in the United States"; Fritz Fellner, "Habsburg Studies in Europe"; Adam Wandruska, "Comments"; *ibid.*, Part 3, pp. 267-310.
3. Wandruska, pp. 307-10.
4. Robert A. Kann's curriculum vitae (*Lebenslauf*), written in 1968 for his election as corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, is discussed in Stanley B. Winters, "The Forging of a Historian: Robert A. Kann in America, 1939-1976," *Austrian History Yearbook* 17/18 (1981/1982), p. 6. Kann's completed doctoral thesis, dating from before the Second World War, and concerning the Habsburgs, was expanded by the author into his famous two-volume work *The Multinational Empire* (New York, 1950).
5. E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (New York, 1963).
6. Council on Foreign Relations, *A Record of Fifteen Years* (New York, 1937), pp. 22-25. Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy* (New York, London, 1977), despite its aggressively Marxist thesis, contains good information.
7. G. Stanley, "Great Britain and the Austrian Question, 1938-1945" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1973), p. 85ff; R. Wagenleitner, "Grossbritannien und die Wiederrichtung der Republik Österreich" (Ph.D. diss., University of Salzburg, 1975), p. ivff. Other major committees included the Armistice and Civil Committee, Ministerial Armistice and Terms Committee and the Civil Administration Committee under Atlee, which became the Armistice and Postwar Committee in 1944.
8. A.J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967), p. 167ff.
9. A.J. Toynbee, *The Armenian Massacres in the Ottoman Empire* (Blue Book, London, 1917), also in French; and *The German Terror in Belgium* and *The German Terror in France*, 2 vols. (London, New York, 1917); "... We were also naively sure that our cause was one hundred per cent righteous We behaved irresponsibly in shutting our eyes to the possible long-term consequences of our hand-to-mouth acts," Toynbee, *Experiences* (New York, London, 1969), pp. 304-05; T.W. Wilson, "Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-1918," in *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979), p. 369ff; M.L. Saunders and P.M. Taylor, *British Propaganda During World War One, 1914-1918* (London, 1982), p. 137ff; W. Lacquer,

- in *The Terrible Secret* (London, 1980), p. 9, blamed this type of World War One propaganda, later unmasked as false, as one of the chief reasons the World War Two Jewish massacres received so little credence.
10. A.J. Toynbee, *Nationality and War* (London, 1915); *The New Europe* (London, 1917).
 11. Toynbee, *Experiences*, p. 611ff; M.L. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office and the Proposed Institute of International Affairs, 1919," *International Affairs* 56 (1980), p. 667; Council on Foreign Relations, *Record of Twenty-Five Years*, p. 5ff.
 12. A.J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922). Also D. Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications a la Conference de Paix* (Paris, 1963), pp. 454-57.
 13. A.J. Toynbee, *Toynbee on Toynbee: A Conversation Between A.J. Toynbee and G.R. Urban* (New York, 1974), p. 57; *Acquaintances*, pp. 110ff; see his "The Issues in British Foreign Policy," and "After Munich," in *International Affairs* 17 (1938), pp. 307-37, and *International Affairs* 18 (1939), p. 1ff.
 14. P.M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 218ff, 271ff. Also F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* 1 (London, 1979), pp. 5, 10, 17.
 15. P.M. Taylor, "'If War Should Come': Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War," in *Journal of Contemporary History* 16 (1981), pp. 43-47. M. Balfour, *Propaganda at War* (London, 1979), p. 90.
 16. Press Surveys of the FRPS are published in *The Review of the Foreign Press, 1939-1945* (Munich), 27 vols.
 17. RHLB (Foreign Office) to Robert W. Seton-Watson, 12 October 1939, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 898 (Political Warfare), p. 29.
 18. F. Ashton-Gwatkin, *Report on FRPS*, 10 January 1941, PRO, FO 898, p. 29.
 19. Including the following academics, together with some of their writings: C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors, 1919-1937* (London, 1937) and *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1937); I.F.D. Morrow, *The Peace Settlement and the German-Polish Borderlands* (London, 1936); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans* (London, 1938); R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Rumanians* (London, 1934) and *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934); and Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934-1939), *The Problem of International Investment* (London, 1937), *Central and Southeastern Europe: Syllabus for a Study Group* (London, 1938). Included among the 121 were 23 paid research assistants, 24 volunteer researchers and 74 assistants and clerical staff.
 20. Some of the volunteers were eminent professors as well. For instance, N.H. Baynes worked on his two-volume annotated *Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 to August 1939* (London, 1942), while with FRPS. M. Balfour, *Propaganda at War*, p.59ff.
 21. Toynbee's coordinating committee consisted of himself, Sir J. Hope Simpson and Professors Paton and Price. Eleven subcommittees were established, including "The German State and Nazi Regime," "Regional New Orders," and "The Danubian Countries: States and Peoples." See Ashton-Gwatkin Report, p. 29.
 22. R. Shackle, an officer in the FO German Department, to Ashton-Gwatkin, 18 June 1941, and note of 23 July 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26537.
 23. W. Selby to O. Harvey, and Walford to Harvey, *op. cit.*, 26538.
 24. Stanley, *Great Britain and the Austrian Question*, pp.22ff.
 25. A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London, 1929), p. 153.
 26. Robert W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revision...*, pp. 69-71.
 27. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941* (London and Hamden, Connecticut, 1943, 1962), p. 411.
 28. RIIA, *South-Eastern Europe: A Political and Economic Survey* (London, 1939).
 29. Toynbee to R. Makins, enclosing Laffan's draft FRPS memorandum on Austria, one copy for Sir Anthony Eden, 2 October 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26538.
 30. The 1943 War Cabinet decision read, "There was general agreement that we

should aim at a Central European or Danubian Group centred in Vienna. ..." PRO, Cabinet Documents 65/34, WM 86 (43), 92-93, 218, of 25 May 1943.

31. Memorandum on Austria, 2 October 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26538.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. Foreign Office memorandum, 3 April 1943, PRO, FO 371, 34466.

35. David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945* (London, 1980), p. 34; Foreign Office telegramme to Moscow, 25 September 1943, and Dominions Office print to Dominions, 19 July 1943, PRO, FO 371, 34466.

36. M. Wright, "Eastern Europe," in A.J. Toynbee and F.T. Ashton-Gwatkin, eds. *Survey of International Affairs: The World in March 1939* (London, 1952), p. 206ff. Ashton-Gwatkin had been the official in the FO in 1942 responsible for recommending attachment of the FRPS to the Foreign Office. See his Report.

37. Toynbee and Ashton-Gwatkin, *Survey*, p. 236.

38. C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, *Independent East Europe* (London, 1962). See also RIIA, *The Balkans Together with Hungary* (London, 1945); A.J. and A.V. Toynbee, *The War and the Neutrals* (London, 1956); and Hugh Seton-Watson, *The "Sick Heart" of Europe: The Problem of the Danubian Lands* (Seattle, 1975).